GENIUS FORUMS

Matt Gregory wrote:What I mean is, if you got rid of all belief in altruism, purged it 100%, would that make moral indignation impossible?

I don't think so. For instance, some people get morally indignant about homosexuality. They see it as inherently wrong, as a "crime against nature". I don't think that has much to do with altruism or the lack of it.

DHodges wrote:

Matt Gregory wrote:What I mean is, if you got rid of all belief in altruism, purged it 100%, would that make moral indignation impossible?

I don't think so. For instance, some people get morally indignant about homosexuality. They see it as inherently wrong, as a "crime against nature". I don't think that has much to do with altruism or the lack of it.

Well don't they see themselves as defending humanity from the horrors of homosexuality? That "crime against nature" line sounds like empty rhetoric to me. I think they see homosexuals as liable to convert others to homosexuality, like Romeroian zombies or something.

A question, Matt. Jesus's (for want of a popular example) existence and his activities are, by definition, altruistic.

Would purging people 100% of their "belief in altruism" make it any less so?

Edit: Socrates would be another good example...

Well I thought we've established that everybody acts in their own self-interest thus rendering altruism impossible. But if you want to call sages altruistic, then I'm talking about ignorant altruism. Damn, I didn't realize this question would be so frickin' complicated!

Matt wrote:What I mean is, if you got rid of all belief in altruism, purged it 100%, would that make moral indignation impossible?

And you would do this...with the wave of a magic wand? :)

Generally (or perhaps even wishfully) speaking, when science identifies a cause of a thing it usually remedies--or at least is intended to progress toward remedying--the effect. The "cause" of diabetes, for instance, is identified with insulin resistance or a decrease in insulin production. Hence, they treat it with insulin. I think this is a fairly typical example of the identification of causes in science. But when we speak of causes in philosophy, what do mean?

Well I thought we've established that everybody acts in their own self-interest thus rendering altruism impossible.

:)

But if you want to call sages altruistic, then I'm talking about ignorant altruism. Damn, I didn't realize this question would be so frickin' complicated!

I don't think it's complicated at all!

But I do think we've established that the belief in altrusim is not the sole cause of moral indignance. I mean, "ignorant" is a pretty important qualifier, given the definition of altruism and our sages!

I don't think a sage acts out of self-interest as much as he does out of truth-interest. Unless, that is, a sage is identified as truth itself...

DH: The ego, and hence, self-interest, are both things that exist conventionally but not in any "inherent" sense. So, they are things we can talk about, terms we can use, but ultimately there is nothing to "believe" in, in either term.

I do not have, nor have I ever had, a problem with non-inherency as applied to the self. I have studied too much about feral children, too many years of personal meditation, and even more of those years in rational inquiry involving self/other dynamics not to arrive to this modifier of human existence on my own.

Yet, this is the beauty of waking to it: you are fully and entirely . . . returned to your own skin. I assume the buddha to have sat down for himself and stood up for himself in that paradoxical condition: everything has changed, and nothing has changed at all. mountain= mountain, etc.

I understand your use of the word "conventional" (self) here; in it's place I would say phenomenal (self). This very much exists. In fact, it's the only thing that exists. Two of them are speaking to each other right now.

DH: If we look closely enough, and try to define exact what is and is not contained in "self interest", the edges are fuzzy. There will always be things that one may or may not consider to be in one's own self interest, and people do things which from another person's perspective might obviously not be in their self interest (e.g., suicide bombing).

And of course, "from another person's perspective" is precisely the problem, for now what constitutes self-interest involves the self-interest of this other person's perspective and judgment of same. From the self that acts, it cannot be any other way than self-interest, for even a person on a programme of slow suicide is playing out precisely what is needed for that organism (the for-itself). We only judge it as non-self-interest if it offends our own self-interest (in this case, staying alive and comfortable at all costs).

As for suicide bombing, I cannot think of a more self-interested act, for this is done in one sense to secure a permanent place (root of delusion) for this self in glory/heaven/greeted by virgins, or what-have-you; or done to serve a value held higher than life. But said value can only be held by said self; one self at a time. That people often value things/ideas over their very lives does not mitigate self-interest at all.

DH: A self only exists in a context, in relation to other selves, concepts and things. A person might consider sacrificing themselves for their children, for instance, to be a perfectly rational thing to do, and even consider it a horrible, cowardly thing if they backed away from doing that. Is that not because, in some way, they consider their children to be part of themselves? That part of how they define themselves, at least, is as "parent"?

I'm fine with all of that - both the co-defining of self-and-other, as well as value-held that demands (apparent) sacrifice. This does not eliminate each of the phenomenal selves involved, though. And each of these phenomenal selves have the for-itself quality of all living phenomena. S'how we've been caused to be, etc.

DH: And yet there would usually not be any confusion that the child is a separate person - a separate ego, a separate point of view, and the child may not understand a parent doing something "for their own good".

Yes. ?

DH: Self-interest is a matter of perspective, of point of view. In the end, it can only be defined in terms of what you consider to be in your interest. That interest may be narrowly egotistical, or promoting a group's interest ( a family or tribe) or even an ideology might be included in it.

Yes, self-interest is a matter of . . . self-interest!

DH: When we talk about a person that is egoless (perhaps a Buddha), I take that to mean that person understands that the ego exists conventionally but not inherently - he no longer has the delusion of the ego being something transcendental. He could still say, "I went to the store and bought some eggs with my credit card," understanding that the "I" would went is something that only exists as a social convention, like the money he spent. He still acts, he just acts without the false idea of things (including himself) existing inherently.

Again, once this notion of inherency is dispatched on both sides of the equation, they cancel each other out. We still have a phenomenal buddha/mountain still being a phenomenon in the world, still acting, valuing - still a phenomenal self.

I estimate that both in the east and in the west a long time ago, distrust of the phenomenal was born, and borne out of the need to address suffering. If this is all there is, then it sucks, etc. So another world was dreamed-of: the noumenal; the metaphysical - or whatever one wants to name it, just so it is not this, and it is not apparent. Just so something does not die, change, and suffer in the process.

As a result, we inherit this ideological hangover at the cellular level, so to speak, wherein, as with Plato and the judeo-christians, all things about appearance (phenomena) are downgraded in favor of this other, more stable world, wherein things don't die and things don't change (wherein there aren't even "things" but things-in-themselves, eternally, un-phenomenally). The eastern concept of no-self - while hanging on a thread to the phenomenal truth - falls into this category as well. It is another way to address the suffering of the isolation of the for-itself being and its temporal doom, by washing, wishing, it away.

There is only the phenomena; the appearance, and hence, only this phenomenal self - with all its attendant needs/values/suffering/co-defining/for-itself qualities, etc. - as basic Nietzsche helps us to understand. That we make mistakes about it - can be 'fooled' by our own eyes/minds, is part of that, too. It is, ironically, the noumenal - the metaphysical - that is the real dream . . . .

DH: Self interest and self (ego) are an example of co-dependent origination.

Yes. They come from the same thing: the phenomenal self.

DH: Self interest can not arise without a self. When the false idea of a self (as inherently existing) arises, it gives rise to [. . . . . ] self-interest.

Shouldn't those ellipses also contain your modifier "false" - to balance what you are saying? If so, this is where it will all begin to break down . . . .

DH: Alternatively, self-interest gives rise to the ego - needs exists, such as hunger, and so the "self" arises as the object that has those needs.

The phenomenal self is the start of it all.

Truth is subjectivity, no matter where it falls in the web of cause and effect, no matter how dependent and un-inherent it is.

DHodges writes:

If I can take a crack at this....

yes, thanks, Dave.

Leyla,

I don't think it's complicated at all!

But I do think we've established that the belief in altrusim is not the sole cause of moral indignance. I mean, "ignorant" is a pretty important qualifier, given the definition of altruism and our sages!

Well I don't think we've established anything but I'll provide my own counterexample: I think the crying of an infant would count as moral indignation that's solely focused on itself without any regard for others. So I guess I'll turn my theory upside-down and say that moral indignation is always rooted in the sense of self, which can expand to include other people so that when your friend gets screwed over, you genuinely feel moral indignation as if it happened to yourself. Maybe the average person's idea of altruism happens the same way.

Matt writes:

Damn, I didn't realize this question would be so frickin' complicated!

Only in that we are forced in such a discussion to face ourselves head-on. It can make for wonderfully fruitful complications . . . .

Leyla writes:

Jesus's (for want of a popular example) existence and his activities are, by definition, altruistic.

By definition, his teachings and activities are pure self-interest. This fellow believed himself god's son-on-a-mission. There is no greater expression of self-interest as when we preface our thoughts and actions with, "but I have to! I must!"

Again, the judgment of altruism as applied to Jesus is a judgment about our own values about what people ought to be doing. Jesus saving the souls of humanity would be judged by nearly all of us as to our advantage. So, too might all that help he gave the poor and meek and such, if these were things we valued as well. We might especially value them because someone is taking the work off our backs and doing it for us!

Leyla also writes:

But when we speak of causes in philosophy, what do mean?

Us!!

Leyla:

I don't think a sage acts out of self-interest as much as he does out of truth-interest.

It's still his or her value to uphold; his or her interest.

Leyla: Unless, that is, a sage is identified as truth itself...

(I feel a big, sugary toothache coming on . . . ;)

Judeo-christian thinking (and buddhism, for that matter) has sunk the fangs of morality so deeply into the word "self"; the concept of "self"; and the promotion of the un-self, that we are unable to recognize a good thing when we see it. What an excellent condition we find ourselves in - one wherein we so often gain our greatest sense of self by coming to the aid of others . . . .

The key point is emotional attachment. An egoless Buddha doesn't make any emotional investments in his activities, owing to the fact that he no longer believes in his own existence and consequently never experiences emotions of any kind. Thus, he never gets upset if his activities fail, and never experiences any sense of reward if they succeed.

So his "self-interest" is one of working towards the spreading of a particular "self" - namely, wisdom - but without the emotions and delusions that ordinary people project into their projects.

-

Matt wrote:Well I don't think we've established anything but I'll provide my own counterexample: I think the crying of an infant would count as moral indignation that's solely focused on itself without any regard for others. So I guess I'll turn my theory upside-down and say that moral indignation is always rooted in the sense of self, which can expand to include other people so that when your friend gets screwed over, you genuinely feel moral indignation as if it happened to yourself. Maybe the average person's idea of altruism happens the same way.

When you say you don't think anything has been established, do you mean that you cannot see, or are uncertain of, the reasoning in your counterexample--the reasoning that says altruism is not the sole cause of moral indignation, but that (an "average") altruism can expand from it?

If this is so, what must happen to this sense of self in order for a non-average altruism to occur--or would that be impossible?

Pye wrote:Judeo-christian thinking (and buddhism, for that matter) has sunk the fangs of morality so deeply into the word "self"; the concept of "self"; and the promotion of the un-self, that we are unable to recognize a good thing when we see it. What an excellent condition we find ourselves in - one wherein we so often gain our greatest sense of self by coming to the aid of others . . . .

But, Pye, I'm confused! That's precisely what Christian missionaries do, isn't it?

Leyla: But, Pye, I'm confused! That's precisely what Christian missionaries do, isn't it?

*lol!*

(yes, a fine mess, a fine mess, this altruism . . . . :)

And yes, thank you David, for your exegesis. It's a cul-de-sac of argument we've traversed before - the coherence of a non-feeling yet sentient being - and so I'll beg off on additional go-rounds.