GENIUS FORUMS

I know certain people like Trevor, Dan, David, and Kevin will either try to claim all of this agrees with them or pick this stuff apart line by line but the more open minded around here should read this.

Yes, it is from Will to Power so Dan will immediately try to discredit it... it was still well developed thought in his notebooks, food for thought at the least.

Emphasis added roughly, good idea to read through it all, takes 10 minutes.

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578 (Spring-Fall 1887)

Moral values even in theory of knowledge: trust in reason--why not mistrust? the "true world" is supposed to be the good world--why? appearance, change, contradiction, struggle devalued as immoral; desire for a world in which these things are missing; the transcendental world invented, in order that a place remains for "moral freedom" (in Kant); dialectic a way to virtue (in Plato and Socrates: evidently because Sophistry counted as the way to immorality); time and space ideal: consequently "unity" in the essence of things; consequently no "sin," no evil, no imperfection --a justification of God; Epicurus denied the possibility of knowledge, in order to retain moral (or hedonistic) values as the highest values. Augustine, later Pascal ("corrupted reason"), did the same for the benefit of Christian values; Descartes' contempt for everything that changes; also that of Spinoza

579 (1883-1888)

Psychology of metaphysics.--This world is apparent: consequently there is a true world;--this world is conditional: consequently there is an unconditioned world;--this world is full of contradiction: consequently there is a world free of contradiction;-- this world is a world of becoming: consequently there is a world of being:--all false conclusions (blind trust in reason: if A exists, then the opposite concept B must also exist). It is suffering that inspires these conclusions: fundamentally they are desires that such a world should exist; in the same way, to imagine another, more valuable world is an expression of hatred for a world that makes one suffer: the ressentiment of metaphysicians against actuality is here creative.

Second series of questions: for what is there suffering?--and from this a conclusion is derived concerning the relation of the true world to our apparent, changing, suffering, contradictory world: (1) Suffering as a consequence of error: how is error possible? (2) Suffering as a consequence of guilt: how is guilt possible? (--experiences derived from nature or society universalized and projected to the sphere of "in-itself"). If, however, the conditioned world is causally conditioned by the unconditioned world, then freedom to err and incur guilt must also be conditioned by it: and again one asks, what for?--The world of appearance, becoming, contradiction, suffering, is therefore willed: what for?

The error in these conclusions: two opposite concepts are constructed--because one of them corresponds to a reality, the other "must" also correspond to a reality. "Whence should one derive this opposite concept if this were not so?"--Reason is thus a source of revelation concerning being-in-itself.

But the origin of these antitheses need not necessarily go back to a supernatural source of reason: it is sufficient to oppose to it the real genesis of the concepts. This derives from the practical sphere, the sphere of utility; hence the strength of the faith it inspires (one would perish if one did not reason according to this mode of reason; but this is no "proof" of what it asserts).

The preoccupation with suffering on the part of metaphysicians--is quite naive. "Eternal bliss": psychological nonsense. Brave and creative men never consider pleasure and pain as ultimate values--they are epiphenomena: one must desire both if one is to achieve anything--. That they see the problem of pleasure and pain in the foreground reveals something weary and sick in metaphysicians and religious people. Even morality is so important to them only because they see in it an essential condition for the abolition of suffering.

In the same way, their preoccupation with appearance and error: cause of suffering, superstition that happiness attends truth (confusion: happiness in "certainty", in "faith").

580 (Spring-Fall 1887)

To what extent the basic epistemological positions (materialism, idealism) are consequences of evaluations: the source of the supreme feelings of pleasure ("feelings of value") as decisive also for the problem of reality!

--The measure of positive knowledge is quite subsidiary or a matter of indifference: as witness the development of India.

The Buddhistic negation of reality in general (appearance = suffering) is perfectly consistent: undemonstrability, inaccessibility, lack of categories not only for a "'world-in-itself," but an insight into the erroneous procedures by means of which this whole concept is arrived at. "Absolute reality," "being-in-itself" a contradiction. In a world of becoming, "reality" is always only a simplification for practical ends, or a deception through the coarseness of organs, or a variation in the tempo of becoming.

Logical world-denial and nihilation follow from the fact that we have to oppose non-being with being and that the concept "becoming" is denied. ("Something" becomes.)

581 (Spring-Fall 1887)

Being and becoming.--"Reason", evolved on a sensualistic basis, on the prejudices of the senses, i.e., in the belief in the truth of the judgments of the senses.

"Being" as universalization of the concept "life" (breathing), "having a soul", "willing, effecting," "becoming".

The antithesis is: "not to have a soul," "not to become," "not to will." Therefore: "being" is not the antithesis of non-being, appearance, nor even of the dead (for only something that can live can be dead).

The "soul," the "ego" posited as primeval fact, and introduced everywhere where there is any becoming.

582 (1885-1887)

Being--we have no idea of it apart from the idea of "living."-- How can anything dead "be"?

583 (March-June 1888)

( A )

I observe with astonishment that science has today resigned itself to the apparent world; a real world--whatever it may be like--we certainly have no organ for knowing it.

At this point we may ask: by means of what organ of knowledge can we posit even this antithesis?--

That a world accessible to our organs is also understood to be dependent upon these organs, that we understand a world as being subjectively conditioned, is not to say that an objective world is at all possible. Who compels us to think that subjectivity is real, essential?

The "in-itself" is even an absurd conception; a "constitutioning-itself" is nonsense; we possess the concept "being," "thing," only as a relational concept--

The worst thing is that with the old antithesis "apparent" and "true" the correlative value judgment "lacking in value" and "absolutely valuable" has developed.

The apparent world is not counted as a "valuable" world; appearance is supposed to constitute an objection to supreme value. Only a "true" world can be valuable in itself--

Prejudice of prejudices! Firstly, it would be possible that the true constitution of things was so hostile to the presuppositions of life, so opposed to them, that we needed appearance in order to be able to live--After all, this is the case in so many situations; e.g., in marriage.

Our empirical world would be determined by the instincts of self-preservation even as regards the limits of its knowledge: we would regard as true, good, valuable that which serves the preservation of the species--

a. We possess no categories by which we can distinguish a true from an apparent world. (There might only be an apparent world, but not our apparent world.)

b. Assuming the true world, it could still be a world less valuable for us; precisely the quantum of illusion might be of a higher rank on account of its value for our preservation. (Unless appearance as such were grounds for condemnation?)

c. That a correlation exists between degrees of value and degrees of reality (so that the supreme values also possess the supreme reality) is a metaphysical postulate proceeding from the presupposition that we know the order of rank of values; namely, that this order of rank is a moral order--Only with this presupposition is truth necessarily part of the definition of all the highest values.

( B )

It is of cardinal importance that one should abolish the true world. It is the great inspirer of doubt and devaluator in respect of the world we are: it has been our most dangerous attempt yet to assassinate life.[/b]

War on all presuppositions on the basis of which one has invented a true world. Among these is the presupposition that moral values are the supreme values.

The supremacy of moral valuation would be refuted if it could be shown to be the consequence of an immoral valuation --as a special case of actual immorality--it would thus reduce itself to an appearance, and as appearance it would cease to have any right as such to condemn appearance.

( C )

The "will to truth" would then have to be investigated psychologically: it is not a moral force, but a form of the will to power. This would have to be proved by showing that it employs every immoral means: metaphysicians above all.

We are today faced with testing the assertion that moral values are the supreme values. Method in investigation is attained only when all moral prejudices have been overcome:--it represents a victory over morality--

584 (March-June 1888)

The aberration of philosophy is that, instead of seing in logic and the categories of reason means toward the adjustment of the world for utilitarian ends (basically, toward an expedient falsification), one believed one possessed in them the criterion of truth and reality. The "criterion of truth" was in fact merely the biological utility of such a system of systematic falsification; and since a species of animals knows of nothing more important than its own preservation, one might indeed be permitted to speak here of "truth." The naivete was to take an anthropocentric idiosyncrasy as the measure of things, as the rule for determining "real" and "unreal": in short, to make absolute something conditioned. And behold, suddenly the world fell apart into a "true" world and an "apparent" world: and precisely the world that man's reason had devised for him to live and settle in was discredited. Instead of employing the forms as a tool for making the world manageable and calculable, the madness of philosophers divined that in these categories is presented the concept of that world to which the one in which man lives does not correspond--The means were misunderstood as measures of value, even as a condemnation of their real intention--

The intention was to deceive oneself in a useful way; the means, the invention of formulas and signs by means of which one could reduce the confusing multiplicity to a purposive and manageable schema.

But alas! now a moral category was brought into play: no creature wants to deceive itself, no creature may deceive--consequently there is only a will to truth. What is "truth"?

The law of contradiction provided the schema: the true world, to which one seeks the way, cannot contradict itself, cannot change, cannot become, has no beginning and no end.

This is the greatest error that has ever been committed, the essential fatality of error on earth: one believed one possessed a criterion of reality in the forms of reason--while in fact one possessed them in order to become master of reality, in order to misunderstand reality in a shrewd manner--

And behold: now the world became false, and precisely on account of the properties that constitute its reality: change, becoming, multiplicity, opposition, contradiction, war. And then the entire fatality was there:

1. How can one get free from the false, merely apparent world? (--it was the real, the only )

2. how can one become oneself as much as possible the antithesis of the character of the apparent world? (Concept of the perfect creature as an antithesis to the real creature; more clearly, as the contradiction of life--)

The whole tendency of values was toward slander of life; one created a confusion of idealist dogmatism and knowledge in general: so that the opposing party also was always attacking science

The road to science was in this way doubly blocked: once by belief in the "true" world, and again by the opponents of this belief. Natural science, psychology was (1) condemned with regard to its objects, (2) deprived of its innocence--

In the actual world, in which everything is bound to and conditioned by everything else, to condemn and think away anything means to condemn and think away everything. The expression "that should not be," "that should not have been," is farcical-- If one thinks out the consequences, one would ruin the source of life if one wanted to abolish whatever was in some respect harmful or destructive. Physiology teaches us better!

--We see how morality (a) poisons the entire conception of the world, (b) cuts off the road to knowledge, to science, (c) disintegrates and undermines all actual instincts (in that it teaches that their roots are immoral).

We see at work before us a dreadful tool of decadence that props itself up by the holiest names and attitudes.

585 (Spring-Fall 1887; rev. Spring-Fall 1888)

Tremendous self-examination: becoming conscious of oneself, not as individuals but as mankind. Let us reflect, let us think back; let us follow the highways and byways!

( A )

Man seeks "the truth": a world that is not self-contradictory, not deceptive, does not change, a true world--a world in which one does not suffer; contradiction, deception, change--causes of suffering! He does not doubt that a world as it ought to be exists; he would like to seek out the road to it. (Indian critique: e.g. the "ego" as apparent, as not real.)

Whence does man here derive the concept reality--Why is it that he derives suffering from change, deception, contradiction? and why not rather his happiness?--

Contempt, hatred for all that perishes, changes, varies-- whence comes this valuation of that which remains constant? Obviously, the will to truth is here merely the desire for a world of the constant.

The senses deceive, reason corrects the errors; consequently, one concluded, reason is the road to the constant; the least sensual ideas must be closest to the "true world."--It is from the senses that most misfortunes come--they are deceivers, deluders, destroyers.--

Happiness can be guaranteed only by being; change and happiness exclude one another. The highest desire therefore contemplates unity with what has being. This is the formula for: the road to the highest happiness.

In summa: the world as it ought to be exists; this world, in which we live, is an error--this world of ours ought not to exist.

Belief in what has being is only a consequence: the real primum mobile is disbelief in becoming, mistrust of becoming, the low valuation of all that becomes--

What kind of man reflects in this way? An unproductive, suffering kind, a kind weary of life. If we imagine the opposite kind of man, he would not need to believe in what has being; more, he would despise it as dead, tedious, indifferent--

The belief that the world as it ought to be is, really exists, is a belief of the unproductive who do not desire to create a world as it ought to be. They posit it as already available, they seek ways and means of reaching it. "Will to truth"--as the impotence of the will to create.

To know that something is thus and thus:

To act so that something becomes thus and thus:

Antagonism in the degree of power in different natures.

The fiction of a world that corresponds to our desires: psychological trick and interpretation with the aim of associating everything we honor and find pleasant with this true world.

"Will to truth" at this stage is essentially an art of interpretation: which at least requires the power to interpret.

This same species of man, grown one stage poorer, no longer possessing the strength to interpret, to create fictions, produces nihilists. A nihilist is a man who judges of the world as it is that it ought not to be, and of the world as it ought to be that it does not exist. According to this view, our existence (action, suffering, willing, feeling) has no meaning: the pathos of "in vain" is the nihilists' pathos--at the same time, as pathos, an inconsistency on the part of the nihilists.

Whoever is incapable of laying his will into things, lacking will and strength, at least lays some meaning into them, i.e., the faith that there is a will in them already.

It is a measure of the degree of strength of will to what extent one can do without meaning in things, to what extent one can endure to live in a meaningless world because one organizes a small portion of it oneself.

The philosophical objective outlook can therefore be a sign that will and strength are small. For strength organizes what is close and closest; "men of knowledge," who desire only to ascertain what is, are those who cannot fix anything as it ought to be.

Artists, an intermediary species: they at least fix an image of that which ought to be; they are productive, to the extent that they actualy alter and transform; unlike men of knowledge, who leave everything as it is.

Connection between philosophers and the pessimistic religions: the same species of man (--they ascribe the highest degree of reality to the most highly valued things--).

Connection between philosophers and moral men and their evaluations (--the moral interpretation of the world as meaning: after the decline of the religious meaning--).

Overcoming of philosophers through the destruction of the world of being: intermediary period of nihilism: before there is yet present the strength to reverse values and to deïfy becoming and the apparent world as the only world, and to call them good.

( B )

Nihilism as a normal phenomenon can be a symptom of increasing strength or of increasing weakness:

partly, because the strength to create, to will, has so increased that it no longer requires these total interpretations and introductions of meaning ("present tasks," the state, etc.);

partly because even the creative strength to create meaning has declined and disappointment becomes the dominant condition. The incapability of believing in a "meaning," "unbelief."

What does science mean in regard to both possibilities?

1. As a sign of strength and self-control, as being able to do without healing, comforting worlds of illusion;

2. as undermining, dissecting, disappointing, weakening.

( C )

Belief in truth, the need to have a hold on something believed true, psychological reduction apart from all previous value feelings. Fear, laziness.

The same way, unbelief: reduction. To what extent it acquires a new value if a true world does not exist (--thus the value feelings that hitherto have been squandered on the world of being, are again set free).

You are reading facts as value judgements, and genuine questions as rhetorical, self-answering ones.

It's like reading "half of all children born are female" and immediately deciding that this is the best possible scenario -- and this before even figuring out if it's true! You need to read more carefully: keep your opinions out of the facts.

I've read Will to power. It is Nietzsche in all his force, and that work can not be avoided by students of his thought. Only four paragraphs out of a thousand are questionable, and even those four are unimportant, so it is genuine Nietzsche.


Nietzsche does go against QRS on quite a few points, that's no news. And from what I read in your post you noticed some of them. For example he clearly argues that the world of appearance, illusion if you will, is ok if it serves the affirmation of life, which is the main idea of his philosophy.

Boyan,

Yes, however these people refuse to admit that Nietzsche completely opposes their philosophy lol. Not only in this book but throughout, it is just really pronounced here. :)

Neil Melnyk wrote:Boyan,

Yes, however these people refuse to admit that Nietzsche completely opposes their philosophy lol. Not only in this book but throughout, it is just really pronounced here. :)

Nietzsche's soul is against QRS. Some say that death of god is his primary idea, or the eternal return, but it is the affirmation of life to which these serve. God had to die so man could rule. The Dionysian principle too.

Because the only work of Nietzsche I saw talked about here was Zarathustra, I presumed that's the only work of his the QRS are familiar with.

Yes, the differences can be seen throughout Nietzsche's writings, just take his chapter on the ascetic ideal in the Genealogy i.e. And Nietzsche was against eastern life negating philosophy, which is held in high regard here. And paring that with Nietzsche is impossible.

Neil,

Yes, however these people refuse to admit that Nietzsche completely opposes their philosophy lol. Not only in this book but throughout, it is just really pronounced here. :)

As I said, you are taking facts and turning them into normative claims. Nietzsche was not a moralist, but a psychologist. Most of this stuff is him describing himself -- and where he sounds like he is being judgemental about others, he is simply being brutally honest with himself.

It is his "fear and laziness" that he refers to. Likewise, It is his "will and strength [that] are small" when he criticizes the philosophic lifestyle.

You miss this through your desire to have moral higher ground, and therefore have produced a system where you quite literally think that Nietzsche was opposed to himself. Nietzsche is a difficult philosopher, and you have not been interpreting him accurately.

Trevor,

As I said, you are taking facts and turning them into normative claims. Nietzsche was not a moralist, but a psychologist.

When did I ever say Nietzsche was a moralist? You are ridiculous -- he wrote 10 books against morality and YOU on the other hand are the one trying to give moral principles a root in "absolute truth" and "absolute reality".

It is his "fear and laziness" that he refers to. Likewise, It is his "will and strength [that] are small" when he criticizes the philosophic lifestyle.

"Belief in truth, the need to have a hold on something believed true, psychological reduction apart from all previous value feelings. Fear, laziness."

Clearly he is talking about the people who have "belief in truth" and "need to have a hold on something believed true". This would be YOU, not Nietzsche. He denies that any "truth" exists over and over again: "truth is lying in accordance to set standards".

You miss this through your desire to have moral higher ground, and therefore have produced a system where you quite literally think that Nietzsche was opposed to himself.

You have a misconception of Nietzsche. You believe he was like some Buddhist sage. Then when I read him criticizing the Buddhist denial of life you want to say I am misinterpreting and really he is supporting it. :rolleyes:

Neil,

When did I ever say Nietzsche was a moralist?

You said he is against 'QRS'*. The keyword "against" usually means you believe he was making a moral claim; in this case, based on the context of this thread, that is precisely how you are using the word "against".

YOU on the other hand are the one trying to give moral principles a root in "absolute truth" and "absolute reality".

Where do I do this?

Clearly he is talking about the people who have "belief in truth" and "need to have a hold on something believed true".

How does that not include Nietzsche?

He denies that any "truth" exists over and over again: "truth is lying in accordance to set standards".

The first half of this sentence does not match with the second half: could you choose a quotation of his that actually supports your assertion?

You have a misconception of Nietzsche. You believe he was like some Buddhist sage.

I disagree; my conception of Nietzsche that he was like some sort of Buddhist sage is closer to the mark than your idea that he agrees with you about everything and thinks you are a smashing young man.

Then when I read him criticizing the Buddhist denial of life you want to say I am misinterpreting and really he is supporting it. :rolleyes:

Rolling your eyes is not an argument. It simply shows you are unwilling to discuss the possibility that you are wrong. If Nietzsche criticized the Buddhist denial of life (rather than simply explaining it), then he would be making moral claims.


* By the way, when someone uses the keyword 'QRS', it's a pretty cut-and-dried way to tell that whatever they are about to say is coming out of their ass.

I have to say that I find Neil's use of Nietzsche to criticize wisdom and the spiritual path to be extremely naive, even to the point of being moronic. The quotes above have no relevance for those on the spiritual path.

I can't be bothered going through each quote. We've already discussed these issues in some detail over the past few weeks. It only takes about 5 seconds to see through it all and to see into Nietzsche's soul, but if people have mental blocks and desperately want to avoid having any relationship to truth, then those 5 seconds might as well be an eternity.

The very fact that Nietzsche is describing the truth as he sees it in the above quotes completely undermines the deluded view that he is speaking against truth in and of itself. Instead, what Nietzsche is really addressing are the various misguided ways that people have traditionally approached truth.

Neil's basic mistake is that he cannot see how truth can be approached other than in these misguided ways. He is still thinking inside the box.

-

David,

Note this was one long quote (several sections) from Will to Power.

The very fact that Nietzsche is describing the truth as he sees it in the above quotes completely undermines the deluded view that he is speaking against truth in and of itself. Instead, what Nietzsche is really addressing are the various misguided ways that most people have traditionally approached truth.

Namely yours....

"But the origin of these antitheses need not necessarily go back to a supernatural source of reason: it is sufficient to oppose to it the real genesis of the concepts. This derives from the practical sphere, the sphere of utility; hence the strength of the faith it inspires (one would perish if one did not reason according to this mode of reason; but this is no "proof" of what it asserts)."

Neil's basic mistake is that he cannot see how truth can be approached other than in these misguided ways. He is still thinking inside the box.

When one is inside the box, as we all are, what is the point of trying to think outside it?

David,

"But the origin of these antitheses need not necessarily go back to a supernatural source of reason: it is sufficient to oppose to it the real genesis of the concepts. This derives from the practical sphere, the sphere of utility; hence the strength of the faith it inspires (one would perish if one did not reason according to this mode of reason; but this is no "proof" of what it asserts)."

Either this is actually true, or it is just a piece of practical nothingness. Either way, it presents no challenge to the legitimacy of truth.

DQ: Neil's basic mistake is that he cannot see how truth can be approached other than in these misguided ways. He is still thinking inside the box.

NM: When one is inside the box, as we all are, what is the point of trying to think outside it?

To ensure that one doesn't remain trapped within traditional, misguided thinking. Not everyone is trapped inside such a box.

The irony is that Nietzsche was intent on pushing people outside the box, and yet most of his followers have used his words to maintain their confinement within the box.

-

David,

"But the origin of these antitheses need not necessarily go back to a supernatural source of reason: it is sufficient to oppose to it the real genesis of the concepts. This derives from the practical sphere, the sphere of utility; hence the strength of the faith it inspires (one would perish if one did not reason according to this mode of reason; but this is no "proof" of what it asserts)."

DQ: Either this is actually true, or it is just a piece of practical nothingness. Either way, it presents no challenge to the legitimacy of truth.

Think about it David and you might see what Nietzsche saw.

NM: When one is inside the box, as we all are, what is the point of trying to think outside it?

DQ: To ensure that one doesn't remain trapped within traditional, misguided thinking. Not everyone is trapped inside such a box.

Not everyone will admit that they are trapped in a box/physical_body -- mind, thought, and all.

Neil,

Think about it David and you might see what Nietzsche saw.

When you treat Nietzsche no differently than a fundie treats Jesus, the irony is that you constantly bitch and moan that people here treat truth relgiously, as a god.

And, just like a fundie, you couldn't really answer the question "What Would Nietzsche/Jesus Do?" since you really have no clue.

Trevor Salyzyn wrote:Neil,

Think about it David and you might see what Nietzsche saw.

When you treat Nietzsche no differently than a fundie treats Jesus, the irony is that you constantly bitch and moan that people here treat truth relgiously, as a god.

Huh? I get what Nietzsche is saying. You guys are not trying to -- can't really expect more than when you have so much invested in your philosophy.

Trevor Salyzyn wrote:And, just like a fundie, you couldn't really answer the question "What Would Nietzsche/Jesus Do?" since you really have no clue.

Nietzsche would not preach denial of life and absolute truth. I am fairly certain of this by reading his books in which he constantly criticizes Buddhism, absolute truth, and denial of life.

Neil wrote:

Nietzsche: "But the origin of these antitheses need not necessarily go back to a supernatural source of reason: it is sufficient to oppose to it the real genesis of the concepts. This derives from the practical sphere, the sphere of utility; hence the strength of the faith it inspires (one would perish if one did not reason according to this mode of reason; but this is no "proof" of what it asserts)."

DQ: Either this is actually true, or it is just a piece of practical nothingness. Either way, it presents no challenge to the legitimacy of truth.

Neil: Think about it David and you might see what Nietzsche saw.

Why? Do you think he was without delusion?

-

Neil Melnyk wrote:denial of life.

What "life" are you talking about?

Are you saying that nobody should every seek to overcome the life of lying, cheating, addiction, petty-mindedness, unconsciousness, etc?

Although, like many others, the QRS draw things from his thought,it is obvious Nietzsche can not be paired with QRS philosophy. He even got in the postmodern denial of absolute truths in Will to power.

Why then isn't the great Dostoevsky, Nietzsche's 'brother' on the list of the praised thinkers on this website, when he is the only psychologist Nietzsche had anything to learn from, and approved on Dostoevsky's conclusion that some of the best men Russia had were the convicts in Siberia?

Boyan wrote:Although, like many others, the QRS draw things from his thought,it is obvious Nietzsche can not be paired with QRS philosophy. He even got in the postmodern denial of absolute truths in Will to power.

If Nietzsche said anything like "there are no absolute truths" then he was falling into the same trap of absolutism that all the postmodernists fall into.

It's a misinterpretation of his work to think he is making that mistake.

He's not against absolute truths, but false absolute truths.

Nietzsche's a hard nut to crack. I think most people massively underestimate the difficulty of Nietzsche's writings. They think he was talking about cavemen or something.

Neil,

Huh? I get what Nietzsche is saying.

No. You don't. You really, really, don't.

You guys are not trying to --

Yes, I am. I am pointing out that you are no better than a fundamentalist with your obsession with Nietzsche. I am in the words of your lord and saviour, "turning your values on their head". (Oooh, does that make it acceptable to you now?)

can't really expect more than when you have so much invested in your philosophy.

Yes, when I do a Nietzschean value-reversal -- and it's true, and it makes you look like a jackass -- you can't expect much more than that, since it's pretty impressive. It does take quite a talented philosopher to do that, and be accurate. If I had invested less time in philosophy, I would not be able to use Nietzschean ideas to make a Nietzsche-obsessed postmodernist and social Darwinist look like a fool. I would probably not be able to use Nietzsche's ideas effectively at all, and I would simply make mistakes whenever I brought up his name, like any common postmodernist or social Darwinist.

Nietzsche would not preach denial of life and absolute truth. I am fairly certain of this by reading his books in which he constantly criticizes Buddhism, absolute truth, and denial of life.

So, you are fairly certain that Nietzsche is preaching anti-Buddhism, anti-truth, and love of life? You are turning Nietzsche into a cheezy moralist who agrees with you.

I am very certain that Nietzsche was not a moralist, who gave explanations about Buddhism, people's common reactions to truth, and who explained religious and philosophic denials of life. I am also very certain that by not being a moralist, Nietzsche did not criticize any of these things.

Nietzsche primarily dealt with the psychology of these things, not the ethics; and, not being a clinician like Freud, it was done almost entirely through self-analysis.

As to truth? Well, it goes without saying that if he is describing facts, he believes that his facts are true. I'm pretty positive that Nietzsche would have thought that it went without saying that he believed that some facts can be true, regardless of psychological reactions to the idea of truth.

It is you, not Nietzsche, who criticizes these things.

It is also you that are against 'QRS'. Nietzsche is highly unlikely to have ever heard of them.

Kevin Solway wrote:If Nietzsche said anything like "there are no absolute truths" then he was falling into the same trap of absolutism that all the postmodernists fall into.

He says it in The Gay Science as well. Perhaps you are falling into the same trap metaphysicians fall into.

Kevin Solway wrote:It's a misinterpretation of his work to think he is making that mistake.

It's a misinterpretation if it doesn't align with your own thoughts.

Kevin Solway wrote:He's not against absolute truths, but false absolute truths.

And he doesn't see how any human can come across these absolute truths -- definitely not through reason and logic. In the quoted above he calls the "real world" a mistake made by try to take the antithesis of our "imperfect" world, in other words using reasoning/logic wrongly.

Trevor Salyzyn wrote:If I had invested less time in philosophy, I would not be able to use Nietzschean ideas to make a Nietzsche-obsessed postmodernist and social Darwinist look like a fool. I would probably not be able to use Nietzsche's ideas effectively at all, and I would simply make mistakes whenever I brought up his name, like any common postmodernist or social Darwinist.

*laughs*

Trevor Salyzyn wrote:I am also very certain that by not being a moralist, Nietzsche did not criticize any of these things. He primarily dealt with the psychology of these things, not the ethics;

He just called them decadence, aversion to life, etc. Not criticism unless you are against decadence or the denial of life.

Trevor Salyzyn wrote:It is also you that are against 'QRS'. Nietzsche is highly unlikely to have ever heard of them.

I was against you listing off names of philosophers who "agree" with you when they have multiple books saying to the contrary.

Neil Melnyk wrote:He says it in The Gay Science as well.

You don't see that when he says "There is no absolute truth", he is claiming it as an absolute truth. That is, he believes that there is no way he could possibly be wrong.

denial of life.

What "life" are you talking about?

Are you saying that nobody should every seek to overcome the life of lying, cheating, addiction, petty-mindedness, unconsciousness, etc?

Kevin Solway wrote:

Boyan wrote:Although, like many others, the QRS draw things from his thought,it is obvious Nietzsche can not be paired with QRS philosophy. He even got in the postmodern denial of absolute truths in Will to power.

If Nietzsche said anything like "there are no absolute truths" then he was falling into the same trap of absolutism that all the postmodernists fall into.

It's a misinterpretation of his work to think he is making that mistake.

He's not against absolute truths, but false absolute truths.

Yes, I just used that to show that to him Truth was not the end goal.

It seems that you have not read Nietzsche's works, except for Zarathustra, and that is the problem.


Trevor, wasn't Nietzsche for and against, although not in the typical moralizing way? It was not only a distanced objective psychological analysis, but his personal opinion he would display in his writings.

He does state what he is against and what he is for.

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Question: What language (dialect) of German did this Nietzsche do his writing in? I know, his "sister" did some of the 'glossing over' (interpreted) on his latter works, as his 'mental condition' sank...

And just who, in particular, translated his works into what form of "English"... was it British English or what?

I don't care if he wrote his works by the light of kerosene, candles, wood stoves, fluorescent lamps, or starlight.

All this quibbling over Nietz said this, meant that, hugged horses, ate psycho drugs by the handful whatever. Can you dig it?

Dialect of German language to...? Any one "authority" oversaw the translation into...



ps- quite sincere here, folks.


Tomas


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Boyan wrote:Truth was not the end goal.

So Nietzsche's goal was absolute truths that were true, as opposed to "absolute truths" that weren't.

In other words he wanted truth rather than non-truth.