GENIUS FORUMS

Laird wrote:

it's comforting to speculate

Ah.

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David Quinn wrote:Even in this situation, the thing is what it is in any given moment and not something else.

Well perhaps my point is that "what it is in any given moment" is not as fixed as you seem to think that it is. I've just thought of a third example - an electron orbiting an atomic nucleus. Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle teaches us that we can't simultaneously give that electron a momentum and a position - that we have to, as best I understand it, conceive of the electron as "smeared out" around the nucleus. It's not here, it's not there, it's just "smeared out" somewhere around there. That doesn't seem like a very firm identity to me.

David Quinn wrote:The one situation creating two different interpretations within two different observers is hardly an example of A not equally A.

It is one thing (a situation) and who is to say what its identity actually is? And if no one can definitively say what that identity is, then does it even have an "absolute" identity? I can't answer that question, I'm just throwing up ideas because that's the way that we progress beyond what we already know.

Laird: it's comforting to speculate

David: Ah.

And perhaps that's one of the differences between you and I - that I recognise the value in comfort. I'm sure you'd change your tune were you to be lying in a palliative care ward waiting for the end with the most unbearable pain assailing your every limb. It happens to some of us.

Laird wrote:Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle teaches us that we can't simultaneously give that electron a momentum and a position - that we have to, as best I understand it, conceive of the electron as "smeared out" around the nucleus.

Is this a "comforting speculation" on your part?

It's not here, it's not there, it's just "smeared out" somewhere around there. That doesn't seem like a very firm identity to me.

"Smeared out" is just as firm an identity as anything else.

Jam might be smeared out on a piece of bread, but it is still a firm identity.

It is one thing (a situation) and who is to say what its identity actually is?

Anyone is to say.

And if no one can definitively say what that identity is, then does it even have an "absolute" identity?

What is an "absolute identity", as opposed to just "identity"?

A=A refers just to identity.

I'm sure you'd change your tune were you to be lying in a palliative care ward waiting for the end with the most unbearable pain assailing your every limb. It happens to some of us.

There is true comfort, which is based on truth, and false comfort, which is based on imaginings.

Laird,

DQ: Even in this situation, the thing is what it is in any given moment and not something else.

Laird: Well perhaps my point is that "what it is in any given moment" is not as fixed as you seem to think that it is.

Why do you imagine that I need to think of things being in a fixed state? A fluid changing process possesses just as much identity as a static object does.

I've just thought of a third example - an electron orbiting an atomic nucleus. Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle teaches us that we can't simultaneously give that electron a momentum and a position - that we have to, as best I understand it, conceive of the electron as "smeared out" around the nucleus. It's not here, it's not there, it's just "smeared out" somewhere around there. That doesn't seem like a very firm identity to me.

The smeared out particle is precisely what it is - a smeared out particle.

DQ: The one situation creating two different interpretations within two different observers is hardly an example of A not equally A.

Laird: It is one thing (a situation) and who is to say what its identity actually is? And if no one can definitively say what that identity is, then does it even have an "absolute" identity?

If it exists, then it definitely has an identity. It is impossible for a thing to exist without identity.

Even if two people can't agree on what a particular thing's identity is, it still has an identity nonetheless.

I can't answer that question, I'm just throwing up ideas because that's the way that we progress beyond what we already know.

You don't even understand A=A and already you are trying to go beyond it!

Laird: it's comforting to speculate

David: Ah.

Laird: And perhaps that's one of the differences between you and I - that I recognise the value in comfort. I'm sure you'd change your tune were you to be lying in a palliative care ward waiting for the end with the most unbearable pain assailing your every limb. It happens to some of us.

Argument by torture - that's an interesting one. "If I can just cause you enough pain, I'm sure I can get you to renounce your claim to truth."

It's a bit like the one that Christians love to dredge up: "You say that you are an atheist, but I bet that when you are in great pain and lying on your death bed, you will call out to God."

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David Quinn wrote:The smeared out particle is precisely what it is - a smeared out particle.

So now imagine the scenario where there are two electrons at the same energy level in orbit around the nucleus. I point to a particular location and tell you that there's an electron there; I point to another location and tell you that there's an electron there. Do they have the same identity or are they different electrons? Does A=A? As I understand it, quantum indeterminacy doesn't even allow us to answer that question.

DQ: Even if two people can't agree on what a particular thing's identity is, it still has an identity nonetheless.

It seems then that you believe in what I would call "absolute" identity. I'm sitting on the fence with that one - half of me believes that e.g. a situation has an absolute identity regardless of individual interpretation and the other half of me believes that the situation exists only in the minds of its beholders - that its identity is as indeterminate as the location of an electron.

David Quinn wrote:Argument by torture - that's an interesting one. "If I can just cause you enough pain, I'm sure I can get you to renounce your claim to truth."

Firstly, I wasn't intending on causing you pain, I was speculating on the possibility that circumstances beyond either of our control lead you there. Secondly, you can keep your claim to truth through it all - in fact, let's speculate that your claim to truth only grows stronger in pain. I just want to see you acknowledge that you are human and bound to comfort like anyone else is. But perhaps you are indeed practicing a form of ascetism that I am unaware of. So please tell me - you surely do not sleep on a mattress, do you? Of what austere material is your bed comprised? And when the weather becomes cold, you surely do not reach for your jumper or switch on a heater, do you? (not that it gets particularly cold where you are, but then let's look at heat - surely your house does not have an airconditioner!) And no doubt you make do without the comfort of a stereo system, television and a ... oh, hang on, you don't make do without the comfort of a computer do you?...

So now imagine the scenario where there are two electrons at the same energy level in orbit around the nucleus. I point to a particular location and tell you that there's an electron there; I point to another location and tell you that there's an electron there. Do they have the same identity or are they different electrons? Does A=A? As I understand it, quantum indeterminacy doesn't even allow us to answer that question.

Although you are referring to the uncertainty principle, it has a relationship with entanglement.

Quantum entanglement is a quantum mechanical phenomenon in which the quantum states of two or more objects have to be described with reference to each other, even though the individual objects may be spatially separated. This leads to correlations between observable physical properties of the systems. For example, it is possible to prepare two particles in a single quantum state such that when one is observed to be spin-up, the other one will always be observed to be spin-down and vice versa, this despite the fact that it is impossible to predict, according to quantum mechanics, which set of measurements will be observed. As a result, measurements performed on one system seem to be instantaneously influencing other systems entangled with it. But quantum entanglement does not enable the transmission of classical information faster than the speed of light (see discussion in next section below).

The reason for entanglement is that things are a reverse causal agent acting against the creationary ability of the void. It is like a ballon pressure scenario, where if you poke a section of the balloon, greater pressure will arise in the rest of the balloon as it seeks the path of least resistance. The forces in the void are not absolutely seperable, although in terms of appearances one would think they must be, seeing as the centre of one thing is in a distinctly separate location to the centre of another thing . It is after all a non-spatial domain, so there can be no absolute separation.

What this means is that a change in anything, a photon for example, may result in a lessening of pressure elsewhere so a photon pops out "there" rather than necessarily in a directly adjacent spot. For the most part though, pressure changes are localised and releases in pressure occur nearby, so 9 out of 10 times the photon will appear in close proximity to where the change in an existing photon occurred.

In responding here, I am totally relying on intuition, as always, rather than anything scientists may have said.

Laird wrote:I point to a particular location and tell you that there's an electron there

If there appears to be an electron there, then there appears to be an electron there. A = A.

I point to another location and tell you that there's an electron there.

Likewise, if there appears to be an electron there, then there appears to be an electron there. A = A.

Do they have the same identity or are they different electrons?

They are different identities.

half of me believes that e.g. a situation has an absolute identity regardless of individual interpretation

It is impossible for a thing to have an identity without a mind giving it identity, marking its boundaries, etc.

and the other half of me believes that the situation exists only in the minds of its beholders

Identities can't be isolated in the minds of beholders, since all identities have causes, and minds have causes.

. . . you don't make do without the comfort of a computer do you?...

I don't think you've clarified in your own mind what is a "comfort" and what is useful for some other purpose.

A hundred billion dollars need not be a comfort if a person is using it for some purpose other than comfort.

Kevin, while you are on A=A.

Someone else said

1st law of reality. "what is, is."

and I said

Partly wrong. While under the law of identity, A=A, is
the appearance that your mind identifies and is not something else at the same time (I think thats what A=A means, it is a philosophical statement i have trouble understanding), What "is", is also not what it appears to be.

Am I interpreting A=A properly?

Jamesh wrote:Am I interpreting A=A properly?

"A=A" is meant to suggest consciousness, which makes reasoning possible. It symbolizes memory.

An unconscious person (eg, a person who is almost entirely feminine) experiences just "A" and therefore is unable to think logically. They don't have sufficient memory to think "A=A", or to remember that a thing cannot be other than what it is.

You won't be able to have a rational discussion with such a person because they won't be able to maintain a consistent idea in their heads - or even an idea at all for that matter.

Laird,

DQ: The smeared out particle is precisely what it is - a smeared out particle.

L: So now imagine the scenario where there are two electrons at the same energy level in orbit around the nucleus. I point to a particular location and tell you that there's an electron there; I point to another location and tell you that there's an electron there. Do they have the same identity or are they different electrons? Does A=A? As I understand it, quantum indeterminacy doesn't even allow us to answer that question.

We can't even tell whether the cup of tea from which we drink in the present is the same one that existed on the table a few moments before. And yet the fact still remains that the cup of tea in the present is precisely what it is - namely, a cup of tea in the present - just as the cup of tea in the past is what it is - a cup of tea in the past.

DQ: Even if two people can't agree on what a particular thing's identity is, it still has an identity nonetheless.

L: It seems then that you believe in what I would call "absolute" identity. I'm sitting on the fence with that one - half of me believes that e.g. a situation has an absolute identity regardless of individual interpretation and the other half of me believes that the situation exists only in the minds of its beholders - that its identity is as indeterminate as the location of an electron.

Even if a situation exists only in the mind of its beholder, the fact still remains that it is what it is - namely, a situation that exists in the mind of its beholder.

It is impossible for us to escape the notion of absolute identity altogether, no matter how hard we try.

DQ:Argument by torture - that's an interesting one. "If I can just cause you enough pain, I'm sure I can get you to renounce your claim to truth."

L: Firstly, I wasn't intending on causing you pain, I was speculating on the possibility that circumstances beyond either of our control lead you there. Secondly, you can keep your claim to truth through it all - in fact, let's speculate that your claim to truth only grows stronger in pain. I just want to see you acknowledge that you are human and bound to comfort like anyone else is.

I am imperfect and have weaknesses, sure.

But perhaps you are indeed practicing a form of ascetism that I am unaware of. So please tell me - you surely do not sleep on a mattress, do you? Of what austere material is your bed comprised? And when the weather becomes cold, you surely do not reach for your jumper or switch on a heater, do you? (not that it gets particularly cold where you are, but then let's look at heat - surely your house does not have an airconditioner!) And no doubt you make do without the comfort of a stereo system, television and a ... oh, hang on, you don't make do without the comfort of a computer do you?...

I practice the only austerity which matters - namely, adhering to truth. All those other austerities you mention are really just forms of vanity and egotism.

There is the story of Diogenes one day re-arranging his scruffy clothes to allow their holes to become more visible. At the sight of this, Plato remarked, "I can see your vanity shining through those holes, Diogenes."

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Laird: I point to a particular location and tell you that there's an electron there

Kevin: If there appears to be an electron there, then there appears to be an electron there. A = A.

Oh but there doesn't appear to be anything there - we're dealing with quantum uncertainty and the electron is "in reality" spread out across multiple locations. But if I point to a particular location, I can say that one electron is as much there as it is anywhere else.

Laird: I point to another location and tell you that there's an electron there.

Kevin: Likewise, if there appears to be an electron there, then there appears to be an electron there. A = A.

Again, there's no appearance due to uncertainty. It could be anywhere in some regional orbit.

Laird: Do they have the same identity or are they different electrons?

Kevin: They are different identities.

Well, here - as far as I understand this quantum situation - you simply can't make that claim. Both electrons are simultaneously spread out across multiple locations. It could be the same electron for all we know.

Incidentally, and rather than starting a new thread, I want to share with you something new from my readings. Kev, this is what I've tried to communicate to you on a few occasions but you haven't been receptive to it. The way it's expressed below is almost exactly what I've been trying to say to you:

Paul Davies in Chapter 7 of The Mind of God wrote:It has been argued by some that everything in the universe can be explained in terms of something else, and that in terms of something else again and so on, in an infinite chain. [...] However, it is quite wrong to suppose that an infinite chain of explanation is satisfactory on the basis that every member of that chain is explained by the next member. One is still left with the mystery of why that particular chain is the one that exists, or why any chain exists at all. Leibniz made this point eloquently by inviting us to consider an infinite collection of books, each one copied from a previous one. To say that the content of the book is thereby explained is absurd. We are still justified in asking who the author was.

Laird wrote:

Laird: I point to a particular location and tell you that there's an electron there

Kevin: If there appears to be an electron there, then there appears to be an electron there. A = A.

Oh but there doesn't appear to be anything there

That's why I said "If there appears to be an electron there . . . "

So you're telling me that you're pointing somewhere where there doesn't appear to be anything at all. So why would I be interested?

It could be the same electron for all we know.

Things are whatever they appear to be. A = A.

Paul Davies in Chapter 7 of The Mind of God wrote:It has been argued by some that everything in the universe can be explained in terms of something else, and that in terms of something else again and so on, in an infinite chain. [...] However, it is quite wrong to suppose that an infinite chain of explanation is satisfactory on the basis that every member of that chain is explained by the next member. One is still left with the mystery of why that particular chain is the one that exists

Any particular chain is explained by whatever caused that chain.

or why any chain exists at all.

This is an invalid question, for the reasons already explained.

We are still justified in asking who the author was.

No, you're not justified in asking what the cause of the Totality is.

Can you see why?

Kevin Solway wrote:So you're telling me that you're pointing somewhere where there doesn't appear to be anything at all. So why would I be interested?

I thought that you might be interested to consider the idea that identity is sometimes a tenuous and nebulous concept.

Laird: It could be the same electron for all we know.

Kevin: Things are whatever they appear to be. A = A.

Sometimes things don't even appear directly to us. The only way that we measure anything about electrons is through complex scientific instrumentation.

Paul Davies in Chapter 7 of The Mind of God: It has been argued by some that everything in the universe can be explained in terms of something else, and that in terms of something else again and so on, in an infinite chain. [...] However, it is quite wrong to suppose that an infinite chain of explanation is satisfactory on the basis that every member of that chain is explained by the next member. One is still left with the mystery of why that particular chain is the one that exists

Kevin: Any particular chain is explained by whatever caused that chain.

The elements of the chain are, yes, but the chain itself is left unexplained.

Continuing the quotation of Paul Davies: We are still justified in asking who the author was.

Kevin: No, you're not justified in asking what the cause of the Totality is.

Can you see why?

I know why you make that statement - because you claim that all causes are contained within the Totality and that therefore the Totality itself must be uncaused. Some of us find that to be a particularly unsatisfactory answer. I thought that you might have been interested to know that Paul Davies (and, if his quotation is faithful, Leibniz too) is one of those people, and I thought that you might have also found it interesting that he independently raised almost exactly the same points that I'd made to you verbally a month or so prior. Incidentally, the sentence prior to the passage that I quoted made it clear that he is very unimpressed by such reasoning, however I didn't include it for reasons of diplomacy. Speaking for myself and not Paul Davies nor Leibniz, what is so unsatisfactory about the answer is that it is not an answer at all but rather a pronouncement that no answer is possible. I'm willing to consider that an answer might be impossible, but not as a consequence of such a simple rationalisation. There is an alternate and conflicting question of rationalisation that runs like this: all works - especially complex and interesting ones - seem to have been created somehow; how can we explain that the universe as an entirety is solely exempt? Your answer to this question amounts to "it just is - get over it". Well, unless you can provide some deeper reasoning that explains how something hugely complex can come into existence without an explanation, I can't and probably won't just get over it - and I will probably continue to draw inspiration from the knowledge that this fantastic mystery exists at all.

Jamesh wrote:What this means is that a change in anything, a photon for example, may result in a lessening of pressure elsewhere so a photon pops out "there" rather than necessarily in a directly adjacent spot. For the most part though, pressure changes are localised and releases in pressure occur nearby, so 9 out of 10 times the photon will appear in close proximity to where the change in an existing photon occurred.

In responding here, I am totally relying on intuition, as always, rather than anything scientists may have said.

I have similar intuitions about the possibility of miracles occurring through quantum mechanics. To change water into wine a whole lot of implausible quantum events need to occur in a localised area - these "suck implausibility" away from other areas, causing events in other areas to occur at probabilities that balance out those of the miracle area.

Laird: I just want to see you acknowledge that you are human and bound to comfort like anyone else is.

David: I am imperfect and have weaknesses, sure.

Your candour is refreshing, although I am left with the question: what is it that you find so negative about comfort that to embrace it is a weakness? I am guessing that your answer will run along the lines that it is a distraction from truth. OK, so what prevents you from embracing both?

Or perhaps another answer (and one which I am more personally drawn to) is that comfort is often produced at the expense of hard (and uncomfortable) work, so that we should minimise our use of it to minimise the amount that others (and sometimes ourselves) have to suffer for it. Here I refer to things like factory workers who perform mindless and repetitive tasks to assemble our comfort goods for us; to farm labourers who slave in the hot sun to pick our comfort foods for us; to tradesmen who stick at one boring line of work just so that our taps, lights and toilets work for us; etc. To me the dream of mechanisation is to minimise the amount that conscious humans have to suffer for comfort by transferring that "suffering" onto unconscious machines, but we are still far from that dream and it seems possible to me that the ultimate realisation of that dream - subtle and complex general-purpose robots - will be capable of suffering too (but perhaps not).

Laird wrote:I thought that you might be interested to consider the idea that identity is sometimes a tenuous and nebulous concept.

It never is, so you have failed to illustrate this point.

A "cloud of probability" is precisely a "cloud of probability". There's nothing tenuous or nebulous about this identity.

However, if you are pointing to something where there is nothing appearing, that is not at all tenuous or nebulous, but simply irrational.

Things are whatever they appear to be. A = A.

Sometimes things don't even appear directly to us.

What is your definition of a "thing"?

My definition of a thing is "that which appears to us". Therefore all things necessarily appear directly to us.

The only way that we measure anything about electrons is through complex scientific instrumentation.

The only way we can measure the existence of, say, a chair, is through complex scientific instrumentation - namely our eyes and other senses.

Any particular chain is explained by whatever caused that chain.

The elements of the chain are, yes

No, the chain itself is explained by whatever caused that chain. Do you imagine that a particular causal chain is itself without cause?

Kevin: No, you're not justified in asking what the cause of the Totality is.

Can you see why?

I know why you make that statement - because you claim that all causes are contained within the Totality and that therefore the Totality itself must be uncaused. Some of us find that to be a particularly unsatisfactory answer.

That's like saying that you don't find it satisfactory that 1 + 1= 2.

what is so unsatisfactory about the answer is that it is not an answer at all but rather a pronouncement that no answer is possible.

No. The question is not possible. That's a big difference.

how can we explain that the universe as an entirety is solely exempt?

It is obvious why it is exempt. It is exempt because there is nothing other than the All.

. . . how something hugely complex can come into existence without an explanation

It is obvious that it can never come into existence, and terms like "simple" or "complex" don't mean anything when applied to the All, because there's nothing to compare it to.

Kevin Solway wrote:However, if you are pointing to something where there is nothing appearing, that is not at all tenuous or nebulous, but simply irrational.

It's not hard to take that as a claim that the universe at the most fundamental level is irrational. I found it interesting to review the Schrödinger's cat though experiment. From there I came across A Lazy Layman's Guide to Quantum Physics where I stumbled upon a description of a remarkably parallel scenario: Neils Bohr was the founder of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum physics, and he "browbeat all dissenters into submission (with the notable exception of Einstein) at a Brussels conference sponsored by a man called Solvay in 1927". Solvay, Solway; "browbeating dissenters" - quite similar, no? But wait, it gets better: "If anyone asked why [the Schroedinger equation worked as a tool for calculating where the particle would be, except that it 'collapsed' as soon as you took a peek], he would say, "shut up and calculate" (or he might as well have done)." "Shut up and calculate", "the Totality just is, shut up and stop questioning" - pretty similar, huh? It only falls down in that it was Bohr who took that attitude and not Solvay (although Solvay was sponsoring him).

Kevin: Things are whatever they appear to be. A = A.

Laird: Sometimes things don't even appear directly to us.

Kevin: What is your definition of a "thing"?

We've been through this before, both in person and on the forum. My working definition of "thing" is "a coherent set out of all that exists".

Kevin Solway wrote:My definition of a thing is "that which appears to us". Therefore all things necessarily appear directly to us.

You seem to have different definitions of "thing", and to pick and choose between them depending on circumstance (not that there's anything wrong with that - that seems to me to be the way that we use language). In personal email - and I hope that you don't mind me repeating it here but it seems to be innocuous enough - you've written on two separate occasions:

Kevin Solway wrote:I define a "thing" to be anything that has a beginning and an end, causes and effects.

and

Kevin Solway wrote:I define a thing to have boundaries - which means it must have causes (it is caused by that which defines its boundaries)

Nothing in either of those two definitions implies appearance, so this is an addendum to your definition of "thing". The problem with it is what "appear directly" means. As you point out later in your response, we rely upon instrumentation (through the human senses or secondhand through human-created technology) to detect things. So perhaps we can define "appearance" as "the impression upon our consciousness of sensory data that leads us to infer the presence of a thing". What is direct about this? It necessarily progresses through some instrumentation before it reaches us. Where I see directness is in the appearance of things that seem to be created more immediately by consciousness itself, such as thought. But even this sometimes feels the same as indirect appearance through the senses - I can sit back and, given a suitable atmosphere and concentration, observe thoughts arising as though they were coming from elsewhere (and I'm willing to entertain the possibility that this is exactly what is happening - that we are somehow "fed" thoughts).

Laird: The only way that we measure anything about electrons is through complex scientific instrumentation.

Kevin: The only way we can measure the existence of, say, a chair, is through complex scientific instrumentation - namely our eyes and other senses.

Yes, good point, but it rather detracts from your earlier point about the directness of the appearance of a thing.

Kevin: Any particular chain is explained by whatever caused that chain.

Laird: The elements of the chain are, yes

Kevin: No, the chain itself is explained by whatever caused that chain.

Do you realise that "chain" here represents the Totality, and that you've just admitted the possibility that consideration of the cause of the Totality is a valid endeavour? Apparently not, because I can't imagine you volunteering such reasoning.

Kevin: No, you're not justified in asking what the cause of the Totality is.

Laird: I know why you make that statement - because you claim that all causes are contained within the Totality and that therefore the Totality itself must be uncaused. Some of us find that to be a particularly unsatisfactory answer.

Kevin: That's like saying that you don't find it satisfactory that 1 + 1= 2.

Only if you're willing to stretch analogies. The mathematical statement has a testable and practical correspondence with reality. We can't test your claims about the Totality, nor are they practical - they deny other lines of rationalisation.

Laird: what is so unsatisfactory about the answer is that it is not an answer at all but rather a pronouncement that no answer is possible.

Kevin: No. The question is not possible. That's a big difference.

Since you are so fond of definitions and constructs, I entertain the conjecture that we can find a way to define and construct the question such that it is acceptable to your mind. I'll have a go now:

"By your logic the totality of the universe cannot have a cause, and yet it exists. How can we explain that the totality has this unique property of existence-without-a-cause, given that your logic requires it?"

Please note that I'm making the distinction between a requirement (created by your logic) and an explanation (demanded by my mind).

Laird: how can we explain that the universe as an entirety is solely exempt?

Kevin: It is obvious why it is exempt. It is exempt because there is nothing other than the All.

I'll reiterate the distinction between requirement and explanation. In my opinion you are claiming the obviousness of a requirement, without offering an explanation for the satisfaction of that requirement: it is the explanation that I seek.

Laird wrote: . . . although Solvay was sponsoring him).

There was no argument there that I could detect.

My working definition of "thing" is "a coherent set out of all that exists".

Okay, what is your definition of "exists"?

Does my definition of the number "1" exist? If so, how do you know?

Kevin Solway wrote:My definition of a thing is "that which appears to us". Therefore all things necessarily appear directly to us.

You seem to have different definitions of "thing" . . .

"I define a "thing" to be anything that has a beginning and an end, causes and effects."

If a thing has a beginning and an end (boundaries) it means that it has made an appearance, so there is no contradiction.

We rely upon instrumentation (through the human senses or secondhand through human-created technology) to detect things.

The senses may have nothing to do with the appearance of any particular thing. But we can certainly say that something has caused the appearance.

. . . it rather detracts from your earlier point about the directness of the appearance of a thing.

An appearance is an appearance. You can't get more direct than that.

When you experience the appearance of a chair, the experience is direct.

Do you realise that "chain" here represents the Totality

The Totality is not "a chain of cause and effect".

They are completely different.

Kevin: That's like saying that you don't find it satisfactory that 1 + 1= 2.

Only if you're willing to stretch analogies.

There can be no external explanation for the All when there is nothing other than the All. This is a purely logical truth, of the same order as 1 + 1 = 2.

The mathematical statement has a testable and practical correspondence with reality.

1 + 1 = 2 is not true because it is "testable". Think about it.

There's a reason why pure mathematics is not a science.

By your logic the totality of the universe cannot have a cause, and yet it exists.

No. For a thing to exist it must have a beginning and an end (boundaries). But the Totality doesn't fit these criteria.

. . . it is the explanation that I seek.

Explanation for what? That there is nothing more than the All? This is by definition.

Laird: . . . although Solvay was sponsoring him).

Kevin: There was no argument there that I could detect.

Nevermind, hopefully someone gets something out of it if not you (the argument was mostly in the links that I provided). I do hope though that you detected irony, or my faith in my ability to communicate with you will take a blow.

Laird: My working definition of "thing" is "a coherent set out of all that exists".

Kevin: Okay, what is your definition of "exists"?

Tough one. Perhaps: "is a part (or the entirety) of reality".

Does my definition of the number "1" exist? If so, how do you know?

You want to know about *your* definition in particular, and I can't recall that you've actually provided one, nevertheless I'm confident that, yes, you have one and that therefore - as a concept in your mind - it exists (or will exist at such time as you formulate it). It might be a somewhat loose existence because it is such a simple concept that an actual definition is likely to be difficult to come by - I'd be more confident in writing that your "conceptual representation" of the number "1" exists in your mind.

Kevin: My definition of a thing is "that which appears to us". Therefore all things necessarily appear directly to us.

Laird: You seem to have different definitions of "thing" . . .

Kevin: "I define a "thing" to be anything that has a beginning and an end, causes and effects."

Kevin: If a thing has a beginning and an end (boundaries) it means that it has made an appearance, so there is no contradiction.

I wasn't suggesting contradiction, I was suggesting addition. I'm not convinced that something with a boundary necessarily appears though. I can imagine very small particles that interact with absolutely nothing at all. These would be undetectable - they would have boundaries but would not make an appearance.

Laird: We rely upon instrumentation (through the human senses or secondhand through human-created technology) to detect things.

Kevin: The senses may have nothing to do with the appearance of any particular thing. But we can certainly say that something has caused the appearance.

I'm curious to know what other things you can think of that cause appearances - and I assume that you mean appearances in the mind, right? The only thing that I can think of other than the senses is the mind itself - that perhaps some internal feedback loop presents information to consciousness that seems to be external but that actually is generated by consciousness itself. And then thought and emotion can be considered to be appearances that are not necessarily generated by the senses. Anything else?

Laird: . . . it rather detracts from your earlier point about the directness of the appearance of a thing.

Kevin: An appearance is an appearance. You can't get more direct than that.

Now you claim that appearance is of itself direct. So then to speak of a "direct appearance" as you did earlier is a tautology. What do you mean by a "direct appearance" as opposed to an ordinary appearance then?

Laird: Do you realise that "chain" here represents the Totality

Kevin: The Totality is not "a chain of cause and effect".

They are completely different.

So if not "a chain of cause and effect" then what? Do you prefer the word "web" to "chain"?

Laird: The mathematical statement has a testable and practical correspondence with reality.

Kevin: 1 + 1 = 2 is not true because it is "testable". Think about it.

There's a reason why pure mathematics is not a science.

There are many mathematicians who do regard it that way - as far as I understand him, Roger Penrose for one. They believe that they make discoveries in the same way that scientists do.

Laird: By your logic the totality of the universe cannot have a cause, and yet it exists.

Kevin: No. For a thing to exist it must have a beginning and an end (boundaries). But the Totality doesn't fit these criteria.

We have different understandings of what it means to exist. But I am surprised at your conclusion: it seems that you are claiming that "everything that exists does not exist".

Laird: . . . it is the explanation that I seek.

Kevin: Explanation for what? That there is nothing more than the All? This is by definition.

Nevermind, I didn't really expect that you had one, but I wanted to at least give you the opportunity to provide one. It seems that you don't even understand the way that I've formulated the question, let alone have anything close to a satisfactory answer.

Laird wrote:Kevin: Okay, what is your definition of "exists"?

Perhaps: "is a part (or the entirety) of reality".

Unless you can provide a firm definition of what you mean by "exists", then I can't be sure I understand what you are saying.

Does my definition of the number "1" exist? If so, how do you know?

. . . I'd be more confident in writing that your "conceptual representation" of the number "1" exists in your mind.

In short, you don't know that anything exists unless you experience it yourself.

If a thing has a beginning and an end (boundaries) it means that it has made an appearance, so there is no contradiction.

I wasn't suggesting contradiction, I was suggesting addition.

They actually both mean the same thing.

"Having boundaries" and "appearing" really mean the same thing.

I'm not convinced that something with a boundary necessarily appears though.

Since all boundaries are created by the process of perception/imagination - the process of creating appearances - things with boundaries are always appearances.

I can imagine very small particles that interact with absolutely nothing at all.

If they have a boundary then the boundary is in contact with something other than themselves, and will therefore be interacting.

So, in fact, you can't even imagine things that have no effect on anything.

I'm curious to know what other things you can think of that cause appearances

Lots of things can cause appearances - imagination, hallucinations, chemicals, etc.

What do you mean by a "direct appearance" as opposed to an ordinary appearance then?

All appearances are direct.

Laird: Do you realise that "chain" here represents the Totality

Kevin: The Totality is not "a chain of cause and effect".

They are completely different.

So if not "a chain of cause and effect" then what? Do you prefer the word "web" to "chain"?

The Totality is all things, so it includes time. That's why it is wrong to conceive of it as a chain of cause and effect.

A web of cause and effect that includes time would be a better description of what it is. But you can't draw a boundary around that which has no boundary.

There's a reason why pure mathematics is not a science.

There are many mathematicians who do regard it that way

The reason that such things as 1 + 1 = 2 is not a science is that such things can't be disproven. Simple as that.

It's very important in the practice of science that things are able to be disproven.

it seems that you are claiming that "everything that exists does not exist".

The All neither exists and nor does it not exist. It's not the kind of object you can talk about it existing or not existing.

Laird: Perhaps [my definition of "exists" is]: "is a part (or the entirety) of reality".

Kevin: Unless you can provide a firm definition of what you mean by "exists", then I can't be sure I understand what you are saying.

That's as firm as I've got for the moment. If you spot any deficiencies then I'm willing to revise it.

Laird: . . . I'd be more confident in writing that your "conceptual representation" of the number "1" exists in your mind.

Kevin: In short, you don't know that anything exists unless you experience it yourself.

In some sense the word "know" can be used for things that one is highly confident in without being absolutely certain. In that sense I know that you have a conceptual representation of the number 1 even though I don't experience it myself. But yes, there is a sense in which "know" applies only to things that are directly experienced.

Laird: I'm not convinced that something with a boundary necessarily appears though.

Kevin: Since all boundaries are created by the process of perception/imagination - the process of creating appearances - things with boundaries are always appearances.

As you already know we differ on this point. It seems to me unlikely that boundaries are created solely in the mind.

Laird: I can imagine very small particles that interact with absolutely nothing at all.

Kevin: If they have a boundary then the boundary is in contact with something other than themselves, and will therefore be interacting.

They are not in contact with anything: they are floating in the void.

Laird: I'm curious to know what other things you can think of that cause appearances

Kevin: Lots of things can cause appearances - imagination, hallucinations, chemicals, etc.

OK, so since you believe that everything that has an appearance exists, and that all appearances occur in the mind, then an hallucination (which appears in the mind) must be as real as anything else. Agreed?

Laird: What do you mean by a "direct appearance" as opposed to an ordinary appearance then?

Kevin: All appearances are direct.

That's completely unresponsive. You're merely repeating what you originally wrote and what I pointed out made your claim of a "direct appearance" a tautology. So then do you take back your wording "appears directly" as a mistaken tautology?

Kevin Solway wrote:The Totality is all things, so it includes time. That's why it is wrong to conceive of it as a chain of cause and effect.

A web of cause and effect that includes time would be a better description of what it is.

Traditional cause and effect operates within time, so it seems that time is implicit in the description "chain of cause and effect".

I also prefer "web" to "chain" so I'll stick with that in future.

Kevin Solway wrote:But you can't draw a boundary around that which has no boundary.

What boundary do you suggest that I am attempting to draw?

Kevin: There's a reason why pure mathematics is not a science.

Laird: There are many mathematicians who do regard it that way

Kevin: The reason that such things as 1 + 1 = 2 is not a science is that such things can't be disproven.

I think you'll find that many "mathematical truths" have subsequently been disproven. I haven't studied mathematical history that much so I can't provide any examples without research but I'm sure that someone like Victor would have many at his fingertips.

Laird: it seems that you are claiming that "everything that exists does not exist".

Kevin: The All neither exists and nor does it not exist. It's not the kind of object you can talk about it existing or not existing.

Paradox and mysticism! The stuff of legends. I like that your philosophy has some mystique to it. The way that you capitalise various words suggests a very human reverence for the mysterious.

Laird wrote:It seems to me unlikely that boundaries are created solely in the mind.

The mind is only part of the process of boundary-creation.

They are not in contact with anything: they are floating in the void.

In that case they are in contact with the void (if that is what it is that you are specifying is other than themselves).

OK, so since you believe that everything that has an appearance exists

Only by definition.

and that all appearances occur in the mind, then an hallucination (which appears in the mind) must be as real as anything else. Agreed?

All we can ever know are appearances. It's impossible for us to tell where those appearances come from.

So then do you take back your wording "appears directly" as a mistaken tautology?

You were speaking of things appearing directly, and I was making the point that all appearances are direct.

Kevin Solway wrote:The Totality is all things, so it includes time. That's why it is wrong to conceive of it as a chain of cause and effect.

Traditional cause and effect operates within time

That's why it can't be the Totality, since it is within something.

Kevin Solway wrote:But you can't draw a boundary around that which has no boundary.

What boundary do you suggest that I am attempting to draw?

You are wanting to draw a boundary around cause and effect, making it "within time", and call that the Totality - which it can never be.

I think you'll find that many "mathematical truths" have subsequently been disproven.

No purely mathematical truth (such as 1 + 1 = 2) can ever been disproven.

The All neither exists and nor does it not exist. It's not the kind of object you can talk about it existing or not existing.

Paradox and mysticism!

Not to me it's not. It's just a plain, hard, logical truth, that has nothing mysterious about it.

The way that you capitalise various words suggests a very human reverence for the mysterious.

The capitalization is meant to serve as a reminder that we are talking about the Infinite, which has completely different properties to all finite things.

Laird: It seems to me unlikely that boundaries are created solely in the mind.

Kevin: The mind is only part of the process of boundary-creation.

Agreed - some boundaries are inherent.

Laird: They are not in contact with anything: they are floating in the void.

Kevin: In that case they are in contact with the void (if that is what it is that you are specifying is other than themselves).

You could say that if you like. They, however, create no appearance, which is the point that I wanted to make.

Laird: OK, so since you believe that everything that has an appearance exists...

Kevin: Only by definition.

Laird: ...and that all appearances occur in the mind, then an hallucination (which appears in the mind) must be as real as anything else. Agreed?

Kevin: All we can ever know are appearances. It's impossible for us to tell where those appearances come from.

That looks to me like a yes. So if it's impossible for us to tell where appearances come from, then on what basis do you classify something as an hallucination?

Laird: So then do you take back your wording "appears directly" as a mistaken tautology?

Kevin: You were speaking of things appearing directly, and I was making the point that all appearances are direct.

I don't know whether that's a yes or a no. That's OK, I won't force the point - I don't enjoy being pushed to admit a mistake either.

Laird wrote:The mind is only part of the process of boundary-creation.

Agreed - some boundaries are inherent.

I've never suggested that any boundaries are inherent. You will notice above that I said that "the mind is part of the process of boundary-creation".

If any boundaries were inherent, then the mind wouldn't need to be part of the process of boundary creation.

Laird: They are not in contact with anything: they are floating in the void.

Kevin: In that case they are in contact with the void (if that is what it is that you are specifying is other than themselves).

You could say that if you like. They, however, create no appearance, which is the point that I wanted to make.

Since they are in contact with something other than themselves, they can make an appearance.

That's the standard way that things make an appearance.

if it's impossible for us to tell where appearances come from, then on what basis do you classify something as an hallucination?

An hallucination is a particular type of appearance that we imagine has a different set of causes to another type of appearance.

Laird: So then do you take back your wording "appears directly" as a mistaken tautology?

Kevin: You were speaking of things appearing directly, and I was making the point that all appearances are direct.

I don't know whether that's a yes or a no.

No, I don't take back my wording, since there's nothing wrong with me saying that all appearances are direct when correcting your suggestion that they aren't.

Kevin: The mind is only part of the process of boundary-creation.

Laird: Agreed - some boundaries are inherent.

Kevin: I've never suggested that any boundaries are inherent.

OK, so what are the other parts of the process of boundary-creation then?

Laird: They are not in contact with anything: they are floating in the void.

Kevin: In that case they are in contact with the void (if that is what it is that you are specifying is other than themselves).

Laird: You could say that if you like. They, however, create no appearance, which is the point that I wanted to make.

Kevin: Since they are in contact with something other than themselves, they can make an appearance.

To me, making an appearance involves impinging on consciousness. I am suggesting the possibility of particles that, whilst being "in contact with the void", have no effect on any other thing - they are invisible and unknown to any consciousness. How then can they make an appearance?

Laird: if it's impossible for us to tell where appearances come from, then on what basis do you classify something as an hallucination?

Kevin: An hallucination is a particular type of appearance that we imagine has a different set of causes to another type of appearance.

Can you explain what the two sets of causes are - what sets of causes do hallucinagenic appearances have and what different sets of causes do non-hallucinagenic appearances have?

Laird: So then do you take back your wording "appears directly" as a mistaken tautology?

Kevin: You were speaking of things appearing directly, and I was making the point that all appearances are direct.

Laird: I don't know whether that's a yes or a no.

Kevin: No, I don't take back my wording, since there's nothing wrong with me saying that all appearances are direct when correcting your suggestion that they aren't.

I think what this comes down to is that I make a distinction between a "thing" - existing in some putative reality external to the mind - and the "appearance of that thing" (the mind's representation of that externally existing object) whereas you seem to deny that any external reality actually exists. I really find it difficult to see how you hold this position but I'll keep on trying to understand. (and before you ask: I don't believe that all things are external objects - I do believe in things of the mind too)

So when I say that an appearance is not direct I mean that we do not directly perceive things - that our perceptions of things come through our senses.

And when you say that an appearance is direct I think that you mean that everything is in the mind so everything is directly perceived. But I can't really reconcile this with the references that you make to the senses. Are senses "all in the mind" too? What sense does that make?

Laird wrote:

I've never suggested that any boundaries are inherent.

OK, so what are the other parts of the process of boundary-creation then?

Other causes of boundaries are countless, including things like lighting conditions and any other causes acting on the senses and mind.

Since they are in contact with something other than themselves, they can make an appearance.

To me, making an appearance involves impinging on consciousness. I am suggesting the possibility of particles that, whilst being "in contact with the void", have no effect on any other thing

If they have an effect on one other thing they have an effect on countless other things, and they are therefore detectable.

they are invisible and unknown to any consciousness. How then can they make an appearance?

Even things that are currently unknown to consciousness, and may be known tomorrow, still have an imaginary existence, and these imaginary things make an appearance.

Laird: if it's impossible for us to tell where appearances come from, then on what basis do you classify something as an hallucination?

Kevin: An hallucination is a particular type of appearance that we imagine has a different set of causes to another type of appearance.

Can you explain what the two sets of causes are

One set is imagined to stem mostly from an imagined "physical world", while another set is imagined to stem from an imagined "inner world".

Are senses "all in the mind" too?

The mind is a necessary factor in the creation of all things (boundaries). It is not the case that all things are in the mind.

Kevin: I've never suggested that any boundaries are inherent.

Laird: OK, so what are the other parts of the process of boundary-creation then?

Kevin: Other causes of boundaries are countless, including things like lighting conditions and any other causes acting on the senses and mind.

So you seem to be saying that things outside of the mind influence how the mind "creates" boundaries. And "lighting conditions" are one of these external factors. But we can say that these external lighting conditions are defined by (external) boundaries, and that therefore there are inherent boundaries in things outside of the mind. Or do you argue that these lighting conditions are actually within the mind?

Kevin: Since they are in contact with something other than themselves, they can make an appearance.

Laird: To me, making an appearance involves impinging on consciousness. I am suggesting the possibility of particles that, whilst being "in contact with the void", have no effect on any other thing

Kevin: If they have an effect on one other thing they have an effect on countless other things, and they are therefore detectable.

These particles affect nothing. They exist in the void but do not perturb it, nor do they interact with any other particle.

Laird: they are invisible and unknown to any consciousness. How then can they make an appearance?

Kevin: Even things that are currently unknown to consciousness, and may be known tomorrow, still have an imaginary existence, and these imaginary things make an appearance.

I really can't see how the imagined appearance of a thing is equivalent to the sensed appearance of that thing. You seem to accept the senses yet at the same time you seem to be saying that reality and imagination are identical. So what are the senses perceiving then if not some (non-imagined) reality?

But for argument's sake, I'll accept your reasoning. So now I tell you that there are other things like these particles that I've describe that likewise affect nothing but that no one has yet imagined nor ever will imagine. Do you still want to maintain that these things can make an appearance?

Laird: if it's impossible for us to tell where appearances come from, then on what basis do you classify something as an hallucination?

Kevin: An hallucination is a particular type of appearance that we imagine has a different set of causes to another type of appearance.

Laird: Can you explain what the two sets of causes are

Kevin: One set is imagined to stem mostly from an imagined "physical world", while another set is imagined to stem from an imagined "inner world".

There's a lot of imagination going on there - is there anything that is not imagined? And by the way, I understood that you believed that there was no reality independent of thought - are you now revising that to "there is no reality independent of imagination"?

Laird: Are senses "all in the mind" too?

Kevin: The mind is a necessary factor in the creation of all things (boundaries). It is not the case that all things are in the mind.

Well now I'm really confused. If there are things that are not in the mind then there must be some independent external reality, but at the same time you deny that there is any independent reality outside of mind/thought/imagination (I'm also confused as to which of these you intend - perhaps all three?). How do you resolve this apparent contradiction?