GENIUS FORUMS

Leyla Shen wrote:Well, of course, the Communist Manifesto is a clear example of political ideology. Notwithstanding that, the paragraph quoted here is not what I would consider ideological. It is the philosophical basis for the political ideology.

But it's a basis that only bothers with philosophy as will turned toward the world, which seems to blur the line between ideologies and philosophies right there. Hence my problem with dealing with it as philosophy in spiritual, existential contexts.

That is, we do "struggle" to see enlightenment itself make an appearance, do we not?

Philosophy in the way I see it is more into describing, exploring the truth of the situation of our existence. The more it trickles down into worldly matters, like ideology or science - the less philosophical it can be, ever. Marx seems to 'solve' this by building his ideas on top of this semi-philosophical notion of a philosophy 'losing' something, being delivered in ongoing synthesis. But it goes against the nature of philosophy as that doesn't even assume appearance and would not be concerned with making one.

If anything, enlightenment sidesteps the struggle by seeing directly into and behind appearances. There's ultimately no need to incarnate left while at the same time lying at the root of all appearances.

Diebert:

But it's a basis that only bothers with philosophy as will turned toward the world, which seems to blur the line between ideologies and philosophies right there. Hence my problem with dealing with it as philosophy in spiritual, existential contexts.

I cannot agree with this. Honestly, I am flabbergasted that you make this charge against him when what I read in this paragraph is exactly his dealing with philosophy in the spiritual, existential context; exactly his deeper definition of the meaning to the word “ideology” itself.

I think he is saying, Diebert, that philosophy as the action of will turned toward the world of appearances is reduced to a philosophical system of total abstraction, an abstract totality - ideology. In this way is it completely reflexive with no realization of it in reality other than as the very manifestation of ideology itself.

Until this is resolved, I cannot possibly hope to proceed meaningfully with any further discussion of it. Hence, I await any further comment you may have here before I address the latter part of your last post. I genuinely hope you will continue to engage this most perplexing (to me) anomaly.

(Jason, I hope to get to your last post soon.)

Leyla Shen wrote: I think he is saying, Diebert, that philosophy as the action of will turned toward the world of appearances is reduced to a philosophical system of total abstraction, an abstract totality - ideology. In this way is it completely reflexive with no realization of it in reality other than as the very manifestation of ideology itself.

Could you pinpoint me to a location, in the quoted material or elsewhere, where Marx would address dealing with 'philosophy in the spiritual, existential context'? Where is his talk about philosophy about something not turned toward the world? It seems to me he never addresses it.

One bit that I might misunderstand is:

That which opposes philosophy and that which philosophy struggles against is always the same thing as philosophy, only with the factors reversed.

What you do think this means, and which factors are reversed? To me it reads again like philosophy only in terms of action, will and struggle.

Hi Diebert:

Could you pinpoint me to a location, in the quoted material or elsewhere, where Marx would address dealing with 'philosophy in the spiritual, existential context'? Where is his talk about philosophy about something not turned toward the world? It seems to me he never addresses it.

But I am pointing. I am pointing like mad to it with this very (quoted) paragraph as a whole. I can, therefore, only continue to point and hope that somebody, somewhere, sometime comes to see what I am pointing at—if only for my own sake.

Let me try again, if you'll continue to bear with me; Marx:

Inasmuch as philosophy as will turns toward the world of appearances, the [philosophical] system is reduced to an abstract totality and thus becomes one side of the world confronted by another side. Its relation to the world is a reflexive relation.

When we engage philosophy as will – as the action itself – toward the world the only “action” there can be is a system reduced to an abstract totality, which results not in the resolution of inner/outer conflict, but in the exacerbation of it. Such “action” is thus reflexively related to the world, dividing it up into a perpetually insurmountable abstract/concrete dualism with one’s inner world in constant reflexive conflict with what is supposed to be the outer world—the subject, that is, is itself conflictingly divided. Is this not philosophy "not turned toward the world of appearances" in a very exact way?

Before I move on to the next part of the quote, do we have an understanding that this is his meaning here; perhaps you don’t read it this way or see me drawing such meaning from some other source than that intended in these few quoted sentences?

Leyla Shen wrote:

Could you pinpoint me to a location, in the quoted material or elsewhere, where Marx would address dealing with 'philosophy in the spiritual, existential context'? Where is his talk about philosophy about something not turned toward the world? It seems to me he never addresses it.

But I am pointing. I am pointing like mad to it with this very (quoted) paragraph as a whole.

Fair enough. But please note that my remarks were about his use of the term philosophy and also about his outlook, his canvas or what you point at as being his existential philosophy as being more like a Hegelian semi-philosophical notion.

That doesn't mean it's bad at all, most readers here have no idea about the more subtle points that Marx makes. But in my opinion his strengths lie more in the social-economical consequences of his outlook and the exploration of such than anything else.

Inasmuch as philosophy as will turns toward the world of appearances, the [philosophical] system is reduced to an abstract totality and thus becomes one side of the world confronted by another side. Its relation to the world is a reflexive relation.

When we engage philosophy as will – as the action itself – toward the world the only “action” there can be is a system reduced to an abstract totality, which results not in the resolution of inner/outer conflict, but in the exacerbation of it. Such “action” is thus reflexively related to the world, dividing it up into a perpetually insurmountable abstract/concrete dualism with one’s inner world in constant reflexive conflict with what is supposed to be the outer world—the subject, that is, is itself conflictingly divided. Is this not philosophy "not turned toward the world of appearances" in a very exact way?

But aren't you reading too much in it here? Why would the philosophy expressed in that paragraph as a whole be a different type of philosophy than the subject of that paragraph. I never got the impression in the writings of Marx that he would exclude anything from the process he describes, that is: the ongoing transformation of nature by ideas, which has to include as well the transformation of ideas by nature. Nature for him being seen purely from the materialistic 'literal' perspective as far as I can tell.

Diebert wrote:Fair enough. But please note that my remarks were about his use of the term philosophy and also about his outlook, his canvas or what you point at as being his existential philosophy as being more like a Hegelian semi-philosophical notion.

OK. Duly noted.

That doesn't mean it's bad at all, most readers here have no idea about the more subtle points that Marx makes. But in my opinion his strengths lie more in the social-economical consequences of his outlook and the exploration of such than anything else.

And, of course, I think that, insofar as your last sentence above goes, that is exactly the way he intended it.

But aren't you reading too much in it here?

I don’t think so. After I have made the following amendment, perhaps you can reconsider what I wrote.

Why would the philosophy expressed in that paragraph as a whole be a different type of philosophy than the subject of that paragraph. I never got the impression in the writings of Marx that he would exclude anything from the process he describes, that is: the ongoing transformation of nature by ideas, which has to include as well the transformation of ideas by nature. Nature for him being seen purely from the materialistic 'literal' perspective as far as I can tell.

Oh, such terrible ambiguity! My apologies, Diebert. And, I agree with what you have written above. However, where I wrote “[...] —the subject, that is, is itself conflictingly divided” I had intended to refer to the individual in question with the word “subject” rather than philosophy as the subject.