GENIUS FORUMS

Leyla Shen wrote:Sorry, you'll have to do better than that, and make sure you keep this in the context of the sentence in Kant under question!

Okay, you're saying that Kant thinks that change is not derived from experience, right?

I don't need the link, Matt. The paras under scrutiny have been repeated here in this thread over and over.

Currently, and for a while now, we are discussing this:

For example, the proposition, “Every change has a cause,” is a proposition á priori, but impure, because change is a conception which can only be derived from experience.

Humour me and let's start again by clearly stating our position in respect of the above quote.

I have been saying that what Kant means here is the whole proposition (in quotation marks), and not the conception change itself, is what Kant is calling impure a priori and you have maintained that what Kant means in this sentence is that the conception change is a posteriori.

Do you agree with this?

Sorry, I missed this one.

Leyla Shen wrote:

Experience = the totality of all we experience. When we look within it and perceive things, then the things we perceive are uncertain because they aren't derived directly from the logical concept of experience, but indirectly because the perceptions are merely a subset of the totality of experience. In other words, the concept of experience has been altered by the senses.

Rubbish!

If experience is defined as the totality of all that we experience then everything is necessarily derived from it directly.

It's depends on how you define experience. Kant did not include thought within his definition of experience.

Matt Gregory wrote:

Leyla Shen wrote:Sorry, you'll have to do better than that, and make sure you keep this in the context of the sentence in Kant under question!

Okay, you're saying that Kant thinks that change is not derived from experience, right?

Noooooooo...

Clearly, he says it is!

Leyla Shen wrote:I don't need the link, Matt. The paras under scrutiny have been repeated here in this thread over and over.

I was talking to Sapius, actually.

Currently, and for a while now, we are discussing this:

For example, the proposition, “Every change has a cause,” is a proposition á priori, but impure, because change is a conception which can only be derived from experience.

Humour me and let's start again by clearly stating our position in respect of the above quote.

I have been saying that what Kant means here is the whole proposition (in quotation marks), and not the conception change itself, is what Kant is calling impure a priori and you have maintained that what Kant means in this sentence is that the conception change is a posteriori.

Do you agree with this?

I'm arguing that:

1. "Every change has a cause" is impure a priori. And that's because:

2. Causation would be pure a priori, except for the fact that:

3. "Change" is a posteriori.

So, that's why "every change has a cause" is impure a priori.

Leyla Shen wrote:

Matt Gregory wrote:Okay, you're saying that Kant thinks that change is not derived from experience, right?

Noooooooo...

Clearly, he says it is!

Oh right, sorry! :)

We gotta hurry up and resolve this, Leyla. We still have another 478 pages of this book left to go!

Matt:

I was talking to Sapius, actually.

That's alright. I'm sure he won't mind that I've responded.

I'm arguing that:

1. "Every change has a cause" is impure a priori. And that's because:

2. Causation would be pure a priori, except for the fact that:

3. "Change" is a posteriori.

So, that's why "every change has a cause" is impure a priori.

Alright. But before I read this and give it some thought, for the purposes of utter clarity, are you also arguing that this is what Kant is arguing?

We gotta hurry up and resolve this, Leyla. We still have another 478 pages of this book left to go!

[laughs] You know, I've been thinking the very same thing--estimated maybe spending the next two years with you on it! But I reckon if we properly resolve this, the rest might not be so much of a problem...

Yeah. The whole reason he brought it up was to point out the difference between pure and impure a priori.

Alright, I'll get back to it soon.

Oops, that post goes a priori with the one before it. :)

No worries. I've been momentarily distracted by a woman...

That's alright. I'm sure he won't mind that I've responded.

Not at all Leyla, but it would be very kind of Matt to mention who he was responding to.

I am essentially not interested in WHO said what in the past, but what is being said by people that can respond and discuss about what they are saying.

Selam.

Leyla Shen wrote:

We gotta hurry up and resolve this, Leyla. We still have another 478 pages of this book left to go!

[laughs] You know, I've been thinking the very same thing--estimated maybe spending the next two years with you on it! But I reckon if we properly resolve this, the rest might not be so much of a problem...

Don't worry, it gets worse. Much worse.

Matt:

1. "Every change has a cause" is impure a priori. And that's because:

2. Causation would be pure a priori, except for the fact that:

3. "Change" is a posteriori.

So, that's why "every change has a cause" is impure a priori.

Alright. Now we’re speaking the same language and it’s perfectly clear to me how you are reading that sentence. However, this understanding of it becomes problematic in continuing on a bit further down because Kant then says:

1. (Given the above) it is easy to show that there are judgements in the sphere of human cognition which are necessary and, in the strictest sense, universal and consequently pure a priori.
2. Maths serves as such an example in the field of science.
3. The proposition “Every change must have a cause” amply serves the purpose of demonstration that there is knowledge that there are pure a priori judgements, because:
4. The conception of a cause so clearly involves the necessity of connection with an effect and of a strict universality of the law (of cause and effect), that
5. If one had to: derive that necessity from a frequent association of what happens with that which precedes and the habit from that of connecting representations—the necessity inherent in the judgement being [is] therefore merely subjective; and
6. Because that which is absolute and universal is not and cannot, by definition or otherwise, be subjective the very notion of causality literally would disappear!

Sapius wrote:

That's alright. I'm sure he won't mind that I've responded.

Not at all Leyla, but it would be very kind of Matt to mention who he was responding to.

I am essentially not interested in WHO said what in the past, but what is being said by people that can respond and discuss about what they are saying.

Selam.

Aleyküm selam, Sapius.

Yes, Matt's a nasty bugger sometimes!

Of course, Kant is not really dead insofar as he is at least being partially reincarnated in one of us. Matt thinks it's him, I think it might just be me! You may take your pick.

Leyla,

Leyla Shen wrote:

1. "Every change has a cause" is impure a priori. And that's because:

2. Causation would be pure a priori, except for the fact that:

3. "Change" is a posteriori.

So, that's why "every change has a cause" is impure a priori.

Alright. Now we’re speaking the same language and it’s perfectly clear to me how you are reading that sentence. However, this understanding of it becomes problematic in continuing on a bit further down because Kant then says:

1. (Given the above) it is easy to show that there are judgements in the sphere of human cognition which are necessary and, in the strictest sense, universal and consequently pure a priori.
2. Maths serves as such an example in the field of science.
3. The proposition “Every change must have a cause” amply serves the purpose of demonstration that there is knowledge that there are pure a priori judgements, because:
4. The conception of a cause so clearly involves the necessity of connection with an effect and of a strict universality of the law (of cause and effect), that
5. If one had to: derive that necessity from a frequent association of what happens with that which precedes and the habit from that of connecting representations—the necessity inherent in the judgement being [is] therefore merely subjective; and
6. Because that which is absolute and universal is not and cannot, by definition or otherwise, be subjective the very notion of causality literally would disappear!

Okay, so you're saying that Kant thinks that causation is pure a priori and change is a posteriori and that the statement "every change has a cause" is what you get when you mix the two together?

Sapius wrote:

That's alright. I'm sure he won't mind that I've responded.

Not at all Leyla, but it would be very kind of Matt to mention who he was responding to.

I was just responding to whoever just joined the thread and might not know what we're talking about.

I am essentially not interested in WHO said what in the past, but what is being said by people that can respond and discuss about what they are saying.

It's good for stimulating different thoughts, though, painful as it is sometimes :)

Selam.

Ciao

Matt:

Okay, so you're saying that Kant thinks that causation is pure a priori and change is a posteriori and that the statement "every change has a cause" is what you get when you mix the two together?

Well, I was saying that, but I’m not so sure, yet. I think he might just be focussing on pointing out that in this example of common understanding (“Every change must have a cause”) lies the proof of a pure a priori judgement (the notion “effect”) rather than him making an absolute comment directly about causality. Time will tell.

With this, are we so far in harmony as to Kant's direction?

Leyla,

I think you're right. It was wrong of me to think that he equated causation with that statement. He was just applying the law of causation to the idea of change and coming up with that impure à priori proposition.

Well, I was saying that, but I’m not so sure, yet. I think he might just be focussing on pointing out that in this example of common understanding (“Every change must have a cause”) lies the proof of a pure a priori judgement (the notion “effect”) rather than him making an absolute comment directly about causality. Time will tell.

Yeah, I'm pretty sure that's what he's doing, but he seems to assume that the reader already knows how he defines causality, which seems kind of strange to me. Maybe Hume or an earlier philosopher defined it and he's just borrowing that definition?

With this, are we so far in harmony as to Kant's direction?

I think so. Sorry about all that; I just couldn't comprehend what you were trying to tell me!

Still, we got somewhere.

Matt:

Sorry about all that; I just couldn't comprehend what you were trying to tell me!

Hey, no worries.

Still, we got somewhere.

Yes, I think it's a great "little" project. Thanks for bringing it up. :)

I'll move on with it in another post later tonight.

Matt:

Yeah, I'm pretty sure that's what he's doing, but he seems to assume that the reader already knows how he defines causality, which seems kind of strange to me.

Strange irony?

I mean, if "effect" (the other side of cause in causality) is an a priori judgement in the "change" proposition, why wouldn't he assume that the reader already knows what causality is?

It means that, in the current context, there's is no such specific thing that is an absolute a priori--and only that in each proposition, the a priori is the necessary and implicit component of it. This makes sense when we consider his reference to having to derive such a necessity "from a frequent association...and the habit thence proceeding..." No?

Leyla,

Matt: Yeah, I'm pretty sure that's what he's doing, but he seems to assume that the reader already knows how he defines causality, which seems kind of strange to me.


Leyla: Strange irony?

I mean, if "effect" (the other side of cause in causality) is an a priori judgement in the "change" proposition, why wouldn't he assume that the reader already knows what causality is?

It still leaves the question open of how the two are related. I know Hume was thinking of billiard ball causation, so, since Kant didn't seem to refute that definition, I think it's safe to think that he used the same definition, but it's hard to tell.

Leyla wrote:It means that, in the current context, there's is no such specific thing that is an absolute a priori--and only that in each proposition, the a priori is the necessary and implicit component of it. This makes sense when we consider his reference to having to derive such a necessity "from a frequent association...and the habit thence proceeding..." No?

You mean because "frequent association" and "habit of connecting" are specific empirical things, then they are necessarily not à priori? That's true, but I think Kant was referring to the formation of the concept of "cause". We can easily define something to be a connection borne by association, but I think the one-sided nature of cause is the key factor of his contention, that in conceiving of a cause, an effect is necessarily conceived of with it.

Leyla: I mean, if "effect" (the other side of cause in causality) is an a priori judgement in the "change" proposition, why wouldn't he assume that the reader already knows what causality is?

Matt: It still leaves the question open of how the two are related.

I don’t know about that, because:

I know Hume was thinking of billiard ball causation,...

If we take this billiard ball causation to be an exact kind of a posteriori conception of causality, we notice that even in this very sentence where I have used the word “causality” (bolded) that that concept (causality) is not the same as the billiard ball concept. With the former (billiard ball conception), clearly we have a mental image of a sequence of events. That is not true of the latter.

You mean because "frequent association" and "habit of connecting" are specific empirical things, then they are necessarily not à priori?

Actually, I think they are impure a priori conceptions. :) But there is be an uncanny twist to Kant which begs vigilant attention:

But, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience. For, on the contrary, it is quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself (sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion), an addition which we cannot distinguish from the original element given by sense, till long practice has made us attentive to, and skilful in separating it.

I’ll re-work the following in an attempt to state it more clearly.

I wrote:

It means that, in the current context, there's is no such specific thing that is an absolute a priori--and only that in each proposition, the a priori is the necessary and implicit component of it. This makes sense when we consider his reference to having to derive such a necessity "from a frequent association...and the habit thence proceeding..." No?