Expectantly Ironic,
[quot="Expectantly Ironic"]
Think about what happens in the brain that causes me to say "I see an apple". A bunch of light particles stimulate my retinal nerves which send a signal down through my neurons, causing a chain reaction which eventually results in the movement of my lips. Where is the observer in all this? The neurons that fired as a result of light particles stimulating my retinal nerves? Fair enough. [/quote]
I get the sense that you are suggesting that the human self, the observer is 'a mere sensation' generated by a sufficiently advanced nervous system, one which is analagous to a computer. And
that I would agree to, on the grounds that it appears as the most logical hypotheses.
Nevertheless, the apple that appears in my conscious experience is the process that those neurons undergo. Or, perhaps, it isn't only that process, but it certainly isn't the light particles or the particles of the apple.
There is the appearance of apple in consciousness, or the appearance of any distinction in consciousness for the very reason that distinctions registered by the mind, reflect, or are co-created by, an unknowable actuality, an actuality that occupies it's own space distinct from the brain observering/registering it.
When we talk of an appearance, we generally talk of a thing as it appears to consciousness. From this point-of-view an observer doesn't make sense.
I'm not sure what you mean. I don't personally believe in any inherently existing observer. If I go by appearances, which is the only logical thing to do, I can only presume that the self is analagous to a computer. But a hypothesis is all I have, and it certainly isnt regarded as the absolute truth.
It is like saying that an apple-as-phenomena isn't a bunch of neurons firing, but rather a thing separate from that.
I would say that the entity with it's neurons firing and the object which is registered as an apple, are two distinctions occupying different regions of space, however undivided. The appearance of the apple in consciousness is merely a representation, as the mind cannot totally know the object it concieves. It knows only impressions made in part by things (but also made by what the nervous system is capable of registering) and not the things as they truly are. The senses are a door, yet also eternally a barrier.
There is some reason to suspect that conscious experience isn't reducible to the physical.
I don't know what you mean by 'physical'. How is that you find making distinctions between physical and spiritual any less confusing than leaving it at a single substance? Physical, spiritual, these words hardly seem meaningful when I reflect on the inherent lack of existence in all things.
Only from a purely third-person perspective does it make sense to posit an observer: which would be the brain. If by observer you meant "brain", and by appearance you meant "noumenal thing", then I have no objections to what you said.
No, I was making a distinction between the actuality sensed by consciousness (yet unknowable by consciousness), and the mere mental construct.
Nevertheless, it seemed to me that you were positing an observer that would much more accurately be described as a "soul".
No, I certainly wasnt doing that. The observer, like anything, isnt totally knowable, but only definable. The definition is not the actuality, but rather it is just a hypotheses. The actuality is unfathomable, as our senses will never be able to empirically know any object in its entirety.