GENIUS FORUMS

Jason,

DQ:What about spiritual ignorance? Does spiritual ignorance continue to exist for the perfectly-realized person?

J: The perfect understanding/realization of the nature of Reality guarantees an end to ignorance of the nature of Reality. That is simply due to the law of non-contradiction: you cannot have both a perfect understanding and an imperfect(ignorant) understanding of the nature of Reality.

In the same way, suffering cannot arise in the perfectly-enlightened person because of the law of non-contradiction. This is because suffering is essentially an experience of loss, and it is impossible for the perfectly-enlightened person, having transcended all duality, to ever experience loss.

I would define a perfectly realized person as someone who always has a perfect understanding of the nature of Reality. That doesn't mean the perfect understanding is continuously stuck in the persons conscious mind. It just means that when the conscious mind steers towards thoughts of Reality only a perfect understanding arises. My realization is an understanding. A bunch of thoughts. It doesn't alter any fundamental aspects of my experience of reality. As far as I am concerned there is no further to go and there is no removal of ego or suffering.

There is still the task of completely removing the false thoughts (of things inherently existing) which trigger the arisal of suffering and egotism.

DQ:While everything is a valid manifestation of Reality, they still require the right causal conditions to come into being. Rain, for example, is a valid manifestation of Nature, yet it cannot come into being when the sky is cloudless.

J: Incorrect. The existence of clouds has no bearing on the existence of rain. Causation doesn't imply that rain cannot exist when the sky is cloudless.

Rain is defined to mean "water which falls from clouds in the sky", so it is definitely the case that rain is caused by clouds.

The only "right" causal condition for the existence of rain is non-rain.

Again, by definition, if clouds are absent, then rain cannot possibly come into being. A "non-rain" that has no clouds in it will never lead to rain.

You seem to have a habit of asserting that the existence of certain specific finite things is necessary for the existence of other specific finite things. This may be a pointer to a deeper error in your understanding I think.

It is necessarily the case that specific finite empirical events are produced by specific finite empirical causes. To assert anything other than this is to assert that an empirical event can arise without any empirical causes.

Again, you're misapplying a broad abstract logical relation to specific details within the empirical realm. It's as though you are willfully blocking out the whole of Nature, in all its tangibility, blood and guts, in order to remain conscious of this safe, broad logical relation. That is a form of madness, Jason, not wisdom.

DQ:So even though a perfectly-enlightened person sees through the illusion of a real persisting self with perfect clarity, he still somehow falls victim to this illusion? And even though he perfectly understands the nature of Reality and realizes with perfect clarity that neither he nor anything else inherently exists, he still somehow manages to suffer at the hands of these non-existent things?

J: There is no illusion.

As you stated yourself, the perception that a real persisting self exists is an illusion.

A perfect realization shows that ultimately everything is real.

Except a real persisting self.

Pay close attention to this: I'm not saying ego or suffering will or will not continue after realization. I'm saying that the issue of either continuing or ending ego and suffering has no inherent link with perfect realization. (Sometimes I'm not sure if we are actually disagreeing on some issues or we are simply negating each others finite statements in an attempt to point to the infinite.)

We're definitely disagreeing over a fundamental point. In effect, what you're saying is that a kind of contentless suffering is able to arise in the perfectly-enlightened person - out of thin air, without any reason at all. Even though he has transcended life and death and literally has nothing to suffer over, he can nevertheless still experience a kind of vague, nebulous suffering which isn't connected to anything. I don't think so, Jason.

I think the best way forward from here is for me to pick out some choice passages from "Wisdom of the Infinite" and show where and why I disagree.

Fire away.

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Lenny,

Note that it's possible for perfection to completely replace imperfection, however unlikely the possibility is.

Considering that it would, don't you think that "perfection" itself would also disappear that very instant? One can say for the sake of communication and expressing understanding that he sees everything as perfect, but if one were able to see beyond "things", what would actually be there to be perfect? Emptiness? But that is not a thing; ask David how is that? Perfection or otherwise only apply to things, so it wouldn't apply to emptiness, nor Totality, but my thought of it is, that is, a 'thing', and that can lie only within a comparative zone, even potentiality. So, in that sense, perfection cannot absolutely replace imperfection, only both could disappear. Have a field day. :)

Really, at least I can't do any better than that.

We can speak of someone having perfect understanding which comes from our perspective only, even while from his perspetive it is altogether transcended.

DQ:While everything is a valid manifestation of Reality, they still require the right causal conditions to come into being. Rain, for example, is a valid manifestation of Nature, yet it cannot come into being when the sky is cloudless.

J: Incorrect. The existence of clouds has no bearing on the existence of rain. Causation doesn't imply that rain cannot exist when the sky is cloudless.

DQ: Rain is defined to mean "water which falls from clouds in the sky", so it is definitely the case that rain is caused by clouds.

J:The only "right" causal condition for the existence of rain is non-rain.

DQ: Again, by definition, if clouds are absent, then rain cannot possibly come into being. A "non-rain" that has no clouds in it will never lead to rain.

You have made a logic error here. You have defined rain as "water which falls from clouds in the sky". So rain is not caused by clouds, rain is clouds(and water, falling, sky etc). Since you have defined rain as "water which falls from clouds in the sky" the contents of non-rain do not have to be clouds at all. The contents of non-rain do not have to be any specific thing. All we can know is that the contents of non-rain are not "water which falls from clouds in the sky".

Here is another expression of your logic error:
Rain = "water which falls from clouds in the sky"
therefore necessarily:
non-Rain = "clouds"

Here is an expression of what the correct logic would be:
Rain = "water which falls from clouds in the sky"
therefore necessarily:
non-Rain = non-"water which falls from clouds in the sky"

J: There is no illusion.

DQ: As you stated yourself, the perception that a real persisting self exists is an illusion.

I don't believe I stated that, and I certainly don't believe that. Maybe you could show me a quote of where you think I suggested that, because I think you have misunderstood me.

DQ: We're definitely disagreeing over a fundamental point. In effect, what you're saying is that a kind of contentless suffering is able to arise in the perfectly-enlightened person - out of thin air, without any reason at all. Even though he has transcended life and death and literally has nothing to suffer over, he can nevertheless still experience a kind of vague, nebulous suffering which isn't connected to anything. I don't think so, Jason.

You are projecting some of your own ideas onto me, that I do not hold myself. That is where the problems you list are coming from. You obviously still don't fully understand my ideas.

Jason,

DQ:While everything is a valid manifestation of Reality, they still require the right causal conditions to come into being. Rain, for example, is a valid manifestation of Nature, yet it cannot come into being when the sky is cloudless.

J: Incorrect. The existence of clouds has no bearing on the existence of rain. Causation doesn't imply that rain cannot exist when the sky is cloudless.

DQ: Rain is defined to mean "water which falls from clouds in the sky", so it is definitely the case that rain is caused by clouds.

J:The only "right" causal condition for the existence of rain is non-rain.

DQ: Again, by definition, if clouds are absent, then rain cannot possibly come into being. A "non-rain" that has no clouds in it will never lead to rain.

J: You have made a logic error here. You have defined rain as "water which falls from clouds in the sky". So rain is not caused by clouds, rain is clouds(and water, falling, sky etc).

No, rain is rain, and clouds are clouds. They are two seperate phenemona. But inherent in the definition of rain is that it is caused by clouds.

This is how we always experience rain - as a phenemonon caused by clouds. If, in the future, we observe water falling from the sky when there appears to be no clouds, we can either investigate further as to whether the clouds are too tenuous to be seen from our standpoint on earth, or we can investigate whether the falling water is being caused by something else.

J: There is no illusion.

DQ: As you stated yourself, the perception that a real persisting self exists is an illusion.

J: I don't believe I stated that, and I certainly don't believe that. Maybe you could show me a quote of where you think I suggested that, because I think you have misunderstood me.

I must have done. On page 3 of this thread, you stated that "ego" was the belief in a real persistent self. I assumed that you considered this to be an illusion (how could it not be?). But I obviously misunderstood you there.

What about the perception that empirical things, such as rain, have specific empirical causes, such as clouds? You seem to regard this as an illusion - no?

DQ: We're definitely disagreeing over a fundamental point. In effect, what you're saying is that a kind of contentless suffering is able to arise in the perfectly-enlightened person - out of thin air, without any reason at all. Even though he has transcended life and death and literally has nothing to suffer over, he can nevertheless still experience a kind of vague, nebulous suffering which isn't connected to anything. I don't think so, Jason.

J: You are projecting some of your own ideas onto me, that I do not hold myself. That is where the problems you list are coming from. You obviously still don't fully understand my ideas.

Well, if you want to argue this point, you'll have to give an example of the kind of suffering that can be experienced by a perfectly-enlightened person. By what means can a perfectly enlightened person suffer? In what way can he experience loss?

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Lennyrizzo wrote:We can speak of someone having perfect understanding which comes from our perspective only, even while from his perspetive it is altogether transcended.

Sure.

DQ:While everything is a valid manifestation of Reality, they still require the right causal conditions to come into being. Rain, for example, is a valid manifestation of Nature, yet it cannot come into being when the sky is cloudless.

J: Incorrect. The existence of clouds has no bearing on the existence of rain. Causation doesn't imply that rain cannot exist when the sky is cloudless.

DQ: Rain is defined to mean "water which falls from clouds in the sky", so it is definitely the case that rain is caused by clouds.

J:The only "right" causal condition for the existence of rain is non-rain.

DQ: Again, by definition, if clouds are absent, then rain cannot possibly come into being. A "non-rain" that has no clouds in it will never lead to rain.

J: You have made a logic error here. You have defined rain as "water which falls from clouds in the sky". So rain is not caused by clouds, rain is clouds(and water, falling, sky etc).

DQ:No, rain is rain, and clouds are clouds. They are two seperate phenemona. But inherent in the definition of rain is that it is caused by clouds.

David I've shown you very clearly what your error is. In your above reply you edited out the logic sequence I posted that showed your error as clear as daylight. It is a very fundamental error in logic that you keep making. I took considerable effort to point out your error to you in the previous post and you still missed it, so I suggest you pay close attention to what I write in this post. Here's another chance:

Your definition of rain was: "water which falls from clouds in the sky". You then went on to incorrectly state: "A non-rain that has no clouds in it will never lead to rain."

Here is another way to express your logic error:
Rain = "water which falls from clouds in the sky"
therefore necessarily:
non-Rain = "clouds"

Here is an expression of what the correct logic would be:
Rain = "water which falls from clouds in the sky"
therefore necessarily:
non-Rain = non-"water which falls from clouds in the sky"

Here is the correct logic with a valid content in non-rain:
Rain = "water which falls from clouds in the sky"
non-Rain = "a pony and a bunch of other things, but absolutely no clouds"

There is no contradiction between rain and non-rain in the bottom logic sequence. Do you see? But you said that it would be impossible for the definition of rain to be "water which falls from clouds in the sky" while at the same time the content of non-rain didn't contain "clouds".

It is such a straighforward simple point. If you cannot get your head around it I'm not sure I can do anything more to help you.

Assimilating:

Jason: Here is the correct logic with a valid content in non-rain:
Rain = "water which falls from clouds in the sky"
non-Rain = "a pony and a bunch of other things, but absolutely no clouds [or sky, no?]"

therefore, necessarily
'the only "right" causal condition for rain is non-rain'

I have to admit, I'm having trouble with this.

What do you mean by "right"?

Jason, you are papering over the issue with sophistry. If you want enlarge the concept of rain to include clouds (which is the sophistry), then all it does is push back the essential issue to another place. Nothing is essentially resolved by doing this.

"Rain plus clouds" also requires specific causal conditions such as the existence of a planet, an atmosphere, gravity, humidity, the sun, the molecular structure of water, etc. In other words, the same basic issue of specific empirical events causing other specific empirical events remains.

The way you are going, you will eventually have to define rain to mean "rain plus everything else in the Universe". You will have to equate it to the totality of all there is. And the reason you will forced into this absurdity is because of your allergy towards empirical causation.

Also, what about the issue of how the perfectly-enlightened person can experience loss? What is your response to that?

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David I really think our disagreement is actually due to a misunderstanding, because everything I understand about your ideas tells me that we should be in agreement about these issues. I want to try to work out our misunderstanding. Instead of continuing to go around in circles of disagreement or misundestanding, let's see if we can agree on some things first:

A=A is the fundamental principle of existence of all finite things. "A" always requires the specific causal condition of non-A in order to exist. Do you agree with that?

A=A is the fundamental principle of existence(finiteness) whether someone is working from an empirical causation perspective, from the perspective that all things are appearance or even from the perspective that everything is a computer simulation. From any of these perspectives, or in fact from any perspective at all, the fundamental principle of existence is still A=A. Do you agree with that?

From any of those perspectives the necessary causal condition for the existence of A is always non-A. It doesn't matter if "rain" is considered to be empirical, appearance or simulation, rain will always need the causal condition of non-rain to exist. Do you agree with that?

So if I define "rain" as "water which falls from clouds in the sky", then the existence of rain will always rely on the causal condition of non-"water which falls from clouds in the sky". It doesn't matter if the rain is considered to be just appearance, a simulation or an empirical object. Do you agree with that?

--

DQ: Also, what about the issue of how the perfectly-enlightened person can experience loss? What is your response to that?

I think it would be difficult for me to answer that question here directly without misunderstanding. That's why I have decided it is best to answer it in my the critiques of "Wisdom of the Infinite", which I am currently writing. Although unless the current disagreement is sorted out I'm not sure I will see the relevance in posting my critique.

Jason,

David I really think our disagreement is actually due to a misunderstanding, because everything I understand about your ideas tells me that we should be in agreement about these issues. I want to try to work out our misunderstanding. Instead of continuing to go around in circles of disagreement or misundestanding, let's see if we can agree on some things first:

A=A is the fundamental principle of existence of all finite things. "A" always requires the specific causal condition of non-A in order to exist. Do you agree with that?

Yes. But it means viewing causation in the broadest possible way. There are other ways to view causation. For example, it is just as true to say that if the "A" in question is an empirical object - i.e. one that appears to the senses - then it will necessarily have specific empirical causes. Both views are equally true.

A=A is the fundamental principle of existence(finiteness) whether someone is working from an empirical causation perspective, from the perspective that all things are appearance or even from the perspective that everything is a computer simulation. From any of these perspectives, or in fact from any perspective at all, the fundamental principle of existence is still A=A. Do you agree with that?

Well, it is a fundamental principle of existence. There are other fundamental principles as well - e.g. the principle that all things causally come from other things, and the principle that all things lack inherent existence. As with A=A, these latter principles remain true in any scenario - e.g. whether or not the world is a computer simulation.

From any of those perspectives the necessary causal condition for the existence of A is always non-A. It doesn't matter if "rain" is considered to be empirical, appearance or simulation, rain will always need the causal condition of non-rain to exist. Do you agree with that?

Yes. But it also needs specific empirical conditions. (A simulated world is just as empirical as a physical one.)

So if I define "rain" as "water which falls from clouds in the sky", then the existence of rain will always rely on the causal condition of non-"water which falls from clouds in the sky". It doesn't matter if the rain is considered to be just appearance, a simulation or an empirical object. Do you agree with that?

Yes. But again, it also needs specific empirical conditions.

It seems to me that you are not handling the fact that "empirical observation is inherently uncertain" very well. Your reasoning seems to be that if we cannot establish with 100% certainty that the causal processes we observe with our senses are really what they appear to be, then we should do away with the concept of empirical causation altogether.

For example, it is true that we cannot establish with 100% certainty that rain really does come from clouds. It certainly appears that way, but it could easily be an illusion and we have no way of resolving the matter one way or the other. You seem to have taken this fact and concluded (irrationally) that the causal link between rain and clouds doesn't exist - or worse, that rain doesn't have causal links with any empirical phenomena at all. This is causing you reject the logical truth that specific empirical events necessarily have specific empirical causes.

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DQ: It seems to me that you are not handling the fact that "empirical observation is inherently uncertain" very well. Your reasoning seems to be that if we cannot establish with 100% certainty that the causal processes we observe with our senses are really what they appear to be, then we should do away with the concept of empirical causation altogether.

I told you in an earlier post that I completely accept conventional empirical uncertainty, but you wouldn't believe me. I absolutely do think we should/can accept conventional empirical uncertainty, however a realized person would also know that fundamentally, at the level of A=A, everything is certain. It is absolutely certain that: I think that empirical causal processes in empirical reality are inherently uncertain.

DQ: For example, it is true that we cannot establish with 100% certainty that rain really does come from clouds. It certainly appears that way, but it could easily be an illusion and we have no way of resolving the matter one way or the other. You seem to have taken this fact and concluded (irrationally) that the causal link between rain and clouds doesn't exist - or worse, that rain doesn't have causal links with any empirical phenomena at all. This is causing you reject the logical truth that specific empirical events necessarily have specific empirical causes.

If we define "rain" as "something that comes from clouds" then we can be 100% certain that rain is something that comes from clouds. If something doesn't come from clouds then it isn't rain, end of story. If water falls from the sky but we can't see any clouds, then the water is not rain until the instant we can see that the water is falling from clouds.

I now think the misunderstanding we have been having is due to the fact that I have been framing my responses using the most broad and fundamental meaning of causation, whereas it seems you have been framing your responses from the perspective of empirical uncertainty causation.

Our misunderstanding shows why I have always disliked the term causation when it refers to A=A. I know you think it is a neat way to leverage from the conventional empirical causation perspective to the broader A=A perspective of causation. I just think using the same word for both perspectives is confusing. I prefer the terms "boundaries", "identity" and "finiteness" to refer to the A=A causation perspective. Less likely to get confused with conventional empirical causation.

Jason,

I just think using the same word for both perspectives is confusing. I prefer the terms "boundaries", "identity" and "finiteness" to refer to the A=A causation perspective. Less likely to get confused with conventional empirical causation.

Finally, we can agree.

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DavidQuinn000 wrote:Jason,

I just think using the same word for both perspectives is confusing. I prefer the terms "boundaries", "identity" and "finiteness" to refer to the A=A causation perspective. Less likely to get confused with conventional empirical causation.

Finally, we can agree.

-

You agree just with the bit you quoted? Or you agree with all of what I wrote in the previous post? I always thought you used "causation" to refer to both the broad and certain A=A, and the limited and uncertain conventional empirical causation.

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Much earlier in this thread i wrote [Ed: I have added a sentence to the first example]:

"People often make predictions of the future, and make mistakes whilst doing so. These predictions fall into the realm of appearances; they are an appearance, as such.

- They might hold their predictions to be certain representations of future events, ignorant of the fact they are necessarily uncertain. In such cases an appearance occurs of "the future" along with the notion of it being a certain representation of a future event. And given the future is infinity unlikely to pan-out exactly the same as their representation, they stand good chance of being disappointed.

- They might 'live' those predictions, they might mistakenly get tangled up in the visions and respond emotionally to what is a mere foretelling of an event or events. In such instances an appearance occurs of "the future" along with the notion of it 'being' the future (to which they react).

- They might think there is a future somehow residing objectively beyond their present experience, as if they somehow have insight into what has it's own real existence. In such cases they will likely have an emotional involvement similar to the previous point."


Sapius then responded:

R: - They might hold their predictions to be certain representations of future events, ignorant of the fact they are necessarily uncertain.

S: Well, they are necessarily uncertain from the point of view that it is impossible to “know” all causes involved, but however uncertain predictions may be, there is certain certainty dictated by logic and memory. For example, what does logic and memory tell you when Leyla waits for ten minutes, and eventually has her tea without the ground splitting beneath her? Or for the umpteen times she has had tea without any major calamity occurring?

Hi Sapius. Your concept "certain certainty" is a tautology. Either something is certain, unfalsifiable, or it is uncertain, and open to error. There's really no other option.

I think you're referring to the way we can reason likelihoods. Sure, that's possible, and highly valuable, but it's important to understand that these reasonings are by nature uncertain.

R: In such cases an appearance occurs of "the future" along with the notion of it being a certain representation of a future event.

S: Similarly there is a notion of past, agreed, but how do we arrive at such “notions” if not through cause and effect? And would calling it a “notion” falsify its own comparative reality?

Ultimately the notions just pop into awareness, there's not really any causality involved.

But yeah, its fair to say that in most cases notions are arrived at as a result of past occurances. 'Conditioned' by past occurances we could say.

R: - They might 'live' those predictions, they might mistakenly get tangled up in the visions and respond emotionally to what is a mere foretelling of an event or events.

S: What has emotions got to do with actually drinking tea in the "here and now"?

Lets say someone imagines spilling hot tea onto themself in the future (lets say they do it to remind themself to not be careless, in order to avoid actually do it). In such an instance they will have an emotional involvement with the imaginary spilt tea.

R: In such instances an appearance occurs of "the future" along with the notion of it 'being' the future (to which they react).

S: “Living” a certain prediction is what tells me that there is certain amount of certainty in a necessarily uncertain Totality.

Well, in the moment a prediction is being "lived", it is certain a prediction is being "lived". There's no uncertainty in that.

What are necessarily uncertain are notions that pertain to past, alternative present, or future events. Events that are conceived as being separate to the now.

R: They might think there is a future somehow residing objectively beyond their present experience, as if they somehow have insight into what has it's own real existence.

S: What do you mean by “residing” and “real” in this context? I think that is a mixture of two differet point of views.

Hmm, i quite easily see them as pointing in the same direction. Here's a paraphrasing;

'They might think there is a future somehow existing objective to their present experience, as if they somehow have insight into what purportedly has it's own separate existence.'

R: In such cases they will likely have an emotional involvement similar to the previous point.

S: Are you saying that the notion of cause and effect is a result of emotional involvement? . . .

No, although we could rightly say the reverse, that the notion of cause and effect and the 'thingness' it implies causes emotional involvement, i.e. the notion of an inherently existent self and the possibility of it being caused harm, causes people emotional involvement.

S: As I see it, without the notion of cause and effect, and the fact that it has to necessarily be dynamic, there would be no notion of past present and future, and without either, one cannot even think.

True. What is important is that these notions are free of false elements.

S: Within the realm of appearances, which is all that we have, one cannot even identify them as such without first understanding the notion of motion. Does notion mean actually no motion? And if there is nothing without, then what are we talking about?

If it were the case that people could not identify appearances until such time as they experience the notion of motion, if that is they ever do happen to experience it, then it would be an incredibly important notion to experience!

I don't see them as dependant in that way. I can easily imagine a baby naming an appearance "mummy", and i can easily imagine a baby saying "mummy's moving". If anything i would say the former would come before the latter.

S: This might be a stupid line of questioning, but I too would like to understand it, please bear with me.

No problem.

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Rhett wrote:

Hi Sapius. Your concept "certain certainty" is a tautology. Either something is certain, unfalsifiable, or it is uncertain, and open to error. There's really no other option.

I think you're referring to the way we can reason likelihoods. Sure, that's possible, and highly valuable, but it's important to understand that these reasonings are by nature uncertain.

My apologies. Yes, I was referring to reasoned likelihood’s. What I really meant was a certain amount of certainty being fully aware of its untimately uncertain nature.

R: In such cases an appearance occurs of "the future" along with the notion of it being a certain representation of a future event.

S: Similarly there is a notion of past, agreed, but how do we arrive at such “notions” if not through cause and effect? And would calling it a “notion” falsify its own comparative reality?

R: Ultimately the notions just pop into awareness, there's not really any causality involved.

I see. And how did you arrive at this notion that notions just pop into awareness? Did the notion "there's not really any causality involved" just pop up into your awareness?

But yeah, its fair to say that in most cases notions are arrived at as a result of past occurances. 'Conditioned' by past occurances we could say.

In most cases??

Rhett, I think the rest of your post also follows from the same pop up philosophy, so I can’t actually say any thing unless you first make it clear that how any thing, and I mean ANY THING at all, is possible without cause and effect?

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R: In such cases an appearance occurs of "the future" along with the notion of it being a certain representation of a future event.

S: Similarly there is a notion of past, agreed, but how do we arrive at such “notions” if not through cause and effect? And would calling it a “notion” falsify its own comparative reality?

R: Ultimately the notions just pop into awareness, there's not really any causality involved.

S: I see. And how did you arrive at this notion that notions just pop into awareness? Did the notion "there's not really any causality involved" just pop up into your awareness?

Yes, it just popped into my awareness. However, it occurred after reasonings on the nature of existence and causality.

R: But yeah, its fair to say that in most cases notions are arrived at as a result of past occurances. 'Conditioned' by past occurances we could say.

S: In most cases??

Speaking strictly in respect to causality, to which i imagine you are alluding, you are right; all notions, indeed all occurances, are necessarily caused.

The point i was intending to convey is that notions typically, but not always, arise after deductive processes, in the thinking person anyway. An example of a notion that could arise that we would reasonably consider bereft of deduction would be this: The sky will fall on the sixth day of the six month of 2006.

Rhett, I think the rest of your post also follows from the same pop up philosophy, so I can’t actually say any thing unless you first make it clear that how any thing, and I mean ANY THING at all, is possible without cause and effect?

My circumstances have changed and i may not have time to continue this conversation, but i will still try. My local environment and this forum have openly cross-pollinated, resulting in a stir. We have sour, insecure protagonists that lack the guts to venture on this forum, and rather use elements of it irresponsibly. How about giving it a go guys?

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Rhett:

R: In such cases an appearance occurs of "the future" along with the notion of it being a certain representation of a future event.

S: Similarly there is a notion of past, agreed, but how do we arrive at such “notions” if not through cause and effect? And would calling it a “notion” falsify its own comparative reality?

R: Ultimately the notions just pop into awareness, there's not really any causality involved.

S: I see. And how did you arrive at this notion that notions just pop into awareness? Did the notion "there's not really any causality involved" just pop up into your awareness?

R: Yes, it just popped into my awareness. However, it occurred after reasonings on the nature of existence and causality.

Ah! I get it. Even though the notion popped into your awareness after your reasoning, it is not causally connected to reasoning at all. According to this, it seems 'awareness' remains untouched by causality. Wow!

My circumstances have changed and i may not have time to continue this conversation, but i will still try.

That’s all right, Rhett. I simply wanted to know where I failed to see the insightfulness in your original post. I thank you for your time. :)

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R: In such cases an appearance occurs of "the future" along with the notion of it being a certain representation of a future event.

S: Similarly there is a notion of past, agreed, but how do we arrive at such “notions” if not through cause and effect? And would calling it a “notion” falsify its own comparative reality?

R: Ultimately the notions just pop into awareness, there's not really any causality involved.

S: I see. And how did you arrive at this notion that notions just pop into awareness? Did the notion "there's not really any causality involved" just pop up into your awareness?

R: Yes, it just popped into my awareness. However, it occurred after reasonings on the nature of existence and causality.

S: Ah! I get it. Even though the notion popped into your awareness after your reasoning, it is not causally connected to reasoning at all. According to this, it seems 'awareness' remains untouched by causality. Wow!

To talk in respect to causality and reasoning, one could talk of each notion as being caused and conditioned by the preceeding notion(s).

To talk in respect to causality and awareness, one could talk of each moment of awareness as being caused (by the All if you like).

To talk in respect to awareness only, one could talk of a stream of form.


Very few statements can be made that do not introduce things or causality. For example, 'Nature is formless'. 'Nature' meaning the unlimited, the All, and 'formless' alluding to the lack of inherent existence, unbeginning and unendingness, timelessness.

Some statements introduce things without introducing causality. For example, 'That flower is yellow'.

Many statements introduce both thingness and causality. For example, "I am typing a response to a post that may not have required one, and therefore i have made this statement".

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Rhett;

To talk in respect to causality and reasoning, one could talk of each notion as being caused and conditioned by the preceeding notion(s).

To talk in respect to causality and awareness, one could talk of each moment of awareness as being caused (by the All if you like).

To talk in respect to awareness only, one could talk of a stream of form.

If you notice, in all of the above instances one needs to “talk” (or think), including about awareness. Do you consider awareness itself not to be an appearance, but something beyond it?

Very few statements can be made that do not introduce things or causality. For example, 'Nature is formless'. 'Nature' meaning the unlimited, the All, and 'formless' alluding to the lack of inherent existence, unbeginning and unendingness, timelessness.

Very poetic indeed, but we are not talking about any particular statement that does not introduce causality, (which actually is absurd), but that any statement in itself is bound by causality. I don’t see how any statement or thought could exist devoid of causality. Thoughts are no more than “things” in them selves. Are you saying that the above statement ‘Nature is formless’ was triggered by no cause at all? Isn’t the statement ‘Nature is formless’ a thought? An appearance? Hence necessarily bound by causality?

Some statements introduce things without introducing causality. For example, 'That flower is yellow'.

Really? Nothing caused you to state that I take it. To say the least, how about the definitions of each word in that statement? What caused you define them? Do you actually understand what you state or are they devoid of any meaning? As I see it, there are tons of incalculable causes to that statement. I’m actually amazed that a thoughtful person like you cannot see it. Or are you arguing simply for the sake of it? Trying to play a Devil’s Advocate?

Many statements introduce both thingness and causality. For example, "I am typing a response to a post that may not have required one, and therefore i have made this statement".

I must admit that this is beyond my understanding. It creates painful knots in my brain just trying to make some sense out of it. :)

Sapius, darling. I think you are missing the point.

Rhett originally gave you, in my estimation, a few types of "psychology," if you will.

I'm going to show you the line of reasoning to the one type he mentioned that you are taking completely out of context:

1. Rhett listed a third type of "psychology" (for want of a better word at the moment):

They might think there is a future somehow residing objectively beyond their present experience, as if they somehow have insight into what has it's own real existence. In such cases they will likely have an emotional involvement similar to the previous point.

2. Sapius snips part of it and responds, changing the whole meaning to "we" instead of keeping it as "one of three different types":

R: In such cases an appearance occurs of "the future" along with the notion of it being a certain representation of a future event.

S: Similarly there is a notion of past, agreed, but how do we arrive at such “notions” if not through cause and effect? And would calling it a “notion” falsify its own comparative reality?

3. Rhett -- for some reason -- misses this point, or does not give it the attention it deserves, and responds as follows:

Ultimately the notions just pop into awareness, there's not really any causality involved.

But yeah, its fair to say that in most cases notions are arrived at as a result of past occurances. 'Conditioned' by past occurances we could say.

4. Sapius continues this foolishness with;

In most cases??

Rhett, I think the rest of your post also follows from the same pop up philosophy, so I can’t actually say any thing unless you first make it clear that how any thing, and I mean ANY THING at all, is possible without cause and effect?

5. Rhett returns to the "psychological" type in question, but still misses the fundamental error in the discussion with this:

Some statements introduce things without introducing causality. For example, 'That flower is yellow'.

Thanks for clarifying it Leyla.

For you, any time.

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R: In such cases an appearance occurs of "the future" along with the notion of it being a certain representation of a future event.

S: Similarly there is a notion of past, agreed, but how do we arrive at such “notions” if not through cause and effect? And would calling it a “notion” falsify its own comparative reality?

Leyla: Rhett -- for some reason -- misses this point, or does not give it the attention it deserves, and responds as follows:

All of what i have written in this thread is actually quite linked to a proper understanding of causality, as well as psychology.

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R: To talk in respect to causality and reasoning, one could talk of each notion as being caused and conditioned by the preceeding notion(s).

To talk in respect to causality and awareness, one could talk of each moment of awareness as being caused (by the All if you like).

To talk in respect to awareness only, one could talk of a stream of form.


S: If you notice, in all of the above instances one needs to “talk” (or think), including about awareness. Do you consider awareness itself not to be an appearance, but something beyond it?

No, i consider 'awareness' and 'appearances' to be terms applicable to one and the same. After all, an appearance could not possibly occur in the absence of awareness. And neither could there be awareness in the absence of content - i.e. an appearance.

R: Very few statements can be made that do not introduce things or causality. For example, 'Nature is formless'. 'Nature' meaning the unlimited, the All, and 'formless' alluding to the lack of inherent existence, unbeginning and unendingness, timelessness.

S: Very poetic indeed, but we are not talking about any particular statement that does not introduce causality, (which actually is absurd), but that any statement in itself is bound by causality. I don’t see how any statement or thought could exist devoid of causality. Thoughts are no more than “things” in them selves. Are you saying that the above statement ‘Nature is formless’ was triggered by no cause at all? Isn’t the statement ‘Nature is formless’ a thought? An appearance? Hence necessarily bound by causality?

On the one hand, we can fairly consider any statement bound by the beginning and ending of the text, and as such it is a thing, and we could say it is caused.

On the other hand, knowing this boundary only exists as a conception, we could swipe thingness and causality off our register.

R: Some statements introduce things without introducing causality. For example, 'That flower is yellow'.

S: Really? Nothing caused you to state that I take it. To say the least, how about the definitions of each word in that statement? What caused you define them? Do you actually understand what you state or are they devoid of any meaning? As I see it, there are tons of incalculable causes to that statement. I’m actually amazed that a thoughtful person like you cannot see it. Or are you arguing simply for the sake of it? Trying to play a Devil’s Advocate?

Since we know, and indeed you expouse, that causality exists as a thought, it is entirely inappropriate to refer to it as existing beyond thought, either in the past, elsewhere in the present, or in the future.

R: Many statements introduce both thingness and causality. For example, "I am typing a response to a post that may not have required one, and therefore i have made this statement".

S: I must admit that this is beyond my understanding. It creates painful knots in my brain just trying to make some sense out of it. :)

Keep going, you're doing well.

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