GENIUS FORUMS

.


Automatically A=A, there is: A=not-not-A

(If that's not enough, there is also: not-A=not-A)

Both are A=A. It doesn't matter what A is.

Since A=A is inevitable to consciousness, distinction is also inevitable.



--

Even though Reality is not a thing (for it could then be not and be), it is distinctly "something" by memory of distinction (something is distinguished from what it isn't). Cause and effect.

But since a thing-hood (distinctiveness) is never not, i.e. A is A, Reality is not distinctly something. Memory is the same A.

Distinguishing, and thus creation itself, is an illusion, because any isn't-A is still A=A.

Whenever there "is", (i.e. relative existence, i.e. definitions, i.e. symbolism), there is a contrast between an A and another A. The first A is contrasted with what it is not, directly it exists (memory); the same goes for the second A. The second A is a dividing-up of the first A into "itself, and what it is distinct from". This is just A=A again, on itself. A "second" memory.

I wonder whether this is the "difference" between deductive and inductive logic: one is "identical identity", the other is "non-identical identity".




.
[edit: added "Cause and effect".]

"Non-identical identity" - what is that?

Both deductive and inductive logic make use of the same process of identifying identical elements within separate threads of information. But they differ in other ways.

Inductive logic is a process of infering universal principles or generalizations from what is observed in a limited number of specific cases. For example, if we observe in a hundred cases that women are shorter than men, we can infer that, as a general rule, women are shorter than men.

Of course, this form of logic can never yield absolute certainty, because we can never be sure that the limited number of cases that we observe and infer from are truly repesentative of the situation. For all we know, these cases could easily be exceptions to the rule, not representatives of it.

Because of its nature, inductive logic is primarily an empirical tool. We use it all the time in our daily lives, scientists constantly use it in their attempt to reach conclusions about the laws of nature, and philosophers use it to form generalizations about human behaviour/psychology and the like. It's also useful in formulating theories about the nature of Reality - although it can never be used to prove these theories beyond all doubt. For that, deductive logic is needed.

Where does your "non-identical identity" fit into all this?

-

DavidQuinn000 wrote:"Non-identical identity" - what is that?

My thinking is a bit ad hoc here, as I haven't gotten to a universal on inductive logic (ironic that one can't use inductive logic to understand it).

The way I've been distinguishing absolute truths (deductive logic) from relative truths (inductive logic) was based on two ideas:

If the Absolute is like a tree, then the relative is a leaf to a leaf.

If deduction is based on identicality (A=A), then induction is based on non-identicality (A is property x, and property x is not the same as A). A "is" property x, it isn't identical with it, e.g. An orange is round.

Both deductive and inductive logic make use of the same process of identifying identical elements within separate threads of information. But they differ in other ways.

Taking my first idea, if the tree exists, then where is the separate thread of information, let alone the identical element that is in it? Is not there only one thread for the causation of a memory (reflecting the tree on itself)?

Inductive logic is a process of infering universal principles or generalizations from what is observed in a limited number of specific cases.

If a tree appears, then no matter what I call it, it appears "universally" as what it is. How is just the one appearance uncertain to be what it is?

Perhaps induction is actually the process of defining any particular thing to be what it is, because I could not know the appearance as a unique thing, unless there was a contrast with many similar but not identical things. Nevertheless, I would still know automatically, that this appearance was itself, compared to all those different appearances. Then, because of the concept of all those different types, I'd reach a universal "type" - say, the abstraction "tree".

You're saying I could not form the universal abstraction "tree", ever, because I may not have all the unique types of it.

In other words, none of my abstractions about particular things are certain, because they're relative to appearances, which are infinite. But I can be certain of the abstraction "thing".

Now, I get it. Science is purely inductive, but philosophy is deductive.

But why "separate threads of information"? I tried exploring this, but can't make sense of it. Do you mean, different levels of complexity?

[Inductive logic is..] also useful in formulating theories about the nature of Reality - although it can never be used to prove these theories beyond all doubt. For that, deductive logic is needed.

Using inductive logic to arrive at the universal, by analogy, is never going to work. How can that be called "useful"? Are you referring to creating "temporary abodes" for the ego to rest in?

Where does your "non-identical identity" fit into all this?

Automatically, one can't use the "A is property x" about Reality. It doesn't have an identity which is used to define itself (i.e. a particular part).

But it could be used about some part of Reality, such as "a woman is shorter than a man", since "shorter than a man" is not a property identical to "woman", but rather one of a woman's properties.


.

Excellent.

Now, to my mind, we're talking.

I eagerly await David's reply.

I've been working really hard on this Logic stuff, and I think I finally have it figured out, I challenge any thinker out there to try to find holes in my reasoning...
-------------------------------------------------------------

All sages have beards

David Quinn has a beard

Therefore David Quinn is a sage.

-------------------------------------------------------------

The Cosmic Prostitute is jealous of Quinn’s Beard

Monkeys feel Jealousy

Therefore the Cosmic Prostitute is a monkey.

-------------------------------------------------------------

David Quinn wrote:

Both deductive and inductive logic make use of the same process of identifying identical elements within separate threads of information. But they differ in other ways.

Kelly Jones responded:

Now, I get it. Science is purely inductive, but philosophy is deductive.

But why "separate threads of information"? I tried exploring this, but can't make sense of it. Do you mean, different levels of complexity?

I think when David says ‘separate threads of information’ that is just his way of saying that there is only ‘relationship’. There is no such thing as one isolated thing. Something can only be recognized and thought about only in relationship to something else.

The earth, the moon and the sun for example could all be considered separate threads of information with identical elements (the identical elements being their roundness, and their elliptical trajectories).

And of course the three different eliptical trajectories are each unique, yet share identical elements (although its probably not a good idea to fragment things to that extreme, to divide an eliptical trajectory from a planetary body is just taking things too far, because the eliptical trajectory is totally dependant upon the qualities of a body)

Logic depends on acknowledging the fact of relationship.

Another example is: if I were to stumble upon a statue, it would be deductive logic to explain the existence of the statue by inferring a sculptor. The sculptor and the statue are two separate threads of information - - but is there a significant element within the statue that is identical to the sculptor?

There are some really dull and obvious similarities such as, both the sculptor and the sculpture are subject to gravity….?

This is pretty new to me, it would be nice to hear more from Quinn or anyone who has a good handle on this….

DavidQuinn000 wrote:Of course, this form of logic can never yield absolute certainty, because we can never be sure that the limited number of cases that we observe and infer from are truly repesentative of the situation. For all we know, these cases could easily be exceptions to the rule, not representatives of it.

A very minor nit to pick: You can make inferences about sets based on a limited number of representatives, if those sets have finite number of elements. If there are a finite number of elements, it is possible to sample the entire set.

I may not be able to (theoretically) reach a conclusion about "women", but I can reach a definite conclusion about "American women who are alive today," a group which (at a given moment) has definable and measurable average height and weight, and definable and measurable variances around those averages, and these can be measured to an arbitrary degree of accuracy.

Ryan,

Unfortunately, I have very little formal education. Hence, my "logic vocab" leaves a lot to be desired. However, I can see -- as a thinker -- that there is definitely something wrong with the structure of your argument here:

The Cosmic Prostitute is jealous of Quinn’s Beard

Monkeys feel Jealousy

Therefore the Cosmic Prostitute is a monkey.

It's not hard to see, really. Just compare it to your first argument.

Now, I'm not saying you're not a monkey. I just think you might have the wrong reasoning for it. :)

PS: I haven't forgotten about your other question. I appreciate your patience.

DHodges wrote:A very minor nit to pick: You can make inferences about sets based on a limited number of representatives

Definition for inference: an abstraction assumed to represent all cases of a particular appearance.

It is logically impossible to use inferences about the Absolute (all possible abstractions/appearances), because the Absolute is all cases of all particular appearances. There is no assumption.

An inference (inductive logic) makes the mistaken assumption that its abstraction covers a finite absolutely, because it doesn't define what it isn't, absolutely.

I'll use your example to clarify this difference (that the Absolute is not an infinite, fuzzy set using deductive logic, but that it is always so using inductive logic).

I'm sure what I write could be simplified, but I'm learning it out.

Any abstraction at all about a finite is set against what it isn't - which is infinitely finitisable. However, if the Universal (absolutely everything) is made of only two parts, such as consciousness and unconsciousness, then it is a logically complete set. When man = consciousness, and woman = unconsciousness, then the two "absolute" abstractions are not averages of appearances. They're absolutely categorising all appearances into two parts, thereby creating a "set". No set exists beyond it.

However, if the abstraction is about a finite, relative to another finite, and not relative to the Universal, then it is always an average of finitisations - so it cannot cross the gap to know *what it is* absolutely. It is not a complete set, because it is relative to infinite sets. Its meaning cannot be fixed. So we cannot know a finite abstraction definitely.

"Woman is unconsciousness" is an abstraction that is true by definition. It is true *when there is consciousness*, so it is absolutely true. We don't need empirical evidence, we don't even have to know if "woman" exists. Its meaning is simply "unconsciousness". So it has a fixed meaning.

Since consciousness just means "something is happening", it really means "consciousness of consciousness". Woman is therefore "unconsciousness of consciousness", which is simply "the appearance of illogic." Because the appearance of illogic implies the correct and logical judgment of it (not-woman), thus the category is a truth-by-definition, not by observation. It isn't true only when an illogical event occurs, but is always a truth.

This is the case with "American women who are alive today". This is not always a truth, because it relies on the event that there is such a thing.

The Universal is: "American women who are alive today" plus "everything that is not American women who are alive today". Thus, all we know is that they are unlike, and finite. We cannot decide what American women are. Are they an event? Or are they an inevitable part of consciousness?

The only way we can make further distinctions to the meaning for each finite abstraction is to take at least one of them, and add something extra to it. We give it some additional property/ies.

In this case, the abstraction is further clarified (and what it is not becomes also further clarified) to be: "not all the American women that can possibly exist, but only alive ones"; "having height and weight".

The average of the height and weight of alive American women can only be known by measuring all of them. Immediately, one can never know whether one has measured all of them, because what is "not the alive American woman currently appearing, whose height and weight is being measured" is both that and what it is not, and the latter is: "American women, who are not the alive American woman currently appearing whose height and weight is being measured" and "everything that is not the alive American currently appearing....." -- such that there is a "missing" identity. "American women, who are not the alive American woman currently appearing...." is not exactly the same as "everything that is not the alive American currently appearing..." because of the above definition, that Everything is "American women .... plus everything that is not American women..."

There is a gap, meaning "all things/events which are not the current American woman... and which are not American women..." - which has no known information. Because of this gap, we cannot decide for certain whether the average is an absolute average - we can NEVER do so. The finite abstraction that is relative to a finite abstraction remains unfixable.

[edit: Very simply:
x is a thing that is appearing
not-x is not-appearing
therefore x is not an absolute; there is no real x
]

these can be measured to an arbitrary degree of accuracy.

This arbitrary degree can never approach 100%, so it isn't really arbitrary.


So I suppose abstractions are purely pragmatic.


.

Kelly,

If deduction is based on identicality (A=A), then induction is based on non-identicality (A is property x, and property x is not the same as A). A "is" property x, it isn't identical with it, e.g. An orange is round.

You're confusing different things together. All logic is based on identicality, including the inductive form. Inductive logic differs in that it is a process of teasing out inferences from specific things observed in the world, while deduction is an abstract process of resolving two or more premises into a single conclusion.

DQ: Both deductive and inductive logic make use of the same process of identifying identical elements within separate threads of information. But they differ in other ways.

KJ: Taking my first idea, if the tree exists, then where is the separate thread of information, let alone the identical element that is in it? Is not there only one thread for the causation of a memory (reflecting the tree on itself)?

Is this the tree which is supposed to represent the Absolute?

If you define the Absolute to be the totality of all there is, and if you then pose the question as to whether anything can exist beyond the Absolute, you automatically creat two separate streams of information - (1) the Absolute is the totality, and (2) the possibility of things existing beyond the Absolute - that contain the necessary identical element from which a logical deduction can be made.

DQ: Inductive logic is a process of infering universal principles or generalizations from what is observed in a limited number of specific cases.

KJ: If a tree appears, then no matter what I call it, it appears "universally" as what it is. How is just the one appearance uncertain to be what it is?

Is this the same tree which represents the Absolute? Or is this a normal tree?

We normally use inductive logic to extrapolate from the particular to the general. For example, if we observe a tree with apples on it, we might infer that all trees have apples. Or if we discern that it is finite, we might infer that all trees are finite.

Perhaps induction is actually the process of defining any particular thing to be what it is, because I could not know the appearance as a unique thing, unless there was a contrast with many similar but not identical things.

No, induction is strictly the process of constructing broad inferences from limited evidence. What you're talking about here is simple identification, which underlies both deductive and inductive logic.

Nevertheless, I would still know automatically, that this appearance was itself, compared to all those different appearances. Then, because of the concept of all those different types, I'd reach a universal "type" - say, the abstraction "tree".

These are called "categories", yes. Our minds are able to group together things which are unique to themselves, but not too dissimilar from one another, and place them in the same category - such as "tree", or "chair", or "mountain", or "love".

DQ: [Inductive logic is..] also useful in formulating theories about the nature of Reality - although it can never be used to prove these theories beyond all doubt. For that, deductive logic is needed.

KJ: Using inductive logic to arrive at the universal, by analogy, is never going to work. How can that be called "useful"? Are you referring to creating "temporary abodes" for the ego to rest in?

No, I'm talking about the process of logical thought. Take the concept of cause and effect, for example. A person might initially observe that everything around him seems to be causally-created, and this could lead him to infer that all things in the Universe are causally-created. In doing this, he is performing an inductive step.

At this point, he doesn't know whether it is actually true that all things are causally-created. It is still just a speculative theory for him. To properly test its truthfulness, he is going to have to use deductive logic to prove that it is logically impossible for things not to be causally-created. Only then can he turn his inductive piece of speculation into solid truth.

DQ: Where does your "non-identical identity" fit into all this?

KJ: Automatically, one can't use the "A is property x" about Reality. It doesn't have an identity which is used to define itself (i.e. a particular part).

But it could be used about some part of Reality, such as "a woman is shorter than a man", since "shorter than a man" is not a property identical to "woman", but rather one of a woman's properties.

We can give Reality the property of formlessness and reach conclusions about it on that basis. Or we could give it the property of being the totality, or the property of beginninglessness and endlessness, or the property of non-duality, and so on.

-

DavidQuinn000 wrote:A person might initially observe that everything around him seems to be causally-created, and this could lead him to infer that all things in the Universe are causally-created. In doing this, he is performing an inductive step.

At this point, he doesn't know whether it is actually true that all things are causally-created. It is still just a speculative theory for him. To properly test its truthfulness, he is going to have to use deductive logic to prove that it is logically impossible for things not to be causally-created. Only then can he turn his inductive piece of speculation into solid truth.

Induction:
1.
This tree has apples. Inferring: All trees have apples.
Assumption: this thing (tree with apples) is an Absolute.
2.
All things that have been experienced are causes. Inferring: All possible experiences are causes.
Assumption: this thing (things are causes) is an Absolute.
3.
This Absolute is everything. Inferring: All Absolutes are everythings.
Assumption: this thing (Absolute is everything) is an Absolute.

Deduction:
1. Absolute means everything.
2. example 1 is unresolved, example 2 is unresolved, example 3 is true.

DQ: We can give Reality the property of formlessness and reach conclusions about it on that basis. Or we could give it the property of being the totality, or the property of beginninglessness and endlessness, or the property of non-duality, and so on.

This reply is in the context of induction. Did you intend it that way? Or in the context of deduction, in order to say that Reality = x, and formlessness = not exactly the same as x, ie. to say something ?

Induction: Reality is formlessness, so all Realities are formlessness. (unsure)
Deduction: Reality is formlessness, Reality is all forms, there are no other forms "outside" all forms, having no form "outside" all forms Reality is not a form, not a form is the same as formlessness, Reality is formlessness (sure)


This is obviously related to the exploration of psychoanalysis in the Porn thread. I'd like to make sure that I haven't turned into a poet.

In understanding one's own nature, one can be certain through using deduction (I define that consciousness is of things, induce that all consciousnesses make up the Totality, and then deduce that what is true for the Totality is true for any consciousness, because the Totality is made of all things).

In defining the ego, I define that unenlightenment (egotism) is lack of understanding of formlessness, induce that all egotists lack enlightened consciousness, and then deduce that, since enlightenment is about the Absolute, egotists lack enlightened consciousness, no matter what appears in consciousness.

I can induce that all human egotists have sexual desires, but since I cannot reasonably define all consciousnesses as human, I cannot logically deduce that all egotists have sexual desires. They might well be asexual aliens from another planet.

Also, I cannot logically deduce that all human egotists have sexual desires, since a definition for human (a sexually reproducing organism) is absolutely open to change, even though the definition for egotism (incapable of non-attachment) is absolutely not. Human is not Absolute.

Within the realm of current definitions, and probability, I can deduct that it is fairly likely that all human egotists have sexual desires, and express them similarly. I cannot be certain, and may well be communicating with robots, computer programs, aliens, or good enlightened actors.

If I were not to use induction at all in communicating, then I would frequently be saying, "that's not certain". By induction, I can be fairly sure that it would be mistaken for an encouragement to think nothing is certain. But I could certainly clear up my thinking anyway....



[edit: added some comments, changed a negative to a positive]

I'm taking some time off to visit the trolls.

David wrote:

You're confusing different things together. All logic is based on identicality, including the inductive form. Inductive logic differs in that it is a process of teasing out inferences from specific things observed in the world, while deduction is an abstract process of resolving two or more premises into a single conclusion.

You know, that sounds an awful lot like Sapius’s explanation. So much so that I cannot fathom on what basis you would have disagreed with him.

There is A=A - the Law of Identity.

This is in use in both inductive and deductive logic.

Deductive (abstract/pure) logic is employed only after the fact of inductive (empirically based) logic.

In other words, your absolutes can only exist after the fact of (or, more accurately, within) some degree uncertainty. That is, experience first, definition later.

Leyla Shen wrote:Deductive (abstract/pure) logic is employed only after the fact of inductive (empirically based) logic.

What are your reasons for saying this?

If I experience, say, the appearance of two apples, in what way would this be empirically based (ie, uncertain), provided that I never assume that the appearances are any more than appearances?

Well, it has something to do with the idea “experiencing an appearance.”

Experience is what? Sensation plus observation. An appearance, then, is that thing that “shows” itself to the senses and observation.

What does it matter whether or not you assume that the appearances are never any more than appearances? All you are saying here is that you cannot be certain of what you experience (sense and observe) outside of being certain that it has appeared (been sensed and observed) to be what it is.

Leyla Shen wrote:

Deductive (abstract/pure) logic is employed only after the fact of inductive (empirically based) logic.

If I experience, say, the appearance of two apples, in what way would this be empirically based (ie, uncertain), provided that I never assume that the appearances are any more than appearances?

Well, it has something to do with the idea “experiencing an appearance.”

Experience is made up of appearances.

What does it matter whether or not you assume that the appearances are never any more than appearances?

That I experience, say, hunger, when hungry, is a certainty. No amount of empirical measurement can tell me that I don't experience the feeling of hunger when I am feeling hungry.

All you are saying here is that you cannot be certain of what you experience (sense and observe) outside of being certain that it has appeared (been sensed and observed) to be what it is.

Yes. But that means that deductive (abstract/pure) logic is not necessarily based on inductive (empirically based) logic.

It can have a basis in certainty.

Induction isn't always empirically based. There is, for example, mathematical induction, where you prove some equation for k, then you prove it for k+1, which proves that it holds for any value of k.

L: All you are saying here is that you cannot be certain of what you experience (sense and observe) outside of being certain that it has appeared (been sensed and observed) to be what it is.

K: Yes. But that means that deductive (abstract/pure) logic is not necessarily based on inductive (empirically based) logic.

It can have a basis in certainty.

Whether the argument is deductive or inductive ie., whether the conclusion reached is specific or general, where is the basis for certainty since all premises are based on empiricism as well as abstraction?

K: That I experience, say, hunger, when hungry, is a certainty. No amount of empirical measurement can tell me that I don't experience the feeling of hunger when I am feeling hungry.

Yes, but, isn’t it empirical measurement that tells you "I'm hungry"?

1. A thing has boundaries
2. A contrast is a boundary
3. A boundary is a definition
4. A definition is an appearance
5. Experience is made up of appearances
6. An absolute is a universal appearance (it is true -- appears -- in all possible worlds)
7. All appearances are temporal

Therefore: Absolutes are things that are experienced
Therefore: Absolutes are temporal

(Edit: general grammar)

Leyla Shen wrote:

K: That I experience, say, hunger, when hungry, is a certainty. No amount of empirical measurement can tell me that I don't experience the feeling of hunger when I am feeling hungry.

Yes, but, isn’t it empirical measurement that tells you "I'm hungry"?

I say not, since the experience is not uncertain. My experience of hunger can't be verified by others. It is purely a personal thing.

. . .
Therefore: Absolutes are things that are experienced
Therefore: Absolutes are temporal

Yes, you could say that an absolute only exists while experienced.

For example, I am hungry only for the period that I'm hungry.

Or, enlightenment can be said to only exist for the enlightened.

Nevertheless, despite temporality, we have certainty. And that removes it from the empirical.

I say not, since the experience is not uncertain. My experience of hunger can't be verified by others. It is purely a personal thing.

Your experience of hunger may not be able to be verified by others (though I will work on an argument against that and see how I go), but it is still verfied by other things. In what way are other things less empirical than others?

In other words, you are saying that empiricism is based on verification by "other people," no?

In other words, you are saying that empiricism is based on verification by "other people," no?

By others, or verification by yourself.

Something like the raw experience of hunger can't be verified even by yourself. It just is. It wouldn't make any sense to verify what already is.

In what way are other things less empirical than others?

It's not that some things are less empirical than others, but that some things are empirical and other things aren't.

If, for example, I thought my feeling of hunger was caused by a lack of food, that would be an empirical matter.

[Edit: It wouldn't be an empirical matter that I thought it, but it would be an empirical matter to see whether there is a causal link between my hunger and a lack of food.]

ksolway wrote:I say not, since the experience is not uncertain. My experience of hunger can't be verified by others. It is purely a personal thing.

Kevin, is it not possible to be hungry and not realize that you are hungry?

I think it's possible to become wrapped up in something, and not notice that you are hungry, until you suddenly realize that you have been hungry for quite a while.

Meanwhile, someone who knows you well might have been paying attention and noticed that you are hungry before you did.

Maybe I'm a bit more "absent" at times than other people, but I've certainly had people, for instance, point out to me that I'm upset about something, well before I was aware of being upset about it. But if I stop and think about it, I realize they are right.

You seem to have this idea of internal qualia that are uniquely and unmistakeably available to the person that has them, but I don't think that is so. In fact, certain types of experiences can be traced to certain types of activity in the brain, and verified that they are in fact occurring.

DHodges wrote:Kevin, is it not possible to be hungry and not realize that you are hungry?

I am speaking more about knowledge here - knowing that you feel hungry.

An earthworm, for example, might be hungry without knowing it. And someone playing computer games might be hungry without knowing it.

But when you know you feel hungry, then you know that with certainty. (That's not to say that the feeling of hunger won't change to something else at any moment).

Maybe I'm a bit more "absent" at times than other people, but I've certainly had people, for instance, point out to me that I'm upset about something, well before I was aware of being upset about it. But if I stop and think about it, I realize they are right.

That would be a case of becoming more fully conscious, and elevated above the earthworm!

In fact, certain types of experiences can be traced to certain types of activity in the brain, and verified that they are in fact occurring.

Yes, there's all sorts of stuff happening that we are not conscious of, but what concerns me specifically is what we are conscious of. That's where clarity and certainty are found.

KS: [Edit: It wouldn't be an empirical matter that I thought it, but it would be an empirical matter to see whether there is a causal link between my hunger and a lack of food.]

In that case, “I” is the abstraction of the complex of boundaries within a boundary beyond which empiricism (verification) is required. Any thing occurring within this complex of boundaries would be considered as not requiring verification -- as “just is”: as certain. Deduction. Yet…

(Returning to the comment which I originally questioned)

DQ: Inductive logic differs in that it is a process of teasing out inferences from specific things observed in the world, while deduction is an abstract process of resolving two or more premises into a single conclusion.

It appears to me that any notion of abstraction in induction is being denied here. This process of teasing out inferences from specific things observed in the world does not require abstraction?

Are we to deliberately ignore this? For what purpose?

When this “just is-ness” of hunger occurs, does the thought simply pop out of nowhere? Does it just appear through abstract thought? Or is it inferred through observations in the world?

Rhett wrote (in the ABCs for QRS thread):

The conclusion did simply appear, and just afterwards, a verification of its logic simply appeared. Then, the two simply appeared melded together. The verification was that causality is wholly inapplicable to the hidden void.

Is this verification inductive or deductive?

Leyla Shen wrote:

DQ: Inductive logic differs in that it is a process of teasing out inferences from specific things observed in the world, while deduction is an abstract process of resolving two or more premises into a single conclusion.

It appears to me that any notion of abstraction in induction is being denied here. This process of teasing out inferences from specific things observed in the world does not require abstraction?

I think David was wrong to specify that it must involve "things in the world".

Matt made the following point earlier in the thread:

Induction isn't always empirically based. There is, for example, mathematical induction, where you prove some equation for k, then you prove it for k+1, which proves that it holds for any value of k.

So induction can concern purely abstract things, in which case it can achieve certainty, or it can concern empirical things in the world, in which case it will be uncertain.

When this “just is-ness” of hunger occurs, does the thought simply pop out of nowhere?

Who knows from where it pops? It pops from Nature, for sure.

Does it just appear through abstract thought?

It appears in consciousness, which means that it appears to abstract thought.

If it doesn't appear to consciousness, then it remains in henid (vague) form, at best.

Or is it inferred through observations in the world?

There are many ways it could appear.

Rhett wrote (in the ABCs for QRS thread):

The conclusion did simply appear, and just afterwards, a verification of its logic simply appeared. Then, the two simply appeared melded together. The verification was that causality is wholly inapplicable to the hidden void.

Is this verification inductive or deductive?

It doesn't matter. The important thing is that it is certain.