GENIUS FORUMS

EI,

I'm not saying you choose your desires, but rather that you are (in part) those desires. You are (in small part) what you want to eat. The decision to eat a steak over rice is caused, but it is caused by you.

OK, your position is making sense to me now. Thanks.

Nevertheless, your desire to not work (which makes you want to desire to eat rice) is acknowledged as an aspect of your being when you suggest that you want to desire to eat rice.

BTW, could we call the latter a second order desire, since it is a desire to desire?

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Trevor,

How could a totally random event occur? I've always had a hard time conceiving of anything like that, so if you can give me an example....

I imagine that it happens the same way a non-random event does. It just does. If we ask "how do the clock hands move"? We should say that the gears make them turn, and that electricity moves the gears, and that electricity is moved by yadda yadda yadda, and eventually we're going to start talking about forces and whatnot. This is all well and good, and it does provides us with a degree of predictive power. Nevertheless, our talk of "forces" or "natural laws" or whatnot doesn't explain away the phenomena. It merely provides it with a name. I haven't explained why objects fall to the ground by suggesting that gravity does it. I've merely named the fact that objects fall to the ground. We can reduce our macroscopic mysteries to microscopic mysteries, but from there we have no more room for reduction, and must simply accept that some things just are or will never be known. We should always try to reach the limits of what we can know, but at the same time must accept that we cannot know everything.

Shah,

BTW, could we call the latter a second order desire, since it is a desire to desire?

Yeah. That's a good idea.

Expectantly Ironic wrote:

DQ: Let's say you are watching a conjurer's trick and he seemingly produces a rabbit out of thin air.

EI: If the conjurer could consistently preform this feat in a controlled experiment, I'd be inclined to believe that he wasn't using standard stage tricks.

You would believe that he was using magic? Or would you simply think that he is performing a trick that is not readily decipherable?

What else is the current belief in quantum theory but a belief in magic? Nature repeatedly performs conjurer's tricks in the quantum realm, and the only explanation that scientists can come up with is magic. It is bizarre.

It's from nature that we find things that seem to be random though, and nature isn't a stage magician.

A causal universe can throw up "random" events just as easily as a non-causal one can. Thus, the observation of randomness isn't a valid argument against causality.

DQ: The trouble is, determinism is a philosophical principle, not a scientific one. It is indeed testable, not through empirical evidence, but through the exercise of pure logic.

EI: I'm unaware of any purely logical proof for determinism: whereas one could theoretically determine everything in the future from a knowledge of the exact state of affairs at present and a complete understanding of natural "laws".

Again, you're wrongly identifying the principle of determinism to be a scientific theory. Being a purely philosophic principle, determinism isn't intended to be a predictive tool and shouldn't be judged on that basis. Determinism merely describes the fundamental manner in which things come into being. It basically states that it is inherently impossible for anything to arise without cause - which is a truth that can be proven via logic.

I'm inclined to believe that one could pretty accurately predict the future given such knowledge, but not to the extent that they'd know where every particle would be at any given point in time.

It is actually impossible to predict any future event with 100% certainty, no matter how much data we have. The fact that the Universe is deterministic makes no difference here.

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David,

It basically states that it is inherently impossible for anything to arise without cause - which is a truth that can be proven via logic.

Before I respond to the rest of your post, why don't you describe to me exactly what you mean by "cause". What conditions must something meet in order for it to qualify as "caused" in your view?

A "cause" is something which is necessary for a thing to exist.

For example, light is necessary for a shadow to exist and therefore would count as one of its causes. Other causes would include an object capable of blocking light, a surface upon which the shadow could be cast, the current structure of photons and atoms, space, time, even the Universe itself. If any of these things were absent, then the shadow wouldn't be able to exist.

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ExpectantlyIronic wrote:Elizabeth,

I'd say the phenominal self is caused It just seems to me like the word "free" as you are describing "free will" is meaningless. Why not just say people have will?

Because they are free in the sense that they can will whatever they like

But their likes are also caused.

E: I would differentialte will from desire or wish as will including determination to accomplish, desire being an emotional want, and wish being a daydream.

Exp: It seem to me then, that the will would always be accompanied by both desire and wish.

with the added element of determination.

ExpectantlyIronic wrote:Trevor,

How could a totally random event occur? I've always had a hard time conceiving of anything like that, so if you can give me an example....

I imagine that it happens the same way a non-random event does. It just does.

This makes no sense to me. If a non-random even occurred the same way a random even occurred, they would be the same thing, and no need for the dualistic term. As for "it just does" as an explination, that is as closed-minded of a response as when a parent tells a child "because I said so."
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David,

For the sake of explanation and clarity I'm going to refer to universal causality as C, universal determinism as D, and universal randomness to be R. It seems to me that your saying D if C and C if ~R thus D if ~R. I'll accept that. So now one only needs to demonstrate that ~R, C, or D is the case. Now your truth conditions for C are such that if C=C then C. Thus, as long as we accept all the necessary axioms, what you say is completely true. Nevertheless, I don't believe it's useful to talk about universals. I have an unshakable reverence towards phenomenal reality, just as you have an unshakable reverence towards universal reality. Pragmatists and Platonists will bicker until the end of time without a resolution to their dispute.

My point throughout this thread (though I only explicitly stated it once) was that D isn't useful when talking about the phenomenal world. Given that you stated something similar, I imagine that you agree. Nevertheless, it seems that some folks think D offers predictive power over phenomenal matters, by confusing talk of universals with talk of phenomenal reality. I really don't care a lick if someone wants to call themselves a "determinist" or not. Nevertheless, I do believe in facilitating understanding, and whatever one thinks about universal vs phenomenal truths, I think he/she should understand the difference.

Do you get what I'm saying here at all?

Exp - I need a tutorial on your equation. What is that squiggle line for, and where is it on the keyboard?

Elizabeth,

But their likes are also caused.

I'll grant you that. Insofar as you insist on thinking of freewill in incompatibilist terms, I'm not sure I can show you my point. All I can ask is that you try to understand, and stop thinking (for a moment at least) that an uncaused aspect of reality is a truth condition for freewill. Hume made a very good point for why it shouldn't be, which is the fact that a random event (the only imaginable alternative to a caused event) is no more capable of granting that sort of freewill then an uncaused one. What I'm attempting to show is why we have what you might term "the illusion of freewill" (though I don't think it's an illusion anymore then anything else).

I'll reiterate my point. Lets establish the truth conditions for freewill so that it is true so long as nothing that is not an aspect of one's being plays a role in the will. I'll explain the reasoning behind these truth conditions in the next paragraph. You might suggest that if we see an apple, and the physical circumstances of our brain were such that we desired an apple, then several aspects that are not part of our being clearly influence our action. Nevertheless, human consciousness is characterized by being, and being of something.

I consider myself to be only and everything that is characterized as being. If an apple enters my visual field, then my consciousness is partially of the apple, and thus the apple is part of my being. If I say that I desire an apple, it is because I am conscious of my desire, and thus such desire is part of my being. If the desire leads me to will, and that desire is an aspect of my being, then I lead me to will. If I lead me to will that which I will, then my will is only enslaved to myself. Nevertheless, the notion that I can enslave my own will is absurd, and is spoken of only because we distinguish one aspect of our being from another arbitrarily.

I'll grant that this is a difficult point, and requires one to take on a perspective that isn't facilitated by our language or culture, but I think it's one that anyone can understand if they're willing to adopt different ways of looking at things.

This makes no sense to me. If a non-random even occurred the same way a random even occurred, they would be the same thing, and no need for the dualistic term.

The two are different, but they are the same in that we cannot know their ultimate causes. We could say that a random event is characterized by not having an ultimate cause by definition, but when we see that seemingly causal events can't be infinitely reduced down to the result of more and different causes, we see why it is not absurd to posit something we cannot explain the cause of. If we take determinism to be D, then the suggestion that a random event cannot occur because we cannot imagine what causes it, is akin to saying D because D. I could just as easily say ~D because ~D if we are inclined to accept such things. Thus D because D and ~D because ~D is the case, and we have D and ~D, and we've led ourselves to contradiction. Thus, such logic is undoubtedly invalid.

As for "it just does" as an explination, that is as closed-minded of a response as when a parent tells a child "because I said so."

How about "it just does insofar as we can know"? I'm merely acknowledging limitations on human knowledge in a universe that wasn't designed so that we could understand it.

Elizabeth,

Exp - I need a tutorial on your equation. What is that squiggle line for, and where is it on the keyboard?

~ represents negation. It's right under the Esc key.

Thank you for the tutorial.

ExpectantlyIronic wrote:What I'm attempting to show is why we have what you might term "the illusion of freewill" (though I don't think it's an illusion anymore then anything else).

I agree that it seems like we have freewill, but things are not always as they seem to be. I also agree that all appearances are an illusion.

ExpectantlyIronic wrote:We could say that a random event is characterized by not having an ultimate cause by definition, but when we see that seemingly causal events can't be infinitely reduced down to the result of more and different causes, we see why it is not absurd to posit something we cannot explain the cause of.

We can't give an ultimate cause because there was no begining of infinity. Infinity is not an event. All events are within infinity. I agree that it is not absurd to posit the inexplicable.

Let me pause for a moment to observe that I think we're saying the same thing, but that our difference or misunderstanding lies in our definitions. If your definition of freewill is will that is caused but seems self-directed, then I will agree with the concept behind the definition, but just note that the term freewill is misleading.

ExpectantlyIronic wrote:If we take determinism to be D, then the suggestion that a random event cannot occur because we cannot imagine what causes it, is akin to saying D because D. I could just as easily say ~D because ~D if we are inclined to accept such things. Thus D because D and ~D because ~D is the case, and we have D and ~D, and we've led ourselves to contradiction. Thus, such logic is undoubtedly invalid.

You invalidated the logic when you posited that we could just as easily say ~D because ~D. Try this: if we point to an apple and say "this is an apple because this is an apple" that is true. If we point to an apple and say "this is not an apple because this is not an apple" that is ridiculous. If we point to an orange and say "this is not an apple because this is not an apple" that is true. If we only take the premises that are true, we are comparing apples and oranges, which does not invalidate logic. It's just considered a fruity practice.

ExpectantlyIronic wrote:

As for "it just does" as an explination, that is as closed-minded of a response as when a parent tells a child "because I said so."

How about "it just does insofar as we can know"? I'm merely acknowledging limitations on human knowledge in a universe that wasn't designed so that we could understand it.

It would be clearer to say "we don't know."
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David writes [of mechanistic cause/effect]:

There is that gaunt caricature again.

And I repeat again that this gaunt caricature is needed to produce your gaunt caricature of a robotic human future.

and:

Ah, it's nice to see the woolly-minded flocking together, nuzzling each other's ears, and worshiping the glories of vagueness.

Instead of reducing yourself to catty sentiments, why not answer to any number of the problems I've presented here on determinism, i.e. the truth of subjectivity; the impossibility of the instrument of measurement measuring past itself; the for-itself nature of living organisms; the indeterminate quality of consciousness (upon which determinism cannot depend), etc.



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Elizabeth,

It's true that our differences of opinion come from a different way of talking about things. I should tell you though that I find your definitions as misleading as you find mine. I tend to think and explain things in an existentialist manner, whereas the notion that anything might have an "essence" beyond its sensible aspects is taken as obviously false.

I also agree that all appearances are an illusion.

The being of everything is characterized by its appearance to consciousness, and thus I would say that everything is an appearance. It strikes me as somewhat absurd to suggest that everything is an illusion. That is, though, the existentialist in me, and if you want to think that everything is an illusion because it doesn't have an essence I can't really argue.

You invalidated the logic when you posited that we could just as easily say ~D because ~D.

I wasn't trying to invalidate logic. I was providing logic for why we shouldn't accept a proposition in the form of "D because D". Although, you seem to be suggesting here that a proposition points to something. I would disagree with that. Meaning is use and nothing more.

Pye,

How is it that you perceive that the subjective experience is not deterministic? (Yes, that is a trick question because in answering, not only do you show my what you see, but you also list the cause of your perception, which is your subjective experience.)


edit to add:
Exp,

I'll get back to this later.
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Expectantly Ironic wrote:

Do you get what I'm saying here at all?

Not really. One of the difficulties I have of discussing things with you is that you cannot seem to deal directly with an issue using straightforward English and straightforward reasonings. You're always veering off into the contrivances of textbook-speak and academic technicalities, which serves no useful purpose other than to create unnecessary confusion.

Just as Pye has to adopt an over-educated, high-brow pose and filter everything into old-fashioned, literary discourse before she can deal with anything philosophical, you have to filter everything through textbook language. It indicates that the pair of you do not handle simple, direct reasonings about deeper aspects of reality very well. It's a defensive mechanism, a way to remove yourself from the coal-fire of thought. I guess that is why she sees you as a kindred spirit. After all, the two of you seem to have nothing else in common.

At root, Pye considers you an "excellent thinker" not because of your ability to reason simply and directly, but because you have well-honed skills in disrupting the rational process, just as she does.

For the sake of explanation and clarity I'm going to refer to universal causality as C, universal determinism as D, and universal randomness to be R. It seems to me that your saying D if C and C if ~R thus D if ~R. I'll accept that.

Now hold on just a moment. This is an example of what I mean. A simple issue with simple concepts has now been pushed through an academic filter and suddenly something far more complicated has needlessly arisen.

For example, you are suddenly dividing the perfectly simple principle of causality/determinism into two different principles, just so that it can fit into a textbook academic procedure. Not only is this unnecessary, but it also creates contrived problems which don't actually exist. This might be considered a blessing by academics, as it gives them plenty of technical material which they can endlessly debate for many years to come, but it is entirely useless if you want to actually understand anything.

I've also explained in a previous how randomness is not in opposition to causality. A causal process is just as capable of producing random events as a non-casual process is. So unless by "randomness" you simply mean non-causality, the point you are trying to put forward doesn't make any sense.

So now one only needs to demonstrate that ~R, C, or D is the case. Now your truth conditions for C are such that if C=C then C. Thus, as long as we accept all the necessary axioms, what you say is completely true.

There are no axioms here. They have been artificially created by your contrived filtering process.

Nevertheless, I don't believe it's useful to talk about universals. I have an unshakable reverence towards phenomenal reality, just as you have an unshakable reverence towards universal reality. Pragmatists and Platonists will bicker until the end of time without a resolution to their dispute.

That is a false distinction. You're not really a pragmatist, except on the surface. Deeper down, your pragmatism rests on what you believe to be universal realties. For example, it rests on your universal belief that the most amazing, meaningful, mind-blowing knowledge cannot be attained by pure logic. This is wishful thinking on your part, which takes the form of a universal principle.

My point throughout this thread (though I only explicitly stated it once) was that D isn't useful when talking about the phenomenal world. Given that you stated something similar, I imagine that you agree. Nevertheless, it seems that some folks think D offers predictive power over phenomenal matters, by confusing talk of universals with talk of phenomenal reality.

Determinism, as a philosophic principle, is capable of predicting a number of things. For example, it predicts that at no time in the future will an event occur without cause. It also predicts that reality will continue on forever, that all future events will be without beginning and end, that it is impossible for any future event to possess inherent existence, and so on. These are remarkable predictions to make, and they are 100% certain to boot.

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Pye wrote:

DQ: There is that gaunt caricature again.

P: And I repeat again that this gaunt caricature is needed to produce your gaunt caricature of a robotic human future.

We are already robots in the here and now. It is only human vanity and ignorance which thinks otherwise.

Going deeper, because things really don't begin or end, including ourselves, we can't really speak of cause and effect as being "mechanical". A mechanical process can only operate on discrete things with discrete parts. But because all things and parts are seamlessly connected to the Infinite, it is true to say, from a deeper perspective, that we are all spontaneously existing within the Infinite.

However, the ability to perceive and enjoy this spontaneity and freedom within the Infinite can only begin to occur after we recognize and accept the robotic nature of our own egos. Clinging to the illusion that we are not robots prevents awareness of this spontaneity and freedom from arising.

"Those who want to save their life will lose it, but those who lose their life for me will find it." - Jesus

DQ: Instead of reducing yourself to catty sentiments, why not answer to any number of the problems I've presented here on determinism, i.e. the truth of subjectivity;

Causality generates our experiences in each moment. It also causes some individuals to form a subjective relationship with truth in each moment, and others to shy away from it.

the impossibility of the instrument of measurement measuring past itself;

Causality has dictated that measurements are finite.

the for-itself nature of living organisms;

Causality, via the mechanism of evolution by natural selection, has dictated that living creatures act out of self-interest (remembering that "self-interest" can have many different forms).

the indeterminate quality of consciousness (upon which determinism cannot depend), etc.

All aspects of consciousness are caused. The so-called indeterminate nature of it refers to our lack of ability to fathom the details of how our consciousness works - which, of course, is irrelevant to the truth of causality.

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David,

EI said:

For the sake of explanation and clarity I'm going to refer to universal causality as C, universal determinism as D, and universal randomness to be R. It seems to me that your saying D if C and C if ~R thus D if ~R. I'll accept that.

David said:

Now hold on just a moment. This is an example of what I mean. A simple issue with simple concepts has now been pushed through an academic filter and suddenly something far more complicated has needlessly arisen.

I don't think you should dismiss it so quickly. When he expressed these ideas in math language, I understood them clearly and effortlessly. OTOH, when he speaks in philosophical language, it takes effort for me to follow, and I have to ask for clarifications. Basically, it depends on how a person has been trained to think. Your hatred for academic and math languages is only based on your point of view.

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ExpectantlyIronic wrote:Elizabeth,

It's true that our differences of opinion come from a different way of talking about things. I should tell you though that I find your definitions as misleading as you find mine.

In that case, it may not just be a difference of definitions. Let's keep plodding through this until we fully understand each other's position.

ExpectantlyIronic wrote:

Elizabeth wrote:I also agree that all appearances are an illusion.

The being of everything is characterized by its appearance to consciousness, and thus I would say that everything is an appearance. It strikes me as somewhat absurd to suggest that everything is an illusion. That is, though, the existentialist in me, and if you want to think that everything is an illusion because it doesn't have an essence I can't really argue.

I think we have two levels of miscommunication here, and I'm wondering if I should redirect this part of this thread to the thread on Worldly Matters "Actual Faces with Actual Names, which has also gotten onto the topic of exitence. Actually, I should take all this existence stuff and copy it into one separate thread, but I don't have the time tonight. Here is a jumping in point to the other thread, and I'll leave the existence stuff over there.

For the second level, you say a thing is an appearance. I say the perception of a thing - that nebulous stuff going on in the brain, is only an illusion. The illusion is based on enough reality that we can get through life without looking like total ding-bats (unless, of course, a person really is a ding-bat), but we do not see all that Is because our senses are limited.

You do know that you don't see every atom, don't you? You couldn't see every atom or you would not see your computer screen because there were too many atoms of air in the way.

ExpectantlyIronic wrote:

You invalidated the logic when you posited that we could just as easily say ~D because ~D.

I wasn't trying to invalidate logic. I was providing logic for why we shouldn't accept a proposition in the form of "D because D". Although, you seem to be suggesting here that a proposition points to something. I would disagree with that. Meaning is use and nothing more.

I have no idea what you mean here.
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Shahrazad wrote:

I don't think you should dismiss it so quickly. When he expressed these ideas in math language, I understood them clearly and effortlessly. OTOH, when he speaks in philosophical language, it takes effort for me to follow, and I have to ask for clarifications. Basically, it depends on how a person has been trained to think. Your hatred for academic and math languages is only based on your point of view.

Trying to reach philosophic truth using mathematic and academic language is like trying to use the Bible to formulate scientific theories. They are the wrong tools for the job.

Learning how to logically deal with philosophic concepts and clarifying them perfectly in your own mind goes to the core of developing a good understanding of reality. Mathematical symbology isn't going to help you with this.

If anything, it will only hinder the process because, by its very nature, it falsely turns philosophy from an introspective activity undertaken by individual genius to a public one that makes appeals to the lowest-common denominator.

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David wrote:

If anything, it will only hinder the process because, by its very nature, it falsely turns philosophy from an introspective activity undertaken by individual genius to a public one that makes appeals to the lowest-common denominator.

Absolutely. I think the logical veracity of P1, P2, C is the precondition for postmodernist "thinking."

For one thing, the "I" in the equation is left floating out there in the ether...

Talk about mechanistic!

David,

Learning how to logically deal with philosophic concepts and clarifying them perfectly in your own mind goes to the core of developing a good understanding of reality. Mathematical symbology isn't going to help you with this.

If you were trying to explain philosophy to a French person who knew very little English, and you happened to know French, do you think it would be ridiculous to explain it in French, because English is just so much better to express these concepts?

Yes. You would probably tell the Frenchy to perfect their English first, and when their English is perfect, then they can start learning the most basic principles.

It should be clear by my attitude that I think you're being blinded by arrogance.

If anything, it will only hinder the process because, by its very nature, it falsely turns philosophy from an introspective activity undertaken by individual genius to a public one that makes appeals to the lowest-common denominator.

This is your hatred of math coming through. Math is just a language used to describe the world, and it makes sense to a lot of people.

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D: If anything, it will only hinder the process because, by its very nature, it falsely turns philosophy from an introspective activity undertaken by individual genius to a public one that makes appeals to the lowest-common denominator.

Sh: This is your hatred of math coming through. Math is just a language used to describe the world, and it makes sense to a lot of people.

Irony, anyone?

Don't . . . . do . . . it . . . Sher. . . . .

Pleeeeease! . . . . . . . Don't . . . . do . . . it!

Go on, do it...