GENIUS FORUMS

Elizabeth wrote:

Leyla - I was referring to your sense of humor. Perhaps I was being too optimistic.

I suggest you give up on the attempt at making me pander to your (or other people's) emotions. It ain't gonna happen.

Suck it up.

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James:

I just don’t see how Kant is adding any value to knowledge at all. I sense a trickster.

Alright, I shall set aside a few hours as early as possible to explain myself and the Kant I see.

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Elizabeth, and all others,

In case you didn't know, Leyla Shen is a grouchy old bear in her cave, trying to get her winter's hibernation.

Please, stop poking her with sticks.

Thank you.

Oh, ha-ha-ha, ho-ho-ho! That's so funny! Elizabeth is going to love it!

[raa-rr-rr!]

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Alright, I shall set aside a few hours as early as possible to explain myself and the Kant I see.

Do it for yourself not me, though. I really don't care whether what some dead philosopher wrote is true or brilliant or whatever. It will not change my thinking in any way - that the whole topic is mere academic play.

James?

I really don't care whether what some dead philosopher wrote is true or brilliant or whatever.

Are you serious? After that lecture you just gave the "Sh" person?

Anything I do for anyone I'm doing for myself, silly. Same shit.

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Leyla Shen wrote:In other words, this “every change has a cause” is an example of [Hume-type] impure a priori knowledge.

Well, Hume didn't see cause and effect as á priori knowledge, but rather as an empirical conclusion created out of repeatedly seeing the same two events arise together. I don't think he took it any further than that. It was Kant who took it further and explained it at the level of pure reasoning.

Matt:

Yes, when I said “Hume-type” I meant as defined by Kant.

If we cast our eyes upon the commonest operations of the understanding, the proposition, “every change must have a cause,” will amply serve our purpose. In the latter case [criterion 2 in the strictest sense universal consequently pure á priori], indeed, the conception of a cause so plainly involves the conception of a necessity of connection with an effect, and of a strict universality of the law, that the very notion of a cause would entirely disappear, were we to derive it, like Hume, from a frequent association of what happens with that which precedes, and the habit thence originating of connecting representations—the necessity inherent in the judgement being therefore merely subjective.

If, like Hume, we derived “every change must have a cause” (“from a frequent association of what happens with that which precedes, and the habit thence originating of connecting representations”) the necessity in that judgement (every change must have a cause) is then/therefore merely subjective.

In other words, if you had to experience "every change must have a cause" as the subject of a connected sequence of events of change over time without the necessity of effect, the idea of cause would, in fact, also disappear (since, obviously, a cause cannot ever be separated from its effect).

Which brings me back to your original question:

Kant: For example, the proposition, "Every change has a cause," is a proposition á priori, but impure, because change is a conception which can only be derived from experience.

Matt: How can it be proved that the concept of change can only be derived from experience? If that's true then it's not certain that reality always changes.

It can’t. That’s Kant’s point here (note that he is investigating "every change has a cause" as knowledge not just derived independently of "this or that" experience, but derived independently of all experience--which I would define as cognitively/logically and as diametrically opposed to experience, by definition):

Besides, without seeking for such examples of principles existing á priori in cognition, we might easily show that such principles are the indispensable basis of the possibility of experience itself, and consequently prove their existence á priori.

“Every change has a cause” is a principle derived through thought (the question of free will notwithstanding), by definition. If one can come to this realisation (“seek for such examples existing a priori in cognition) we prove a priori “such principles are the indispensable basis of the possibility of experience itself.”

Your conclusion that it’s therefore not certain that reality always changes is incorrect.

It's also the basic distinction between what is known here as masculine and feminine experience.

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Leyla Shen wrote:If, like Hume, we derived “every change must have a cause” (“from a frequent association of what happens with that which precedes, and the habit thence originating of connecting representations”) the necessity in that judgement (every change must have a cause) is then/therefore merely subjective.

In other words, if you had to experience "every change must have a cause" as the subject of a connected sequence of events of change over time without the necessity of effect, the idea of cause would, in fact, also disappear (since, obviously, a cause cannot ever be separated from its effect).

I'm not sure I'm understanding you, but it sounds to me like you're trying to incorporate an observer into the causal chain in that first paragraph, but that's not quite right. He's thinking of the causal occurrence and the observation of it as separate and by "subjective" he's talking purely about the validity of the judgement. Then again, maybe you're just using that situation as an example. But it doesn't make sense to me to say that "every change must have a cause" can be experienced, since it's a logical deduction.

I read him this way: If we derive the law of causation from observation then it can't be proven that an effect necessarily follows a cause. However, because the definitions of cause and effect are interrelated, if an effect didn't follow a cause, then there would be no reason to call it a "cause".

Matt:

Then again, maybe you're just using that situation as an example.

Yes, I’m using it as an example, which is what Kant is doing, isn’t he?

But it doesn't make sense to me to say that "every change must have a cause" can be experienced, since it's a logical deduction.

OK. Let me try it this way.

Kant:

In the latter case, indeed, the conception of a cause so plainly involves the conception of a necessity of connection with an effect, and of a strict universality of the law, that the very notion of a cause would entirely disappear, were we to derive it, like Hume, from a frequent association of what happens with that which precedes, and the habit thence originating of connecting representations—the necessity inherent in the judgement being therefore merely subjective.

Matt’s interpretation:

If we derive the law of causation from observation then it can't be proven that an effect necessarily follows a cause. However, because the definitions of cause and effect are interrelated, if an effect didn't follow a cause, then there would be no reason to call it a "cause".

I read it this way: that all those things which comprise experience are derived from the senses but that a thing such as a law is not and is therefore universal. He is also pointing out that, it appears, Hume’s argument for the proposition “every change must have a cause” is rooted in the necessity to experience such events with their precedents by association and the habit of connecting representations that comes from that, which idea defeats itself since it, too, must necessarily be subjective in such a necessarily continuous association.

The point is subtle, but important.

Now, if we are to return to the question of the insignificance of subjectivity or things such as thought as an experience:

Kant:

Again, if we take away, in like manner, from our empirical conception of any object, corporeal or incorporeal, all properties which mere experience has taught us to connect with it, still we cannot think away those through which we cogitate it as substance, or adhering to substance, although our conception of substance is more determined than that of an object. Compelled, therefore, by that necessity with which the conception of substance forces itself upon us, we must confess that it has its seat in our faculty of cognition á priori.

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I'm still not sure I'm understanding you, but...

Leyla Shen wrote:I read it this way: that all those things which comprise experience are derived from the senses but that a thing such as a law is not and is therefore universal.

Well, it's the other way around: If a non-experiential concept is found to be universal, then it's a law or whatever. A priori knowledge. If it went the other way then false imaginings would be considered universal.

He is also pointing out that, it appears, Hume’s argument for the proposition “every change must have a cause”

Except Hume wasn't arguing for this, he was arguing against it, and Kant is arguing against Hume. So I don't know what to make of the rest of this:

Hume’s argument for the proposition “every change must have a cause” is rooted in the necessity to experience such events with their precedents by association and the habit of connecting representations that comes from that, which idea defeats itself since it, too, must necessarily be subjective in such a necessarily continuous association.

Hume's "habit" refers to the habit of our thinking of our conceptual associations as cause and effect relationships. He thought of causality as nothing more than a habit of thought that has no provable validity. He basically did the same thing as Kant in making two categories, an a priori and an a posteriori, but Hume put cause and effect in the a posteriori category. So when Kant says:

Kant wrote:indeed, the conception of a cause so plainly involves the conception of a necessity of connection with an effect, and of a strict universality of the law, that the very notion of a cause would entirely disappear, were we to derive it, like Hume, from a frequent association of what happens with that which precedes, and the habit thence originating of connecting representations—the necessity inherent in the judgement being therefore merely subjective.

He was stating what logically follows from Hume's argument after the dash there: that by Hume's logic a cause doesn't have a necessary effect.

Matt:

Except Hume wasn't arguing for this, he was arguing against it, and Kant is arguing against Hume. So I don't know what to make of the rest of this:

Well, it’s not really necessary that Hume argue for the proposition “every change must have a cause” to understand the point Kant is making about Hume and the scientific proposition in question (which might well have been any number of propositions), which is:

[snip] that the very notion of a cause would entirely disappear, were we to derive it, like Hume, from a frequent association of what happens with that which precedes, and the habit thence originating of connecting representations—the necessity inherent in the judgement being therefore merely subjective.

So, I’m not sure what this is about:

So I don't know what to make of the rest of this:

What’s it about?

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He was stating what logically follows from Hume's argument after the dash there: that by Hume's logic a cause doesn't have a necessary effect.

I thought he was very clear about this bit: “that the very notion of a cause would entirely disappear.”

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Matt,

How can it be proved that the concept of change can only be derived from experience?

Can you imagine someone who had complete sensory deprivation from birth having any knowledge about change? If not, then it would seem to be obvious that our notion of change can only come to us by way of experience. In fact, that's the fundamental point of the empiricists: all knowledge comes to us by way of experience. Kant attempted to throw a wrench in the empiricist spokes by pointing out that mathematics seemed to be both a priori and synthetic knowledge, and thus demonstrated that not all a priori notions were fundamentally semantic or false, although that opens up a whole new can-o-worms concerning how we know the propositions of math to be true.

If that's true then it's not certain that reality always changes.

Not logically certain, but not even mathematics has a purely logical foundation to derive truth value from. All claims need to be rooted in observation in order to not be entirely arbitrary.

Not logically certain, but not even mathematics has a purely logical foundation to derive truth value from. All claims need to be rooted in observation in order to not be entirely arbitrary.

It is as logically certain as any form of logic can be.

Kant attempted to throw a wrench in the empiricist spokes by pointing out that mathematics seemed to be both a priori and synthetic knowledge, and thus demonstrated that not all a priori notions were fundamentally semantic or false, although that opens up a whole new can-o-worms concerning how we know the propositions of math to be true.

Yeah, the prick was looking for justifications to be religious. That is the true purpose of his Pure Reason stuff.

Modern science would have already blown his ideas completely out of the philosophical scene by now, if it wasn't that those teaching academic philosophy love his complexity of argument - they use crap like he wrote to find their relative place in the academic herd.

Leyla,

What’s it about?

Your language, I don't understand your language. You said:

“every change must have a cause” is rooted in the necessity to experience such events with their precedents by association and the habit of connecting representations that comes from that, which idea defeats itself since it, too, must necessarily be subjective in such a necessarily continuous association.

How is an event associated with its precedent? What do you mean by "connecting representations"? I mean, what is the nature of the connections being made? Which idea defeats itself? And how? What do you mean by "subjective"? What do you mean by "continuous association"?

Oh my Goddddd! That's not my flippen language---pay attention!

It's Kant's.

Jeez. :)

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But, nevertheless, I'll attack the same ol' paragraph tonight when I get home...

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ExpectantlyIronic wrote:Matt,

How can it be proved that the concept of change can only be derived from experience?

Can you imagine someone who had complete sensory deprivation from birth having any knowledge about change? If not, then it would seem to be obvious that our notion of change can only come to us by way of experience.

That's not what I was referring to, actually. The truth of a proposition doesn't depend on where it physically came from.

In fact, that's the fundamental point of the empiricists: all knowledge comes to us by way of experience. Kant attempted to throw a wrench in the empiricist spokes by pointing out that mathematics seemed to be both a priori and synthetic knowledge, and thus demonstrated that not all a priori notions were fundamentally semantic or false, although that opens up a whole new can-o-worms concerning how we know the propositions of math to be true.

He pointed out that all knowledge has an a priori component. This can be seen in the fact that there's no such thing as a "pure" observation, meaning an observation with no mental processing. We always have to apply an interpretation to sense impressions before we can think about them. Even calling something a "sense impression" is an interpretation. So, the a priori is rooted in this interpretive faculty and that's what I was trying to ask about in regard to change.

If that's true then it's not certain that reality always changes.

Not logically certain, but not even mathematics has a purely logical foundation to derive truth value from. All claims need to be rooted in observation in order to not be entirely arbitrary.

But whether something is true or not doesn't depend on its fitfulness for a particular purpose (assuming that's what you mean by "arbitrary"). It's just has to be consistent.

Jamesh wrote:Yeah, the prick was looking for justifications to be religious. That is the true purpose of his Pure Reason stuff.

So what? There's a lot of genius in the first 50 or so pages of the Critique. I think you would like it if you studied it. It is a lot of work, though, I admit. It took me a several readings before I could get past the language. I'm still trying to get past it, actually.

Leyla Shen wrote:But, nevertheless, I'll attack the same ol' paragraph tonight when I get home...

Thanks! I'll look forward to hearing from you.

Matt Gregory wrote:

Jamesh wrote:Yeah, the prick was looking for justifications to be religious. That is the true purpose of his Pure Reason stuff.

So what? There's a lot of genius in the first 50 or so pages of the Critique. I think you would like it if you studied it. It is a lot of work, though, I admit. It took me a several readings before I could get past the language. I'm still trying to get past it, actually.

lol...I did actually get his book out of the library on Sunday, read about 4 pages with a lot of difficulty, then threw it to the side. I just don't accept some of the conclusions he makes.

I don't particulary like reading philosophy of that type. I'm not in love at all with complex truths or partial truths, I only like truths of reality, of cause and effect and infinity.

I've spent little time on the philosophy of others. I only like the some of works of Nietzsche, and perhaps some Schopenhauer. Nietzsche is particularly good for prompting thoughts.

To be honest I'm happy enough to create my own philosophy on the go, the foundation of my time spent here and at TPG is enough. If people think much of what I say is insane or inane, well so be it. Of course though, my ego would prefer they didn't think that way :)

So, the a priori is rooted in this interpretive faculty and that's what I was trying to ask about in regard to change.

If the nature of the interpretive faculty is different from one moment to another, surely one would have to call that change.
It could only not be change if one believed in a separate soul.

Jamesh,

lol...I did actually get his book out of the library on Sunday, read about 4 pages with a lot of difficulty, then threw it to the side. I just don't accept some of the conclusions he makes.

He's a professor's philosopher. He's suitably confusing and inconclusive that someone can base his entire life around pretending that Kant said something useful, when really, Kant is a nothing more than the terrifying precursor to postmodernism.

His best contributions to philosophy were the words ontology, a priori, and a posteriori... assuming those words didn't already exist before he used them. In which case, he made no meaningful contributions.

He's a professor's philosopher. He's suitably confusing and inconclusive that someone can base his entire life around pretending that Kant said something useful, when really, Kant is a nothing more than the terrifying precursor to postmodernism.

I used to think the same thing, but after reading so many metaphysical discussions on this forum that simply go nowhere, it thought it was about high time to try and resolve of these questions once and for all, so I thought it might help to break out the Kant.

I actually think the complexity of Kant's language is a strength, because it forces you to slow down and think deeply about the questions, at least if you're making a sincere effort to understand the guy. I think that is his contribution to philosophy, just making people think. You can't make a greater contribution to philosophy than that.

Alright, Matt, I’m not sure whether this is going to make things better or worse between us, but here goes!

Kant: indeed, the conception of a cause so plainly involves the conception of a necessity of connection with an effect, and of a strict universality of the law, that the very notion of a cause would entirely disappear, were we to derive it, like Hume, from a frequent association of what happens with that which precedes, and the habit thence originating of connecting representations(1) —the necessity inherent in the judgement being therefore merely subjective.

Leyla: “every change must have a cause” is rooted in the necessity to experience such events with their precedents by association and the habit of connecting representations that comes from that, which idea defeats itself since it, too, must necessarily be subjective in such a necessarily continuous association.

Matt‘s questions:

How is an event associated with its precedent?

Joe ate 7,000,000 tonnes of sugar between the ages of 6 and 15 and he has rotten teeth (precedent).
Mary, Bill, James and Bob have rotting teeth and a history of eating substantial amounts of sugar.
Jane, Jack and Jill have never had sugar and they have healthy teeth.
If I eat too much sugar, my teeth will rot (event) = “association of what happens (event) with that which precedes.”

What do you mean by "connecting representations"?

“Connecting” is fairly straight forward, I would hope. A representation is an idea presenting corporeal phenomena in the form of thought or mental image. It means, literally, to re-present (present again).

I mean, what is the nature of the connections being made?

Subjective. If that does not suffice as an answer, I’m not sure why you are asking the question and am compelled to ask for more information.

Which idea defeats itself? (Now, the aforesaid was my language.) And how?

I think you answered this very well here:

“This can be seen in the fact that there's no such thing as a "pure" observation, meaning an observation with no mental processing. We always have to apply an interpretation to sense impressions before we can think about them. Even calling something a "sense impression" is an interpretation.”

So, if we were to derive laws (universals) in the manner in which Hume posits as truth (see 1)--that is, if all logic can only ever be derived from some sort of direct phenomenological experience of it--then not only would the notion of cause entirely disappear, so would notions of everything else, which is actually the true crux of postmodernism since if, as you so eloquently replied to ExI, not only the truth of a proposition but truth itself were solely dependent upon and subsequent (effect) to empiricism (cause) then the idea of cause itself has no more truth or substance than being in actuality and according to this idea, therefore, nothing more than an effect. It actually eliminates logical necessity and I STILL have no idea how to express it any clearer!! And, you know why? Because logic, reason and truth are not dependent upon (caused by) empiricism. I have empiricised every day of my life since I was physically born, and still there are those who think me no wiser for it!

Am I making sense to anyone other than myself? (Rhetorical, of course.)

What do you mean by "subjective"? What do you mean by "continuous association"?

I think I’ll wait and see what the above brings forth before I continue!

For now, I'm physically tired and am about to head off to bed. Of course, James reckons that that's an emotion. What a curious fellow he is, accusing Kant of religiosity over this "pure reason stuff"...

Oh well, time to put my pure reason and emotion to sleep.

Night, Matt. Night, James-boy.

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Oh, sorry, forgot one thing...[points to the "Avatars" thread in Worldly Matters]

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