GENIUS FORUMS

Matt,

Here is the beginning of my reply to your last question:

Ok yeah, change is not an object, but why couldn't it be finite? }:-)

Firstly, it requires an explanation/interpretation of the last Kantian quote I posted, which I will provide dissected over a couple of posts starting as follows.

Conclusion: Not only in judgements, however, but even in conceptions, is an á priori origin manifest.

For example, if we take away by degrees from our conceptions of a body all that can be referred to mere sensuous experience—colour, hardness or softness, weight, even impenetrability—the body will then vanish; but the space which it occupied still remains, and this it is utterly impossible to annihilate in thought.

That is, we can take away all sensory qualities from our conceptions of a body and the body will vanish [NOTE: we, of course, cannot take away the causes of those sensations in any given object itself otherwise objects would literally be disappearing all over the place despite all our senses being in order--course, the first thing I‘d do is make Elizabeth disappear :)] but what cannot be eliminated in this process is the space in thought which the now non-sensory object occupies. The concept of space, in other words, is the a priori “common denominator” to the conception of all things. This is true because if that notion in our conception of the space of an object were removed each time we considered, in thought, a non-sensorial existing object, you’d “forget” there was ever anything there at all and it would be as though no such process occurred.

Such conceptions, conceived as containing mappable and, therefore, changing sensory properties, are “empirical conceptions.”

[Edited Freudian slip]

In my view, the following requires little clarification:

Again, if we take away, in like manner, from our empirical conception of any object, corporeal or incorporeal, all properties which mere experience has taught us to connect with it, still we cannot think away those [properties] through which we cogitate it as substance, or adhering to substance, although our conception of substance is more determined [fixed] than that [substance] of an object.

Given all of the above, thus we are:

Compelled, therefore, by that necessity with which the conception of substance forces itself upon us, we must confess that it [the necessity with which the conception of substance...etc.] has its seat in our faculty of cognition á priori.

As detailed above, the conception of substance (that which contains mass and occupies space) is fundamental to experience itself whether in the form of corporeal or incorporeal objects--including empirical judgements and empirical conceptions--and, therefore, has its seat in our faculty of cognition a priori. (Again, the consequences of this conception of substance necessarily being acquired a posteriori are that such a conception would, in fact, be unnecessary!)

Matt wrote:

How can it be proved that the concept of change can only be derived from experience? If that's true then it's not certain that reality always changes.

That, Matt, as I see it, is the logical proof for change being derived from experience. It does not contradict the finite (changing) nature of reality unless you remove yourself as a part of it; that is, unless you think you somehow exist independently of all other things .

[Deleted dup. post--quantum glitch]

Wow. I can make objects appear without using the forum buttons!

Matt:

L: Let me get this straight: you think that the idea “change is a concept that can only be derived from experience” is the type of necessity Kant is calling a priori knowledge rather than a posteriori knowledge?

M: Yeah, Kant implies that it's á posteriori, but all sages (Lao Tzu, Quinn, etc.) imply that it's universal and thus á priori, so I think it's something I need to look into because I realized that I can't think of a proof for change other than the fact that it is experienced.

Like in Luke 21:5 when Jesus said, "There is no stone that won't be cast down." Or when Lao Tau said, "The ten thousands things rise and fall while the self watches their return."

Not sure about the Jesus quote yet (will have to look further into it) but I certainly see the Lao Tzu quote as in harmony with Kant, so far.

It doesn't really matter what past sages think, anyway. They just acted like a muse that made me think of the problem. Same with Kant.

Leyla,

Let's try to keep it simple and just talk about what Kant said for awhile. We can go back to the infinite vs. finite change problem later. I think we should consider that one on our own. Three's a crowd!

Matt: Well Kant said that causation is impure a priori [snip]

Leyla: Oh, he so did not, Matt Gregory! At least not in the few paragraphs we have had under scrutiny in this thread. Is it somewhere else?

I'm sure it is in other places, but it's all contained in this sentence:

Kant wrote:For example, the proposition, “Every change has a cause,” is a proposition á priori, but impure, because change is a conception which can only be derived from experience.

Leyla: What he has said is that the statement “Every change must have a cause” is impure a priori due to the a posteriori element of “change” which is a concept derived from experience.

I'm not sure I fully understand what you're saying, but I think he was saying that there is change, out there beyond the mind, and that experience is the conduit that causes that external change to stimulate our minds into forming the concept of change.

If we take that whole statement to mean causation, then causation is impure a priori. But I think that is an error because once one has derived the concept change from experiences, one then opens the door to further a priori knowledge--through reason--to causality since, just as with change, one never actually sees causality either.

I think Kant would argue that we do see change, and thus the idea that things change is derived from experience.

Reconsider this; Kant:

Besides, without seeking for such examples of principles existing á priori in cognition, we might easily show that such principles are the indispensable basis of the possibility of experience itself, and consequently prove their existence á priori. For whence could our experience itself acquire certainty, if all the rules on which it depends were themselves empirical, and consequently fortuitous?

…and that the concept of change is a posteriori (derived from experience).

This might seem pedantic but I think it's quite the contrary: the concept of change is not itself a posteriori (since it is not a corporeal object) but is derived a posteriori-ly…what do you think?

I think he thinks of change as a visible event, and so that's why he calls it a posteriori, which is the implication of the first Kant quote. He doesn't see it as infinite. Even the statement "every change has a cause" indicates that he is thinking of each change as an isolated incident that is separate from the thing that caused it.

Hi, Matt:

Let's try to keep it simple and just talk about what Kant said for awhile.

Good plan! :)

I'm sure it [the notion that causation is impure a priori] is in other places, but it's all contained in this sentence:

Kant wrote: For example, the proposition, “Every change has a cause,” is a proposition á priori, but impure, because change is a conception which can only be derived from experience.

[collapses]

Leyla: What he has said is that the statement “Every change must have a cause” is impure a priori due to the a posteriori element of “change” which is a concept derived from experience.

Matt: I'm not sure I fully understand what you're saying, but I think he was saying that there is change, out there beyond the mind, and that experience is the conduit that causes that external change to stimulate our minds into forming the concept of change.

Kant: For example, the proposition, “Every change has a cause,” is a proposition á priori, but impure, because change is a conception which can only be derived from experience.

No, here he’s saying change is a conception derived from experience and that fact makes the proposition “Every change must have a cause” impure a priori.

Do you not "see" the difference?

PS:

Matt: ...there is change, out there beyond the mind, and that experience is the conduit that causes that external change to stimulate our minds into forming the concept of change.

If that's the case, change is a posteriori knowledge and his reference to the proposition as impure a priori means what?

That causation is logically created, but that the observation of change is a necessary element of it.

No, I don't "see" the difference, or see it, even. :)

Matt:

L: If that's the case, change is a posteriori knowledge and his reference to the proposition as impure a priori means what?

M: That causation is logically created, but that the observation of change is a necessary element of it.

I am going to give you a multiple choice reply.

1. Logically created? Is that like, you think it and it appears in reality as an object?

2. Logically? Foul play, Matt Gregory! I should smack you in the head for that, since obviously the very subject in question is pure reason/logic and, thus, your answer is nothing but an avoidance of the question. However, I will assume that where you have said “logically created” you mean causation is a priori knowledge and you therefore necessarily retract your previous statement that Kant said causation is impure a priori.

3. Observation of change? If this “observation of change” is the experience of change itself as a finite object, how could one continue to observe it necessarily as an element?

No, I don't "see" the difference, or see it, even. :)

I know. :)

Leyla,

I am going to give you a multiple choice reply.

Sweet! I love freedom of choice.

1. Logically created? Is that like, you think it and it appears in reality as an object?

I figured I'd have a problem with that word :0

I mean "logically" in the Genius Forum sense: definitionally. He's saying a cause is defined to be "the antecedent of a change", but because "change" is not true by definition, but by observation, then causation is impure a priori. There's some empirical element "mixed up" with the concept of a cause.

David,

The only thing I accept as an "axiom" is A=A. But it isn't really an axiom as such. Since it is impossible to dispute A=A without entering into contradiction, it qualifies as a brute fact.

It would seem then that you accept two axioms: that it is impossible to dispute A=A without entering into contradiction, and that anything that can't be disputed without entering into contradiction is a brute fact. If one accepts those two axioms (which you seem to) then A=A isn't axiomatic at all. I'm not sure how one can discover every philosophical truth by knowing only that "it is impossible to dispute A=A without entering into contradiction, and that anything that can't be disputed without entering into contradiction is a brute fact", so maybe you can demonstrate to me how you accomplish such a feat.

Recognizing and accepting the universality of A=A requires no justification. It's simply a matter of opening one's eyes and seeing a brute fact.

You gave a justification though. A deductive justification no less. Either way though, how do you deductively infer things from only the knowledge that A=A? I've been turning around the notion that "A=A and thus all things are caused" in my head for awhile now and it just isn't making sense. What am I missing here?

On the contrary, if a philosophical claim makes an appeal to "common sense", it is guaranteed to be false.

P1: A=A
P2: (somehow unnecessary?)
C: Thus, all philosophical claims that appeal to common sense are false.

That can't be right. I think you need to back up in your deductions. Such a notion doesn't seem to follow at all from the only axiom you accept.

With "A=A", David is basically saying that we can see things (mentally). If you see something then it's indisputable as well as a brute fact that you saw it.

Matt, what is your definition of "derived"?

Deduced

Matt:

I see. So, if change is a (logical) conception inferred from a general principle (deduction) rather than a concept deductively and necessarily formed as a result of sensory (not deduced but literal physical) experience (of objects)--that is, derived from experience, what the heck part of that is a posteriori and by what definition of experience? And, what is this general principle from which you deduce change? It wouldn’t be….[drum roll]….that experiences are literally and physically happening?

If it is, then it seems your understanding looks something like this:

1. (Sensory) experiences are happening but are uncertain since they are empirical.
2. Change is true by observation (that is, by experience--and so is uncertain).
3. Causation has “some empirical element ‘mixed up’ with it” (that is, experience--and so is uncertain).
4. Therefore, Kant is arguing that there is no such thing as a priori knowledge.
5. Therefore, Kant is arguing that there is no such thing as pure reason (despite the fact that, by definition, deduction itself necessarily implies and proves it.)

Again, I say Kant is saying it is not necessary to experience change for change to be true. It is necessary to experience in order to derive the a priori knowledge “change.” The proposition “Every change must have a cause” is impure a priori not because change is experienced (as an object), but because experience (the measurement of objects by sensation and substance) is necessary for its conception.

If this were not the case, “Experiences are happening” is equally untrue, unnecessary and not absolute.

What kind of henid a priori reality are you looking for?

Leyla,

I see. So, if change is a (logical) conception inferred from a general principle (deduction) rather than a concept deductively and necessarily formed as a result of sensory (not deduced but literal physical) experience (of objects)--that is, derived from experience, what the heck part of that is a posteriori and by what definition of experience?

No. We have the logical concept of experience, right? Experience = the totality of all we experience. When we look within it and perceive things, then the things we perceive are uncertain because they aren't derived directly from the logical concept of experience, but indirectly because the perceptions are merely a subset of the totality of experience. In other words, the concept of experience has been altered by the senses.

So, a posteriori is a judgement that is derived from experience. a priori is a judgement that is derived from a definition. "Change" is a judgement (or "change exists", if you like) that is derived from experience.

And, what is this general principle from which you deduce change? It wouldn't be....[drum roll]....that experiences are literally and physically happening?

It's not directly derived from that, because then Kant would have had to equate change with experience, but if that were the case then how could he derive change from it and call it a posteriori? Defining thing A to be identical as thing B is not the same as deriving A from B. We don't need to deduce jack in that case, just imagine the definition.

The general principle he's using is that if we experience something, then it exists.

If it is, then it seems your understanding looks something like this:

1. (Sensory) experiences are happening but are uncertain since they are empirical.
2. Change is true by observation (that is, by experience--and so is uncertain).
3. Causation has "some empirical element 'mixed up' with it" (that is, experience--and so is uncertain).

Causation is certain here...it is its physical existence that's uncertain because change is uncertain (meaning, not necessary nor universal). But if there is change then there is causation. Causation is certain relative to change.

Now, just in case you want to get peeved over my using the word "relative" to describe a certainty, note that the statement "every change has a cause" addresses every possible location in the universe, because any point is either changing or it's not: if it's changing then it has a cause, and if it's not then no cause is necessary. So, the statement is a universal statement.

4. Therefore, Kant is arguing that there is no such thing as a priori knowledge.
5. Therefore, Kant is arguing that there is no such thing as pure reason (despite the fact that, by definition, deduction itself necessarily implies and proves it.)

Ahhh, no.

Again, I say Kant is saying it is not necessary to experience change for change to be true. It is necessary to experience in order to derive the a priori knowledge "change." The proposition "Every change must have a cause" is impure a priori not because change is experienced (as an object), but because experience (the measurement of objects by sensation and substance) is necessary for its conception.

If that were the reason then that would make all a priori judgements impure, but clearly that's not relevant. Kant doesn't even appear to include concepts within the realm of experience.

The act of thinking a concept has nothing to do with the meaning of it. Thinking is something that falls into the realm of practical action. Meaning is something wholly logical.

If this were not the case, "Experiences are happening" is equally untrue, unnecessary and not absolute.

Assuming experience and change are identical, which Kant didn't.

What kind of henid a priori reality are you looking for?

We can talk about this when you start making some sense :)

Experience = the totality of all we experience. When we look within it and perceive things, then the things we perceive are uncertain because they aren't derived directly from the logical concept of experience, but indirectly because the perceptions are merely a subset of the totality of experience. In other words, the concept of experience has been altered by the senses.

Rubbish!

If experience is defined as the totality of all that we experience then everything is necessarily derived from it directly.

Christ, talk about funny. This is so funny it's flippen-well painful! Round-and-round the garden goes the teddy bear...

It's not directly derived from that, because then Kant would have had to equate change with experience, but if that were the case then how could he derive change from it and call it a posteriori?

Oh, reeeally?? Isn't that the question I've been asking you??

It's not directly derived from that, because then Kant would have had to equate change with experience, [snip]

You mean, like you are doing here:

I mean "logically" in the Genius Forum sense: definitionally. He's saying a cause is defined to be "the antecedent of a change", but because "change" is not true by definition, but by observation, then causation is impure a priori. There's some empirical element "mixed up" with the concept of a cause.

[Edited to repeat portion of quote for clarity]

The difference is between a part and a whole. You're trying to equate them, but they're not the same.

Matt, so that I may understand it better…

So, a posteriori is a judgement that is derived from experience. a priori is a judgement that is derived from a definition. "Change" is a judgement (or "change exists", if you like) that is derived from experience.

Yes, it is derived from experience, but could ‘experience’ itself be possible without change? In my opinion… no. So what kind of a derived judgment would that be?

Yeah, we're just talking about Kant right now because it was getting too complicated trying to discuss both at the same time. We'll be returning to that very subject after we figure out what Kant was saying.

Matt Gregory wrote:The difference is between a part and a whole. You're trying to equate them, but they're not the same.

Sorry, you'll have to do better than that, and make sure you keep this in the context of the sentence in Kant under question!

Here's a link to my Critique of Pure Reason page if you missed it. I took out the commentary because I decided it's probably not useful for reading.