I agree with this definition. What I am questioning is if there are really any truths beyond science that we can grasp. It is vital to understand and affirm that our language was originally created from empirical observations as a tool. The line has been blurred has our language evolved and we seem to have forgotten that ultimately our language is derived from the natural material world. The question is whether this language can be applied to anything "beyond" the natural material world. As I formulated last post, metaphysics is basically: Our_World -> Language -> Beyond_Our_World. I can see no reason to find the last step legitimate. More on this below.Neil: Metaphysics means something like beyond nature or beyond our world.
DQ: Strictly speaking, it means "beyond science", which is not the same thing as saying "beyond Nature". I agree that it is foolish to talk about going beyond Nature, especially if one conceives of Nature as being the totality of all there is. But pushing one's reasoning beyond science in order to understand those truths of Nature which are beyond the powers of science to either prove or disprove is a perfectly legitimate activity to engage in. And I would argue, a vitally important one too. It would cure most of the world's madness in an instant.
We really need to dig deeper than you did. We human beings must conceptualize. There is no other way. No two trees are the same and yet we lump them all into a category and label them "tree". Why? For predictive power. We can remember the common and perhaps not-so-common traits of trees and can make rational decisions involving the properties we have attributed to this concept "tree". The difference between science and metaphysics is that science is modeling our empirical observations for predictive power whereas metaphysics is modeling beyond our empirical observations in the name of "truth". An intelligent scientist won't claim science is truth, only that it is highly useful and rigid models of life. A metaphysician will claim that he has arrived at some ultimate truth by doing row reductions on arrays of concepts that have been created for predictive power as though God himself had created or was bound by these concepts.NM: So talking about other worlds, all worlds, gods, and other intangible concepts is metaphysics.
DQ: Science deals in intangible concepts all the time. "Particle", "force", "energy", "law", "star", etc - these are all intangible generalizations upon which the entire edifice of science is built.
Nietzsche made the point that no two things in the world are ever alike, that there are really no such things as "stars" and particles" and so on. These are just abstract categories into which we lump seemingly not-too-dissimilar things together. And yet despite this, science is a perfectly legitimate activity that can be used to glean much information from the world. The same is equally true of philosophic reasoning.
You are making your mistake right here. How do you know that nothing can fall outside the definition? Because you defined it so. But how did you come to that definition? Ultimately all our definitions were derived from our subjective empirical observations. So your definition can only hold, and only really as a model, for the world of your empirical observations.DQ: An example is the truth all things are finite or limited in nature. In other words, a thing always falls short of constituting the totality of all there is. This is something which is necessarily true in all possible worlds. There can never be an instant, in any place or time or dimension, in which a particular thing isn't limited in extent, that it doesn't have a beginning or an end. All things are united by this characteristic.
Neil: This is a logical truth only because of the way we have defined terms like "finite".
DQ: While that is true, the beauty of this definition is that it is impossible for anything, anywhere, to fall outside of it. That is what makes the definition useful as far as philosophically understanding the nature of all phenomena is concerned.
What is really happening here is that we create a plethora of definitions from induction, from inductive reasoning. Then the rationalists come along and use these definitions as though they were laws of the universe. They use deductive reasoning on these definitions which they forget were originally simply inductions and act as though their results are binding on a scope outside the original inductions.
Reminder from dictionary, induction: any form of reasoning in which the conclusion, though supported by the premises, does not follow from them necessarily. Thus we cannot state that there are any real "facts" about our world, only very powerful predictive models. And we are just extremely way off when we try to take our induction from a small population and apply it to a larger one or a to the "totality" (another horrible metaphysical term). Any statistician knows that you must sample large populations and make inferences inwardly, not work the other way around.
Too bad the same cannot be said of "infinite" or "non-finite" (that it has a place in 'reality'). It is a useless concept in the natural world, we have to thank the abstract world of mathematics for this.NM: Remember that our whole language is derived from empirical observations. To assert that this language can then describe things outside our empirical observations is metaphysics.
DQ: It is fortunate for me, then, that the concept of "finite", as I define it, applies to everything that I empirically observe.