GENIUS FORUMS

David Quinn wrote:Cling to a crumb and an entire feast is missed out....

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Learn to eat over a plate and maybe you wouldn't get so many ants.

cousinbasil wrote:

David Quinn wrote:The entity is just the brain itself. In other words, the "I" is a useful fiction that the brain creates as part of its strategy for dealing with the world.

So your contribution to philosophy boils down to: "The brain thinks, therefore I is."

It's one of an infinite number of contributions from an inexhaustible well of creativity .....

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Is there a real distinction between subject and consciousness?

If not, it may be erroneous or redundant to state subjective consciousness. If consciousness is independent of subjectivity, then is it subjectivity or consciousness that is or isn't transferable? I believe this distinction has been drawn in the prior discussion also.

I'll tell you what I think, how's that?

I think they are both ideas, there is no such thing as a subject or a consciousness. But within this crazy realm of ideas, there never exists any consciousness in the absence of a subject, or subject in the absence of consciousness. Nor does physicality exist in the absence of mind, nor mind exist in the absence of physicality. There is no real distinction between the two outside of the distinguishing combination of both.

It would be equally true, to say that the brain creates the mind, as to say the mind creates the brain. They are not even intricately linked together, but are the same integrated abstraction dissected. Dare I call them simples... or monads. All I mean is that physicality and non-physicality are both perspectives, but they are integrated, in the way that up and down are integrated in relation to their reference point. And, the reference point does not exist in the absence of up and down, since the reference point is arbitrary for the purposes of distinguishing up and down. So it is a triumvirate of three simples. These simples are not things, they are arbitrary.

From a neurophilosophical perspective this holds a lot of water. Philosophers have struggled ad infinitum trying to figure out how the brain can create the mind or vice versa, but primarily the former. What distinguishes them as "neurophilosophers" is their reliance on observational evidence and theoretical neuroscience in the formulation of their theories. Observational neuroscience consists of many facets including clinical cases and invasive experimentation on monkeys, as well as non-invasive techniques like transcranial magnetic stimulation and neuroimaging (CT, EEG, fMRI, etc..). Neuroscientists have isolated the phenomena of self and consciousness to various brain complexes (not to be thought of as singular entities, but as functionally integrated systems). Never-the-less, the "Hard Problem" of consciousness can not be solved by pointing to a gaggle of nerve cells. The hard problem, so-to-speak, is the perceptual gap between physicality and phenomenality (where phenomenality is "mind-stuff", consciousness).

In order to cross over this gap, neuroscience and neurophilosophers have began speaking in terms of functionally clustered systems. On the most simplified scale - too simplified in-fact - the atom of perception is a simple reaction. Gerald Edelman gives the example of a photosensitive diode which reacts to photons (hence photo-sensitive). When photons are presented to the diode it reacts with an electrical current in much the same way the retinal ganglion cells of the human eye - which comprise the retina, the photosensitive portion of the human eye - react to photons. In this sense, the photosensitive diode is "aware" of two states (1,0); 1 light, 0 darkness. However, the diode is not aware of itself by any means, there is no reaction to its own existence. A much more complicated system is required to accomplish this task. The human brain does not function in exactly the same way as the retinal ganglion cells or the photo diode, though in principle they are the same. The primary difference is that the cells of the human eye are sensory to the human body, and brain cells are positioned to filter, differentiate and organize, they do not contain rhodopsin or melanopsin (two photopigments employed in the retina), but receive their inputs electrochemically from other cells of the brain, or the senses.

Antonio Damasio formulated a triumvirate model of the self, consisting of a proto-self which is a basic awareness of the autonomic nervous system, of one's own body. The neuroanatomical locality of which is in the peripheral nervous system and the brain stem, medulla, pons, etc... comprising the Reptilian Complex and is common to all vertebrates. Next in his model is the core-self which is instantiated whenever a system acts on the proto-self, which has its locality in the mammalian brain common to all mammals. Finally there is the autobiographical-self, which is a reflection upon memory, emotion and all that comprises the proto-self and the core-self. The autobiographical-self has its locality in regions of the frontal lobes. However, it is erroneous to think in terms of isolated clusters, though certain operations are performed by functionally clustered groups of nerve cells, they are seamlessly and functionally integrated into the entire brain and extended nervous system.

For example; we can generate a combination of nerve cells which will differentiate between the presence and absence of light. We can grab our retinal ganglion cells that contains the photopigment rhodopsin which will convert the photons into electrochemical waves. These waves will propagate down the axon of the cell in the presence of photons. Now, we attach another cell to the axon of the retinal ganglion cell, so that, when the retinal ganglion cell generates an electrochemical wave of potential (an Action Potential) our new neuron (N1) will react to the reaction of the retinal ganglion cell (N0). Now we have an awareness of being aware. This is an extremely over-simplified depiction of a much more complicated process.

It is erroneous at this point to consider the essential nature of self as physical, because what is termed physical is a perspective of the activity of functionally clustered groups of nerve cells, which offer only the appearance of differentiated existence. What is of more importance in understanding the perceptual hard problem of consciousness is that the answer lies in functional analyses and not things themselves. Things are only ever categories of functions themselves. Neurophilosophy invariably leads to a break-down of the material-mental distinction. The same "mind-stuff" that comprises the mind, comprises a photosensitive diode or a light-switch. Its really just a matter of functional integrity, physicality and phenomenality are persuasive attachments only because they appear concrete within our functionally clustered prisons.

In light of all this, the answer is simply what has been said already in this discussion, it is not possible to be someone else by the very definition of who you are. If you are a functionally integrated operation (over time), there is no way of escaping your fate. You can only duplicate yourself, but never escape yourself, and in duplicating yourself you do not escape yourself. And yet, the self is just a functionally integrated operation. To relieve ourselves of the torture of being in these prisons we must simply let go of our attachment to ourselves. I believe that is why in many religious traditions this perceptual transmutation is termed "submission".

Edit: Ultimately, the only real reason to arrive at these conclusions through neuroanatomical research is because we believe there to be more concretion in our perception of physicality than in anything else we might think of. If we worked in reverse and abstracted the principles of possible experience we could infer the architecture of the human brain. This is so because the brain is possible to experience and must therefor conform to the principles of possible experience. This is, of course, separate from the question of what is possible outside of experience, which peradventure would reveal only ignorance. The rules of possible experience immediately indicate something like a brain, although we may typically experience ourselves as functionally isolated, we could not interact in a world as such. The only way to interact with an environment is through functional integration. In the end, all this talk of functional analyses is really another way of talking about causation.

Edit: On a monadic scale, the simplest scale, I should have stated that the brain is indicated by the possibility of experiencing ourselves. To be self-aware implies there is something to be aware of, and this automatically implicates something. That thing is distinct from other things which are not it, comprising it's environment, it's world. Thenceforth the self-other distinction was incarnate, and the necessity of physicality and a physical representation of self. The body and the self are co-created and co-extinguished in the same reality. Reality, need not be anything more than the instantiation of this basic function of perception. The self-other distinction, which necessitates the material and immaterial, life and death.

David: There are no such things as material causes. Have you not even understood this?

guest_of_logic: Which angle are you working here? Is it the angle of "from the absolute perspective, there are no causes, merely a seamless continuum"?

David: That the duality of material and non-material doesn't really exist.

guest_of_logic: Call it what you will; if you don't like the implications of "materialist" then we can find another word for it - my point is that you don't believe in any dimension to life and consciousness beyond "physical" (quoting the word for your sensitivities) causes.

David: I believe in any dimension which exists, whether it be physical or non-physical.

What happened to "all beliefs are delusions"?

And which dimensions that exist and that you therefore believe in are those?

Or did you really mean to say something more along the lines of, "I would believe in any dimension which could be shown to exist"?

You see, David, I think you're just paying lip service here. Every time any reference to the effects of any potential spiritual dimension beyond the purely physical comes up, you poo-poo it as mystical or magical thinking. You might say you're open to other dimensions, but your approach belies your true belief. This is why I say that, at heart, your philosophy is materialist in nature.

guest_of_logic: I have no idea how the subjectivity of consciousness works, and whether it truly is a "blank slate". The point of the analogy, though, doesn't lie there - the point is to capture what I mean by subjective consciousness having an identity as entailed by its being a "looking-out-ness".

David: Pure "looking-out-ness" doesn't have any identity in the sense you mean. It is like a pure mirror. Accordingly, if tonight our own subjective awarenesses or "looking-out-nesses" were somehow swapped during our sleep, we would both wake up not knowing the difference.

How ironic. You accuse me of conflating two different conceptions of personal identity, and here it is you who fails to make an adequate distinction between the two. You write (emphasis mine) that "we would both wake up not knowing the difference", and in this you fail to distinguish between (1) the "we"s of cognitive consciousness including memory, thought, personality (etc) and pure subjective awareness, and (2) the "we"s of pure subjective awareness alone. I agree with you that that part of our consciousness which is cognitive would not be able to detect a change in the pure subjective awareness at its heart, but, in another sense, these pure subjective awarenesses are the cores of what we refer to by "we", and so, in that sense, these core "we"s would have been swapped, and our identities (our "we"s) would have fundamentally changed, regardless that their cognitive casings would be incapable of recognising that change.

In any event, we're taking a rather extreme approach: separating the entirety of the cognitive functions of consciousness from the pure awareness at the centre of consciousness; it might be more fruitful to enquire into the possibility of swapping, along with the pure awareness, a bare minimum of cognitive consciousness to retain a fundamental personality. This would lead to such interesting questions as, "How much of our personality is innate and how much is developed?", and, "To what extent does personality depend upon memory and to what extent does it depend upon innate features of our cognitive consciousness?"

Animus,

Interesting post.

You write of the brain/mind distinction: "All I mean is that physicality and non-physicality are both perspectives, but they are integrated, in the way that up and down are integrated in relation to their reference point." You also write: "The hard problem, so-to-speak, is the perceptual gap between physicality and phenomenality (where phenomenality is "mind-stuff", consciousness)." You seem to then suggest a solution to the HPC: "In order to cross over this gap, neuroscience and neurophilosophers have began speaking in terms of functionally clustered systems." You go on to explore what functionally clustered systems are using examples.

I want to make sure that I'm understanding you correctly as proposing "functionally clustered systems" as a solution to the HPC, or at the least as a potential path to discovering that solution, because from what you wrote I don't see how they achieve the aim of "bridging the gap" between physicality and phenomenality. Basically, what, in my opinion, you haven't adequately explained, is the answer to this question:

How do you go from functionality to phenomenality?

cousinbasil wrote:

overmyhead wrote:I haven't the patience to read all the debate, but I will chance a reply anyhow.

Why does one's subjective consciousness inhabit a particular body and not another?

The question makes presumptions which create paradoxes, namely, that subjective consciousness is unique, subject to possession, and resides somewhere.

It does seem that consciousness is tied to an individual. But it is simply the case that consciousness which involves an individual is consciousness which relates to that individual. This carries to the specific case of consciousness of the individual which is me the observer. Consciousness of me the observer doing something is necessarily tied to consciousness of me the observer. It does not make sense to conceive of consciousness which is dependent on Ramses II as me the observer occurring in any context other than Ramses II as me the observer. It's so easy to complicate this very simple understanding by trying to integrate it with mundane concepts such as mind, brain, soul, life/death, ownership, me/other, etc. Just don't.

I see no reason why consciousness need be tied to an individual. Not even in the case of human consciousness. The individual is found every time it is looked for, and so the notion is borne that the individual is always there. But is this so?

Stop pretending to be God.

Would you please clarify what you meant by "Stop pretending to be God"?

David: The entity is just the brain itself. In other words, the "I" is a useful fiction that the brain creates as part of its strategy for dealing with the world.

Yet, not every brain can meaningfully be said to have created an "I." This is as manifestly true in babies as it is in some adults, and in animals who have evolved to survive independently in the early beginnings of life.

That's right, there is no law which states that a brain has to create the I-fiction. The typical human brain does so out of an evolutionary need to be more adaptable to changing conditions, which necessitates knowing how to be part of fluid and adaptable social groupings.

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How can the concept of the self be created to merge with other people? The 'I' as a concept is a delusion(since it is the basis of all concepts) but most people aren't conscious enough to have this delusion.

What guestoflogic is talking about isn't the concept of the I. In fact, I don't think he even knows what he's talking about.

jupiviv:

How can the concept of the self be created to merge with other people?

In psychoanalytic terms, this is usually referred to as the interactions between consciousness, ego, id and superego. These are all, of course, concepts, just like the concept "memory."

Biochemically speaking, one may consider the functions of the nervous and endocrine systems arising in conjunction with such notions as "I love and am loved," "I hurt and am healed," "I live and will die," and so on.

Aside from that, I'm not sure what kind of merging you may be referring to.

The 'I' as a concept is a delusion(since it is the basis of all concepts) but most people aren't conscious enough to have this delusion.

So, you are saying all concepts are delusions? Here we go :) When is a concept not a concept?

What about the concept that the "I" is the basis of all delusions? Or, the concept that the "I" is a rhetorical tool?

What guestoflogic is talking about isn't the concept of the I. In fact, I don't think he even knows what he's talking about.

Who?

Leyla Shen wrote:What about the concept that the "I" is the basis of all delusions?

True, most likely. But then it would also have to be the basis of thought which is not delusional. Specifically, something must "have" the concept you just elucidated.

Or, the concept that the "I" is a rhetorical tool?

Without question. And there are many such rhetorical tools. But here again, what is the thing that employs rhetoric?

Biochemically speaking, one may consider the functions of the nervous and endocrine systems arising in conjunction with such notions as "I love and am loved," "I hurt and am healed," "I live and will die," and so on.

This is how I see it, if I read you correctly. The key concept being "in conjunction": I do not believe that the nervous or endocrine systems cause awareness, but rather support it like a scaffolding, something that arises in conjunction. I also think that when this scaffolding is faulty, it is reflected in one's awareness. Often the fault can be traced to a chemical imbalance which can be corrected or somewhat repaired. The "I" is a meta-phenomenon which relies on very many things for optimum performance, but it does not vanish when a small enough subset of these many things is broken or missing. It persists in an often identifiably impaired state.

If the "I" itself is an illusion, it surely is one of the most useful ones, no?

@Leyla Shen, David Quinn said that the I is something created by people to be part of the environment(which may be a human society), but I'd say that the creation of the concept of the I distinguishes a person from things around him. I don't know what id and superego is, but I'm guessing they are some more nonsensical terms in psychoanalysis.

I don't understand how the 'I' can arise in conjunction with the endocrinal and nervous systems, because if it did then it would not be able to perceiive that fact.

I said that the concept of the I is a delusion, not all concepts.

We can think of the "I" in each individual as being a building block within a larger, more adaptable organism - the social grouping, the tribe. The "I's" are joined together by emotion, which is the cohesive glue of the tribe. The flexibility and adaptabilty of the tribe is driven by the self-interest of each "I", while the cohesion within the trible is sustained by emotion. This has enabled our species to break away, to some extent, from the rigid programming that governs the social groupings of other species.

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David Quinn wrote:We can think of the "I" in each individual as being a building block within a larger, more adaptable organism - the social grouping, the tribe. The "I's" are joined together by emotion, which is the cohesive glue of the tribe. The flexibility and adaptabilty of the tribe is driven by the self-interest of each "I", while the cohesion within the trible is sustained by emotion. This has enabled our species to break away, to some extent, from the rigid programming that governs the social groupings of other species.

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Does each "I" have equal access to memories?

That rather depends on the moment-by-moment functioning of each person's neurology.

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David Quinn wrote:That rather depends on the moment-by-moment functioning of each person's neurology.

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Seems to be an important question. If the "I's" have equal access, then they can be considered equivalent. Maybe more accurately, if they do not, then they certainly cannot be considered equivalent. I tend to think they do not. Because what else could distinguish between them as they vie for supremacy at each instant? I'm thinking there is not a continuum, but a discrete set of "I's." And it is probably a small set, at least in underdeveloped minds, with new ones coming in response to new environmental situations (if any) and older ones falling into disuse or disappearing altogether. I think in a developed mind, there are so many of them that arise and fall with each moment as to create a continuum, which is in effect one thing, or one-mindedness. This is a Gurdjieffian notion, although certainly not original with him. Maybe the "I's" are rather like gears in a car? It would certainly account for the various speeds or "clips" at which time seems to pass in different situations.

@David Quinn, OK, I'll grant that it is possible to think of the I as being part of a whole(the tribe), but this is not necessarily the case, and even here we are distinguishing the I from the tribe. The clearer the concept of the I becomes, the more distinct it becomes from other things, which include 'wholes'(especially more material, tangible 'wholes' like a tribe.)

Moreover, I don't think there is a single great achievement in any field in the history of humanity(and especially not in philosophy), which was created for the 'tribe'. There may well be free thinking and innovative people who do some good things for 'humanity', but they never achieve anything of real value.

David Quinn wrote:That rather depends on the moment-by-moment functioning of each person's neurology.

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Let me make my take on this a bit more concrete if I may. You depict one as being a collection of I's that are somehow disunited. I am inquiring as to what causes the plurality and what causes it to persist.

Let me examine the one "I" that "has the floor" at any given moment - since if the illusion is that each of us is singular and not plural, only one is running with the baton at a time. (Or for the computer buffs out there, the host in a Token Ring that has the token.) Since the physical reality of the human is such that it never resides in the future - which has not happened yet - that leaves the present and the past. The present must be an illusory point, since it by definition is not part of the past and since the future has not become real yet. Therefore, all any organism ever has to live in is the past.

We can immediately observe that the past is ever changing, since it is constantly added to. If it is growing, then it is necessarily changing. But where does it reside? It resides completely in memory. Therefore, if the human self consists of a plurality of "I's," the only possible differences between them must reside in one's memory (using the term "one" here rhetorically, given that its posited plurality is what is under discussion.)

I suggest that which "I" receives the "token" depends on the existing external circumstance. The total of available memory is instantly addressed by a mechanism apart from the ego or "I"; the "I" best suited to deal with the external circumstance is then assigned the token. Since this "I" represents the ingress for the newly incoming memories and since the newly incoming memories are similar with the existing memories which produced this "I," this "I" is strengthened and further solidified with respect to the other "I's."

Yet in a healthier psyche, the "I's" overlap- - if they do not, memory available to one will not be available to another, and corresponding entire separate personalities result. (It must be born in mind that a "personality" is not a characteristic of of a person, but a perception residing in other people.)

To me, the process of enlightenment entails not being satisfied with letting the external world construct these "I's" within oneself and be the arbiter of which one gets the token as it were. That is, one strives to make the mechanism which assigns the token somehow less "mechanical."

There are degrees of enlightenment, since for most people who undertake the endeavor move step-by-step along a path. One can observe others at different stages of development by the extent to which they appear not to let external circumstances dictate which "I" surfaces. For example, some people think before they speak, while others simply cannot (girls).