GENIUS FORUMS

Leyla,

OK. So we might more usefully now make such a distinction with the terms “personal” and “impersonal” since subjectivity and objectivity are common to all objects “person” but not all subjectivities between one person and the next could be considered to apply to any particular object.

We call a subjective determination "subjective" because it is dependent on the subject who interprets. We call an objective determination "objective" because it is dependent on the object that is interpreted. Nevertheless, it really doesn't matter what we call such things, just so long as we're on the same wavelength when discussing them.

Well, I know what you’re saying but I would go so far as to say that “Maggie Thatcher” is a subjective judgement as it is entirely based on one’s personal conceptions of the subject associated with the physical object.

I'm hesitant towards this notion of classifying things as subjective or objective. Think of the term "blue'. We'd generally think of such a thing as an objective property, but nevertheless one can say "the weather is making me blue". In such a case we should say that the term is being used subjectively. Objectivity lies in intent and interpretation: which is to say that a statement is only objective insofar as I intend it to be, and whoever hears or reads it interprets it to be.

If they were to find scientific evidence of the body of “Jesus,” for example, it still would not prove Jesus’s existence--only that of a body associated to the name and every possible personal (subjective) conception of it.

Science can't provide logical proofs because of the problem of induction. That's well established. Nevertheless, I can't provide a logical proof for the fact that Monet paintings exist, or that some apples are red, or even that I own a blue shirt. That doesn't render all such truths a matter of opinion. There is a fact of the matter of the color of apples, even though some folks might not agree on what it is. What you're doing here is suggesting that because folks can have contrasting opinions on something, that it makes that thing entirely a matter of opinion. Lets say you were discussing evolution. Would you argue your stance as if there were a fact of the matter, or as if you derived it through emotive impulse? If I'm discussing the deliciousness of pasta, my opinion on the matter is determined by how I happen to feel about the taste of pasta. It would seem to me that one's opinion on evolution shouldn't be determined by how they happen to feel about the issue, but rather by a rational weighing of facts.

My view: hence, the distinction between philosophy and science.

Are you suggesting that philosophy shouldn't be rigorous? If so then I entirely disagree. If your suggesting that philosophy only concern itself with the subjective, then we should imagine that Plato would have been a better philosopher if his dialogs consisted of:

SOCRATES: Kool-aid is fantastic.
GLAUCON: I agree.
CEPHALUS: It would seem so.
POLEMARCHUS: Necessarily.
THRASYMACHUS: Yes, Socrates.
ALCIBIADES: Certainly, Socrates.
PAUSANIAS: Quite so, if we are to be consistent.
ARISTOPHANES: Assuredly.
ERYXIMACHUS: The argument certainly points that way.
PHAEDO: By all means.
PHAEDRUS: What you say is true, Socrates.

They are both necessarily subjective.

Not so. Socrates was a philosopher. All evidence points to that conclusion, and thus that conclusion is true. Is this my opinion? Of course. Nevertheless, I hold such an opinion because I feel it corresponds to the fact of the matter. One can never prove beyond all doubt that Socrates was indeed a philosopher, but that doesn't mean that I don't think it more likely that we'll find texts denoting the fact he was a philosopher, then texts that contradict that theory.

Do you think science will one day be able to give a 100% accurate account of the specific thoughts and apparently unique minds of Socrates or Jesus?

I don't think we should expect it to.

Whether it be Jesus the Jew or Socrates the asshole, have these these men ever existed in any other way than in the minds of those who speak their names?

The evidence points to yes. Although, whether or not one thinks Socrates is an asshole depends upon their emotional reaction to the various accounts of him.

ExI:

I think before one can get anywhere in a discussion, definition of the terms is essential. Despite the fact that you and I have had several exchanges, the recurring theme appears to be whether or not you want to change your mind on the definition/s of subjective/objective. The following are some of your responses to the question, “Can we define subjective/objective?” and what happened after I responded:

Yes: Lets also change up how we're using the term "subjective", because we've rendered it useless as things currently are.

Yes: Lets say that something is only subjective if it is subject to one's thoughts.

No: Whereas I'm not sure that I could give a definition of subjective or objective that would ensure that one could properly identify to which set any given observation belonged, [snip]

Yes: …I still happen to think that the distinction is valid.

Yes: Remember here that by "objective" I merely mean that any sensory information I gather about you isn't controlled by whatever my opinion happens to be.

Yes: (Mind you, I'm not pulling any of my definitions out of thin air to prop up my preferred method of speaking about things. Rather, these definitions are quite common insofar as I can tell.)

Yes: We call a subjective determination "subjective" because it is dependent on the subject who interprets. We call an objective determination "objective" because it is dependent on the object that is interpreted. Nevertheless, it really doesn't matter what we call such things, just so long as we're on the same wavelength when discussing them.

No: I'm hesitant towards this notion of classifying things as subjective or objective. [Then directly after that] Yes: Think of the term "blue'. We'd generally think of such a thing as an objective property, but nevertheless one can say "the weather is making me blue". In such a case we should say that the term is being used subjectively. Objectivity lies in intent and interpretation: which is to say that a statement is only objective insofar as I intend it to be, and whoever hears or reads it interprets it to be.

With respect to the italicised above, do you mean "opinion"?

Because then you say:

What you're doing here is suggesting that because folks can have contrasting opinions on something, that it makes that thing entirely a matter of opinion. Lets say you were discussing evolution…

Now, I wasn’t discussing evolution, I was discussing “Jesus” and the body of Jesus when you attributed the above (bolded) to me. Yet again, not so long after the first time, you seem to be suggesting the very thing you objected to me apparently suggesting:

Not so. Socrates was a philosopher. All evidence points to that conclusion, and thus that conclusion is true. Is this my opinion? Of course. Nevertheless, I hold such an opinion because I feel it corresponds to the fact of the matter. One can never prove beyond all doubt that Socrates was indeed a philosopher, but that doesn't mean that I don't think it more likely that we'll find texts denoting the fact he was a philosopher, then texts that contradict that theory.

The evidence points to yes. Although, whether or not one thinks Socrates is an asshole depends upon their emotional reaction to the various accounts of him.

It is impossible to carry on a meaningful discussion about anything if you cannot even define the terms, and stick to those definitions.

Are you sure you're talking to me, ExI?

Passthrough,

Passthrough: For argument’s sake, let’s assume your definition of God exists, synonymic with noumena.

Matt: Whoa there, hold the phone. We can define a thing however we want, it's just a matter of imagining the definition. So, there's no question that my definition exists, at least in my head.

Passthrough: This forum is aggressive which is good in one way because it makes you think before you speak lest you get bulldozed...and as it should, but it also has a tendency for false perceptions of others intent...in other words, I was not saying that your definition does not exist at all, I was using it as argument form. As I told Leyla and I will tell you, I am a simple person with no agenda other than to learn here...if it sounds anyways other than that, it is due to my writing skills and not the person. Why would I bite the hand of one who feeds me?

Well, okay. But your words are all I have to go by. You may want to take more time to meditate on and clarify your writing. It will help stimulate your mind as well.

Matt: Consciousness is just like anything else. It may be mysterious as to how it works, but it's not anything special.

Passthrough: I'm not sure I agree with you that it is nothing special, if it wasn't why are all things not as seemingly perceptive, such as rocks?

For the same reason that all things aren't as hard as a rock. There's just a lot of variety in the things nature creates.

Is this moral path a priori? I don't know if Kant thought so because we haven't gotten around to that part of his philosophy, but I think it is. So, in this connection process, we can determine past experience and relate it to future choices. We may not have knowledge about the outside world, but we have knowledge of the inside world.

Morality is about bringing about certain effects through action, so you really can't get around the experiential aspect of it. It's really more of a science in that you're trying to manipulate causes to serve your ends. The thing that distinguishes morality from regular science is that the causes involve getting yourself to do what you want it to do.

Ironic,

I apologize for the length of this post, but the only way I know how to properly demonstrate my point is by pointing to it with examples.

No problem, take your time, take your time.

Matt: I don't know what you mean by "language-game", I suppose you mean to say that logic has no relevance,

Ironic: Wittgenstein coined the term "language-game" and described his usage of it as "consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven". Of course, a good chunk of both Philosophical Investigations and the Brown Book are dedicated to the concept, so I can't really hope to do justice to it here.

Well, can you tell me what the purpose of the idea is?

Matt: but 2+2=5 is something that points to nothing. 2+2=4 is the opposite: it's consistent and therefore can be applied to anything in the universe.

Ironic: If we divorce 2+2=4 from any empirical foundation, then we can say that it is true due the fact it follows from the axioms of mathematics. I'll use the term "jululu" to denote 2+2=4, its proof, and the axioms used in the proof. So now we have the problem of what makes jululu true, rather then 2+2=5.

Well, what's the problem? You wrote two big paragraphs assuming there's this problem, but you didn't even state what it is.

Matt: All sensible statements are universal like this: if they're not universal, they're qualified until they are. If they're not, then they are either false or nonsense.

Ironic: So the job of the philosopher is to tediously qualify various statements until they cannot be questioned?

No. The job of the philosopher is to clean up ignorance. He's like a janitor. Actually, he's more like a psychologist who cleans up more subtle forms of mental illness.

I could do as much to the statement "unicorns are magical" but my results would vastly uninteresting, and quite frankly, I'd find the results of any such drudgery to be similarly uninteresting. Sane people don't bother to qualify statements until they can't be misunderstood, but rather only do as much when necessary. The reason we don't bother to do this is because most propositions don't derive their truth from grammatical structure, but rather by correspondence to facts which exist in the world.

Lets say I were to suggest that "George Washington was the third president of the United States". If I were to say that to someone they would call me out as speaking falsehood immediately. If I then elaborated on my statement by adding a number of qualifiers to make my statement true, they would think me a liar or a nut. Why? The fact of the matter is that George Washington was the first president of the United States. Sure, I can dink about with language to make any statement true by adding qualifiers, but if I did as much I'd be only working to make myself incomprehensible.

Do you always assume that everyone is trying their best to lie? Let's take an example that's not insane and go with "George Washington is the first president of the United States". "Of the United States" is a qualifier that attempts to make the statement universal. If we are two Americans talking, then the qualifier might not be necessary because it could be understood in the context.

But none of this is here nor there. My point is that logical statements are always universal statements. The mind naturally functions this way.

Matt: A proposition can't have two justifications. And numbers aren't empirical concepts.

Ironic: I've already demonstrated how a proposition can have two justifications with my George Washington proposition, so we'll just go right on ahead and dismiss the notion that such a thing isn't possible.

I'm talking about proof of a truth. There's only one way. That proposition you gave is not a truth as it's an uncertain empirical proposition. These types of propositions are never universal because they would have to be qualified infinitely.

Note here that a proposition isn't a fact, but merely corresponds to a fact insofar as it is true. Facts don't have justifications, as facts simply are. I've also addressed the notion that numbers aren't empirical concepts, but I'll give that a bit more attention.

Lets say that I have 2 coca-cola bottles (because the fact of the matter is that I do, and also because coca-cola is delicious). Now you'll object here that I'm applying a non-empirical concept to an empirical matter, whereas a "coca-cola bottle" is merely an overlay which we place over our observations. I'd agree with you here up to a point. The term "coca-cola bottle" could be applied to a bottle with the word "coca-cola" scribbled on it, just as easily as it could apply to a bottle of the familiar branded beverage we all know and love. So does this mean that coca-cola bottles aren't empirical concepts? I'd suggest not, and I'll demonstrate this to you by showing it's similarity with the obvious empirical concept of 2.

If you were to look around a room you'd probably be able to easily identify cases where 2 similar objects sat besides each other. Now you'd also be able to easily identify the presence of a coca-cola bottle. This is because you understand what empirical concepts both terms are intended to denote. If the fact of the matter was that you had a coca-cola bottle before you, then you could indicate in proposition form "there is a coca-cola bottle in front of me" and be speaking the truth. There's a complicated learning process that goes into the discovery of how people use terms like "2" or "coca-cola bottle". We can imagine a situation in which someone were to abstract the term "coca-cola bottle" to convey a concept that's incredibly different from what it is usually meant to convey. For instance, I could say "that water is coca-cola bottle clear". How is it that I can understand such a statement? Simple. I simply understand the full extent of what is potentially indicated by a term such as "coca-cola bottle", and determine what the term is being used to reference from context. Just like if I were to say that "there are 2 cats on my head".

Well, "coca-cola bottle" needs to be defined and a definition is not empirical, even if it is inspired by experience because definitions don't depend on experience. If all coca-cola bottles in the universe were destroyed, the definition of coca-cola bottle would still exist. It's logic that enables us to do this and form knowledge. You can take that definition and form another definition from it, like "coca-cola bottle clarity". You can do whatever you want and it's all the same principle at work.

Matt: And deductive determinations, which is what philosophy is about.

Ironic: It was what ancient Greek philosophy was all about, but we've since moved well past that, and for our efforts we now have science, sociology, psychology, etc. It's amazing what one can do if they don't limit their thinking to the deductive.

I never said you should limit it, I'm just saying it's the tool that's used to create all these things like science, etc.

Think about what justifies the need to do an experiment multiple times before you can draw a conclusion from it. How was this conclusion drawn? By experimenting? No, by pure logic. Ideally, experiments would be carried out an infinite number of times or the measurements made with perfect accuracy, but since neither of these are possible we reach towards them by performing multiple experiments and developing better measurement tools. If logic didn't give us access to the Infinite then we wouldn't be able to strive towards it.

M: Morality is about bringing about certain effects through action, so you really can't get around the experiential aspect of it.

So, do you think that in order to be moral it requires trial and error? Can you not reason first by stating what it is you want to do to someone and determining whether you’d want them to do it to you? There would seem to be no experience associated with this process, it is all a priori, unless you base it on past experience of it happening to you to know how it would feel to be done to, then you would draw on a posteriori knowledge.

M: It's really more of a science in that you're trying to manipulate causes to serve your ends.

Kant states that people should not be used as means to ends but rather be considered in the means and ends. For example, if I wanted to get a promotion and the only way I could do it was by preparing a report to place onto the desk of my boss in five hours. Knowing I could not do it by myself, I could either manipulate another coworker into helping me by using a false pretext or I could level with him and allow him to make a choice whether or not he wanted to help me get the promotion. Kant would state the latter is a "categorical imperative" for morality and again, this is something that is reasoned through first before acting upon it.

Can you give me an example of how manipulation to serve your ends could be moral?

If one can manipulate causes to meet an end, does this not lend support for free will and defy determinism?

M: The thing that distinguishes morality from regular science is that the causes involve getting yourself to do what you want it to do.

Which seems to be a priori, not a posteriori, and therefore not scientific. Perhaps you could explain your position a bit further?

Passthrough,

M: Morality is about bringing about certain effects through action, so you really can't get around the experiential aspect of it.

P: So, do you think that in order to be moral it requires trial and error?

Yeah, it definitely can if you have high moral standards.

Can you not reason first by stating what it is you want to do to someone and determining whether you’d want them to do it to you? There would seem to be no experience associated with this process, it is all a priori, unless you base it on past experience of it happening to you to know how it would feel to be done to, then you would draw on a posteriori knowledge.

Well, any knowledge related to doing is by definition a posteriori knowledge. It has to be based on experience because doing is an experience. Even thinking is a type of doing and controlling thought requires knowledge of experience.

A priori knowledge, pure logic, is confined to knowledge that comes from definitions. For example, if you define "Passthrough" to be yourself and "Matt" to be someone else, then you know a priori that Passthrough and Matt are different persons. Nothing needs to be experienced to know this; there's no empirical test that can be performed to verify this because before doing the test (a priori = prior to experience), you would have to identify the people you want to label as "Passthrough" and "Matt", and simply doing this would make any empirical observation redundant.

M: It's really more of a science in that you're trying to manipulate causes to serve your ends.

P: Kant states that people should not be used as means to ends but rather be considered in the means and ends. For example, if I wanted to get a promotion and the only way I could do it was by preparing a report to place onto the desk of my boss in five hours. Knowing I could not do it by myself, I could either manipulate another coworker into helping me by using a false pretext or I could level with him and allow him to make a choice whether or not he wanted to help me get the promotion.

Either way you're using him as a means to serve your ends as far as the promotion goes, but the moral dilemma in this case is how should you go about getting him to serve you. That is answered by whether you value being honest more than you value the promotion in this situation. If you value the promotion more, then you would opt for the most effective method of getting it, which may be the method of giving your coworker the false pretext. But the point is, we all serve our own ends.

Kant would state the latter is a "categorical imperative" for morality and again, this is something that is reasoned through first before acting upon it.

Can you give me an example of how manipulation to serve your ends could be moral?

Maybe you want the promotion in order to improve conditions for workers, conditions that have deteriorated because your coworker was busy on some project and he neglects his responsibilities to the workers, and he also never does you any favors because he's bitter from some bullshit that happened between you two, and so you're afraid that he won't agree to your request and it's important because the workers are about to go on strike, so you manipulate him and get him to help you get the promotion and you save the day for the workers by firing the guy.

I don't know, it's a complex world that doesn't follow fixed rules, so fixed rules can't really help you be moral, except as rough guidelines or something.

If one can manipulate causes to meet an end, does this not lend support for free will and defy determinism?

No. You are caused to manipulate the causes.

M: The thing that distinguishes morality from regular science is that the causes involve getting yourself to do what you want it to do.

P: Which seems to be a priori, not a posteriori, and therefore not scientific. Perhaps you could explain your position a bit further?

It's a posteriori, as I said up above. Let's say someone who has a major sweet tooth goes on a diet of no sweets. This is her primary concern in life so sweets are now morally repugnant to her. The next day her girlfriend invites her to lunch at a bakery/deli type of place and she sees all the delicious pastries, the temptation is too great, so she winds up eating one. She ate the pastry because it was in her vicinity and she didn't have the strength to deny yourself. She then stopped agreeing to go to that place for lunch. So, she learned about the extent of her weakness through experience. That's really the only way you can learn about your weaknesses is by testing yourself.

A priori knowledge, pure logic, is confined to knowledge that comes from definitions. For example, if you define "Passthrough" to be yourself and "Matt" to be someone else, then you know a priori that Passthrough and Matt are different persons. Nothing needs to be experienced to know this; there's no empirical test that can be performed to verify this because before doing the test (a priori = prior to experience), you would have to identify the people you want to label as "Passthrough" and "Matt", and simply doing this would make any empirical observation redundant.

Please pardon my ignorance, Matt, but I’m curious. You mean to say a baby has no prior awareness of things being different and hence does not know the difference between mama and papa unless and until it is able to verbally define so? Yes, it might not KNOW that they are two different persons (as defined), but does that mean he has no sense experience of differentiation at all?

I think it would be pretty difficult to define something if the differences were not experienced in the first place. I do understand that knowledge is dependent on definitions, but does not the same knowledge tell us what definitions are dependent on? Namely, sense experiences. The fact that our sense experiences may be illusory does not really matter, because there isn’t any other means by which we could consider ourselves conscious.

Hi Sapius,

The "prior" part of a priori needs to be understood in the context of creating a logical argument. If I were to try and empirically prove that Sapius is different from Matt, it would be silly, because I've already created the difference in conceiving of the question (assuming, of course, that Sapius and Matt are actually different persons).

Please pardon my ignorance, Matt, but I’m curious. You mean to say a baby has no prior awareness of things being different and hence does not know the difference between mama and papa unless and until it is able to verbally define so?

Not verbally, conceptually. The brain needs to sense both parents for awhile in order to form an imprint of them, which happens long before the baby begins learning to speak.

Yes, it might not KNOW that they are two different persons (as defined), but does that mean he has no sense experience of differentiation at all?

All differentiation occurs in the mind. The eye doesn't differentiate anything. It just gives data to the brain as-is.

I think it would be pretty difficult to define something if the differences were not experienced in the first place.

Yeah, I'm not denying that experience is necessary to physically form definitions in the brain. But that doesn't have anything to do with their use in logic. Although they are physically dependent on consciousness to exist, in a logical sense they are totally independent of consciousness. Definitions are timeless, meaning they can't be changed in any way due to the A=A principle.

I do understand that knowledge is dependent on definitions, but does not the same knowledge tell us what definitions are dependent on? Namely, sense experiences. The fact that our sense experiences may be illusory does not really matter, because there isn’t any other means by which we could consider ourselves conscious.

I agree.

Leyla,

Alright, let me see if I can provide a general summary of what I've said so far. First off, I said quite explicitly that I couldn't provide a definition that would ensure that one could properly classify any given observation. You'll remember that I also suggested that the reason for scientific rigor came from the very fact that its difficult to determine what the facts of the matter are. When I suggest that objective knowledge isn't entirely a matter of opinion, I mean to suggest that there is empirical evidence involved in such determinations, and thus such determinations are influenced by evidence in a way that aesthetic or ethical matters aren't. Obviously we can say that what sorts of food I like are influenced by my previous encounters with food, but if I eat something and dislike it, we should not say that my dislike of that food comes from a rational weighing of facts.

We could interpret a phrase like "kiwi is awesome" as an objective reporting of past experience, or as a subjective report of pure opinion. Hence my mention of intent and interpretation. If I was reading a book about what sorts of fruit Millard Fillmore enjoyed, I'd imagine that the statement "Millard Fillmore thought kiwi was awesome" would be an objective report. Any given term or proposition can go both ways, and thus we must rely on our ability to interpret a report to properly classify it. You might suggest that this makes such a thing "entirely a matter of opinion", but I've since explained what I meant by such a thing, and thus hopefully I've cleared up whatever confusion I've caused.

Now, I wasn’t discussing evolution, I was discussing “Jesus” and the body of Jesus when you attributed the above (bolded) to me.

I was, obviously, using an example to help demonstrate my point. As for the Jesus thing: discovering a body that is thought likely to be that of Jesus would provide more evidence to suggest that he exists, although such matters depend on the strength of the evidence that suggests the body belonged to Jesus in the first place. Also, the existence or non-existence of Jesus is generally thought of as an objective matter.

Yet again, not so long after the first time, you seem to be suggesting the very thing you objected to me apparently suggesting:

The word "feel" often gets used as a synonym for "think". Could you really not derive the meaning of the term from the context in which it appeared?

It is impossible to carry on a meaningful discussion about anything if you cannot even define the terms, and stick to those definitions.

My approach to philosophy is descriptive rather then proscriptive. I'm attempting to describe something, so everything that I say is part of the definition of the term that represents the concept. I really wish I could just provide a list of objective or subjective things to illustrate my point, but this issue wouldn't be so controversial if it was that clear cut. When I suggested that "things" aren't subjective or objective, I probably should have said "specific words", but I figured you'd notice the seeming contradiction and work out what I meant.

Matt,

Think about what justifies the need to do an experiment multiple times before you can draw a conclusion from it. How was this conclusion drawn? By experimenting? No, by pure logic.

I'll respond to the rest of your post when I get more time, but for the moment could you provide me an example of how one might derive the fact you stated above from pure logic?

Hi, ExI: y’all ready f’r this? :)

I‘m going to take this discussion back a page or two to maintain what I consider to be the salient points of our discussion, even though with this post I will be asking you a question more directly related to your last post:

What would it mean for me to suggest that the noumena exists? The apparent answer is nothing. We can look and report, but we can't look at the noumena, so what would it be that we would be reporting about it? So, quite obviously, the noumena doesn't exist. Yet, what would it mean for me to say the noumena doesn't exist? The apparent answer is nothing.

What's the phenomenal? It seems we've defined the term so that it means everything we can experience. Can we speak knowledgeably of that beyond that which we can experience? No, that doesn't seem reasonable. Does that mean that only experience exists? No, that doesn't seem reasonable either. It would almost seem here as if we don't know what we're saying. Could it be that one of the most controversial and hotly debated topics in modern philosophy is just so many moves in a language-game prettied up with suggestive imagery?

Metaphysics eat themselves.

If you look at the etymology of these two words--phenomena and noumena--you will discover that they mean, in their most basic form, “to appear, to show” and “to conceive, of mind, nous” respectively.

Now, mind itself can only appear (exist) as a mental object (an object of thought), thus it can be considered objective, by that definition. When we read a book and contemplate what we consider to be the mind of an individual separate from us--say, the mind of a philosopher; or, the mind of Jesus the son of God--we would say that the book itself is objective by a different definition. The book is a physical object. But the thoughts we imagine to be contained by it are not, for that would certainly give the book a whole new thinking life of its own, no? Is not the body of Jesus the same in this way---his walking, living and breathing existence on this earth at some time notwithstanding? The body of Jesus is not “Jesus the man.”

Alright, let me see if I can provide a general summary of what I've said so far. First off, I said quite explicitly that I couldn't provide a definition that would ensure that one could properly classify any given observation. You'll remember that I also suggested that the reason for scientific rigor came from the very fact that its difficult to determine what the facts of the matter are. When I suggest that objective knowledge isn't entirely a matter of opinion, I mean to suggest that there is empirical evidence involved in such determinations, and thus such determinations are influenced by evidence in a way that aesthetic or ethical matters aren't. Obviously we can say that what sorts of food I like are influenced by my previous encounters with food, but if I eat something and dislike it, we should not say that my dislike of that food comes from a rational weighing of facts.

The facts of the matter are always what appear. What the heck else can? Limitations, on the other hand, can either be a deficiency or efficiency in classification/distinction--definition. And they are the only things one is ever certain of, when they have them, that is.

I’m going to stick to Jesus; I prefer him as a subject over food. If I saw Jesus walk on water and it was abundantly clear that no-one else had seen such a thing, if it is difficult, as you say, to determine what the facts of a matter are, what kind of objectivity would be involved on your part in determining the nature of that event--just that it is not likely? For me, the fact of the matter would be that I saw Jesus walk on water and nobody else did. For you, the fact of the matter would be that I said I saw Jesus walk on water, but neither you nor anyone else did. (See, I can be “objective”!)

So, by your own admission, it is abundantly clear that the empirical is in oh-so-many-ways ultimately uncertain, right? What does not seem so clear to you is the way in which the ability to distinguish between things is not uncertain. On what grounds do we look, then, to the empirical--the uncertain--to verify a logical truth? I am asking you from a deep, genuine desire to understand, ExI: on what certain grounds do we conclude that because the empirical is uncertain so too is the logical? I ask you this particularly because this piece of absolute truth is the logic that pins your entire philosophy together by overt demonstration. Is it because they--feeling/thought, object/subject, empirical/theoretical, matter/mind, physical/metaphysical, phenomena/noumena--are one and the same?

Ironic,

Matt: Think about what justifies the need to do an experiment multiple times before you can draw a conclusion from it. How was this conclusion drawn? By experimenting? No, by pure logic.

Ironic: I'll respond to the rest of your post when I get more time, but for the moment could you provide me an example of how one might derive the fact you stated above from pure logic?

Sure. Let me first recap a couple of things that I've said in order to pull everything together. First, we strive for certainty in all our knowledge. Second, to be certain about an empirical fact we would have to perform an experiment an infinite number of times taking measurements of infinite precision and accuracy. Even that wouldn't be enough to guarantee certainty, actually, but let's just leave it there as a pointer towards the direction we would have to head in order to achieve certainty.

Okay, so to answer the question of why it is that the idea of performing multiple experiments came about using pure logic: the simplest way to see this is to think about how doubt comes about. When someone performs an experiment, what in their experience of the experiment tells them that it was incomplete or insufficient? He was sitting there looking at what happened. Everything was in plain sight and if it wasn't, it obviously wouldn't be perceived. So, what could cause him to doubt it but introspective thinking and logic? Now, if you want an example demonstrating the purity of the logic, then this is going to have to get very abstract and metaphysical, so take care.

Let's take the example of Galileo testing Aristotle's hypothesis of gravity, which states that heavier objects fall faster than lighter objects. From what I understand, he took two balls of different weights and rolled them down a ramp of some sort. It turns out that they rolled down at the same speed.

Okay, metaphysics. A scientist conceiving of an experiment creates a mental category for the experiment. Let's just call it E for "elements of the experiment". When Galileo thought up his experiment he put gravity, the balls, the ramp, his hand to place the balls, the procedure of releasing the balls, and everything else about the experiment into E. Things not belonging to E by default fall into category U, "the rest of the universe". The thing that causes us to doubt is this: all of the objects in E are causes of the experiment, but the thing is, we still have this other category, U, which is obviously enormous, and the things in U are also causes influencing the experiment. Scientists try their best to isolate the things in E from the things in U, but there is metaphysically no way to do this, because E and U are causally dependent on each other due to the fact of their being artificial contrivances that divvy up an otherwise continuous universe. Ideally, everything in U should go into E and be accounted for in the experiment, but being limited beings we can't hope to achieve that. For one, there is no way to know all of the things in U. So, U causes us to doubt the results of the experiment, and reason that we would have to perform the experiment an infinite number of times in order to be sure that nothing in U is impacting the experiment in such a way that would force us to alter our hypothesis. So performing it multiple times is just a small stretch towards doing it an infinite number of times, many being closer to infinity than one.

Matt,

The "prior" part of a priori needs to be understood in the context of creating a logical argument.

OK.

If I were to try and empirically prove that Sapius is different from Matt, it would be silly, because I've already created the difference in conceiving of the question (assuming, of course, that Sapius and Matt are actually different persons).

Lets see what the logical argument here is. This is not that clear to me though.

You mean to say that questioning ‘Is Sapius different from Matt’ already assumes that they are different? Then what is the point in questioning? And how did one come about with that assumption in the first place? And is that really an assumption? Logically speaking.

S: You mean to say a baby has no prior awareness of things being different and hence does not know the difference between mama and papa unless and until it is able to verbally define so?

M: Not verbally, conceptually. The brain needs to sense both parents for awhile in order to form an imprint of them, which happens long before the baby begins learning to speak.

Of course, conceptually that is. The meaning of mama is conceptualized meaningfully before uttering. Other than that, I don’t see you have said any thing different than I have. All I mean is that the imprint is being “logically” differentiated even before it is conceptualized which necessarily needs words and language.

S: Yes, the baby might not KNOW that they are two different persons (as defined), but does that mean he has no sense experience of differentiation at all?

M: All differentiation occurs in the mind. The eye doesn't differentiate anything. It just gives data to the brain as-is.

How exactly does this relate to what I asked? So are you saying that a baby has a mind well before it has the capability of forming concepts?

S: I think it would be pretty difficult to define something if the differences were not experienced in the first place.

M: Yeah, I'm not denying that experience is necessary to physically form definitions in the brain. But that doesn't have anything to do with their use in logic. Although they are physically dependent on consciousness to exist, in a logical sense they are totally independent of consciousness. Definitions are timeless, meaning they can't be changed in any way due to the A=A principle.

I understand, but all I’m saying is that definitions are necessarily dependant on an experiential A=A principal as defined. In fact A=A principal is what consciousness works through, and A=A is a necessary principal for existence to be, irrelevant of one being aware of it.

I know I have gone a bit too far; may be we can talk about A=A some other time. It requires a vast understanding in its self.

Sapius,

Matt: The "prior" part of a priori needs to be understood in the context of creating a logical argument. If I were to try and empirically prove that Sapius is different from Matt, it would be silly, because I've already created the difference in conceiving of the question (assuming, of course, that Sapius and Matt are actually different persons).

Sapius: Lets see what the logical argument here is. This is not that clear to me though.

You mean to say that questioning ‘Is Sapius different from Matt’ already assumes that they are different?

I didn't realize this before, but the question "Is Sapius different from Matt" can be interpreted in two different ways, so this is getting kind of confusing. It's a legitimate thing to ask if you're asking who the names refer to. Say, if you don't know who Sapius is and you're wondering if Matt is called Sapius by his close friends or something. But that's not what I wanted to express. When I write "Sapius" and "Matt" above, I'm specifically talking about the meanings of the words, and assume that they are known.

The distinction I'm trying to draw lies within the different usages of the empirical definition, and it's pretty subtle unless I can find the right words to express it.

In an empirical definition there lies two questions: "What is it?" and "Does it (physically) exist?" The former is a question of knowledge a priori. The latter is a question of knowledge a posteriori. We need to answer the former in order to even make sense of the latter, and the answer to that question is found in pure logic. That's all I'm really trying to point out with all this.

Then what is the point in questioning?

There is none. That's what I'm trying to point out. The fact of their being different is known a priori and therefore is already fully known without resorting to experience to verify it.

And how did one come about with that assumption in the first place? And is that really an assumption? Logically speaking.

Well, when I said, "assuming they are different", I was speaking from my own perspective as the person giving this argument, rather than from the general one of someone trying to empirically prove difference. I'm giving an argument about another argument, so there are two levels to deal with, and it's kind of tricky to keep them straight.

But if you were talking about the other level, maybe you mean to ask "How did the definitions of 'Sapius' and 'Matt' come about?" And my answer is: from experience. Although, logic plays a part, too. When you enter a strange room for the first time and see a flash of red in the first moment, and see the same flash of red with the white squiggles in the next, it's logic telling you that those two impressions are of the same thing. It's logic that guides one's attention while the brain absorbs the series of impressions and forms the concept of a red book with white lettering on the spine. So in experience, logic and experience arise together, but in logic they arise in alternation as we separate them and analyze them individually. So, I guess the ultimate answer to that question is that a definition arises from both experience and logic. Experience doesn't even exist without logic, but logic can operate independently of experience.

S: You mean to say a baby has no prior awareness of things being different and hence does not know the difference between mama and papa unless and until it is able to verbally define so?

M: Not verbally, conceptually. The brain needs to sense both parents for awhile in order to form an imprint of them, which happens long before the baby begins learning to speak.

S: Of course, conceptually that is. The meaning of mama is conceptualized meaningfully before uttering. Other than that, I don’t see you have said any thing different than I have. All I mean is that the imprint is being “logically” differentiated even before it is conceptualized which necessarily needs words and language.

Yeah, I think we're saying the same thing, but I don't normally tie conceptualizing and language together. They are two different things in my mind. The concept is the meaning of the language used to describe it, and a blurb of language is a description of a concept.

S: Yes, the baby might not KNOW that they are two different persons (as defined), but does that mean he has no sense experience of differentiation at all?

M: All differentiation occurs in the mind. The eye doesn't differentiate anything. It just gives data to the brain as-is.

S: How exactly does this relate to what I asked? So are you saying that a baby has a mind well before it has the capability of forming concepts?

Well, when you said, "no sense experience of differentiation", that sounds to me like you're saying differentiation comes directly from sense experience without any conceptualization going on. I was arguing against that idea. Sorry if I misunderstood you.

S: I think it would be pretty difficult to define something if the differences were not experienced in the first place.

M: Yeah, I'm not denying that experience is necessary to physically form definitions in the brain. But that doesn't have anything to do with their use in logic. Although they are physically dependent on consciousness to exist, in a logical sense they are totally independent of consciousness. Definitions are timeless, meaning they can't be changed in any way due to the A=A principle.

S: I understand, but all I’m saying is that definitions are necessarily dependant on an experiential A=A principal as defined. In fact A=A principal is what consciousness works through, and A=A is a necessary principal for existence to be, irrelevant of one being aware of it.

I know I have gone a bit too far; may be we can talk about A=A some other time. It requires a vast understanding in its self.

Yeah, I think I'm not understanding what you're talking about.

Matt: The distinction I'm trying to draw lies within the different usages of the empirical definition, and it's pretty subtle unless I can find the right words to express it.

In an empirical definition there lies two questions: "What is it?" and "Does it (physically) exist?" The former is a question of knowledge a priori. The latter is a question of knowledge a posteriori. We need to answer the former in order to even make sense of the latter, and the answer to that question is found in pure logic. That's all I'm really trying to point out with all this.

I have been wrestling with this off and on all day, and between you and Sapius you are getting closer to my mental block on a priori. A posteriori isn't as hard a concept as a priori...or it doesn't seem to be so.

"What is it?"

My father was telling us about his first encounter with a nun when he was little boy of 6. He had been living in a very small remote city where there was no indoor plumbing, he never knew such a thing existed. So, when his father went out of state to start a new business, he was sent to a Catholic school at the age of 6. The nuns took him into the bathroom, showed him long urinal with water that ran all the time, and told him what to do with it. Until then, he had no concept of a urinal nor would he know what it was if he happened upon it by accident.

So, given that he accidentally happened upon it and had no clue what it was how would he know what it was or distinguish it from a place to wash your hands if he had not been told? The "what is it" is part of my problem. You speak of the visual stimulation you get from seeing a book and your mind recognizes it as such because you had to have had some type of association to know what it was. If a priori is not innate and it is not derived from sensory experience, then how do you know what "it" is? Where is a priori derived?

Obviously, if my father was told what it was and how to use, the next time he was in a place that had one, he would have that original impression mapped. How do you acquire the form of understanding if you have never seen one before?

Am I making any sense at all and/or do you see where I am getting hung up?

Passthrough,

So, given that he accidentally happened upon it and had no clue what it was how would he know what it was or distinguish it from a place to wash your hands if he had not been told? The "what is it" is part of my problem. You speak of the visual stimulation you get from seeing a book and your mind recognizes it as such because you had to have had some type of association to know what it was. If a priori is not innate and it is not derived from sensory experience, then how do you know what "it" is? Where is a priori derived?

Obviously, if my father was told what it was and how to use, the next time he was in a place that had one, he would have that original impression mapped. How do you acquire the form of understanding if you have never seen one before?

Am I making any sense at all and/or do you see where I am getting hung up?

You're taking the line of thought about the formation of an object in the mind a little too far. I'm talking about this on the most basic possible level. An object that is sensed and consequently becomes a concept in the mind doesn't need any practical human stuff attached to it, like a purpose or a function or even a word to call it by, in order to become a thing in consciousness. All that is required is for there to be a functional memory in order to remember the sense impression. So when I said, "a red book with white lettering on the spine", I was just describing the object; I didn't mean to say that those words must appear in the mind. So it's really a simple thing that I'm trying to describe, it's just hard to put into words because the words are far more complicated than the idea.

But a priori is merely memory. It all rests on comparing whether two concepts are the same or different. If a statement is not making a simple comparison of ideas then it's a posteriori. For example, if you define a "urinal" as a "toilet that removes piss from the environment", then you know a priori that a urinal removes piss from the environment. But if you say something that isn't inherently part of the definition like "all urinals are white" or something, then that would be a posteriori knowledge, because it didn't come from your definition of "urinal" but from your experience of actual urinals.

So a priori is pure logic, which is always about definitional truths, and this ability is innate and comes from having memory/consciousness. The whole idea of philosophy is to become conscious of your definitions in order to be certain that they are consistent, so you can form a rational view of the world.

For example, if you were to say that the statement "all urinals exist in bathrooms" is a priori, then you would be violating the definition, because it had nothing about bathrooms in it. If you wanted the concept of "urinal" to include being in a bathroom, then you would have to update the definition to something like, "a toilet in a bathroom that removes piss from the environment". But if you were to remove a urinal from a bathroom, then by that definition it would no longer be a urinal. So you would have to qualify the bathroom part by updating it to "a toilet which is installed in a bathroom that removes piss from the environment". We don't normally care about precise definitions for empirical objects because you could spend a lifetime on them. That's just the nature of empirical objects. They can't be isolated from their environment and consequently can never be completely defined.

This definition manipulation might seem like a useless exercise but it's important skill to have, especially when dealing with philosophical concepts that don't depend on experience.

So that's how I look at all this and it's not quite the same as Kant's view. Kant's ideas were a bit too vague. You can read about his on my little Kant page that I made:

http://home.earthlink.net/~msgregory/th ... eason.html

He pretty much covers a priori and a posteriori in the first three sections of the introduction. (The introduction of Critique of Pure Reason is all that I have up there at the moment)

Matt Gregory wrote:Passthrough,

You're taking the line of thought about the formation of an object in the mind a little too far. I'm talking about this on the most basic possible level. An object that is sensed and consequently becomes a concept in the mind doesn't need any practical human stuff attached to it, like a purpose or a function or even a word to call it by, in order to become a thing in consciousness. All that is required is for there to be a functional memory in order to remember the sense impression.

I have to run to work so I don't have time to look at your page just yet, but I think you answered my dilemma.

If one has never seen a book before, and they walk into a room and see an object on the desk, they sense this object and it becomes a concept. Later, the teacher walks into the room and instructs the person on "book", in other words, attaches all the properties and characteristics of "book", which is a posteriori.

The next time, they walk into a library and see many of these same conceptual objects they saw the other day, through Kant's categorical understandings of space and cause and effect, they know "what it is", which is a priori.

Is this a correct interpretation of a priori? I hope?

I don't know, your description is too vague! There shouldn't be any hope involved, though; you need to think about this until it's crystal clear in your mind.

I've thought of yet another way to describe it, though: if a conclusion is drawn from something you've willfully imagined, then it's certain and therefore a priori. The reason certainty is possible is because we can reason about things in our imagination, which doesn't require an external referent in order to verify its reality. The appearance of imagination is certain, and it's not necessary to know where this appearance comes from in order to reason about it, so any conclusions drawn from this mere appearance are certain.

Well, I've given you far too many words already, so I'd better stop. I think you're just going to have to meditate on this problem for awhile; I'm not sure it's something that can be learned through descriptions. I'm just kind of describing it for my own amusement, really.

Matt,

I didn't realize this before, but the question "Is Sapius different from Matt" can be interpreted in two different ways, so this is getting kind of confusing.

I guess.

It's a legitimate thing to ask if you're asking who the names refer to. Say, if you don't know who Sapius is and you're wondering if Matt is called Sapius by his close friends or something.

I don’t know about the legitimacy, but I think may be this “wondering” part causes all the confusion.

But that's not what I wanted to express. When I write "Sapius" and "Matt" above, I'm specifically talking about the meanings of the words, and assume that they are known.

What do the words mean other than what they define? If I don't know what they mean, I will naturally ask.

In an empirical definition there lies two questions: "What is it?" and "Does it (physically) exist?" The former is a question of knowledge a priori. The latter is a question of knowledge a posteriori. We need to answer the former in order to even make sense of the latter, and the answer to that question is found in pure logic. That's all I'm really trying to point out with all this.

Hummm… I think I will get back to the ‘pure logic’ part later, which according to me is none other than ‘reasoning’. Try exchanging just those two words above, and tell me what the difference is.

Sapius: You mean to say that questioning ‘Is Sapius different from Matt’ already assumes that they are different? Then what is the point in questioning?

Scott: There is none. That's what I'm trying to point out. The fact of their being different is known a priori and therefore is already fully known without resorting to experience to verify it.

How do you define ‘experience’? Isn’t sensual perception an experience?

Well, when I said, "assuming they are different", I was speaking from my own perspective as the person giving this argument, rather than from the general one of someone trying to empirically prove difference. I'm giving an argument about another argument, so there are two levels to deal with, and it's kind of tricky to keep them straight.

Very tricky indeed. Do you think the conceptualization of a priory and a posteriori could be responsible for all the confusion?

But if you were talking about the other level, maybe you mean to ask "How did the definitions of 'Sapius' and 'Matt' come about?" And my answer is: from experience. Although, logic plays a part, too.

Of course, logic plays a very crucial part if ‘understanding’ means anything at all. But I need your definition of ‘experience’ to understand it more clearly.

So in experience, logic and experience arise together, but in logic they arise in alternation as we separate them and analyze them individually. So, I guess the ultimate answer to that question is that a definition arises from both experience and logic.

I think PT is handling the red book part, so let us just look at your conclusions here.

What about language? Do definitions not need a language to logically express or understand an experience? Be it even in your own head.

Experience doesn't even exist without logic, but logic can operate independently of experience.

I really need to know your definition of ‘experience’.

S: You mean to say a baby has no prior awareness of things being different and hence does not know the difference between mama and papa unless and until it is able to verbally define so?

M: Not verbally, conceptually. The brain needs to sense both parents for awhile in order to form an imprint of them, which happens long before the baby begins learning to speak.

S: Of course, conceptually that is. The meaning of mama is conceptualized meaningfully before uttering. Other than that, I don’t see you have said any thing different than I have. All I mean is that the imprint is being “logically” differentiated even before it is conceptualized which necessarily needs words and language.

M: Yeah, I think we're saying the same thing, but I don't normally tie conceptualizing and language together. They are two different things in my mind. The concept is the meaning of the language used to describe it, and a blurb of language is a description of a concept.

I think I have not been that clear on this matter.

The description of a concept has to necessarily mean what it describes, and what is described is necessarily understood as and what it means – through language all along. So when using language one is always actually only exchanging, or thinking about that which is signified, not the blurb of a character which is but a symbol of what is being signified, We don’t understand “words” as it were, but what they mean. Isn’t it? So how is a written word any different than what it means? Unless it doesn’t mean what it says.

Sapius: All I mean is that the imprint is being “logically” differentiated even before it is conceptualized which necessarily needs words and language.

Let me reword what I said earlier.

The sensual imprint is already a differentiated imprint, and is a logically consistent one; as in a baby who has yet to know what “conceptualization” means, or is actually “conceptualizing” it mentally through naming things. It simply senses a thing to a thing difference, which has to necessarily be consistent.

So do animals, and their ‘differentiation’ is perfectly a logical one, otherwise they could not operate or interact with their environment in a consistent manner. An animal does not need to define a leaf from a branch, or a tree trunk from the ground to differentiate between them. Yet some how it goes for a green leaf to munch on. It makes use of multiple sensual inputs that are automatically calculated and result in a logical output. Guided by trial and error.

BTW…

M: A priori knowledge, pure logic, is confined to knowledge that comes from definitions.

S: You mean to say a baby has no prior awareness of things being different and hence does not know the difference between mama and papa unless and until it is able to verbally define so?

M: Not verbally, conceptually.

I forgot to ask you earlier. What do you mean here? Because for me conceptually and verbally means the same.

So, are you saying that a baby is conceptually aware of the difference but not verbally? Is a direct sensual differentiation already a conceptualized one? So how about animals? Do they live in an conceptualized world?

Yeah, I think I'm not understanding what you're talking about.

A=A (Recognition through differentiation). In other words; raw consciousness. That a thing is a thing and not something else, not just by definition, but let’s say by the virtue of being logically undeniable. Hence A=A (as defined) is not just a conceptualized principle, but is consciousness in action itself, irrelevant of conceptualization.

Does this make sense?

passthrough:

If one has never seen a book before, and they walk into a room and see an object on the desk, that is, they sense this object and it becomes [delete "a concept" and insert:] an object of consciousness for at least that moment. Later, the teacher walks into the room and instructs the person on "book", in other words, attaches all the properties and characteristics of "book" [no, the teacher defines the characteristics and properties of “book” using language (that is, defines it in the symbolic)], hence, “all knowledge begins with experience” and, as such, [delete "which"] is a posteriori. Later, again, that same person sees an object and identifies its characteristics and properties with the a posteriori knowledge comprising its understanding “book”: “All texts contain ideas.” This is a general rule (since the individual in question has only experienced a specific number of books) and, as such, represents knowledge a priori, BUT impure because it can always be reduced to an initial experience of books.

Some Kant (from Matt’s excerpt) for contemplation:

For whence could our experience itself acquire certainty, if all the rules on which it depends were themselves empirical, and consequently fortuitous? No one, therefore, can admit the validity of the use of such rules as first principles.

You wrote:

The next time, they walk into a library and see many of these same conceptual objects they saw the other day, through Kant's categorical understandings of space and cause and effect, they know "what it is", which is a priori.

Is this a correct interpretation of a priori? I hope?

No. A “conceptual object” is, by definition, an abstract thing that presupposes consciousness. It's a category within which lies the difference between a mental image picture and an idea; between henid and thought. It is not the material thing “book” sensed by the senses but facilitates the experience of a book as a book. Within this category is the core distinction made between animal and human consciousness; where it exists, of course…

[General edit for clarity.]

Given one has never seen a book before, and they walk into a room and see an object on the desk “that is.”

They sense this object and it becomes an object of consciousness for at least that moment.

Later, the teacher walks into the room and defines the characteristics and properties of “book” using language (that is, defines it in the symbolic).

Hence, “all knowledge begins with experience” and, as such is a posteriori.

Later, again, that same person sees an object and identifies its characteristics and properties with the a posteriori knowledge comprising its understanding “book”: “All texts contain ideas.”

This is a general rule (since the individual in question has only experienced a specific number of books) and, as such, represents knowledge a priori, BUT impure because it can always be reduced to an initial experience of books.

“All texts contain ideas” is an a priori conclusion from an experience(s) that was a posteriori.

I have more to question, but I edited it out to think about it some more...

Sapius,

Matt: But that's not what I wanted to express. When I write "Sapius" and "Matt" above, I'm specifically talking about the meanings of the words, and assume that they are known.

Sapius: What do the words mean other than what they define? If I don't know what they mean, I will naturally ask.

Right. But once you ask and find out that "Sapius" means you and "Matt" means me, then by which mode of knowledge do you know that Sapius and Matt are different? Do you figure it out by logic or by experience?

Matt: In an empirical definition there lies two questions: "What is it?" and "Does it (physically) exist?" The former is a question of knowledge a priori. The latter is a question of knowledge a posteriori. We need to answer the former in order to even make sense of the latter, and the answer to that question is found in pure logic. That's all I'm really trying to point out with all this.

Sapius: Hummm… I think I will get back to the ‘pure logic’ part later, which according to me is none other than ‘reasoning’. Try exchanging just those two words above, and tell me what the difference is.

Pure logic is reasoning that doesn't depend on experience for validity. "2+2=4" is pure logic, but "Ouch, I bumped my head; I'd better keep the cupboard door closed" is not. They are both reasoning, though.

Sapius: You mean to say that questioning ‘Is Sapius different from Matt’ already assumes that they are different? Then what is the point in questioning?

Matt: There is none. That's what I'm trying to point out. The fact of their being different is known a priori and therefore is already fully known without resorting to experience to verify it.

Sapius: How do you define ‘experience’? Isn’t sensual perception an experience?

Experience = knowledge derived from the senses; knowledge that doesn't come from logic

Matt: Well, when I said, "assuming they are different", I was speaking from my own perspective as the person giving this argument, rather than from the general one of someone trying to empirically prove difference. I'm giving an argument about another argument, so there are two levels to deal with, and it's kind of tricky to keep them straight.

Sapius: Very tricky indeed. Do you think the conceptualization of a priory and a posteriori could be responsible for all the confusion?

They are just hard to explain. Or maybe I'm just not any good at explaining them.

Matt: But if you were talking about the other level, maybe you mean to ask "How did the definitions of 'Sapius' and 'Matt' come about?" And my answer is: from experience. Although, logic plays a part, too.

Sapius: Of course, logic plays a very crucial part if ‘understanding’ means anything at all. But I need your definition of ‘experience’ to understand it more clearly.

Experience = knowledge derived from the senses; knowledge that doesn't come from logic

Matt: So in experience, logic and experience arise together, but in logic they arise in alternation as we separate them and analyze them individually. So, I guess the ultimate answer to that question is that a definition arises from both experience and logic.

Sapius: I think PT is handling the red book part, so let us just look at your conclusions here.

What about language? Do definitions not need a language to logically express or understand an experience? Be it even in your own head.

No, logic is too simple to require language. Some animals can think logically to a certain extent without any language, it's just that their definitions aren't verbal. They just have mental images of sense impressions to work with. I think language helps us form complex ideas and reason about them, but logic works just the same no matter how complex the ideas are that it works with.

Matt: Experience doesn't even exist without logic, but logic can operate independently of experience.

Sapius: I really need to know your definition of ‘experience’.

Experience = knowledge derived from the senses; knowledge that doesn't come from logic

Matt: Yeah, I think we're saying the same thing, but I don't normally tie conceptualizing and language together. They are two different things in my mind. The concept is the meaning of the language used to describe it, and a blurb of language is a description of a concept.

Sapius: I think I have not been that clear on this matter.

The description of a concept has to necessarily mean what it describes, and what is described is necessarily understood as and what it means – through language all along. So when using language one is always actually only exchanging, or thinking about that which is signified, not the blurb of a character which is but a symbol of what is being signified, We don’t understand “words” as it were, but what they mean. Isn’t it? So how is a written word any different than what it means? Unless it doesn’t mean what it says.

Yeah, and if we are talking about the words themselves, then they don't mean what they say. I'll usually put the word in quotes when I'm talking about the word itself.

Sapius (earlier): All I mean is that the imprint is being “logically” differentiated even before it is conceptualized which necessarily needs words and language.

Sapius: Let me reword what I said earlier.

The sensual imprint is already a differentiated imprint, and is a logically consistent one;

Not necessarily. It takes some time for a thought to become fully formed in the brain, and a lot of thoughts never become distinct enough to make conscious use of them. Henids. Another thing is, most people operate emotionally; their emotions dictate what they pay attention to and what in their experience becomes differentiated in their mind. What this means is that when an object makes an imprint on their mind, their emotions become imprinted along with the object, so their concepts aren't fully differentiated, but are part object and part emotion. Henids.

as in a baby who has yet to know what “conceptualization” means, or is actually “conceptualizing” it mentally through naming things. It simply senses a thing to a thing difference, which has to necessarily be consistent.

So do animals, and their ‘differentiation’ is perfectly a logical one, otherwise they could not operate or interact with their environment in a consistent manner. An animal does not need to define a leaf from a branch, or a tree trunk from the ground to differentiate between them. Yet some how it goes for a green leaf to munch on. It makes use of multiple sensual inputs that are automatically calculated and result in a logical output. Guided by trial and error.

Well, babies aren't very consistent, and animals are only consistent when they are in an environment that they are adapted to and are often driven by instinct.

M: A priori knowledge, pure logic, is confined to knowledge that comes from definitions.

S: You mean to say a baby has no prior awareness of things being different and hence does not know the difference between mama and papa unless and until it is able to verbally define so?

M: Not verbally, conceptually.

S: I forgot to ask you earlier. What do you mean here? Because for me conceptually and verbally means the same.

So, are you saying that a baby is conceptually aware of the difference but not verbally? Is a direct sensual differentiation already a conceptualized one? So how about animals? Do they live in an conceptualized world?

Yes, I would say so. If you wouldn't call the stuff in an animal's head "conceptual", then what would you call it?

Matt: Yeah, I think I'm not understanding what you're talking about.

Sapius: A=A (Recognition through differentiation). In other words; raw consciousness. That a thing is a thing and not something else, not just by definition, but let’s say by the virtue of being logically undeniable. Hence A=A (as defined) is not just a conceptualized principle, but is consciousness in action itself, irrelevant of conceptualization.

Does this make sense?

Yeah, yeah, that how I look at it.

Matt,

Well, can you tell me what the purpose of the idea is?

I'm lazy when it comes to explaining other peoples ideas, so I'll just provide a few quotes that should answer your question.

"For a large class of cases — though not for all — in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language" -Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 43

"In order to address the countless multiplicity of uses, their un- fixedness, and their being "part of an activity", Wittgenstein introduces the key concept of ‘language-game’. He never explicitly defines it since, as opposed to the earlier ‘picture’, for instance, this new concept is made to do work for a more fluid, more diversified, and more activity-oriented perspective on language." -Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Well, what's the problem? You wrote two big paragraphs assuming there's this problem, but you didn't even state what it is.

My point was that words don't point. "2+2=4" doesn't point to anything in particular. It can be interpreted as an empirical concept, a deductive concept, a tautology, or an odd bunch of meaningless marks. If we interpret as a tautology we can better represent it with 4=4 or p=p or just p. What use is knowing "p"? It's a worthless symbol. If we take any meaning from a tautological statement beyond p (which is reducible to "" in real world terms), we run into the problem of regress. One learns nothing from a tautology. If we interpret "2+2=4" as a non-tautological deductive concept, we lose the very certainty that you seem to cherish, given that we'll once again run into the problem of regress.

But none of this is here nor there. My point is that logical statements are always universal statements. The mind naturally functions this way.

Abductive logic--the only logic that seems to provide new knowledge--is never universal. Thus, your notion that logical statements are only universal is false. Furthermore, the mind does not naturally function in such a manner. A newborn doesn't know a thing about definitions, propositions, qualifiers, or other things that it will later begin to learn ostensively if raised in our society. Such things come with language. Shut off the words in your head for a second and just observe (seriously: try it). Tried it yet? I'll wait...

Alright. Now tell me about all the logical notions you came up with well your mind wasn't mucking about with language. I'll tell you exactly what sorts of things you reasoned out: nothing. Nevertheless, your mind still functioned, you still could move about and respond to things. I've gone hours without a single word popping into my head, and was able to perform daily tasks just fine. Pick up Jeff Hawkins On Intelligence some time if you want a masterful account of how the brain actually functions.

I'm talking about proof of a truth. There's only one way. That proposition you gave is not a truth as it's an uncertain empirical proposition. These types of propositions are never universal because they would have to be qualified infinitely.

So it isn't true that George Washington was the first president of the United States? You're obviously using the term "truth" wrong here. If you only accept things qualified to certainty as true, then the only truth you accept is "". We can see this because anything that isn't reducible to an empty statement faces the problem of regress. What you're advocating is complete skeptisism. Anything we derive from p (an empty symbol) or p=p is reducible to p. You can't deduce anything from p.

Well, "coca-cola bottle" needs to be defined and a definition is not empirical, even if it is inspired by experience because definitions don't depend on experience.

The salient point here is that "coca-cola bottle" refers to a thing in the world. We generally use the term to talk of that thing. If that thing were to disappear, then we'd only have our memories of coca-cola bottles and our sound pattern or scribbles that invoke in our minds (by way of automatic association) a visual pattern that once had the potential to be more then just a memory. Which really cuts to the heart of my problem with your epistemological views: I can't imagine why we should say that truth comes about because patterns of sound or scribbles are arranged in a particular way. Those patterns of sound or scribbles should only be called "true" (in a meaningful sense) when their interpreted meaning can be said to correspond to actual states of affairs. "I'm typing right now" is a true proposition. "p=p" is just a scribble.

First, we strive for certainty in all our knowledge.

I strive to learn about the world. The only thing that's certain is that which is before me in any given instant, and such certainty falls apart the second I attempt to analyze it.

When someone performs an experiment, what in their experience of the experiment tells them that it was incomplete or insufficient?

When I was a kid I knew that I had a fish that swam about. He was pretty awesome. One day he stopped swimming about, even though he had always swam about before. That and a thousand similar experiences taught me that change happens.

So, what could cause him to doubt it but introspective thinking and logic?

Experience.

passthrough, let me beef it up a little.

If one has never seen a book before, and they walk into a room and see an object on the desk, that is, they sense this object and it becomes an object of consciousness for at least that moment. Later, the teacher walks into the room and instructs the person on "book." The teacher defines the characteristics and properties of “book” using language (that is, defines it in the symbolic). Hence, Kant‘s conclusion “all knowledge begins with experience (but does not necessarily arise from it*).” Knowledge derived from experience is thus a posteriori knowledge. Later, this same person sees an object and identifies its characteristics and properties with the a posteriori knowledge comprising its understanding “book” and arrives at the general rule: “All texts contain ideas.” This is a general rule since the individual in question has only experienced a specific number of books and not all books and, since this knowledge of “all” is an impossibility for any single person to derive from experience, the proposition, represents knowledge a priori, BUT impure because the knowledge about “all texts” can be ascribed to the initial experience of a limited number of books.

*So, Kant continues on his journey, seeking after that knowledge which has absolutely no derivative connection to experience itself; that is, pure a priori. And his reason? …

For whence could our experience itself acquire certainty, if all the rules on which it depends were themselves empirical, and consequently fortuitous?

If all the rules on which our experience depends were themselves empirical (acquired by observation/experiment) and consequently accidental/random, AND not principles existing “a priori in cognition”, there could be no certainty in experience itself--that is, there would be no certainty if you had to attain experience itself by observation and experiment. It would be like having to test and observe whether or not you ate an apple before you knew you had eaten one.

No one, therefore, can admit the validity of the use of such rules (a posteriori/derived from experience) as first principles.

That this follows should be pretty straightforward.

It would be an understatement to say prudence, in contemplating the above, demands bearing the meaning of the following in mind.

Kant:

Necessity and strict universality, therefore, are infallible tests for distinguishing pure from empirical knowledge, and are inseparably connected with each other. But as in the use of these criteria (Ha! Talk about understatements insofar as what follows!) the empirical limitation is sometimes more easily detected than the contingency of the judgement, or the unlimited universality which we attach to a judgement is often a more convincing proof than its necessity, it may be advisable to use the criteria separately, each being by itself infallible.

I have got to rush off to work, so I don't have time to digest and respond back to you Leyla, but thank you. You hit on something last night that helped me at least realize what my mental block was but I have to do more research on it today and read your new post.

The problem stems not from "All books have ideas" a priori knowledge but the fact that you perceived of the book at all. It all goes back to Kant's categories which he argues are a priori, such as the law of geometry and his proof on space, all of which he calls intuits. Your "henid" got me there last night. So I dug into Critique of Pure Reason to find what he called it.

It is predicated, perhaps not from him directly, but from Plato's discourse between Socrates and Menos and the slave boy's knowledge of geometrical laws without having ever been taught. My problem is also, and I may have misunderstood our book, that he does not believe these to be innate NOR a posteriori...so how is it they come to be? He logics through this as well in COPR, so I am going to work through that one too, intimating one possibility being God, I think.

I think I must understand this before I can really process what you guys are telling me because we have to first start with the perception of the book with his category of space which THEN leads into "All books have ideas. (In a general sense, I understand what you mean by the fact that it cannot be universal)." I have a pretty good idea of a priori in this sense. The problem lies with this intuition to perceive the book...in my very loose understanding it's like he is saying the object conforms to the concept held within the category that is a priori, which he calls intuition.

I worked on this some last night and I will work on it a little more today, but I have a test on Saturday so most of my time has to be working in prep for the test.

Most of all, I appreciate you guys jumping in there. I think we are almost there. Have you guys considered teaching? Although, I guess you already are!