Partial transcript: The War Behind Closed Doors - PBS
WILLIAM KRISTOL, V.P. Chief of Staff '89-'92: You know, the president had urged Iraqis to rise up. There was a huge rebellion. We had helicopters right there, forces right there, obviously.
NARRATOR: And within days, Saddam had lost control of southern Iraq, where Shi'a Muslims took up arms. They were winning, but it wouldn't last. They were soon to be overwhelmed by Saddam's helicopter gunships.
WILLIAM KRISTOL: We allowed Saddam to suppress the rebellion as our forces stood by.
NARRATOR: American troops could see the fighting from their positions, but they were ordered not to intervene by President Bush. There are estimate that thousands of Shi'ites were killed.
TARIQ AZIZ, Deputy Prime Minister, Iraq: [1995] The Americans did not interfere. Therefore, it took us only a few days to recover from the surprise, to reorganize our troops, reorganize our resources and impose peace and order and the southern governors. It took us two weeks to do that.
NARRATOR: It was a defining moment for the hawks.
WILLIAM KRISTOL: That, I think, was a key moment. I know that Paul Wolfowitz was very unhappy at that moment, had argued that we should intervene. It was more that we-- more than that we hadn't removed Saddam, is that we had-- we had stood by and watched people we had encouraged to rise up against Saddam-- we stood by and watched them get slaughtered.
NARRATOR: Twelve years later, the former national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, talked about those decisions with FRONTLINE reporter Lowell Bergman.
[October 2001]
LOWELL BERGMAN, FRONTLINE: Wasn't there an uprising?
BRENT SCOWCROFT, Former National Security Adviser: Of course.
LOWELL BERGMAN: Didn't we see their military killing people?
BRENT SCOWCROFT: Yes.
LOWELL BERGMAN: And we didn't intervene.
BRENT SCOWCROFT: Of course not.
LOWELL BERGMAN: Not from the air.
BRENT SCOWCROFT: No. Of course not.
LOWELL BERGMAN: We didn't cut off their gasoline supplies.
BRENT SCOWCROFT: Because-- OK, because-- first of all, one of our objectives was not to have Iraq split up into constituent parts because it's our-- it's a fundamental interest of the United States to keep a balance in that area--
LOWELL BERGMAN: So--
BRENT SCOWCROFT: --between Iraq and Iran.
LOWELL BERGMAN: --part of the reason not-- to not go after his army, at that point, was to make sure there was a unified country, whether or not--
BRENT SCOWCROFT: Well--
LOWELL BERGMAN: --it was ruled by Saddam.
BRENT SCOWCROFT: Well, partly. But suppose we-- suppose we went in and intervened and the Kurds declare independence and the Shi'ites declare independence. Then do we go to war against them to keep a unified Iraq?
LOWELL BERGMAN: Well, why would we care, at that point? Our-- our interest, I thought, was--
BRENT SCOWCROFT: We care a lot.
LOWELL BERGMAN: I thought we had two interests. One was to evict the Iraqi army from Kuwait, but the other really was to get Saddam out--
BRENT SCOWCROFT: No.
LOWELL BERGMAN: --of power.
BRENT SCOWCROFT: No, it wasn't.
LOWELL BERGMAN: Well, either covertly or overtly.
BRENT SCOWCROFT: No. No, it wasn't. That was never-- you can't find that anywhere as an objective, either in the U.N. mandate for what we did or in our declarations, that our goal was to get rid of Saddam Hussein.