GENIUS FORUMS

Laird wrote:we can say that these external lighting conditions are defined by (external) boundaries

All boundaries are created by the mind, as explained.

If they have an effect on one other thing they have an effect on countless other things, and they are therefore detectable.

These particles affect nothing. They exist in the void but do not perturb it

They definitely perturb it, because they limit it. At the boundary of these things the void ceases to be. That's a huge perturbation.

So what are the senses perceiving then if not some (non-imagined) reality?

All we can say is that the contents of our mind come from somewhere.

There's a lot of imagination going on there - is there anything that is not imagined?

All things have their boundaries created by mind. In other words, an image is formed in the mind, caused by something. That is a kind of imagination.

And by the way, I understood that you believed that there was no reality independent of thought - are you now revising that to "there is no reality independent of imagination"?

Imagination - the forming of images and boundaries - is itself the process of thought.

If there are things that are not in the mind then there must be some independent external reality, but at the same time you deny that there is any independent reality outside of mind/thought/imagination (I'm also confused as to which of these you intend - perhaps all three?). How do you resolve this apparent contradiction?

You resolve it by working out what is true, and then accepting it.

Laird: we can say that these external lighting conditions are defined by (external) boundaries

Kevin: All boundaries are created by the mind, as explained.

Well, as asserted, anyway.

Kevin: If they have an effect on one other thing they have an effect on countless other things, and they are therefore detectable.

Laird: These particles affect nothing. They exist in the void but do not perturb it

Kevin: They definitely perturb it, because they limit it. At the boundary of these things the void ceases to be. That's a huge perturbation.

I could argue that the void exists unperturbed where the particles are but I'm not too concerned about that side issue. I notice that you avoided the key question that I asked, which is whether, given an unimagined type of thing that affects nothing (arguably "other than the void"), you still wish to maintain that it makes an appearance. I take it by your avoidance that the answer is "much as I forced my imagination, this time I could not maintain that assertion". So then you must agree that your third definition of "thing" - that which added appearance to the menu - was indeed an addition rather than something implied by the existing definitions. No big deal, but it took us a lot of discussion to clear up that issue.

Laird: So what are the senses perceiving then if not some (non-imagined) reality?

Kevin: All we can say is that the contents of our mind come from somewhere.

In part, somewhere that is not the mind? Or are you suggesting that sensory data is generated by the mind for its own consumption?

Laird: There's a lot of imagination going on there - is there anything that is not imagined?

Kevin: All things have their boundaries created by mind. In other words, an image is formed in the mind, caused by something. That is a kind of imagination.

I thought that for the "imagined physical world" it was sensory impression. Where does sensory data end and the imagination begin?

Laird: If there are things that are not in the mind then there must be some independent external reality, but at the same time you deny that there is any independent reality outside of mind/thought/imagination (I'm also confused as to which of these you intend - perhaps all three?). How do you resolve this apparent contradiction?

Kevin: You resolve it by working out what is true, and then accepting it.

I simply label it unresolvable. But I didn't ask how I resolve it, I asked how you resolve it. You do both of us a disservice with that unresponsive answer. Yourself, because if there is a gaping contradiction in your philosophy then you're better off acknowledging and fixing it; me because I am genuinely trying to understand your philosophy in its finer details (even though I doubt that it'll be something that I can fully believe in) and I am stuck on this point.

Laird wrote:

They definitely perturb it, because they limit it. At the boundary of these things the void ceases to be. That's a huge perturbation.

I could argue that the void exists unperturbed where the particles are

You've already said that there is a boundary separating the things from the void.

That boundary is a huge perturbation on the void, which it limits.

whether, given an unimagined type of thing that affects nothing

I've demonstrated to you that such a thing is impossible.

If a thing has a boundary, and all things do, then the thing has an effect on that with which it shares a boundary.

In part, somewhere that is not the mind? Or are you suggesting that sensory data is generated by the mind for its own consumption?

The mind is caused by that which is not the mind. Sensory data is generated by the senses. The boundaries of all these things are created by the mind.

Where does sensory data end and the imagination begin?

Wherever the mind chooses to draw a boundary between them.

Where does soil end, and a tree begin?

I simply label it unresolvable. But I didn't ask how I resolve it, I asked how you resolve it.

That's how I resolve it. I work out what is true, then I drop everything that isn't true, which is what you do when you accept what is true.

If you have a burning ember in your hand, which is causing you intense pain, what do you do to resolve it?

Same thing.

Kevin: They definitely perturb it, because they limit it. At the boundary of these things the void ceases to be. That's a huge perturbation.

Laird: I could argue that the void exists unperturbed where the particles are

Kevin: You've already said that there is a boundary separating the things from the void.

That boundary is a huge perturbation on the void, which it limits.

I wanted to avoid what I see as a side issue but it seems to affect your argument so I'll get into it after all. Arguably a "void" is a form of non-existence and to talk of "perturbing" it is meaningless. Alternatively if you want to see it as something that "exists" then you could view it as existing "unperturbed" in parallel with the particles that are superimposed upon it (because it is emptiness itself, so this emptiness can exist "underneath" that which fills it). In any case it seems to me like an angels dancing on pinheads kind of debate. The key point that I wanted to make still stands, and that is...

Laird: whether, given an unimagined type of thing that affects nothing

Kevin: I've demonstrated to you that such a thing is impossible.

If a thing has a boundary, and all things do, then the thing has an effect on that with which it shares a boundary.

...that these unimagined things have no effect on anything else that might in turn impinge on consciousness. These things can make no appearance.

Laird: In part, somewhere that is not the mind? Or are you suggesting that sensory data is generated by the mind for its own consumption?

Kevin: The mind is caused by that which is not the mind. Sensory data is generated by the senses. The boundaries of all these things are created by the mind.

Earlier in the thread you wrote that "[y]ou are assuming that there is a reality independent of thought, and which thought corresponds to. There isn't." Since thought is produced by the mind, then the implication seems to be that there is nothing that is not the mind. And yet above you write that there is that which is not the mind, which causes it. And you also want to recognise sensory data, and chemicals, which likewise are not part of the mind and which seem to imply the existence of "a reality independent of thought". I am really interested to know if/how you resolve this glaring contradiction ("everything is interdependent" just doesn't cut it as I've already tried to explain), and please don't dismiss me again with what amounts to a "work it out for yourself buddy".

Laird wrote:Arguably a "void" is a form of non-existence

If it has boundaries, then it has an existence, the same as any other existence. And there are causes for its existence, just as for any other thing.

this emptiness can exist "underneath" that which fills it

It doesn't matter where it exists. The fact is that there is boundary separating it from other things - as you've postulated it.

...that these unimagined things have no effect on anything else that might in turn impinge on consciousness. These things can make no appearance.

As I say, such things are impossible, given that they have boundaries and so they do indeed have effect on something other than themselves.

then the implication seems to be that there is nothing that is not the mind.

There must be something that has caused the mind, so there must be something that is not the mind.

And yet above you write that there is that which is not the mind, which causes it. And you also want to recognise sensory data, and chemicals, which likewise are not part of the mind and which seem to imply the existence of "a reality independent of thought". I am really interested to know if/how you resolve this glaring contradiction

It's not a contradiction once you understand it, but you don't want to go the steps necessary to do so. The reason you can't understand it is that you are isolating the problem into a compartment of your mind, where it is harmless, and has no teeth.

The way to solve it is, once you have discovered something that is false (eg, that there are things/boundaries independent of the mind), then you must drop that false way of thinking. You must abandon it entirely. If you fail to do so then the delusion will corrupt your thinking and you won't be able to understand the problem.

Imagine a person who has an imaginary friend, and they want to understand why their imaginary friend is upset. So they go to the doctor for advice. The doctor explains to the patient that his friend is imaginary, and the patient responds, "I know he's imaginary, but he's still upset!" Or the patient might respond, "You say he's imaginary, but then why is he upset?"

There is something that needs to happen on the side of the patient. There's a limit to what the doctor can do for him.

Laird: ...that these unimagined things have no effect on anything else that might in turn impinge on consciousness. These things can make no appearance.

Kevin: As I say, such things are impossible, given that they have boundaries and so they do indeed have effect on something other than themselves.

But Kevin they affect nothing at all! Quibble over whether they affect the void all that you like, but the buck at least stops at the void. You've presented nothing to counter my argument that there's no way in which they can impinge on consciousness. I would have been mildly impressed by something like "oh but these unimagined things are completely hypothetical, and the real world isn't like that". But you haven't even gone to that level of recognition of my argument, you've just reasserted a position that I've gone to the trouble of explaining is inadequate. Perhaps this again comes down to the vague idea that you want to promulgate that there is no reality outside of thought, but you can't seem to provide a coherent explanation for that concept.

Kevin Solway wrote:It's not a contradiction once you understand it, but you don't want to go the steps necessary to do so.

You don't want to go to the steps necessary to explain it then, likely because you have no explanation yet. That's OK, I can be patient while you work out exactly what you mean, and I'll be interested to read about it when you eventually do.

Laird wrote:

Kevin: As I say, such things are impossible, given that they have boundaries and so they do indeed have effect on something other than themselves.

. . . they affect nothing at all!

You've already agreed that there is a boundary between these things and this other thing you call "the void". Therefore the void is limited by the existence of those things. That is a huge effect.

You've presented nothing to counter my argument that there's no way in which they can impinge on consciousness.

Since it has been demonstrated that these things have effects on other things, they are therefore able to be detected.

Kevin Solway wrote:You don't want to go to the steps necessary to explain it

It's been fully explained. A doctor can explain to a patient that his imaginary friend is imaginary, but if the patient can't see it then there's little that can be done.

Kevin: As I say, such things are impossible, given that they have boundaries and so they do indeed have effect on something other than themselves.

Laird: . . . they affect nothing at all!

Kevin: You've already agreed that there is a boundary between these things and this other thing you call "the void". Therefore the void is limited by the existence of those things. That is a huge effect.

"The void" is not a thing in the sense that you define "thing". It is an emptiness in which things exist. I've already explained that it can be considered in one sense to be uninterrupted by the things that exist in it, such that the concept of a "boundary" between "a thing that exists in the void" and "the void" has no meaning. I'll express again that I view this discussion of the void as a sideshow distraction.

Laird: You've presented nothing to counter my argument that there's no way in which they can impinge on consciousness.

Kevin: Since it has been demonstrated that these things have effects on other things, they are therefore able to be detected.

I'm not aware of any demonstration that these things have effects on anything that impinges on consciousness. So to again repeat the point of the example: that which has boundaries (your first definition of a thing) does not imply that which appears (your second definition of a thing): you have added something to your definition. I don't know why you should be so reluctant to accept this. What's wrong with tacking a bit on to an existing definition? Oh, I actually have an idea. It is perhaps an indication that your earlier claim of being 100% certain in your definitions is under threat.

Laird: You don't want to go to the steps necessary to explain it

Kevin: It's been fully explained.

You've made several assertions that on the face of it contradict one another and when I've asked you to resolve the contradiction you've baulked, instead choosing to paint me as an unwilling patient.

Kevin Solway wrote:A doctor can explain to a patient that his imaginary friend is imaginary, but if the patient can't see it then there's little that can be done.

If I am indeed a patient then my doctor does not deserve his fee, for he tells me that I have a malady yet refuses to provide me with the remedy, which he nevertheless claims to possess.

Laird wrote:I've already explained that it can be considered in one sense to be uninterrupted by the things that exist in it

I'm only interested in the thing that is other than the things in question. That is, the thing that is outside of their boundary, and which their boundary necessarily interrupts.

It doesn't matter what name you give to this thing that is outside of their boundary, but the interruption necessarily takes place, and this is what makes them detectable.

Since it has been demonstrated that these things have effects on other things, they are therefore able to be detected.

I'm not aware of any demonstration that these things have effects on anything that impinges on consciousness.

If things have effects on other things (and they do, as I have shown above) then they will find a way to impinge on consciousness in some way, through cause and effect.

So to again repeat the point of the example

As I've shown above, your example is entirely mistaken, so you can't draw any true conclusion out of it.

. . . instead choosing to paint me as an unwilling patient.

I would say that you are currently incapable rather than unwilling. To be unwilling you would have to be aware of something you are unwilling to do. But you aren't aware of it.

Kevin Solway wrote:If I am indeed a patient then my doctor does not deserve his fee, for he tells me that I have a malady yet refuses to provide me with the remedy, which he nevertheless claims to possess.

The first step to being cured is to recognize that one is ill. And sometimes the way to learn that one is to be told.

Let's say that an alcoholic goes to a doctor with alcohol-related health problems, but is unable to acknowledge that they are an alcoholic. There is little the doctor can do at this time, and this is not necessarily the fault of the doctor.

In any case, you've already been given a lot of good advice as to what you should do, such as that you should spend a lot of time studying things like David's "Wisdom of the Infinite", Buddhist philosophy, Zen Buddhism, writings of Paul Brunton. That you should sort out your own ideas more before sharing them as though they were true. And that you should be less arrogant and egotistical, etc.

They are good remedies for a start.

Laird: I've already explained that it can be considered in one sense to be uninterrupted by the things that exist in it

Kevin: I'm only interested in the thing that is other than the things in question.

A void is not a thing by your definition of "thing". A void has no real existence - it is an absence not a presence - so the concept of boundaries does not apply.

Kevin Solway wrote:If things have effects on other things (and they do, as I have shown above) then they will find a way to impinge on consciousness in some way, through cause and effect.

They cause no effects and do not interact with any other things, merely existing in the void. They are not perceived through the senses. They are unimagined. What then is this way that they will find to impinge on consciousness?

Kevin Solway wrote:The first step to being cured is to recognize that one is ill. [...] In any case, you've already been given a lot of good advice as to what you should do

Alas, that you were as willing and able in the resolution of contradiction as you are in the dispensing of advice!

Laird,

The Totality includes that which is not real and that which does not exist, therefore the Totality can not be said to be wholly existent nor wholly real - it has nothing to do with its boundaryless condition, save for the fact that the boundarylessness causes it to be inclusive of unreal and nonexistent "things." That is an important caveat, but I think that it would be helpful to your understanding, Laird, to recognize it as a caveat.

Take mathematical infinity for example. The set of whole numbers is mathematically infinite because there are no ends on either the positive nor negative sides of the number line - yet numbers such as 1,4,7, and 982 all mathematically exist and are mathematically real numbers. In that way, not having a boundary on how big of a number, whether positive or negative, does not change the reality of what is in between. Nevertheless there are boundaries in the Infinite sense, because we defined that they would be whole numbers. -1.5 would be outside of the boundaries, as would a dog, because neither a dog nor -1.5 are whole numbers.

Laird wrote:

I'm only interested in the thing that is other than the things in question.

A void is not a thing by your definition of "thing".

As I said above, I'm not interested in your "void", which you now say has no boundaries, but in the thing that is other than the things in question - the thing that's on the other side of the boundary. The thing that's on the other side of the boundary is a thing by definition (since it has boundaries).

Kevin Solway wrote:They cause no effects and do not interact with any other things, merely existing in the void.

There is something other than the things in question, and that thing definitely has a boundary (since it is other than the things in question). So they are interacting.

Elizabeth Isabelle wrote:The Totality includes that which is not real and that which does not exist

Forgive me the bluntness Elizabeth, but that strikes me as a particularly meaningless statement. There is no such thing as "that which does not exist", so there is nothing to be included. I'm not sure either what you mean by "that which is not real". Do you mean such things as hallucinations, which apparently have some form of mental existence, or complex numbers, which likewise have an imaginary yet conceptual existence? Or are you simply using it as a synonym for "that which does not exist", in which case my same comment applies: there is nothing to be included so your entire statement has no sense to it.

Laird: They cause no effects and do not interact with any other things, merely existing in the void.

Kevin: There is something other than the things in question, and that thing definitely has a boundary (since it is other than the things in question). So they are interacting.

I don't see how you go from "has a boundary" to "interacting". The boundaries between these things and all other things never come into contact and have no effect on each other. We really seem to be going in circles here but if I had to guess, I would say that your second definition of "thing" as "that which makes an appearance" simply relies on the fact that such entities cannot exist, which is cause enough for you to consider revising your claim to 100% certainty in your definitions. An entity that is not connected to the rest of the web of cause and effect should in my opinion nevertheless be classed as a "thing".

Getting back to the question of whether thought is the only reality, I'd like to hear from those following this thread. I'm adamant that Kevin's two claims that there is no reality independent of thought yet that there exists that which is other than mind are contradictory. He's adamant that he's demonstrated Truth to me and that I'm too sick to see it. Opinions anyone? I'm most interested to hear from those who think that they can resolve what I see as a contradiction. I'm also particularly interested to hear from Dan, who seemed to express surprise in a different thread that I believed this to be a part of the philosophy that he, David and Kevin are supposedly communally espousing here.

Laird wrote:

Elizabeth Isabelle wrote:The Totality includes that which is not real and that which does not exist

Forgive me the bluntness Elizabeth, but that strikes me as a particularly meaningless statement. There is no such thing as "that which does not exist", so there is nothing to be included. I'm not sure either what you mean by "that which is not real". Do you mean such things as hallucinations, which apparently have some form of mental existence, or complex numbers, which likewise have an imaginary yet conceptual existence? Or are you simply using it as a synonym for "that which does not exist", in which case my same comment applies: there is nothing to be included so your entire statement has no sense to it.

Bluntness is fine; actually I prefer bluntness if it is also accurate. That it strikes you as meaningless, or that you are not sure what something means, or that you can not make sense of it, does not make it senseless, though.

Laird wrote:There is no such thing as "that which does not exist", so there is nothing to be included.

I'll start off by being snarky, and hope that you find a way to appreciate the humor. I will then explain better.

Of course nothing is to be included, which is the point. Once you include nothing in the Totality and unify it all, that changes all the rules of existence.

Breaking it down, how would you describe the void?

Laird wrote:Do you mean such things as hallucinations, which apparently have some form of mental existence, or complex numbers, which likewise have an imaginary yet conceptual existence?

Hallucinations exist as hallucinations. Complex numbers not only have a conceptual existence, but generally are far more useful than hallucinations. Numbers are actually only a conceptual existence. If you see two apples, where do you see the two?

I let this go on a first reading but as it turns out I'm too arrogant and egotistical to let it go on a second reading. ;-)

Kevin Solway wrote:In any case, you've already been given a lot of good advice as to what you should do, such as that ... you should be less arrogant and egotistical, etc.

Hmm, let's see:
* I'm more conscious than Ghandi
* If the Dalai Lama were serious he would get in contact with me
* My book is "probably the greatest book ever written"

Nope, sorry, I can't claim to have made any of those assertions.

But do let me know how you have perceived me as arrogant, because it's a trait that I'm keen to eliminate. I'm happy to be perceived as spirited, confident or cheeky, but arrogance is a personal foe.

Even just based on the above post, I recognize Laird as someone who can spot humor.

Elizabeth Isabelle wrote:Of course nothing is to be included, which is the point. Once you include nothing in the Totality and unify it all, that changes all the rules of existence.

I don't understand what you mean. In what way does it change all the rules of existence?

Elizabeth Isabelle wrote:Breaking it down, how would you describe the void?

An absence or emptiness in which things exist. I suppose that this could imply three-dimensional space, but in the context of this thread I would make a distinction between space-time (which as Einstein reputedly demonstrated can be curved by gravity) and "void" which I would describe as having no properties whatsoever except for emptiness.

Laird: Do you mean such things as hallucinations, which apparently have some form of mental existence, or complex numbers, which likewise have an imaginary yet conceptual existence?

Elizabeth: Hallucinations exist as hallucinations. Complex numbers not only have a conceptual existence, but generally are far more useful than hallucinations. Numbers are actually only a conceptual existence.

Sure, but are those things what you meant by "that which is not real"? If not, then what did you mean?

Laird wrote:I don't understand what you mean. In what way does it change all the rules of existence?

That was the one where I warned you I was being snarky. It's snarky because you have to already understand the answer to understand this answer. Just set it aside for now, and later you will say "oh" and chuckle.

Elizabeth:Breaking it down, how would you describe the void?

Laird: An absence or emptiness in which things exist.

Laird wrote:"void" which I would describe as having no properties whatsoever except for emptiness.

Do you see the contradiction in your statement?

Elizabeth: Hallucinations exist as hallucinations. Complex numbers not only have a conceptual existence, but generally are far more useful than hallucinations. Numbers are actually only a conceptual existence.

Laird: Sure, but are those things what you meant by "that which is not real"? If not, then what did you mean?

Not exactly. Hallucinations are real hallucinations, but not real as anything but hallucinations - yet could be real as the concept assigned to them as what they are not, in which case they would be real as such concepts but false. Until such a concept is assigned, then it would be unreal. I didn't explain before because I recognize that the explanation looks more confusing than just a pointer in the general direction.

Elizabeth:Breaking it down, how would you describe the void?

Laird: An absence or emptiness in which things exist. [...] "void" which I would describe as having no properties whatsoever except for emptiness.

Elizabeth: Do you see the contradiction in your statement?

Perhaps you want me to append "and the ability for things to exist superimposed upon it", which seems sensible enough. Actually though, the more that I think about it, the more that "void" seems to require dimensions, but then as I said earlier, we already have the concept of "space" and the apparently even more descriptive concept of "space-time", so I will redefine "void" thus: "the intangible empty quality of space-time that allows for the existence of matter and energy within it".

Elizabeth Isabelle wrote:Hallucinations are real hallucinations, but not real as anything but hallucinations - yet could be real as the concept assigned to them as what they are not, in which case they would be real as such concepts but false. Until such a concept is assigned, then it would be unreal. I didn't explain before because I recognize that the explanation looks more confusing than just a pointer in the general direction.

The grammar is more confusing than anything - it prevented me from making much sense of what you wrote.

Laird,

Your request for input from me is noted, however I'm not entirely sure I can add much that won't be redundant and/or repetitive. But let's start with this problem (Kevin has really addressed all this stuff; I'm simply going to try and word myself differently) ------

Laird: So to again repeat the point of the example: that which has boundaries (your first definition of a thing) does not imply that which appears (your second definition of a thing): you have added something to your definition.

Kevin hasn't actually done this. You have to look past the words and into the meaning behind them to see that the words all point to the very same meaning. "That which has boundaries" not only implies "that which appears" but says exactly the same thing. An appearance is necessarily a demarcated entity. It is so for 2 reasons: 1) it's not the observer; 2) it's not the Totality (which cannot appear as an individuated thing). Things exist (appear) in relation to what they are not. This is the only way in which it can be said they have identity. Identity not merely connotes, but explicitly denotes relativity and boundedness. They are all tied together and denote the same reality. If you can sense, conceive or imagine in any way whatever, a given thing, then it is bounded, at the very least, by being less than the Totality. It is clearly impossible for a thing to appear and not be bounded and relative to that which it is not. Therefore, the versions of Kevin's definitions, though offered with different words, express the very same thing.

Your idea that there may exist things that do not appear (are perceived in some way) doesn't make any sense. That's like saying there may exist words that cannot be spoken, or sounds that cannot be heard. On the issue of whether things exist entirely within mind, perhaps you could try and think of it this way - i.e. think of "mind" in a way that you may not be familiar with: mind is the set of appearances. It is not something that somehow apprehends entities "outside" itself. In other words, consider that the subject/object duality isn't ultimately real.

Dan,

Thanks for joining the discussion. You seem to have a similar understanding to Kevin's, which is after all reassuring - for a brief period I thought that you guys had got out of sync.

Dan Rowden wrote:On the issue of whether things exist entirely within mind, perhaps you could try and think of it this way - i.e. think of "mind" in a way that you may not be familiar with: mind is the set of appearances. It is not something that somehow apprehends entities "outside" itself. In other words, consider that the subject/object duality isn't ultimately real.

Well this is where I start having difficulties and perhaps I can best express them like this:

I presume that you believe that mind is comprised of or emerges out of something (some "subject/object"s). Your position seems to be that these somethings aren't real in an external sense, that they are "all in the mind" as it were. So then we have the paradox of mind being created by that which exists only in the mind. You already know that I like paradox and I reckon that this one's a pretty cool one so I might be able to wrap my mind around it but I'd first like to clarify that this is what you are actually saying.

My presumption though that you believe mind to be comprised of or to emerge out of something might be wrong, so I also want to ask you this clarifying question: what is the nature of mind - in particular, is it emergent or inherent?

At bottom, mind is whatever we say it is. When we ask the question: where does mind begin and end? - what answer can we hope to come up with? Where is mind's spatio-temporal location? In the brain? That doesn't work, as we know (don't we?) that the brain needs the nervous system and sensory input etc to function and produce content. But then, maybe it doesn't. Maybe it only needs those things to produce certain forms of content. Either way, the question still remains: where does mind begin and end? Or, where is mind? As far as I'm concerned we can answer that question anyway we want, depending on our practical requirements. But when I say that mind is the set of all appearances, I do so because anything less than that creates the dilemma that some appearances aren't associated with mind. But what does it mean to say that an appearance isn't part of what mind is? If it appears, it appears "within" mind. The mind, really, neither creates nor does not create boundaries and therefore things. Boundaries and things are actually what mind is. What produces mind itself? - Reality. No other answer makes any sense because any other answer merely sets out entities that are within mind already and therefore don't constitute an answer.

You may wish to demarcate/define mind differently for your own purposes. If so, I'd like to see where and how you draw those boundaries...

You seem to recognise and want to avoid the paradox that I described, when you write that:

No other answer makes any sense because any other answer merely sets out entities that are within mind already and therefore don't constitute an answer.

As far as I can tell though the only way to avoid the paradox is to avoid declaring that all things exist in the mind, however you continue to take the position that all that appears is (all things are) mind. So you whilst you seem to want to avoid the paradox, you nevertheless express it in your position, because you also write:

Either way, the question still remains: where does mind begin and end? [...] What produces mind itself? - Reality.

If mind can begin begin and end at arbitrary locations within Reality, then there must be something that mind exists within, and therefore there are things that are not in the mind. You still seem to want your cake and eat it too yet to deny that you are invoking paradox. What do you find deficient in the everyday idea that there is an external reality that mental appearances correspond to?

Dan Rowden wrote:You may wish to demarcate/define mind differently for your own purposes. If so, I'd like to see where and how you draw those boundaries...

The whole issue of mind is one that baffles me, but I am consoled that over the full course of humanity's existence no one else has yet been able to provide a complete, satisfying and generally accepted explanation either. I take no firm position, but I like to collect possibilities. You and Kevin have just alerted me to a third one - the possibility of the paradox that mind is everything and that it simultaneously exists within everything. The other two I have alluded to already - that mind is an emergent property of energy/matter, and that mind is an inherent force of will that requires some level of physical structure (e.g. neurons in the brain) by which to affect reality. These two possibilities of course rely on the idea of a physical/energetic reality separate from mind. I am most attached to the idea that mind is inherent, because of my gut feeling that to explain the subjectivity of the experience of consciousness as emergent is going to prove to be an impossible task.

Laird wrote: What do you find deficient in the everyday idea that there is an external reality that mental appearances correspond to?

Where's the demarcation? Where does the mental appearance end and the referent begin? What's the difference between them? Are you thinking in terms of the division between the abstract and the empirical here?

Dan Rowden wrote:

You may wish to demarcate/define mind differently for your own purposes. If so, I'd like to see where and how you draw those boundaries...

The whole issue of mind is one that baffles me, but I am consoled that over the full course of humanity's existence no one else has yet been able to provide a complete, satisfying and generally accepted explanation either.

You mean that you know of or recognise as such.

I take no firm position, but I like to collect possibilities. You and Kevin have just alerted me to a third one - the possibility of the paradox that mind is everything and that it simultaneously exists within everything.

See, this is really the problem you're having here. You're operating within a false duality and unconsciously inserting that duality into all your considerations. It's a bit like when people say if there's no objective meaning to existence then existence is meaningless. Their conclusion secretly contains the bias of that falsely imagined objectivity. Try and stop thinking about "self and other" notions of mind, subject/object stuff and just think for a moment about all things that appear - not to a something or other, but just appear (because the something or other to which things are said to appear also just appear).

The other two I have alluded to already - that mind is an emergent property of energy/matter, and that mind is an inherent force of will that requires some level of physical structure (e.g. neurons in the brain) by which to affect reality. These two possibilities of course rely on the idea of a physical/energetic reality separate from mind.

Yes, that paradigm doesn't work, one reason being is that it sets energy/matter outside mind and yet such things only exist because they appear within mind. i.e. the difference between energy and matter requires mind to exist. If you don't accept this then try demonstrating where anything begins and ends.

I am most attached to the idea that mind is inherent, because of my gut feeling that to explain the subjectivity of the experience of consciousness as emergent is going to prove to be an impossible task.

This is the basic reason that physicalist explanations of mind (consciousness) don't really work. They can't deal with qualia. My perspective gets rid of the mind/body duality per se, and therefore the problem.

Laird wrote:I am consoled that over the full course of humanity's existence no one else has yet been able to provide a complete, satisfying and generally accepted explanation either.

Laird, here is an example of your arrogance and egotism, that you are blind to.

The first arrogance is that you assume that whatever is true will be satisfying and "generally accepted". This is an arrogance because it is a claim that you are not at all qualified to make.

The second arrogance is that you imply that in the whole course of humanity's existence no one has provided a complete and true explanation of mind, etc. This is also a claim that you are not at all qualified to make - and which makes it arrogance.

Thirdly, you seem more concerned with whether you appear arrogant to others, rather than whether you actually are arrogant. And that it is a third kind of arrogance.