GENIUS FORUMS

Cory Duchesne wrote:What’s the difference? It’s the same thing. Defining my environment is a way of making distinctions between different appearances.

There is quite a big difference between smiply making distinctions, and taking the next step of defining them. Defining your environment requires a significant amount of consciousness. A mouse makes distinctions between different appearances, but it does not define them.

Cory Duchesne wrote:Ok, so what is the difference between a thing, and its appearance?

Nothing, except for the context in which one choooses to use them. I actually define a thing as an appearance with no inherent existence.

Cory Duchesne wrote:Furthermore I say: how the totality appears to us and how the totality really is are different to the degree that we are foolish.

Again you are implying the totality can somehow be imagined in a more accurate way. This idea is ridiculous because the totality is beyond appearances and distinctions. All one can picture in their head are things of a finite nature. If you try and picture what the totality somehow "looks like" you are wrong before you even finish your throught process.

Cory Duchesne wrote:The part of the totality that we are looking at can be dramatically different than how it appears.

What is appearing to us is exactly how that "part of the totality" is.

Cory Duchesne wrote:For instance, if a man walking in the dessert exhausted without water, sees a mirage of an oasis, then it is reasonable to say that the way it really is, and the way it appears to be to him, are different.

I understand that appearances can be decieving as far us being able to interact with them efficiently, but that is completely besides the point. Until one's consciousness of a certain appearance is altered, either through someone advising him or trial and error, then that appearances shall remain that appearance, or A=A.

Cory Duchesne wrote:We are not really creating things, we are creating definitions which are not the appearances that we are looking at, and the appearances we are looking at can be said to be a particular face of the totality, but not the actuality of the totality.

When one's mind begins to distinguish between different appearances, it neccessarily creates other appearances. Then one can begin to create definitions for these appearances as well, based on their properties.

Cory Duchesne wrote:When we distinguish an appearance, we are looking at a part of the totality. We define the appearance based on what it appears to do in relationship to other appearances. We break reality up into things for the sake of convenience

Yes.

Cory Duchesne wrote: - - but the reality of things is an illusion.

Everything, including ourselves, exist solely through infinite causes, meaning they have no inherent existence, but that doesn't mean they are not real, or an illusion. Things are in fact as real as the totality itself.

Cory Duchesne wrote:Some illusions leave an individual appearing more wise in regards to how he goes about living.

Some animals live very comfortable and easy lives, but they never appear more wise to me because of it. If anything I would just consider them empirically efficient.

Cory Duchesne wrote:Wise meaning: free from suffering, free from delusion.

Wise is a terrible choice of words in this context. Fortunate or lucky would be a far better description.

Cory Duchesne wrote:This is what is important. Definitions, or conclusions about what a thing is should follow after we have determined how the distinct appearance appears to function, act and interact with other appearances that also seem as if they are independently separate.

Yes indeed. It is also equally important, if one wishes to live a live free of delusion, to understand why things have no inherent existence, no matter if they are efficient or functional to our ability to survive.

Cory Duchesne wrote:My argument implies that there is only a relatively superior approach to dealing with the challenge of environment when one has values. All I can say is that my way appears to be superior to me. There is only faith in my reasoning. And both faith and reason prove nothing. Perhaps I will suddenly ‘see’ that which I have hithero missed – and thus submit to the way that you and Sue are articulating.

I too am fortunate enough to be able to ineteract efficiently with my surroundings without the help of medication. Although I'm not out to prove who's appearances are "more real" than someone elses. One might have a more empirically superior way of viewing the world, but one can't lay claim to a more Absolutely superior way of viewing the world, unless it is from a philosophical standpoint.

Cory Duchesne wrote:IF we establish values, then some functional relationships to reality will appear to be more superior than others. Values are established based on faith only. If I value overcoming the apparent reality of suffering, of emotions, then one can only trust, have faith in an approach to reality that appears more superior at overcoming.

For instance, let us just say that on the one hand we have reality X which involves me believing that the best way to not suffer appears to be by conforming, hanging out, gambling, having sex and drinking alcohol habitually. Is this really the best way to not suffer?

On the other hand we have reality Y which involves me having faith in the more complicated, subtle and broad appearance that these activities will very likely lead only to financial troubles, poor health, mental sloth, dullness, boredom, misery, fear and confusion.

You see what I’m getting at?

I agree with all that, but your dealing with this discussion from an emprical perspective, while I am dealing with this discussion from a philosphical perspective.

Cory Duchesne wrote:How am I? All along I’ve been saying only this: that there is only the totality and the totality is not a thing. When you observe and distinguish an appearance, that appearance is merely a part of the totality, it is a part of that which is not a thing. Inherently, there is no superior way to define the appearances comprising the total appearance of environment, but if you have values (which can only be faith based), then there is the relative appearance of superior ways of interacting with the environment. This is why Kierkegaard wasn’t concerned with primarily what to know, but rather, he was concerned with how he must live, how he must act. His concerns were utilitarian, pragmatic. Why? Because that was the way that appeared to make the most sense to him, given his brain's intelligence, health, given his values, his faith.

Alright.

Cory Duchesne wrote:I am emphasizing that no one can know the way the totality really is. We can only have faith in the appearance that the way the totality is presented to our senses IS a particular way.

It appears that the more wise you are, the more you see the totality as it really is.

Foolish people see the totality as it is not, but rather, they see what appears most comforting and simple, rather than what is most real - -- or perhaps, if they have brain damage, then what they are seeing is quite a deviation away from the actuality as well.

Philosophically yes, empirically no.

Cory Duchesne wrote:My problem is with statements such as: 'things' are as they appear.

The better way of putting it is:

Definitions are as they are defined.

Appearances are as they appear.

The totality is as it is.

The totality comes first, appearances second, and finally definitions. After that process is over, the definitions generally serve to block out further refinement of perception.

Well like I said earlier, I define a thing as a real apperance with no inherent existence.

Cory Duchesne wrote:Judging by your response, I have a hard time believing that you are aware that the man who mistook his wife for a hat was a real person, that there has been real studies done on him.

I’m not just fabricating a thought experiment up here.

Schizophrenia and the various forms of brain damage that are concomitant with apparent gross delusions cannot be cured simply by believing things have no inherent existence.

Your apparent overestimation of this ‘things have no inherent existence’ belief seems to have you flirting with naïve and silly hubris. Well, that’s the way it appears to me.

Not at all, my point is that this man is so attached apperances, as if they inherently existed, that he can't accept the fact that the apperance of the hat is actually his wife. If he weren't so attached to the appearance of the hat, he could begin to respect the hat(his wife) in the same manner he would normally respect his wife.

A more subtle example would be a man who was raised to treat black people as inferior, and one day he meets a black man who was actually far more superior than him intellectually and physically. But because he is so attached to his ignorant view of black people he can't begin to respect the black man in a proper manner.

So you see if people weren't so attached to appearances, the example you have presented me with wouldn't be nearly as much of a problem.

Cory Duchesne wrote:And so what role do you think the brain damage played then?

I think the brain damage caused him to view the world in a less effective manner than you or myself view the world.

Cory Duchesne wrote:Perhaps he might be able to adjust to his mental illness by learning that the way his environment appears to him and the way it really is are going to be occasionally quite different, but i'm not so arrogant and naive to think that it would be 'no problem' to adjust to his mental illness.

Certainly, most people can never come to terms with the fact that things have no inherent existence. It took me a while to fully understand it as well.

Cory Duchesne wrote:The man who mistook his wife for a hat and reached for her as if she were a hat - - his perception had deviated quite drastically away from how the totality really was. And the way the totality really is, we can never know absolutely, but the congruity, power, security and smooth-runningness of our life appears to be an indicator that our appearances and definitions are relatively close to how the totality really is. Some appear to be more lucky than others.

Again you are using philosphical terms in an empirical context. Giving an empirical example of how a man sees his wife as a hat isn't the proper way to justify the philosophical statement, "how the totality really is".

Cory Duchesne wrote:Being schitzophrenic is losing control of your mind. In some cases, without medical treatment, it doesn’t matter whether you know things do not inherently exist, or A=A - - -the fact is that your brain is not producing images that correspond to the way the totality actually is.

Becoming schizophrenic may in part be caused by being attached to certain appearances - - but would one allow themselves to be attached to certain appearances if ones perception of the totality was very close to how the totality really is? The closer ones perception is to the way the totality actually is, the more wise one is. So it appears.

See responce above.

Nick wrote:

As I was implying earlier, the term "unconscious mind" is an oxymoron, since anything that qualifies as a mind neccessarily requires some amount of consciousness no matter how great or small.

I know what you are doing, Nick, and I think you are wrong since you have provided no reasoning. This is beyond grammar.

Your proposition, as it stands, translates as follows:

3. That which is unconscious (contains no consciousness--not being mind) cannot sufficiently discriminate between things ("things no longer exist") yet remains (unconsciously) subject to them (“all that remains is the infinite”).

That which is unconscious (contains no consciousness--not being mind) cannot sufficiently [snip]

That which contains no consciousness cannot discriminate at all, let alone sufficiently. My distinction is specifically a distinction between unconscious and conscious minds, or human and animal minds. What distinctions does your proposition make?

Hence, as your recommendation to change "unconscious mind" to "that which is unconscious" stands, again I ask beyond petty rules of grammar, why is it more accurate?

[Edit: added quote due to intervening posts]

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Cory wrote:

I think the genius sees almost all men as cows (womanly) too.

Yes, but he doesn't eat them for egoistic pleasure.

More later. Since I am more genius than psychopath, I will hand over the PC to my son rather than eat him. He does have some potential.

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Leyla Shen wrote:I know what you are doing, Nick, and I think you are wrong since you have provided no reasoning. This is beyond grammar.

Your proposition, as it stands, translates as follows:

3. That which is unconscious (contains no consciousness--not being mind) cannot sufficiently discriminate between things ("things no longer exist") yet remains (unconsciously) subject to them (“all that remains is the infinite”).

That which is unconscious (contains no consciousness--not being mind) cannot sufficiently [snip]

That which contains no consciousness cannot discriminate at all, let alone sufficiently. My distinction is specifically a distinction between unconscious and conscious minds, or human and animal minds. What distinctions does your proposition make?

Hence, as your recommendation to change "unconscious mind" to "that which is unconscious" stands, again I ask beyond petty rules of grammar, why is it more accurate?

.

Because the concept of an "unconscious mind" is like the concept of a "married bacherlor". It is completely illogical. The two words contradict eachother when combined in such a manner.

Nick wrote:

Because the concept of an "unconscious mind" is like the concept of a "married bacherlor". It is completely illogical. The two words contradict eachother when combined in such a manner.

Rubbish. It's not at all like that.

My dog has a mind. When I make a certain sounds and gestures, he consistently responds in certain ways. That means he makes connections between outside and inside. He distinguishes between his home and not his home. His master and not his master. That is the basic function of mind.

Whereas a rock would simply fall at the complete mercy of gravity, when I take a sharp left my dog has learned to what degree he must lean right. Yet he is not a physicist; or a wise man.

My dog has a mind, yet he cannot be a batchelor.

A rock does none of these things, empirically or logically.

A rock does not, logically or empircally, have a mind.

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You are completely missing the point. In order for something to be defined as a mind, it must require some degree of consciousness. Therefore, the idea of an UNCONSCIOUS mind is illogical.

Just lilke In order for someone to be defined as a bachelor, they can't be married. Therefore the idea of a married bachelor is completely illogical.

Nick wrote:

You are completely missing the point. In order for something to be defined as a mind, it must require some degree of consciousness. Therefore, the idea of an UNCONSCIOUS mind is illogical.

Just lilke In order for someone to be defined as a bachelor, they can't be married. Therefore the idea of a married bachelor is completely illogical.

No, Nick, you are completely missing the point.

L: 3. The unconscious mind cannot sufficiently discriminate between things ("things no longer exist") yet remains (unconsciously) subject to them (“all that remains is the infinite”).

N: I'm not sure what you mean by "unconscious mind", being that anything defined to be a mind neccessarily contains some amount of consciousness. It would be more accurate to substitute "unconscious mind", with "that which is unconscious".

L: You think that is more accurate? Why?

I have made the substitute recommended and will ask you yet again to explain why you think "that which is unconscious cannot sufficiently discriminate between things" is logically possible but "the unconscious mind, etc..." is not.

That is, what is logically consistent in using the term "that which"? What is this "that which," exactly, that we suppose discriminates insufficiently? Does a mouse (for example) not have a mind?

.

Leyla,

Leyla: Hence, as your recommendation to change "unconscious mind" to "that which is unconscious" stands, again I ask beyond petty rules of grammar, why is it more accurate? .

Nick: Because the concept of an "unconscious mind" is like the concept of a "married bacherlor". It is completely illogical. The two words contradict eachother when combined in such a manner.

Leyla: Rubbish. It's not at all like that.

My dog has a mind. When I make a certain sounds and gestures, he consistently responds in certain ways. That means he makes connections between outside and inside. He distinguishes between his home and not his home. His master and not his master. That is the basic function of mind.

My dog has a mind, yet he cannot be a batchelor.

I think Nick’s point is that Dogs are relatively conscious. I too believe that a dog is ‘relatively conscious’. The dog is also unconscious of a great deal too of course.

Definitions can actually impede the mind too you know.

As Kevin Solway wrote: Animals have a clarity and an immediacy, but they have a clarity and immediacy of unconsciousness. When we start making definitions - the beginning of consciousness - we lose our clarity. But when we become enlightened we gain it again, but this time in consciousness.

Your definition of a dog perhaps says both: a) Dogs have minds b) dogs are unconscious.

Your definition is perhaps preventing you from seeing that dogs are relatively conscious - - - yet in contrast to a sage, a dog is unconscious.

Leyla wrote: Does a mouse (for example) not have a mind?

The mouse has a relatively conscious mind.

And of course the mouse's mind is relatively unconscious compared to a humans.

This is the difficulty. When someone like Quinn or Solway say that women’s minds are unconscious - - I’m guessing they mean ‘relatively unconscious’ in contrast to what they idealize as 'ideally' conscious.

Cory, you will note my discussion with Nick started here:

L: 3. The unconscious mind cannot sufficiently discriminate between things ("things no longer exist") yet remains (unconsciously) subject to them (“all that remains is the infinite”).

N: I'm not sure what you mean by "unconscious mind", being that anything defined to be a mind neccessarily contains some amount of consciousness. It would be more accurate to substitute "unconscious mind", with "that which is unconscious".

L: You think that is more accurate? Why?

Ironically, he has not directly or sufficiently addressed this question but continues to turn down a no-through-road with it instead. To him I say, repent!

His ego is engaged at present.

Again, my question boils down to this:

That is, what is logically consistent in using the term "that which"? What is this "that which," exactly, that we suppose discriminates insufficiently?

~

You wrote:

Your definition is perhaps preventing you from seeing that dogs are relatively conscious [snip]

Were I so prevented from recognising relative consciousness by my definition, would I be able to make and restate here the following:

My dog has a mind. When I make a certain sounds and gestures, he consistently responds in certain ways. That means he makes connections between outside and inside. He distinguishes between his home and not his home. His master and not his master. That is the basic function of mind.

Whereas a rock would simply fall at the complete mercy of gravity, when I take a sharp left my dog has learned to what degree he must lean right. Yet he is not a physicist; or a wise man.

My dog has a mind, yet he cannot be a batchelor.

A rock does none of these things, empirically or logically.

A rock does not, logically or empircally, have a mind.

C: This is the difficulty. When someone like Quinn or Solway say that women’s minds are unconscious - - I’m guessing they mean ‘relatively unconscious’ in contrast to what they idealize as 'ideally' conscious.

Interestingly, one of my primary reasons for challenging Nick on this is the fact that he has not demonstrated any objection to the notion “feminine mind”, quite the opposite in fact, yet here he is claiming that an “unconscious mind” is illogical.

Still, I await enlightenment from his wisdom...

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Leyla Shen wrote:I have made the substitute recommended and will ask you yet again to explain why you think "that which is unconscious cannot sufficiently discriminate between things" is logically possible but "the unconscious mind, etc..." is not.

Because it is logical to say that which is unconscious, for instance a rock, can't sufficiently discriminate between things. Where as an "unconscious mind" is a logical impossibility because in order for something to constitute itself as a mind it must contain some degree of consciousness no matter how small that degree is.

Leyla Shen wrote:That is, what is logically consistent in using the term "that which"? What is this "that which," exactly, that we suppose discriminates insufficiently? Does a mouse (for example) not have a mind?

That which, meaning anything that doesn't posess consciousness. Obviously, yes a mouse does have a mind, and therefore it does posess consciousness to some extent. Mice are able to discriminate between different things so it is reasonable to assume this. Not to mention if you cut one open you will find a brain, the platform of the mind if you will.

NOTE: I am not discussing feminine/masculine consciousness. I am speaking soleley about consciousness in its base form. Also I am not arguing whether or not an "unconscious mind" can process information logically or not, I am saying the terminology is illogical. If you meant feminine mind by unconscious mind, it's still a pretty bad example because like I said earlier, mice, women, children and every other animal is conscious, as opposed to unconscious, albeit to a very small degree.

Of course if you were meaning "unconscious mind" as in a mind that is not aware of the true nature of reality, then your terminology would actually work quite well. Although I don't think this is the case because you followed up the term "unconscious mind" with the empirical example of something being able to simply discriminating between things.

Ok Leyla,

Let me try to tackle the original statement you made that Nick had a problem with.

Leyla wrote:

The unconscious mind cannot sufficiently discriminate between things ("things no longer exist") yet remains (unconsciously) subject to them (“all that remains is the infinite”).

So when you wrote: 'the unconscious mind', I'm guessing you meant; the relatively (unsatisfactorily) conscious, but mostly unconscious mind?

What confuses me is when you say: “the unconscious mind cannot sufficiently discriminate between things (things no longer exist)” .

What do you mean by ‘no longer’ exist? At what point did they exist? The wording seems to imply that I moved from a state where things existed to a state where they longer existed. Have I improved or become stupider? According to my understanding, this (assuming things exist, and then realizing they don't) would be an improvement.

Let’s say your quoted sentence above is referring to me. Lets just pretend that I’m not enlightened and wise and that I am for the most part feminine and unconscious ;)

It seems like you are saying that I, because I’m not sufficiently conscious, cannot sufficiently discriminate between things.

But how does it follow that ‘things no longer exist’ for me? I would think the most unconscious of humans make distinctions, to have a sense for there being things and furthermore, they have a very difficult time understanding how things do not exist.

You go further by saying (in different words) how your average feminine Joe remains unconscious of how he is subject to things, and that in his stupidity (all that remains is the infinite)

Does he have a concept of the infinite?

I'll admit, I'm really unsure about where you are coming from.

Nick, I want to take some steps backward and re-examine.

Nick: Things do indeed exist (although not inherently) because we identify and define them via consciousness.

Cory: Just because I have definitions for organizing how reality appears to me, doesn’t mean that things exist.

Nick: Whether you define your environment or not is irrelevant, all that matters is that you are making distinctions between different objects.

Cory: What’s the difference? It’s the same thing. Defining my environment is a way of making distinctions between different appearances.

Nick: There is quite a big difference between simply making distinctions, and taking the next step of defining them.

Yes – that is a good point, and I realize that. What I was trying to get at might have come out better if I said: defining appearances is a way of making the initial distinctions in appearance more distinct, more clear and communicable to others. Often people fail to notice subtlety and further distinction unless they read detailed descriptions and/or definitions which help point the way toward a reality of more subtlety/distinction.

Nick wrote: Defining your environment requires a significant amount of consciousness. A mouse makes distinctions between different appearances, but it does not define them.

Defining reality seems to be an empirical act to me. Isn’t it?

nick wrote: Cory: Furthermore I say: how the totality appears to us and how the totality really is are different to the degree that we are foolish.

nick: Again you are implying the totality can somehow be imagined in a more accurate way. This idea is ridiculous because the totality is beyond appearances and distinctions

What I meant was, when we perceive an appearance, we are perceiving a face, an aspect, a part of the totality.

Nick wrote: All one can picture in ones head are things of a finite nature.

I’m not talking about what we imagine in our heads. I am talking about the finite that we perceive outside of our heads. The finite we observe is a part of the infinite.

nick wrote: If you try and picture what the totality somehow "looks like" you are wrong before you even finish your thought process.

I agree, and that was not what I was trying to do.

Cory: The part of the totality that we are looking at can be dramatically different than how it appears.

Nick: What is appearing to us is exactly how that "part of the totality" is.

Ok, I agree when you put it in that context. But if I see a mirage in the desert, then how things appear to me are not exactly as they are.

Cory: For instance, if a man walking in the dessert exhausted without water, sees a mirage of an oasis, then it is reasonable to say that the way it really is, and the way it appears to be to him, are different.

Nick: I understand that appearances can be deceiving as far us being able to interact with them efficiently, but that is completely besides the point.

No – that is THE point! How we interact with environment is what matters. Philosophy should help us function better, it should help us live, and living involves interaction, function - - it involves empiricism.

Cory: We are not really creating things, we are creating definitions which are not the appearances that we are looking at, and the appearances we are looking at can be said to be a particular face of the totality, but not the actuality of the totality.

nick: When one's mind begins to distinguish between different appearances, it necessarily creates other appearances.

It’s a two way street. The appearances create the mind just as much as the mind creates the appearances.

For example: they did an experiment where they raised kittens who were subject to a pitch dark environment where only vertical strips of white light were allowed to enter the kittens eye. When the kitten was full grown, it could only detect vertical motion and failed to acknowledge horizontal motion. So appearances that enter the eyes seem to ‘create the mind’ to at least an equally significant extent in contrast to the way the mind creates the appearances (I agree that the mind does creates appearances to an extent, for different species perceive life in very different ways).

Cory: When we distinguish an appearance, we are looking at a part of the totality. We define the appearance based on what it appears to do in relationship to other appearances. We break reality up into things for the sake of convenience

Nick: Yes.

Cory: but the reality of things is an illusion.

Nick: Everything, including ourselves, exist solely through infinite causes meaning they have no inherent existence, but that doesn't mean they are not real, or an illusion. Things are in fact as real as the totality itself.

But things (the parts of the totality we are observing) are different than our definitions of them - they are different than how they appear to us. And if you can’t imagine the totality, if you can’t know the totality, then it follows that you can’t know the so called things. They are unknowable. All you can know is your definitions, along with how it(the part of the totality) appears. And this serves ONLY empirical matters. Philosophy exists to serve the empirical.

Cory: Some illusions leave an individual appearing more wise in regards to how he goes about living.

Nick: Some animals live very comfortable and easy lives, but they never appear more wise to me because of it. If anything I would just consider them empirically efficient.

When is empirically unefficient behavior, wise behavior? I can’t see how it ever is.

Cory: Wise meaning: free from suffering, free from delusion.

Nick: Wise is a terrible choice of words in this context. Fortunate or lucky would be a far better description.

So you attribute wisdom to something other than luck? Isn’t being wise, being lucky?

Cory: Definitions, or conclusions about what a thing is should follow after we have determined how the distinct appearance appears to function, act and interact with other appearances that also seem as if they are independently separate.

Nick: Yes indeed. It is also equally important, if one wishes to live a live free of delusion, to understand why things have no inherent existence, no matter if they are efficient or functional to our ability to survive.

Yes, I agree - - but I also say that we establish a more efficient and functional relationship to the totality when we see the all things as inherently non-existing and undivided from the all. Our relationship to reality is generally dysfunctional to the degree that we don't understand the inherent non-existence of all appearances. To understand such a thing seems to require an empirical mind. You mind say - 'no!' it requires a philosphical mind - -but I think a philosophical mind is a scientific mind. Scientists I think can plainly see the inherent non-existence of whatever it is they study, but I think the problem lies in their unwillingness to make sacrifices. It's a problem of character.

Nick wrote: A more subtle example would be a man who was raised to treat black people as inferior, and one day he meets a black man who was actually far more superior than him intellectually and physically. But because he is so attached to his ignorant view of black people he can't begin to respect the black man in a proper manner.

That was a good example.

Nick, by sticking it out with me in this debate, you have helped me become conscious of somethings that I'll admit I was in the dark about.

I never really seen the big deal about A=A before. But I see now why you guys think it so important.

For instance, what I am about to express, as simple as it is, is something that I dont think ever really occured to me with the clarity that I see it now:

People live dysfunctional, stupid lives because they don’t sufficiently look and give respect to how things actually appear and instead assent to beliefs that do not reflect appearances, but instead reflect the imagined hopeful fancies that are imposed upon appearances.

Belief in God, cosmic consciousness, Santa, belief in superstitions, belief that serial killers have a superhuman ability to live in alienation and isolation, belief that enviornment in childhood does not significantly determine how our minds will function in childhood, etc. those of course are all examples of how people believe in spite of appearances, not because of them.

And perhaps we do this in order to make things more simple, to make it feel like we have greater control, to justify our desire to not change and remain comfortable. We are stupid in order to appease anxiety and fear - to ward of the suffering that comes with realizing how complicated and unfair the situation is.

So you see if people weren't so attached to appearances, the example you have presented me with wouldn't be nearly as much of a problem.

Yes, the problem is that people’s emotions and fears, which create the desire for oversimplifications, and the desire for oversimplifications leads to believing in things that one has never seen. This of course leads to violations of A=A.

Cory: The man who mistook his wife for a hat and reached for her as if she were a hat - - his perception had deviated quite drastically away from how the totality really was. And the way the totality really is, we can never know absolutely, but the congruity, power, security and smooth-runningness of our life appears to be an indicator that our appearances and definitions are relatively close to how the totality really is. Some appear to be more lucky than others.


Nick: Again you are using philosphical terms in an empirical context. Giving an empirical example of how a man sees his wife as a hat isn't the proper way to justify the philosophical statement, "how the totality really is".

I am saying that dysfunctional and confused interaction is an indicator that ones notions are a considerable deviation from the way it really is.

Leyla Shen wrote:Cory wrote:

I think the genius sees almost all men as cows (womanly) too.

Yes, but he doesn't eat them for egoistic pleasure.

More later. Since I am more genius than psychopath, I will hand over the PC to my son rather than eat him. He does have some potential.

lol

ok - listen

not only is being calm and collected a sign of wisdom - - but prioritizing ones-life around non-emotional, sensual concerns is also a mark of wisdom.

The psychopath, although he can also be calm and collected, plans his whole life around his uncontrollable appetite for abnormal sensations/pleasures.

So the two are opposites, with some supeficial similarities.

This whole psychopath/genius comparision stems back to when I first came on this board.

It seemed to me that the QRS philosophy and Otto Winneger's philosophy in particular seemed, although highly intelligent, very ruthless, unsympathetic, destructive and alien.

And so I started playing with the comparision, and on various threads I would in ways suggest that the genius was a psychopath.

Perhaps I did this because I secretly wanted to make Quinn and others feel guilty and disturbed with themselves.

Why did I want them to be disturbed? Because what I was reading from them was making me disturbed.

Anyway, I'll drop it. I agree it's not that useful.

:)

Nick wrote:

Because it is logical to say that which is unconscious, for instance a rock, can't sufficiently discriminate between things.

Not according to my reasoning, or any reasoning you have demonstrated in this discussion regarding a rock's abilitiy to discriminate at all. According to my reasoning, it is logical to say that a rock can’t discriminate, period. When, and by what definition, have you seen a rock discriminate at all?

Where as an "unconscious mind" is a logical impossibility because in order for something to constitute itself as a mind it must contain some degree of consciousness no matter how small that degree is.

Rather, it’s a logical impossibility, by my definition, for a rock to be unconscious since it must contain a potential for consciousness to be so--as in a person (or mouse) knocked unconscious but still alive in an accident--and a rock contains not even a small degree of consciousness. A rock has the same amount of consciousness sitting still on a ledge as it would after having fallen of a cliff--that is, none.

I am speaking soleley about consciousness in its base form.

Really? And how do you define this? What is consciousness in its base form?

L: That is, what is logically consistent in using the term "that which"? What is this "that which," exactly, that we suppose discriminates insufficiently?

N: That which, meaning anything that doesn't posess consciousness.

So now we get into the situation where, by your logic and reasoning, a mouse does possess (a small degree of) consciousness and must therefore be excluded from this statement:

3. That which is unconscious cannot sufficiently discriminate between things ("things no longer exist") yet remains (unconsciously) subject to them (“all that remains is the infinite”).

Bearing your below comment in mind, is that right?

N: I am saying the terminology is illogical. If you meant feminine mind by unconscious mind, it's still a pretty bad example because like I said earlier, mice, women, children and every other animal is conscious, as opposed to unconscious, albeit to a very small degree.

By your own logic, you must abandon the above qualifier (bolded) since anything with a mind is conscious, by definition, period. There can be no qualifiers. Your definition and reasoning state that a mind is conscious by definition and, therefore, cannot be unconscious (only things like rocks can be unconscious). Yet here you think it’s perfectly logical to imply degrees of unconsciousness. What is a mind that is conscious to a very small degree if not unconscious to a greater degree?

A mind which is conscious to a very small degree is necessarily unconscious by contrast to a higher degree of consciousness. How on earth do you manage to make the distinction otherwise?

In other words, by your reasoning, your mice, women, children and every other animal is sufficiently discriminating between things and therefore consciously subject to them. This, of course, is a valid argument, but one which imparts no wisdom--no depth of understanding--whatsoever.

Of course if you were meaning "unconscious mind" as in a mind that is not aware of the true nature of reality, then your terminology would actually work quite well. Although I don't think this is the case because you followed up the term "unconscious mind" with the empirical example of something being able to simply discriminating between things.

What I said was:

1. The unconscious mind cannot sufficiently discriminate between things ("things no longer exist") yet remains (unconsciously) subject to them (“all that remains is the infinite”).

Note that my qualifier was “sufficiently” and not “simply.” The argument for consciousness as "simply" discriminating is actually yours.

This was part of a response I wrote to the following comment made by you:

2. There is nothing outside of the mind/consciousness or whatever else you choose to call it. Things gain their identity from consciousness, without consciousness all that remains is the infinite in which things no longer exist.

By what magical stroke of the imagination do you postulate an understanding of the infinite without an understanding of finite things (causality/finitude)?

If the reference to things in 1. above renders the meaning of unconscious mind null and void in terms of the true nature of reality (all things lack inherent existence) because it is an empirical example, in what sense is the reference to things in statement 2. not an empirical example?

.

Cory wrote:

Anyway, I'll drop it. I agree it's not that useful.

Of course, I reserve the right to exhume the subject at will since, occasionally, when I am dressing a chicken or a leg of lamb, there are definitely parallels to human bodies that cross my mind...

:)

Cory Duchesne wrote:

Nick wrote: Defining your environment requires a significant amount of consciousness. A mouse makes distinctions between different appearances, but it does not define them.

Defining reality seems to be an empirical act to me. Isn’t it?

Depends which context your using it in. In my statement above I was speaking empirically, of course.

Cory Duchesne wrote:I’m not talking about what we imagine in our heads. I am talking about the finite that we perceive outside of our heads.

I'm not sure what you mean by "the finite that we perceive outside of our heads". In all actuality the only thing we ever truly perceive/experience is our brain.

Cory Duchesne wrote:Ok, I agree when you put it in that context. But if I see a mirage in the desert, then how things appear to me are not exactly as they are.

If what you mean is the things you see have no inherent existence then yes. Although appearances are real and that apperance is exactly what it is, apperance=appearance, A=A.

Cory Duchesne wrote:[Cory: For instance, if a man walking in the dessert exhausted without water, sees a mirage of an oasis, then it is reasonable to say that the way it really is, and the way it appears to be to him, are different.

Instead of saying "the way it really is", it would be more accurate to say "the way that is more functional".

Cory Duchesne wrote:[No – that is THE point! How we interact with environment is what matters. Philosophy should help us function better, it should help us live, and living involves interaction, function - - it involves empiricism.

Well there is many different ways in which one can apply philosophy. Like business philosophy, or realationship philosophy, but I am primarily concerned with True philosophy. Meaning philosophy that concerns itself with the pupose of this forum. Mainly learning how to live free from attachment/delusion and perfecting our ability to rise above the animal realms.

Cory Duchesne wrote:It’s a two way street. The appearances create the mind just as much as the mind creates the appearances.

Ultimately even the mind is an apperance, which is created by the Totality, the creator of all apperances.

Cory Duchesne wrote:But things (the parts of the totality we are observing) are different than our definitions of them - they are different than how they appear to us. And if you can’t imagine the totality, if you can’t know the totality, then it follows that you can’t know the so called things. They are unknowable. All you can know is your definitions, along with how it(the part of the totality) appears. And this serves ONLY empirical matters. Philosophy exists to serve the empirical.

Where ever did you get the idea that the totality is unknowable? From an empirical context yes it is, but there are in fact things which we can know about the totality through philosophy. Such as no thing inherently exists, everything has infinite causes, and A=A.

Cory Duchesne wrote:When is empirically unefficient behavior, wise behavior? I can’t see how it ever is.

When it enhances the chances of more wise behavior. For instance I see human beings as having the most potential for wisdom and ability to understand Ultimate Reality. So for the time being I think we ought to be as empirically efficient as possible to ensure the survivability of our species.

Cory Duchesne wrote:So you attribute wisdom to something other than luck? Isn’t being wise, being lucky?

In an absolute sense every quality we have is a result of luck or fortune.

Cory Duchesne wrote:Yes, I agree - - but I also say that we establish a more efficient and functional relationship to the totality when we see the all things as inherently non-existing and undivided from the all. Our relationship to reality is generally dysfunctional to the degree that we don't understand the inherent non-existence of all appearances. To understand such a thing seems to require an empirical mind. You mind say - 'no!' it requires a philosphical mind - -but I think a philosophical mind is a scientific mind. Scientists I think can plainly see the inherent non-existence of whatever it is they study, but I think the problem lies in their unwillingness to make sacrifices. It's a problem of character.

I agree for the most part, but I don’t think scientists do see the fact that things have no inherent existence, nor do they want it. For if they did their ego’s would not be satisfied enough by their work. It is most definitely a problem of character.

Cory Duchesne wrote:That was a good example.

Nick, by sticking it out with me in this debate, you have helped me become conscious of somethings that I'll admit I was in the dark about.

I never really seen the big deal about A=A before. But I see now why you guys think it so important.

For instance, what I am about to express, as simple as it is, is something that I dont think ever really occured to me with the clarity that I see it now:

People live dysfunctional, stupid lives because they don’t sufficiently look and give respect to how things actually appear and instead assent to beliefs that do not reflect appearances, but instead reflect the imagined hopeful fancies that are imposed upon appearances.

Belief in God, cosmic consciousness, Santa, belief in superstitions, belief that serial killers have a superhuman ability to live in alienation and isolation, belief that enviornment in childhood does not significantly determine how our minds will function in childhood, etc. those of course are all examples of how people believe in spite of appearances, not because of them.

And perhaps we do this in order to make things more simple, to make it feel like we have greater control, to justify our desire to not change and remain comfortable. We are stupid in order to appease anxiety and fear - to ward of the suffering that comes with realizing how complicated and unfair the situation is.

Exactly! I’m happy to see our discussion is bearing good fruit.

Cory Duchesne wrote:Yes, the problem is that people’s emotions and fears, which create the desire for oversimplifications, and the desire for oversimplifications leads to believing in things that one has never seen. This of course leads to violations of A=A.

Sounds like you are on the right track.

Cory Duchesne wrote:I am saying that dysfunctional and confused interaction is an indicator that ones notions are a considerable deviation from the way it really is.

Philosophically yes, although from an empirical standpoint they might just not be fortunate enough to have the ability to function as efficiently as others.

Cory,

So when you wrote: 'the unconscious mind', I'm guessing you meant; the relatively (unsatisfactorily) conscious, but mostly unconscious mind?

What confuses me is when you say: “the unconscious mind cannot sufficiently discriminate between things (things no longer exist)” .

Hopefully, my last post to Nick provided further clarification in this regard.

What do you mean by ‘no longer’ exist? At what point did they exist? The wording seems to imply that I moved from a state where things existed to a state where they longer existed. Have I improved or become stupider? According to my understanding, this (assuming things exist, and then realizing they don't) would be an improvement.

May I ask you here, Cory, what you think Nick meant by this, specifically the last sentence:

There is nothing outside of the mind/consciousness or whatever else you choose to call it. Things gain their identity from consciousness, without consciousness all that remains is the infinite in which things no longer exist.

But how does it follow that ‘things no longer exist’ for me?

I dunno. My other primary reason for challenging Nick is along these lines.

I would think the most unconscious of humans make distinctions, to have a sense for there being things and furthermore, they have a very difficult time understanding how things do not exist.

The idea that things lack inherent existence (all things are caused/come into existence through causes) is not the same as things do not exist. If it were, it would simply be “things do not exist.” What could possibly be the problem expressing it that way?

The view that things do not exist is just as deluded as the view that things inherently exist. With the former one is denying all appearances and things (and going quietly insane) and with the latter one is unaware of the impermanence and interdependence of all things (and, usually, going rather loudly insane).

You go further by saying (in different words) how your average feminine Joe remains unconscious of how he is subject to things, and that in his stupidity (all that remains is the infinite)

Does he have a concept of the infinite?

No, he does not. Yet he will always be subject to it, even unto the very day he dies or is cloned, genetically re-engineered, or whatever.

.

Cory: What do you mean by ‘no longer’ exist? At what point did they exist? The wording seems to imply that I moved from a state where things existed to a state where they longer existed. Have I improved or become stupider? According to my understanding, this (assuming things exist, and then realizing they don't) would be an improvement.

Leyla: May I ask you here, Cory, what you think Nick meant by this, specifically the last sentence:

Nick: There is nothing outside of the mind/consciousness or whatever else you choose to call it. Things gain their identity from consciousness, without consciousness all that remains is the infinite in which things no longer exist.

I can’t know for sure what he meant. My response to that comment of Nick’s near the beginning of the thread is an indicator of what I thought.

Here it is again:

Nick: There is nothing outside of the mind/consciousness or whatever else you choose to call it.

Cory: Yes, there is - there is the totality. But I don't believe that the totality is a thing. (you probably were trying to say this, but due to the limitations of words....)

When the mind is gone, there is no-thing, but there isnt 'nothing'.

There is an infinitely varied field of energy - - when a mind emerges in this infinite field, it perceives distinctions and differences which exist (how exactly we cannot say) apart from the mind. The mind becomes deluded into believing that things are real.

Ok, so I bolded the tail end there because I guessed it would be the object of scrutiny and disdain.

What I should have said was: “the mind becomes deluded into believing it knows what things are”.

I maintain that things cannot be known.

I would think the most unconscious of humans make distinctions, to have a sense for there being things and furthermore, they have a very difficult time understanding how things do not exist.

The idea that things lack inherent existence (all things are caused/come into existence through causes) is not the same as things do not exist. If it were, it would simply be “things do not exist.” What could possibly be the problem expressing it that way?

The view that things do not exist is just as deluded as the view that things inherently exist.

Well, what do you suppose causes people to think that things do not exist? Usually it’s an indicator that someone has been thinking unusually deeply (but not deep enough)

I said that it was an improvement when a mind moves from thinking things inherently exist, to seeing things as non-existent in the sense of the zen saying:

1) First there is a mountain.(the thing exists) 2) Then there is no mountain. (the thing does not really exist) 3) Then there is a mountain again (the thing does not exist inherently)

Leyla wrote: With the former one is denying all appearances and things (and going quietly insane) and with the latter one is unaware of the impermanence and interdependence of all things (and, usually, going rather loudly insane).

Ok, first off, is there any significant difference between an appearance and a thing?

My contention is: just because you have a definition for the appearance, doesn’t mean the definition becomes anything more than a definition. Generally, people who deny the existence of things I don’t think are denying that there are appearances. What I think they are denying is the validity of the line we draw separating one appearance from another. Although it appears logical to draw the lines where we draw them, it may be arbitrary and history has repeatedly revealed the definitions of past humans do not match up to the latest, more refined empirical observation.

However, since science does such a good job in regards to technology, telescopes, predictions, then we can concede that it is apparently very useful and worthwhile to make definitions to define things.

Having definitions for things, aids us in survival, but it doesn’t grant us knowledge about what a thing is.

To know the thing is to know its roots.

The thing thus can’t be known.

Our definition of the thing is not the thing, and the appearance of the thing is not the thing. There is no-thing there. Drawing boundaries with words creates the thing, but the thing as it is defined is an illusion wielded to survive, more or less effectively depending on the sophistication of both the definition and the perception of the human who wields the definition.

We can know that an appearance is inherently non-existent, but that doesn’t mean that we can totally know and fathom what it is we are looking at.

Personally, since I see the activity of defining appearances as an empirical activity, rather than a philosophical one, I cooperate with what works because I value survival. And I value survival because I value something greater than survival.

The geocentric definition of the earth as being a body at the center of the universe that is circled by the sun is a definition that doesn’t work very well in contrast to what modern empirical observation tells us. In fact, the latest empirical observations indicate any defininitions of the earth are inherently untrue, but they are useful in a pragmatic, utilitarian sense.

Leyla wrote: You go further by saying (in different words) how your average feminine Joe remains unconscious of how he is subject to things, and that in his stupidity (all that remains is the infinite) Does he have a concept of the infinite?

No, he does not. Yet he will always be subject to it, even unto the very day he dies or is cloned, genetically re-engineered, or whatever.

Agreed.

Cory,

NOUMENA AND PHENOMENA

If there are things separate to self that can be experienced, measured, quantified, then--logically and empirically--appearances are an interpretation of such separate entities by an observer. Having postulated one separate observer, one can then postulate many separate observers and we then have the potential for an odd observer here and there to see a stick as a snake and one or more observers who see the stick as a stick.

EMPTINESS

If, on the other hand, there is connectedness, then there really is no separation between thing and appearance; one is necessarily and immutably dependent upon the other: the thing is the appearance and the appearance the thing. That is, things and appearances arise together and cannot possibly do otherwise.

So, does an understanding of the nature of reality come in numbers and the recognition of characteristics or with a recognition of causes?

Is a stick a stick and not a snake because 9 out of 10 people (who define stick in exactly the same way, by its characteristics) see its stickness, or is a stick a stick because of its causes?

Is a mirage any less real because others don’t see it? After all, even if the person seeing the mirage were to think he had satiated his thirst shortly before dying from it, is life anything less than a mirage to the one left behind who couldn’t see it?

You wrote:

I maintain that things cannot be known.

To know the thing is to know its roots.

The thing thus can’t be known.

The roots of all things are in the infinite. Thus, all things can be known.

.

Leyla wrote:The roots of all things are in the infinite. Thus, all things can be known.

So what do you think Socrates meant when he said he knew nothing at all?

Cory,

Your question is duly noted. First, however, I think it wise to explore what your understanding of Socrates’ statement “only God is wise” is. For in The Apology, Socrates--and all other men--are found wanting in such wisdom but Socrates, in questioning “the wisdom of men” was accused of claiming to own it by virtue of his questioning alone.

.

Leyla Shen wrote:Cory,

Your question is duly noted. First, however, I think it wise to explore what your understanding of Socrates’ statement “only God is wise” is.

What he means, IMO, is that, well first, 'God' is the totality and being the totality it is beyond good and evil. The reason God (the totality) is beyond good and evil is because good and evil are 'things' and the totality is not a thing. The totality is wise because it doesnt know things, because it has no counterparts to contrast itself with, or anything with. God, not being subject to things, cannot by virtue have any knowledge.

God, the totality, wisdom, is unknowing.

A human being can know this, and by knowing this he knows nothing.

For in The Apology, Socrates--and all other men--are found wanting in such wisdom but Socrates, in questioning “the wisdom of men” was accused of claiming to own it by virtue of his questioning alone.

Socrates was destructive to the notions people had of 'things'.

If God is not a thing and therefore cannot be either good or evil, that it cannot be wise. Likewise, it cannot be knowing or unknowing. To know that the Totality is not a thing, one must know what a thing is. So, one makes such a distinction only to abandon half of it in the name of wisdom?

If God is not subject to things, then he cannot speak for he cannot be asked a question. Who was it, then, that said there was no other wiser than Socrates?

A human being can know this, and by knowing this he knows nothing.

It would be correct to say, “a human being can know this, and by knowing this he denies knowledge of most things” since he obviously acknowledges knowing some thing. Does he acknowledge knowing any other things? We shall see...

Socrates was destructive to the notions people had of 'things'.

Yes, he was destructive toward delusion--but apparently not to the deluson contained in his own relationship to God.

The God to which he refers is the absolute, but…

I will refer you to a witness who is worthy of credit, and will tell you about my wisdom - whether I have any, and of what sort - and that witness shall be the god of Delphi…

Why do I mention this? Because I am going to explain to you why I have such an evil name. When I heard the answer, I said to myself, What can the god mean? and what is the interpretation of this riddle? for I know that I have no wisdom, small or great. What can he mean when he says that I am the wisest of men? And yet he is a god and cannot lie; that would be against his nature.

How many gods do you know that do not lie?

.

For this fear of death is indeed the pretence of wisdom, and not real wisdom, being the appearance of knowing the unknown; since no one knows whether death, which they in their fear apprehend to be the greatest evil, may not be the greatest good. Is there not here conceit of knowledge, which is a disgraceful sort of ignorance? And this is the point in which, as I think, I am superior to men in general, and in which I might perhaps fancy myself wiser than other men, - that whereas I know but little of the world below, I do not suppose that I know: but I do know that injustice and disobedience to a better, whether God or man, is evil and dishonorable, and I will never fear or avoid a possible good rather than a certain evil. And therefore if you let me go now, and reject the counsels of Anytus, who said that if I were not put to death I ought not to have been prosecuted, and that if I escape now, your sons will all be utterly ruined by listening to my words - if you say to me, Socrates, this time we will not mind Anytus, and will let you off, but upon one condition, that are to inquire and speculate in this way any more, and that if you are caught doing this again you shall die; - if this was the condition on which you let me go, I should reply: Men of Athens, I honor and love you; but I shall obey God rather than you, and while I have life and strength I shall never cease from the practice and teaching of philosophy, exhorting anyone whom I meet after my manner, and convincing him, saying: O my friend, why do you who are a citizen of the great and mighty and wise city of Athens, care so much about laying up the greatest amount of money and honor and reputation, and so little about wisdom and truth and the greatest improvement of the soul, which you never regard or heed at all?

.

Leyla Shen wrote:If God is not a thing and therefore cannot be either good or evil, than it cannot be wise.

What is this 'it' that is wise? Who is this 'someone' that is wise?

As I understand it, wisdom is beyond the reality of things, it is beyond good and evil.

leyla wrote: Likewise, it cannot be knowing or unknowing. To know that the Totality is not a thing, one must know what a thing is.

But by realizing you can't know what a thing is, you realize the nature of the totality. The infinite is seen in the finite. I know these things as they should be known, and by knowing things in this way, I am wisely unknowing. Most people know things in the way they shouldnt be known, and by knowing this way, they are fools unknowingly.

leyla wrote: So, one makes such a distinction only to abandon half of it in the name of wisdom?

I would like to explore the relationship thought has to perception. I would think that when perception loses sight of what what can't be known, then perception becomes enslaved to thought, endarkened by thought, the entity becomes foolish. Action ceases to be wise once perception loses sight of its own ignorance. Thought can be a great help or a great hinderance.

If God is not subject to things, then he cannot speak for he cannot be asked a question. Who was it, then, that said there was no other wiser than Socrates?

You're right, god is this way. But a human being is often not. A human being, with his senses, can experience being subject to things and can speak and be asked a question. But a human being can also be one with that state that is wisdom.

A human being can be one with god.

cory: A human being can know this, and by knowing this he knows nothing.

Leyla: It would be correct to say, “a human being can know this, and by knowing this he denies knowledge of most things”

A human being can know this, and by knowing this he realizes can't know 'things'.

That does not mean we should not continue mapping reality empirically, of course.

leyla wrote: Yes, he was destructive toward delusion--but apparently not to the deluson contained in his own relationship to God.

The God to which he refers is the absolute, but…

Ok, so now you are provding evidence revealing socrates as possibly or apparently deluded is some respects? lets take a look:

I will refer you to a witness who is worthy of credit, and will tell you about my wisdom - whether I have any, and of what sort - and that witness shall be the god of Delphi…

[* isnt this the 'oracle of delphi'?]

Why do I mention this? Because I am going to explain to you why I have such an evil name. When I heard the answer, I said to myself, What can the god mean? and what is the interpretation of this riddle? for I know that I have no wisdom, small or great. What can he mean when he says that I am the wisest of men? And yet he is a god and cannot lie; that would be against his nature.

Leyla: How many gods do you know that do not lie?

What I never understood about this story was, why socrates didnt simply suspect that, when he was told (by who?) that he was the wisest man in Athens, he was being flattered by a fool? Why did he go on to take the compliment so seriously as if it were a message more important than some compliment by a fool?