GENIUS FORUMS

I recently started reading Human Action by Ludwig von Mises. Although this is advertised as a treatise on economics, it turns out to be much more general than that. Although I am only on the second chapter, I think there are some parts that will be of interest to the people here.


Below is an excerpt from Section 5 of Chapter 1, Causality as a Requirement of Action:

Man is in a position to act because he has the ability to discover causal relations which determine change and becoming in the universe. Action requires and presupposes the category of causality. Only a man who sees the world in the light of causality is fitted to act. In this sense we may say that causality is a category of action. The category means and ends presupposes the category cause and effect. In a world without causality and regularity of phenomena there would be no field for human reasoning and human action. Such a world would be a chaos in which man would be at a loss to find any orientation and guidance. Man is not even capable of imagining the conditions of such a chaotic universe.

Where man does not see any causal relation, he cannot act. This statement is not reversible. Even when he knows the causal relationship involved, man cannot act if he is not in a position to influence the cause.

[…]

The treatment accorded to the problem of causality in the last decades has been, due to a confusion brought about by some eminent physicists, rather unsatisfactory. We may hope that this unpleasant chapter in the history of philosophy will be a warning to future philosophers.

There are some changes whose causes are, at least for the present time, unknown to us. Sometimes we succeed in acquiring a partial knowledge so that we are able to say: in 70 per cent of all cases A results in B, in the remaining cases C, or even D, E, F, and so on. In order to substitute for this fragmentary information more precise information it would be necessary to break up A into its elements. As long as this is not achieved, we must acquiesce in what is called a statistical law. But this does not affect the praxeological meaning of causality. Total or partial ignorance in some areas does not demolish the category of causality.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Praxeology

It puts Mises' idea differently:

From praxeology Mises derived the idea that every conscious action is intended to improve a person's satisfaction. He noted that praxeology is not concerned with the individual's definition of end satisfaction, just the way he sought that satisfaction and that individuals will increase their satisfaction by removing sources of dissatisfaction or "uneasiness".

An acting man is defined as one capable of logical thought — to be otherwise would be to make one a mere creature who simply reacts to stimuli by instinct. Similarly an acting man must have a source of dissatisfaction which he believes capable of removing, otherwise he cannot act.

I.e. it says a source of dissatisfaction is necessary for action, rather than consciousness of causation.

I think Mises' idea of causation is based on fulfilling needs, not on how things come into existence.

Is that how you read it, Dave ?

Kelly, he says pretty much what you quoted, in another section. He says that someone who had no dissatisfactions and saw no possibility of improving his level of satisfaction would do nothing.

Within the field of praxeology (the study of human action), he is concerned with what causes humans to act. As background to that, he talks about causation in general.

Action requires and presupposes the category of causality. Only a man who sees the world in the light of causality is fitted to act. In this sense we may say that causality is a category of action.

That is not good.

Steve's New Praxiom

Reaching into self, and pulling the root of the weed - washing it, with Buddha machine!

Kelly Jones wrote:

Action requires and presupposes the category of causality. Only a man who sees the world in the light of causality is fitted to act. In this sense we may say that causality is a category of action.

That is not good.

Not sure exactly what you mean Kelly, but of course it's hard to get the sense of the entire work from small extracts.

When he says causality is a category of action he is contrasting it to his other category of action, which is teleology. He treats teleology - intentions and goals - as being a separate thing from cause and effect, in the sense that, for his purposes, he is taken it as a given (that people have intentions, goals, desires) and not analyzing it further. Essentially there are ends (teleology) and there are means (cause and effect).

When he says only a man who sees the world in the light of causality is fitted to act, he means that an action is aimed at some change in the world. In order to act meaningfully, you have to have some idea that some particular action will have some particular result.

Another extract, from Chapter 2, Section 2: The Formal and Aprioristic Character of Praxeology


[...]
But the problem of the a priori is of a different character. It does not deal with the problem of how consciousness and reason have emerged. It refers to the essential and necessary character of the logical structure of the human mind.

The fundamental logical relations are not subject to proof or disproof. Every attempt to prove them must presuppose their validity. It is impossible to explain them to a being who would not possess them on his own account. Efforts to define them according to the rules of definition must fail. They are primary propositions antecedent to any nominal or real definition. They are ultimate unanalyzable categories. The human mind is utterly incapable of imagining logical categories at variance with them. No matter how they may appear to superhuman beings, they are for man inescapable and absolutely necessary. They are the indispensable prerequisite of perception, apperception, and experience.

He was an underarated thinker in my view, DH.Although I've lost interest in economics now he is the reason I decided to study itat university as a young fella.

Theres a good quote from him --that I notice has been also included in his Wikipedia page --which is lost on most PoMos these days.

The usual terminology of political language is stupid. What is 'left' and what is 'right'? Why should Hitler be 'right' and Stalin, his temporary friend, be 'left'? Who is 'reactionary' and who is 'progressive'? Reaction against an unwise policy is not to be condemned. And progress towards chaos is not to be commended. Nothing should find acceptance just because it is new, radical, and fashionable. 'Orthodoxy' is not an evil if the doctrine on which the 'orthodox' stand is sound. Who is anti-labor, those who want to lower labor to the Russian level, or those who want for labor the capitalistic standard of the United States? Who is 'nationalist,' those who want to bring their nation under the heel of the Nazis, or those who want to preserve its independence?

By 'not good' I meant illogical. If X is a category of Y, i.e. part of, then Y cannot be a category of X.

I think Mises' definition of causation is supposed to be a priori. I do not think he is talking about A=A. This leads to problems when the definition of causation is not really a priori, which in Mises' case isn't.

Essentially there are ends (teleology) and there are means (cause and effect).

That's not good either, because purposes and methods are selected using cause and effect.

I am guessing that Mises doesn't apply causality to the workings of the will. The reasoner can see he must rely on specific causal relations to identify a problem and solve it, but not that the desire or ability to solve problems is subject to same. I.e. it's a free-will type argument. But as you say, it's hard to tell from a very short sample. What do you think about this analysis?

Kelly Jones wrote:I am guessing that Mises doesn't apply causality to the workings of the will. The reasoner can see he must rely on specific causal relations to identify a problem and solve it, but not that the desire or ability to solve problems is subject to same. I.e. it's a free-will type argument. But as you say, it's hard to tell from a very short sample. What do you think about this analysis?

Mises specifically says he is avoiding the question of free willl vs. determinism because it is a metaphysical issue and a distraction from (and irrelevant to) his subject matter. As to where desires etc. come from, he says that these are the subject matter of psychology, and not part of what he is doing (praxeology). He is concerned with the means, not the ends.

I probably won't have time to find quotes on this today, and I will be away from a computer for about the next nine days, so I'll probably have to leave it at that for now.

That's fine.

One question: why do you think Mises focus on human action, rather than everything, as the stage for a study of causation?

Chapter 2, Section 6: The Individual and Changing Features of Human Action

The content of human action, i.e., the ends aimed at and the means chosen and applied for the attainment of these ends, is determined by the personal qualities of every acting man. Individual man is the product of a long line of zoological evolution which has shaped his physiological inheritance. He is born the offspring and the heir of his ancestors, and the precipitate and sediment of all that his forefathers experienced are his biological patrimony. When he is born, he does not enter the world in general as such, but a definite environment. The innate and inherited biological qualities and all that life has worded upon him make a man what he is at any instant of his pilgrimage. They are his fate and destiny. His will is not "free" in the metaphysical sense of this term. It is determined by his background and all the influences to which he himself and his ancestors were exposed.

Inheritance and environment direct a man's action. They suggest to him both the ends and the means. He lives not simply as man in abstracto; he lives as a son of his family, his race, his people, and his age; as a citizen of his country; as a member of a definite social group; as a practitioner of a certain vocation; as a follower of definite religious, metaphysical, philosophical, and political ideas; as a partisan in many feuds and controversies. He does not himself create his ideas and standards of value; he borrows them from other people. His ideology is what his environment enjoins upon him. Only very few men have the gift of thinking new and original ideas and of changing the traditional body of creeds and doctrines.

Common man does not speculate about the great problems. With regard to them he relies upon other people's authority, he behaves as "every decent fellow must behave,' he is like a sheep in the herd. It is precisely this intellectual inertia that characterizes a man as a common man. Yet the common man does choose. He chooses to adopt traditional patterns or patterns adopted by other people because he is convinced that this procedure is best fitted to achieve his own welfare. And he is ready to change his ideology and consequently his mode of action whenever he becomes convinced that this would better serve his own interests.
[...]

Kelly Jones wrote:One question: why do you think Mises focus on human action, rather than everything, as the stage for a study of causation?

Kelly, the full title of the book is Human Action: A Treatise on Economics; that's what he has chosen to write about. He discusses causation (in general) to the extent that it is necessary as background for the topics he has chosen to discuss.

Understanding what it is to be human - the human condition - has long been a focus of philosophy.

(Some comments about God.)

Chapter 2 Section 11: The Limitations on Praxeological Concepts

The praxeological categories and concepts are devised for the comprehension of human action. They become self-contradictory and nonsensical if one tires to apply them in dealing with conditions different from those of human life. The naive anthropomorphism of primitive religions is unpalatable to the philosophic mind. However, the endeavors of philosophers to define, by the use of praxeological concepts, the attributes of an absolute being, free from all the limitations and frailties of human existence, are no less questionable.

Scholastic philosophers and theologians and likewise Theists and Deists of the Age of Reason conceived an absolute and perfect being, unchangeable, omnipotent, and omniscient, and yet planning and acting, aiming at ends and employing means for the attainment of these ends. But action can only be imputed to a discontented being, and repeated action only to a being who lacks the power to remove his uneasiness once and for all at one stroke. An acting being is discontented and therefore not almighty. If he were contented, he would not act, and if he were almighty, he would have long ago radically removed his discontent. For an all powerful being there is no pressure to choose between various states of uneasiness; he is not under the necessity of acquiescing in the lesser evil. Omnipotence would mean the power to achieve everything and to enjoy full satisfaction without being restrained by any limitations. But this is incompatible with the very concept of action. For an almighty being the categories of ends and means do not exist. He is above all human comprehension, concepts and understanding. For the almighty being every "means" renders unlimited services, he can apply every "means" for the attainment of any ends, he can achieve every end without the employment of means. It is beyond the faculties of the human mind to think the concept of almightiness consistently to its ultimate logical consequences. The paradoxes are insoluble. Has the almighty being the power to achieve something which is immune to his later interference? If he has this power, then there are limits to his might and hi is no longer almighty; if he lacks this power, he is by virtue of this fact alone not almighty.

Are omnipotence and omniscience compatible? Omniscience presupposes that all future happenings are already unalterably determined. If there is omniscience, omnipotence is inconceivable. Impotence to change anything in the predetermined course of events would restrict the power of any agent.

This part is long, but I feel it is worth quoting almost all of it. It explains why Mises has spent so much time discussing basics of logic before moving on to economics.



Chapter 3: Economics and the Revolt against Reason

1. The Revolt against Reason

It is true that philosophers were ready to overrate the power of human reason. They believed that man can discover by ratiocination the final causes of cosmic events, the inherent end the prime mover aims at in creating the universe and determining the course of its evolution. They expatiated on the "Absolute" as if it were their pocket watch. They did not shrink from announcing eternal absolute values and from establishing moral codes unconditionally binding on all men.

Then there was the long line of utopian authors. They drafted schemes for an earthly paradise in which pure reason alone should rule. They failed to realize that what they called absolute reason and manifest truth was the fancy of their own minds. They blithely arrogated to themselves infallibility and often advocated intolerance, the violent oppression of all dissenters and heretics. They aimed at dictatorship either for themselves or for men who would accurately put their plans into execution. There was, in their opinion, no other salvation for suffering mankind.

There was Hegel. He was a profound thinker and his writings are a treasury of stimulating ideas. But he was laboring under the delusion that Geist, the Absolute, revealed itself through his words. There was nothing in the universe that was hidden from Hegel. It was a pity that his language was so ambiguous that it could be interpreted in various ways. The right-wing Hegelians interpreted it as an endorsement of the Prussian system of autocratic government and of the dogmas of the Prussian Church. The left-wing Hegelians read out of it atheism, intransigent revolutionary radicalism, and anarchistic doctrines.

[..]

Many more facts of this kind could be mentioned. But they are no argument against reason, rationalism, and rationality.

[...]

The rationalistic philosophers themselves were always intent upon showing the boundaries both of aprioristic theory and of empirical research. [...] It would be more justifiable to blame the philosophy of the last two hundred years for too much agnosticism and skepticism than for overconfidence in what could be achieved by the human mind.

The revolt against reason, the characteristic mental attitude of our age, was not caused by a lack of modesty, caution, and self-examination on the part of the philosophers. Neither was it due to failures in the evolution of modern natural science. The amazing achievements of technology and therapeutics speak a language which nobody can ignore. It is hopeless to attack modern science, whether from the angle of intuitionism and mysticism, or from any other point of view. The revolt against reason was directed against another target. It did not aim at the natural sciences, but at economics. The attack against the natural sciences was only the logically necessary outcome of the attack against economics. It was impermissible to dethrone reason in one field only and not to question it in other branches of knowledge also.

The great upheaval was born out of the historical situation existing in the middle of the nineteenth century. The economists had entirely demolished the fantastic delusions of the socialist utopians. The deficiencies of the classical system prevented them from comprehending why every socialist plan must be unrealizable; but they knew enough to demonstrate the futility of all socialist schemes produced up to their time. The communist ideas were done for. The socialists were absolutely unable to raise any objections to the devastating criticisms of their schemes and to advance any argument in the favor. It seemed as if socialism were dead forever.

Only one way could lead out of this impasse. They could attack logic and reason and substitute mystical intuition for ratiocination. It was the historical role of Karl Marx to propose this solution. On the basis of Hegel's dialectic mysticism, he blithely arrogated to himself the ability to predict the future. Hegel pretended to know the Geist, in creating the universe, wanted to bring about the Prussian monarchy of Frederick William III. But Marx was better informed about Geist's plans. He knew that the final cause of historical evolution was the establishment of the socialist millennium. Socialism is bound to come "with the inexorability of a law of nature." And as, according to Hegel, every later stage of history is a higher and better stage, there cannot be any doubt that socialism,, the final and ultimate stage of mankind's evolution, will be perfect from any point of view. It is consequentially useless to discuss the details of the operation of a socialist commonwealth. History, in due time, will arrange everything for the best. It does not need the advice of mortal men.

There was still the main obstacle to overcome: the devastating criticisms of the economists. Marx had a solution at hand. Human reason, he asserted, is constitutionally unfitted to find truth. The logical structure of mind is different with various social classes. There is no such thing as a universally valid logic. What mind produces can never be anything but "ideology." that is, in the Marxian terminology, a set of ideas disguising the selfish interests of the thinkers own social class. Hence the "bourgeois" mind of the economists is utterly incapable of producing more than an apology for capitalism. The teaching of "bourgeois" science, and offshoot of "bourgeois" logic, are of no avail for the proletarians, the rising class destined to abolish all classes and to convert the earth into a Garden of Eden.

But of course the logic of the proletarians is not merely a class logic. "The ideas of the proletarian logic are not party ideas, but emanations of logic pure and simple." Moreover, by virtue of a special privilege, the logic of certain elect bourgeois is not tainted with the original sin of being bourgeois. Karl Marx, the some of a well-to-do lawyer, married to the daughter of a Prussian noble, and his collaborator Frederick Engels, a wealthy textile manufacturer, never doubted that they themselves were above the law and, notwithstanding their bourgeois background, were endowed with the power to discover absolute truth.

[...]

This author has (now) piqued my interest, somewhat. In my current reinvestigation of Marx, I have been led to some similar lines of thinking (for example, in relation to certain ideas presented directly as rebuttals of Hegel and, thus, the specific nature, relevance, magnitude and import of those ideas to Marx's own), but my judgement is yet reserved---and I'll tell you one reason why:

But of course the logic of the proletarians is not merely a class logic. "The ideas of the proletarian logic are not party ideas, but emanations of logic pure and simple." Moreover, by virtue of a special privilege, the logic of certain elect bourgeois is not tainted with the original sin of being bourgeois. Karl Marx, the some of a well-to-do lawyer, married to the daughter of a Prussian noble, and his collaborator Frederick Engels, a wealthy textile manufacturer, never doubted that they themselves were above the law and, notwithstanding their bourgeois background, were endowed with the power to discover absolute truth.

This, for example, I do not see as a critique but as pure ad hominem. Of course, it may be due to what you are leaving out in these excerpts, but I can only go on what you provide. So, my question to you here would be, what, in your understanding of this man's critique of Marx, is his argument against historical materialism.

For instance, I summarise from your excerpts so far the following:

1. A man can only act if he can see a causal relation he can do something about (thus affecting change/becoming).
2. There are causal relations man can see but cannot do anything about. Thus, he cannot act.
3. The notion of causality itself has been undermined (thus, so too has praxiology) by physicists, who have shown there to be effect (change/becoming) in the absence of identifiable cause.
4. However, given (1) and (2), praxiology is not undermined by (3).
5. Acting (identifying causal relations with a causal aspect one is capable of influencing) requires logic.
6. Thus, the acting man is the logical, thinking man.
7. Thus, every action that effects change is a conscious action undertaken to improve his condition of existence.
8. All things a priori (like A=A) refer to the essential and necessary character of the structure of the logical human mind. Thus,
9. A priori truth is an absolute and elemental aspect of causality, underlies the human experience of causality itself and, thus, comprises the rudimentary basis for praxiology.

In this, I see no basis for a refutation of Marx’s position. In what way has it been proven that Marx was not a logical, thinking man if he acted on something and effected change, which we can at least say Marx definitely did?

[Edit: fixed recently recurring spelling error, "to" to "too," not to be confused with tutu]

I further note for consideration, Dave, that whereas there is a tendency to see and couch socialism (and every other political ideology) as a beast disconnected from capitalism, I see it as something utterly interdependent and, more and more so over time as we have approached globalism. That is, I see it as the living reflection of conditions of existence, and not as a bunch of ideas pulled out of somebody’s arse to be enacted into the “real world.” This is the problem Marx was pointing to with Hegel and idealism.

The idea that communism is dead, or will ever die, is based on this core straw-man fallacy.

From the perspective of interdependence, communism isn’t then merely some independently existing political ideology. It is precisely the prediction that the masses will necessarily and eventually always move against an overly zealous and exploitative elite class, and an exegesis on all interceding relations between such an elite, between man and his environment, man and himself and man and every other individual.

I think I failed to mention that there is a fucking awesome beauty to Marx when one understands him properly...

:)

Leyla, let me note that this is my first reading of Mises. I don't always know where he is heading. I have already seen that there are some inconsistencies in what he writes.

Leyla Shen wrote:

But of course the logic of the proletarians is not merely a class logic. "The ideas of the proletarian logic are not party ideas, but emanations of logic pure and simple." Moreover, by virtue of a special privilege, the logic of certain elect bourgeois is not tainted with the original sin of being bourgeois. Karl Marx, the some of a well-to-do lawyer, married to the daughter of a Prussian noble, and his collaborator Frederick Engels, a wealthy textile manufacturer, never doubted that they themselves were above the law and, notwithstanding their bourgeois background, were endowed with the power to discover absolute truth.

This, for example, I do not see as a critique but as pure ad hominem.

In this context, I don't see it as an ad hominem, but pointing out an inconsistency in Marx' thought. Marx is claiming that the proletariat have some special logic, some special insight that the bourgeois are not capable of. But Marx himself is not proletarian, and so contradicts that very thing he is trying to claim.

So, my question to you here would be, what, in your understanding of this man's critique of Marx, is his argument against historical materialism.

I think the term "historical materialism" can be meant in more than one way.

In the way Mises is saying that Marx is using it here, historical materialism means that a man's thoughts are entirely determined by his social class. He then gives several reasons why this can not be true (extending into the section after the one I quoted here).

Leyla Shen wrote:I further note for consideration, Dave, that whereas there is a tendency to see and couch socialism (and every other political ideology) as a beast disconnected from capitalism, I see it as something utterly interdependent and, more and more so over time as we have approached globalism.

I should probably point out that this book forst came out in 1949.
I agree, in the modern world, many socialist ideas have been incorporated into capitalism. Most places - from the US to China - have some form of state capitalism. The elite that run the government are not a different elite from those that own and run big businesses.

From the perspective of interdependence, communism isn’t then merely some independently existing political ideology. It is precisely the prediction that the masses will necessarily and eventually always move against an overly zealous and exploitative elite class, and an exegesis on all interceding relations between such an elite, between man and his environment, man and himself and man and every other individual.

I think that the elite have seen that it is not in their best interest to push the masses so far; that the masses can be treated like any other resource - exploited in a sustainable manner.

Also, the elite have the power of propaganda and distraction (control of mass media), which can go a long way toward convincing the masses that they are not being exploited, or that it is not in their best interest to try to overthrow the elite.

I think I failed to mention that there is a fucking awesome beauty to Marx when one understands him properly...

I haven't read Marx in the last 20 years, and who's to say if I understood him. I don't remember seeing such beauty, and beauty is certainly not the same as truth.


I expect you will strongly disagree with this, but...
After studying Marx in college, my overall conclusion was that Marx was a shill. The end result of his teachings has always been dictatorship. In my opinion, this is not some flaw, but exactly what he was aiming for. He never defined exactly what a socialist state would look like, because it was never more than a vague fantasy - a promise of some future heaven to excuse the actions here and now.

Shill seems to be a genuinely American word.

There is much here that I look forward to addressing, Dave. But I cannot retire for the evening in peace without saying this:

I should probably point out that this book forst came out in 1949.

That’s an impressive typo. Pronounced phonetically, and with a little roll on the “r,” it gives you a distinctly Russian accent---rather appropriate given the context, I say. :)

May your glass be full and your legs supple, comrade. [crosses her arms, crouches down to her knees…”ha-ha-ha-ha-ha, hey!]

DHodges:

Leyla, let me note that this is my first reading of Mises. I don't always know where he is heading. I have already seen that there are some inconsistencies in what he writes.

Sure.

In this context, I don't see it as an ad hominem, but pointing out an inconsistency in Marx' thought.

We’ll see.

"The ideas of the proletarian logic are not party ideas, but emanations of logic pure and simple."

Marx is claiming that the proletariat have some special logic, some special insight that the bourgeois are not capable of. But Marx himself is not proletarian, and so contradicts that very thing he is trying to claim.

(Of course, I disagree completely. :) Do you know what kind of a life Marx lived? I do. Do you think that would have any bearing on whether he could rightly be considered a proletarian or bourgeois? Elaborate, please.)

Was that a cited quote? I’d be interested in its actual context as I do not recall the specific. Nevertheless, he definitely would not be talking about “some special insight that the bourgeoisie are not capable of." Marx was a materialist---the idea is antecedent to matter; it has its roots in the material world---one cannot have an idea out of absolutely nowhere and no-thing, that is.

He holds the idealist, and the capitalist and bourgeoisie, as being disconnected from their real and human nature by the elevation, the worship, of an idealism that is the alienation of man from his environment--from nature--and thus from himself. An early Marx argues that man himself is differentiated from other animals because, unlike the animals which are merely slaves to and live for their own species alone in everything they do, man is the only animal which has the capacity to (and has) attain(ed) something much greater; much greater than the mere reproduction of his own species---he has influenced other species and the material world about him--nature itself--in a way unique to him. Yet, when man is alienated from nature (and, again, thus from himself, his actual species being) he is artificially limited to maintaining only an animal-species being---like a lion's existence, for example.

Thus, the worker who toils under capitalism as his life, forfeits his life and is turned into just another species-animal.

Thus, the ideas of the bourgeoisie are exactly party ideas and the ideas of the proletariat “emanations [from nature] of logic, pure and simple.”

And you would think such ideas as belonging to a shill?

I am yet to see substantial grounds for this allegation, but am still very interested in what you have to back it up, either a further constructive, or rebuttal.

More later.

Leyla Shen wrote:Do you know what kind of a life Marx lived? I do. Do you think that would have any bearing on whether he could rightly be considered a proletarian or bourgeois? Elaborate, please.)

I vaguely recall that he lived deep in poverty because he refused to work, and Engels supported him. I think his parents were not poor, however - he did manage to go to school and get a doctorate.

Doesn't dividing the world into "proletarian" and "bourgeois" seem simplistic?

Was that a cited quote? I’d be interested in its actual context as I do not recall the specific. Nevertheless, he definitely would not be talking about “some special insight that the bourgeoisie are not capable of."

Wikipedia gives this quote:

“ It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. ”
—Karl Marx, Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy

I see him as taking basic economic factors (social class) as the root cause of pretty much everything.

Marx was a materialist---the idea is antecedent to matter; it has its roots in the material world---one cannot have an idea out of absolutely nowhere and no-thing, that is.

Well, I agree with that - taking the material world generally, including genetics, upbringing, culture, and so on. There's a lot more there than a particular relationship to the means of production.

He holds the idealist, and the capitalist and bourgeoisie, as being disconnected from their real and human nature by the elevation, the worship, of an idealism that is the alienation of man from his environment--from nature--and thus from himself.

There are many people who are alienated in society as it stands, yes. Is there some reason to think that socialism reduces alienation?

Thus, the ideas of the bourgeoisie are exactly party ideas

Do you really believe that - that someone who is middle class is incapable of having thoughts that are not dictated by his economic and social status? (Or are you saying that what the bourgeoisie think becomes party ideas merely by them thinking it?)

And you would think such ideas as belonging to a shill?

I see Marx as being in favor of totalitarianism. He gives the promise of freedom some day, but to get there you have to go through the "dictatorship of the proletariat." But once you have a dictatorship, it stays a dictatorship. The people in charge are no longer proletarian. The state does not "wither away."

I am yet to see substantial grounds for this allegation, but am still very interested in what you have to back it up, either a further constructive, or rebuttal.

As far as Mises goes, he merely stated as a fact that (pre-Marxist) socialism was completely rebutted by economics as it was known at the time. He did not give any reference or proof of that statement. I don't know if that is true or not; I don't think economics was very developed at the time.

As for Marx being a shill, that is my reading of it, not Mises'. What I mean by it is that Marx pretended to have the interests of workers at heart, but his ideas can only lead to dictatorship. He is a totalitarian. The "dicatorship of the proletariat" is just a dictatorship. States do not "wither away."

I would argue that socialist governments that have actually occured have not suffered from some flaw or misunderstandng that turned them into dictatorships (e.g., USSR, China), but that was the entire point of Marxism. Marxism is a trick played on the working class. That is what I mean by him being a shill.