GENIUS FORUMS

Really, I think that last quote of Kant's I posted holds the key, here. I'll wait to see what you have to say about my last post.

Leyla,

The body of Jesus is not “Jesus the man.”

I get what you're saying, but it doesn't follow from such a notion that we should then count all our subjective opinions concerning Jesus to be equal to objective determinations about his life. At least not insofar as we care about the truth of matters. Nice prose though.

What does not seem so clear to you is the way in which the ability to distinguish between things is not uncertain.

The color blue isn't different from the color red because of how I define the terms. They're different because they look different. My ability to distinguish between them is the result of the fact that they exist as different patterns traveling the axon bundles of my neocortex. Such a thing is certain in the same sense that a bee flying is certain. My knowledge of bees flying is uncertain, just as my knowledge of distinctions is uncertain, but raw bee flying or different things are certain in a sense. What you seem to be pointing to here is the fact that facts are facts. Knowing facts is another matter entirely, and such isn't the product of consistent definitions. Definitions are certain in the same way as someone shouting "Fire!" is certain. It's an event that happens, rather then a proposition to be considered.

On what grounds do we look, then, to the empirical--the uncertain--to verify a logical truth?

We've, by this point, already made all the necessary observations to verify a tautological truth. We did so by learning our language. To determine the truth of a deductive statement we need to ensure that it has the proper grammatical structure (which we've already empirically learned by now), and we also must check to see if we agree with its axioms.

I am asking you from a deep, genuine desire to understand, ExI: on what certain grounds do we conclude that because the empirical is uncertain so too is the logical?

I don't hold that deductive statements are uncertain because inductive statements are. Furthermore, I'm not going to be led into contradiction by providing "certain grounds" for uncertainty. It's rather absurd to request such a thing, don't you think?

I ask you this particularly because this piece of absolute truth is the logic that pins your entire philosophy together by overt demonstration.

It isn't an "absolute truth". That which I know happens to support my opinion on this matter.

s it because they--feeling/thought, object/subject, empirical/theoretical, matter/mind, physical/metaphysical, phenomena/noumena--are one and the same?

I wouldn't go that far.

ExI:

I get what you're saying, but it doesn't follow from such a notion that we should then count all our subjective opinions concerning Jesus to be equal to objective determinations about his life. At least not insofar as we care about the truth of matters.

Of course they are not equal. Objective determinations don't even begin to address the subjective. That's the point.

The color blue isn't different from the color red because of how I define the terms. They're different because they look different. My ability to distinguish between them is the result of the fact that they exist as different patterns traveling the axon bundles of my neocortex.* Such a thing is certain in the same sense that a bee flying is certain. My knowledge of bees flying is uncertain, just as my knowledge of distinctions is uncertain, but raw bee flying or different things are certain in a sense.**

*Oh, really? What's an axon bundle?
**Really, this just doesn't add up in my mind. Why is your knowledge of "bee flying" uncertain, but not "raw bee flying"? And in what certain sense is "raw bee flying" certain?

Furthermore, I'm not going to be led into contradiction by providing "certain grounds" for uncertainty. It's rather absurd to request such a thing, don't you think?

Hm. Is it just me or did you just provide "certain grounds" for uncertainty??

L: Is it because they--feeling/thought, object/subject, empirical/theoretical, matter/mind, physical/metaphysical, phenomena/noumena--are one and the same?

ExI: I wouldn't go that far.

I think you have done exactly that and, in that spirit, I'm going to add another one to the list: certain/uncertain.

:)

Leyla,

Of course they are not equal. Objective determinations don't even begin to address the subjective. That's the point.

What use is there in addressing the subjective?

Oh, really? What's an axon bundle?

An axon is this tree-looking thing at the end of a neuron that discharges an electrical impulse that sends chemicals over to another neuron, which may itself release an electrical impulse that sends chemicals yadda yadda yadda. An axon bundle is a bunch of axons.

Really, this just doesn't add up in my mind. Why is your knowledge of "bee flying" uncertain, but not "raw bee flying"? And in what certain sense is "raw bee flying" certain?

Bee flying all italicized like it is supposed to represent a bee actually flying. It's certain because italicized facts just kind of work that way. Or, more precisely, it is certain because I'm asserting that it is right now, and that is exactly my point about how distinctions are certain. They just really aren't.

Hm. Is it just me or did you just provide "certain grounds" for uncertainty??

It's just you.

I think you have done exactly that and, in that spirit, I'm going to add another one to the list: certain/uncertain.

One or two of the things in your list can be interpreted as pointing to empirically differentiable concepts. If you're suggesting that they're all the same by virtue of being words, then I'll grant you that, but words have meanings, and it's the difference between the empirical concepts represented that matter (not the words).

This is ridiculous!

Leyla Shen wrote:Really, I think that last quote of Kant's I posted holds the key, here. I'll wait to see what you have to say about my last post.

In thinking about it, it does set a standard, even for that knowledge that is obtained (how? is yet TBD) before experience he was speaking of, pure a priori reason aka pure intuition. No matter how you slice it, it must be universal and necessary.

Ironic,

Matt: Well, what's the problem? You wrote two big paragraphs assuming there's this problem, but you didn't even state what it is.

Ironic: My point was that words don't point.

Oh, so I can just make up any meaning for your words that I want and that will be fine with you?

Ironic: "2+2=4" doesn't point to anything in particular. It can be interpreted as an empirical concept, a deductive concept, a tautology, or an odd bunch of meaningless marks.

So, you can understand what someone says or misunderstand it. So what?

Ironic: If we interpret as a tautology we can better represent it with 4=4 or p=p or just p. What use is knowing "p"? It's a worthless symbol. If we take any meaning from a tautological statement beyond p (which is reducible to "" in real world terms), we run into the problem of regress. One learns nothing from a tautology.

You don't know what you're talking about. You're taking one trivial example and mistaking it for an infinite body of knowledge. Your argument amounts to saying that all of math is useless because the equation 1=1 is boring.

Matt: But none of this is here nor there. My point is that logical statements are always universal statements. The mind naturally functions this way.

Ironic: Abductive logic--the only logic that seems to provide new knowledge--is never universal. Thus, your notion that logical statements are only universal is false.

I never said that they were. I said we attempt to make them universal. I was pointing to a particular behavior, hoping that you would inquire on your own time, as to what the cause of it could be, but obviously it was overly optimistic of me to think that you would do that.

Ironic: Furthermore, the mind does not naturally function in such a manner. A newborn doesn't know a thing about definitions, propositions, qualifiers, or other things that it will later begin to learn ostensively if raised in our society. Such things come with language.

Logic is the inherent function of the brain. How can someone learn a language without the ability to remember things?

Ironic: Shut off the words in your head for a second and just observe (seriously: try it). Tried it yet? I'll wait...

Alright. Now tell me about all the logical notions you came up with well your mind wasn't mucking about with language. I'll tell you exactly what sorts of things you reasoned out: nothing.

You don't know what reason is, then. It's not something you learned from a book.

Ironic: Nevertheless, your mind still functioned, you still could move about and respond to things. I've gone hours without a single word popping into my head, and was able to perform daily tasks just fine.

Then your mind was still operating logically.

Matt: I'm talking about proof of a truth. There's only one way. That proposition you gave is not a truth as it's an uncertain empirical proposition. These types of propositions are never universal because they would have to be qualified infinitely.

Ironic: So it isn't true that George Washington was the first president of the United States?

It is if he's defined to be the first president of the United States, but we can't be certain that he really was.

Ironic: You're obviously using the term "truth" wrong here.

I meant it in the strict, philosophical sense. I've been talking about this same truth the entire time.

Ironic: If you only accept things qualified to certainty as true, then the only truth you accept is "".

No, you misunderstood my argument, but whatever. Only arguments based on pure logic are certain. Empirical truths are never certain.

Ironic: We can see this because anything that isn't reducible to an empty statement faces the problem of regress. What you're advocating is complete skeptisism. Anything we derive from p (an empty symbol) or p=p is reducible to p. You can't deduce anything from p.

Sure you can. For example, if you know p then you know that what is not p is not p. Or if you know that p is q, then you know that q is p. Or if you know that p is not q, then you know that q is not p. Etc., etc.

Matt: Well, "coca-cola bottle" needs to be defined and a definition is not empirical, even if it is inspired by experience because definitions don't depend on experience.

Ironic: The salient point here is that "coca-cola bottle" refers to a thing in the world.

To know about coke bottles in the world you have to know what a coke bottle is first.

Ironic: We generally use the term to talk of that thing. If that thing were to disappear, then we'd only have our memories of coca-cola bottles and our sound pattern or scribbles that invoke in our minds (by way of automatic association) a visual pattern that once had the potential to be more then just a memory.

And if the concept of a coke bottle were to disappear, the memories, the visual pattern, and all of the coke bottles in the world would disappear.

Ironic: Which really cuts to the heart of my problem with your epistemological views: I can't imagine why we should say that truth comes about because patterns of sound or scribbles are arranged in a particular way.

I never said that. You're just missing my point because you keep thinking I'm talking about language because it's the only thing you can perceive, I guess. Truth doesn't come about, it's in your mind and all around you. True thoughts merely get rid of the delusions that obscure actual truth. You can't perceive it because a mind that has a lot of emotional attachments is heavily burdened with delusion. You have to clean that shit up first.

Ironic: Those patterns of sound or scribbles should only be called "true" (in a meaningful sense) when their interpreted meaning can be said to correspond to actual states of affairs.

Truth is reality. Literally. This phenomenal world you're looking at is constructed by the mind. That's not to say you consciously constructed it, but nevertheless your mind is what you experience at all times.

Ironic: "I'm typing right now" is a true proposition. "p=p" is just a scribble.

Yeah, right. The first one is already false.

Matt:First, we strive for certainty in all our knowledge.

Ironic: I strive to learn about the world. The only thing that's certain is that which is before me in any given instant, and such certainty falls apart the second I attempt to analyze it.

That's because your concentration sucks.

Matt: When someone performs an experiment, what in their experience of the experiment tells them that it was incomplete or insufficient?

Ironic: When I was a kid I knew that I had a fish that swam about. He was pretty awesome. One day he stopped swimming about, even though he had always swam about before. That and a thousand similar experiences taught me that change happens.

How do you know that two experiences are similar?

Matt: So, what could cause him to doubt it but introspective thinking and logic?

Ironic: Experience.

Then how come chimps can't do science? They experience things just as much as we do. Do they have bad vision or something?

Matt,

Matt: But that's not what I wanted to express. When I write "Sapius" and "Matt" above, I'm specifically talking about the meanings of the words, and assume that they are known.

Sapius: What do the words mean other than what they define? If I don't know what they mean, I will naturally ask.


Matt: Right. But once you ask and find out that "Sapius" means you and "Matt" means me, then by which mode of knowledge do you know that Sapius and Matt are different? Do you figure it out by logic or by experience?

You agreed…

Matt: Yeah, I think I'm not understanding what you're talking about.

Sapius: A=A (Recognition through differentiation). In other words; raw consciousness. That a thing is a thing and not something else, not just by definition, but let’s say by the virtue of being logically undeniable. Hence A=A (as defined) is not just a conceptualized principle, but is consciousness in action itself, irrelevant of conceptualization.

Does this make sense?

Matt: Yeah, yeah, that how I look at it.

Keep that in mind, and now let me respond to this…

Matt: Right. But once you ask and find out that "Sapius" means you and "Matt" means me, then by which mode of knowledge do you know that Sapius and Matt are different? Do you figure it out by logic or by experience?

I would say ‘reasoning’, not “logic” per say, with experience necessarily involved, because in your above example, I will have to necessarily verify it by some “empirical” means, as in reasoning that your posts are not posted by me, so who the hell is it? Logic (A=A) is the necessary ingredient (which is none other than consciousness, as described and agreed by you too) for reasoning to occur, and experience confirms the validity of certain reasoning, be it empirical or non-empirical so to speak. In fact, there is no “empirical” unless we separate it by definition. Otherwise, what is happening that is not a mental construct sensed because of A=A?

Science is now coming closer to such a notion as it steps deeper into understanding it “empirically” so to speak. They will know that the deeper they go, the more ‘things’ they will find infinitely, for ultimately, there are but “things” and duality is the only reality to its core. Ultimately, if at all in that direction, there has to necessarily be at least a TWO, never a ONE, because TWO could not have emerged from ONE, because that would be an impossible literal magic. It’s just a matter of time, but a lot of time indeed, for Science to know it through the same reasoning.

However, I do understand what you and others mean by “pure logic” which does not rely on the empirical, but that is actually a reasoning which although is based in and of seemingly “empirical” existence, extrapolates logical conclusions that mentally proves the seemingly-ness of the “empirical”, otherwise we use the same logical reasoning to understand the ‘empirical’. Whereas both, the mental and the empirical, are the two sides of the same coin. That is all I can say.

In an ultimate sense, there is no such literal thing as “empirical” for me, and that’s my point. I don’t mean to say that there isn’t such a thing at all, but it is just that, a thing, and reasoning (or thought), is a thing too, but they both are necessarily not the same THING if consciousness is to mean any thing at all.

That’s how “I” see it, without any contradictions, and I don’t know how else to Say it.

Pure logic is reasoning that doesn't depend on experience for validity. "2+2=4" is pure logic,…

How did the “2” come about?

…but "Ouch, I bumped my head; I'd better keep the cupboard door closed" is not.

And which word or what they point to in the above statement is not true by definition?

They are both reasoning, though.

Of course they are.

Experience = knowledge derived from the senses; knowledge that doesn't come from logic

Then I envy the knowledge of animals, which must be derived from senses as far as I can see, and which doesn’t come from logic (A=A, or being conscious I take it)

Matt: Well, when I said, "assuming they are different", I was speaking from my own perspective as the person giving this argument, rather than from the general one of someone trying to empirically prove difference. I'm giving an argument about another argument, so there are two levels to deal with, and it's kind of tricky to keep them straight.

Sapius: Very tricky indeed. Do you think the conceptualization of a priory and a posteriori could be responsible for all the confusion?

Matt: They are just hard to explain. Or maybe I'm just not any good at explaining them.

May be if you merged them both as in the two faces of the same coin, but yet remain as TWO faces only, one could comprenend the cofusion it creates.

No, logic is too simple to require language. Some animals can think logically to a certain extent without any language, it's just that their definitions aren't verbal. They just have mental images of sense impressions to work with. I think language helps us form complex ideas and reason about them, but logic works just the same no matter how complex the ideas are that it works with.

We two see “logic” differently. I see it as ultimately being none other than consciousness itself, so I rest my case here.

Matt: No. You are caused to manipulate the causes.

I would like to explore this a little. I understand what it means to be caused, but what does it mean to you to "manipulate causes?"

passthrough wrote:

Leyla Shen wrote:Really, I think that last quote of Kant's I posted holds the key, here. I'll wait to see what you have to say about my last post.

In thinking about it, it does set a standard, even for that knowledge that is obtained (how? is yet TBD) before experience he was speaking of, pure a priori reason aka pure intuition. No matter how you slice it, it must be universal and necessary.

The quote under consideration:

Necessity and strict universality, therefore, are infallible tests for distinguishing pure from empirical knowledge, and are inseparably connected with each other. But as in the use of these criteria (Ha! Talk about understatements insofar as what follows!) the empirical limitation is sometimes more easily detected than the contingency of the judgement, or the unlimited universality which we attach to a judgement is often a more convincing proof than its necessity, it may be advisable to use the criteria separately, each being by itself infallible.

What this is saying to me is: necessity and strict universality ARE pure a priori (bear in mind that the most I have read of Kant is right here in these threads--I have not seen his 12-odd categories to which you have referred, yet). How would it possible to experience necessity and strict universality? (It also follows from this that such a thing as experience would be impossible if that were not the case--and, that that's precisely the root of all "God" conceptions--but I'll flesh this out more later.)

Kant then is saying that even in the use of this criteria--necessity and strict universality as infallible TESTS for distinguishing pure from empirical knowledge--the fact that such things as necessity and strict universally cannot be tested empirically ("the empirical limitation") stands out more than the fact of that very judgement. It's like acknowledging the existence of something in order to prove that it doesn't exist when its precisely the reason for all the tests anyone could ever wish to carry out!

In other words, do we run around testing everything in science to prove that there's no such thing as necessity and strict universality when every test itself carries with it its own necessity and strict universality, or are all experiments themselves necessarily and universally arbitrary?

Matt,

"I confused things with their names: that is belief." -Jean-Paul Sartre

I'm going to approach this from a different angle. If I see a butterfly in the park, and later go back to that park to see the butterfly, then I'm inferring that the butterfly will be in the park. Now you'd probably say here that if I'm more "conscious" of the logic that underpins my thought, then I'd realize that the butterfly need not be in the park. The butterfly is the butterfly, and the park is the park, and the two need not go together because the butterfly is not the park by definition (or something along these lines). Perhaps I'm being blinded to this fact by my emotional attachment to the butterfly, which causes me to want to see the butterfly in the park.

To you the definition of butterfly (I gather) would be whatever facts exist about butterflies. So, you should say, that to know a butterfly is to know the definition of butterfly. Where we seem to differ is in the fact that I split things up into two layers. To me there is the butterfly--our mental "picture" of the object that the term "butterfly" refers to--and the "butterfly": the term that is used to invoke in others such thoughts. Your perspective seems to emerge from the idealistic collapse of this distinction: there is no sensible object(butterfly) to which we can knowledgeably refer. Thus, truth can only emerge from definitional consistency. So we can sum up everything true by a single word "totality", or we can expand upon such a notion by saying something like "all bachelors are unmarried", which is just a long winded way of referring to everything in the universe.

Now I'll get into why I disagree with you. Wittgenstein begins his Tractatus with the following proposition: "The world is everything that is the case." This means that we do not fathom the entire world when we sum it up with a term like "totality", "world", "universe", etc. It's the case that leaves once danced upon my windshield, and thus if one tries to comprehend the whole of everything true without thinking about the fact that leaves once danced upon my windshield, they've failed. Nevertheless, you should say, we need not understand everything in the universe to understand the concept. You may imagine that the concept of the "totality" contains within it every other concept, and that is what is real.

On my side in this debate over perspective is the fact that your world of concepts can be reduced to my world of sensible facts. Whereas you have to dismiss the sensible world as an "illusion", I can happily grant that your world of concepts exist. They're just a tiny blip in the universe. The universe is not the term that we use to describe it. Things are what they are, and the phrase "all bachelors are unmarried" is simply a phrase, and is far from adequate for describing the universe. My concept of a coca-cola bottle forms when I see a coca-bottle, and if I am to lose it for whatever reason, it will reform when I see another. The concept is nothing beyond an impression within my brain that forms upon seeing the bottle. It isn't something transcendent of the sensible world that allows that which is in the sensible world to exist. That which we see is not a shadow cast by some transcendent reality. Plato was wrong.

Sartre wrote that "existence precedes and rules essence". When we are born our minds are more-or-less a blank slate. It is only through our interaction with the world that we begin to form concepts of things. The brain works by abstracting things: by forming impressions of things that aren't exactly correspondent to the whole pattern they consist of when they impinge themselves upon our senses. Your computer would interpret an apple facing one way, and an apple facing another way, to be two entirely different things. The human brain, on the other hand, not only takes in a constant stream of different apple patterns when observing the object (due to eye saccades and whatnot), but also doesn't "save" the complete apple pattern, but only an invariant representation thereof. We remember only those parts of the apple pattern that remain temporally constant enough to allow for the strengthening of the correspondent synapses (the gaps between our neurons that chemicals travel across when one of the neurons releases its electrical charge). This is how we are able to always recognize an apple as an apple when we see one. Our brain doesn't connect an entire apple pattern to the sound and scribble patterns that compose the term "apple", but rather just an invariant portion thereof! The sound and scribble patterns that compose the term "apple" are also not the entire pattern as we observe it in any given moment, but rather themselves an invariant representation of the original patterns we perceived. The essence of things is within our head. To limit philosophy to talk of definitions and terms is to cheat philosophy out of its role in describing the world.

Passthrough,

Matt: No. You are caused to manipulate the causes.

Passthrough: I would like to explore this a little. I understand what it means to be caused, but what does it mean to you to "manipulate causes?"

To do something intentionally. Our intentions are caused.

I am willfully writing you this message, but my will to do this was caused by the message you posted, by my having a functional computer to be able to read it, by my having a comfortable environment where I can sit at respond at leisure, by my feeling like responding (I saw your message earlier but I didn't respond because I was tired, now I am more rested), by my opinion of the topic that I developed from reading and participating in discussions of it in the past, and so on and so forth. There are an infinite number of causes for any thing in the universe.

You stated that we are caused to manipulate causes. Then you wrote:

Matt: To do something intentionally. Our intentions are caused.

I am willfully writing you this message, but my will to do this was caused by the message you posted, by my having a functional computer to be able to read it, by my having a comfortable environment where I can sit at respond at leisure, by my feeling like responding (I saw your message earlier but I didn't respond because I was tired, now I am more rested), by my opinion of the topic that I developed from reading and participating in discussions of it in the past, and so on and so forth. There are an infinite number of causes for any thing in the universe.

I am going to break this down:

Effect:
You write a reply.

Causes:
1.the message you posted
2.having a functional computer to be able to read it
3.having a comfortable environment where I can sit at respond at leisure
4.opinion of the topic that I developed from reading and participating in discussions of it in the past

Manipulating Causes?:
I saw your message earlier but I didn't respond because I was tired, now I am more rested

Choice/Cause?:
feeling like responding

“My feeling like responding” seems to indicate that you had a choice as to whether or not to respond. Although, above you state that our intentions are caused, so were you compelled to respond or did you choose to respond?

I chose to respond, but my choice was compelled by causes. In other words, it appeared to me like I made a choice, but from a logical point of view I can see that choice is impossible.

Matt Gregory wrote:I chose to respond, but my choice was compelled by causes. In other words, it appeared to me like I made a choice, but from a logical point of view I can see that choice is impossible.

I may come to understand that as well, but let me go through this example:

I run across a thread topic that catches my attention, which in and of itself has implications of what and why some do and some don’t, which may, in some minor way, be relevant – but not addressed herein.

I read the post. While reading the post, in my mind, I am reacting to what is written. I have found myself reacting in two different ways, which could also have implications with regard to the manner in which the posts are written, which may, in minor way, be relevant –but also not addressed herein.

With some posts, I feel compelled to respond. I react emotionally to the post and quickly launch in defending whatever it is that is challenged on a personal basis, throwing opinions right and left that are personal and not necessarily justifiable – that is, not very well supported. I used to submit the post right away, now I do not. Now, I step back and read it through the eyes of a semi-reasonable person, looking at it objectively rather than subjectively, noting that I have disclosed not only a fair amount of knowledge of my personal life but that I took what was said personally, which is running my mouth rather than thinking.

So, either I decide not to post a response at all [and don’t] or, while in my more rational objective state and with the limited abilities I have at this point, attempt to reply with objectivity and reason.

So what accounts for this change? Part of it could be accounted for by attending a class that forces one to think rationally or one would fail the class. The professor asked for personal opinions on certain subjects in order to write a paper or to start a discussion, but the opinions had to be justified with support.

It is the compulsion to answer that remains unresolved.

Kant states in summary that there are those things by causality that we cannot change by our own will, but there are those things that are not controlled by causal laws that we can change. If we see objects changing externally and independent from ourselves (and not our willing them), they are causal and must adhere to the laws of causality. However, if it appears that I am changing something externally and if I reflect upon it, I will find that it is me who changed by willing it so and is not determined by causal law, [but perhaps a change in perception?]

This summary may be objected to because I may not have interpreted him correctly. And it is to be noted that my body is most assuredly affected by causality because, according to my perception and others, it is definitely aging. I cannot go from being old to being young at will, but does this causality also affect your mind and the way you perceive things? Is your will causally determined or do you have choice?

Now, obviously we are objects (let’s drop the skeptic argument for now) that are caused. It is how we came to be. Upon birth we carry with us the genetic predisposition to act and behave in a certain manner. While maturing, we are bombarded with numerous cause and effect relationships which add [to the human condition] an environmentally created component. Together, this genetic predisposition and environmentally created component determine who I am, among other things…it has caused me to be who I am today.

If I look at my posts from 5 months ago and the posts today, something changed, but it is not external as it is more an archived state of my mind at the time, so I changed. So, why would I change from emoting to reason when posting? Because I was caused to do so? If so, why now, why at this time would causation hop in rather than at any other time? Does this suggest a purpose or randomness? Was it determined to happen sooner or later, it was just a question of when and if the causes and effects lined up properly? And if I were caused to do so, it could be said that there are infinitesimal causes involved in order to do this. These causes and effects can be traced back as you traced back your causes for your reply. Therefore, it leads me to think it not random but destined.

What I am having a glitch on is the interrelation of this all – it is a bit overwhelming. Looking back, I can trace what caused me to do one thing and then another, but it seems that I had a choice to do so. In some cases, the choice to do something had detrimental effects – or so was my thinking. I could hold myself back by my own will…for a while, but then I would end up doing that which I knew or thought was against my better interest, feeling compelled to do so either by reason or emotion. In some ways, looking back, what happened almost seemed necessary in order for me to be where I am, a place that is more desirous than that which I was. Even though thinking, at the time, that I shouldn’t continue forward because of what I perceived to be to my own detriment.

Does this make any sense at all? If not, reel me back in.

Matt Gregory wrote:I chose to respond, but my choice was compelled by causes. In other words, it appeared to me like I made a choice, but from a logical point of view I can see that choice is impossible.

I need some clarifications.

What about the “I”? Is that too impossible from a 'logical point of view'?

What does ‘it appears’ actually mean in this context? Does it mean that ‘it appears’ but in fact is not really there? That ONLY “causality” is actually there? Or even that too falls into the category of “it appears”? It should logically be so, then.

If choice is impossible, then I guess I should be caused, (through reason and thence a philosophical point of view), to ignore ‘you’, since “you” or “I” would actually be a figment of a causally created pure imagination. Since it would then stand to reason that it is NOT “you” or “ME” that actually reasons. And hence, it must be pure ‘causality’ that reasons.

OR are you saying that it ‘appears’ that there is a ‘reasoning’ happening, but there is no real choice in that happening? Hence, it would stand to reason that individually reasoned opposing conclusions are really an “appearance” too as seen against one another, since that too is all just ‘causality’. So why should I give a damn to actually care about ANY opposing views at all? Be it wise or an un-wise view. Because if I do care either way, it wouldn’t be a choice at all, since the fact of causally created appearances actually renders individual reasoning redundant.

What real meaning or value do your views hold as opposed to mine then? It would then stand to reason that reasoning is merely an ‘appearance’ with no real comparative reality at all, because either way it is merely a caused phenomena, and that nothing is really experiencing that in a meaningful way at all, actually.

Simply saying that it does hold comparative meaning and hence value, irrelevant of it being causally created appearances from either side, makes causality a joke, really.

IF, “choice” is impossible from a logical point of view, (which is of course based in and of A=A), then you had no choice in saying, “MY choice was compelled by causes”, so there is no logical reason for me to take “YOU” or your conclusion seriously, since not only does that remove ‘choice’ but even ‘you’ from the equation, thereby violating the fact on which logic itself is based on, that is A=A. So what you are essentially saying is that A=A is an illusion in fact.

If “I” am merely an arbitrary ‘appearance’, I might as well lie down and die. It is an individual’s reasoning that makes one act the way he does, however caused an individual’s reasoning may be. Those that kill themselves do it for some reason, which if is merely an ‘appearance’, then I can say that ‘appearances’ can KILL, which of course is an ‘appearance’ too, rendering either opposing choice meaningless, that is living or dieing. If there is no difference between living or dieing, then there is no meaning in either, and without meaning, nothing exists, not even totality.

If one removes a real meaning of the “I”, nothing is relevant, meaningfully. And meaning making is not an illusion of an illusory “I”, but a real fact, because what is it that is not reality, or totality so the speak; full of meaning by the fact that “I” exist in and of totality that is meaningful by the mere fact that “I” can experience meaning.

ExpectantlyIronic,

I'm going to approach this from a different angle. If I see a butterfly in the park, and later go back to that park to see the butterfly, then I'm inferring that the butterfly will be in the park.

Okay.

Now you'd probably say here that if I'm more "conscious" of the logic that underpins my thought, then I'd realize that the butterfly need not be in the park.

If you thought that it was certain that the butterfly would be in the park, then yeah, I would probably say something like that.

To you the definition of butterfly (I gather) would be whatever facts exist about butterflies.

No, it would be whatever you conceive it to be. Definitions aren't fixed entities. A philosopher who uses a butterfly as an example in an argument has a different definition from an insect biologist (whatever they're called) concerned with categorizing butterflies, who has a different definition from a gardener concerned with the butterfly's effect on his plants, who has a different definition from a child reading about a butterfly in a storybook, etc.

So, you should say, that to know a butterfly is to know the definition of butterfly.

It depends on what you mean by "know a butterfly". If by "know" you mean "we can think about", then yeah.

Where we seem to differ is in the fact that I split things up into two layers. To me there is the butterfly--our mental "picture" of the object that the term "butterfly" refers to--and the "butterfly": the term that is used to invoke in others such thoughts.

This is how I think of it. But don't you mean you split it up into three layers? One for the word, one for the picture and one for the external object?

Your perspective seems to emerge from the idealistic collapse of this distinction: there is no sensible object(butterfly) to which we can knowledgeably refer. Thus, truth can only emerge from definitional consistency.

Yeah, philosophical truth or certainty. Scientific truths emerge from observation, but observations are always contingent and therefore uncertain. But if we don't fall into the belief that science yields certain truth, then we can do science without deluding ourselves. So, in the sense that the concept is merely a contingent model and not an absolute truth, sensible objects exist.

So we can sum up everything true by a single word "totality", or we can expand upon such a notion by saying something like "all bachelors are unmarried", which is just a long winded way of referring to everything in the universe.

I would say both the word "Totality" and true propositions point to Truth, which does encompass everything that is true in a sense, but that doesn't mean we become conscious of every true proposition. Realizing what Truth is doesn't mean we come to know every possible thing in the universe.

Now I'll get into why I disagree with you. Wittgenstein begins his Tractatus with the following proposition: "The world is everything that is the case." This means that we do not fathom the entire world when we sum it up with a term like "totality", "world", "universe", etc.

I don't really know what you mean by "sum it up", but we can point to the entire world with language, like you just did when you said "entire world".

It's the case that leaves once danced upon my windshield, and thus if one tries to comprehend the whole of everything true without thinking about the fact that leaves once danced upon my windshield, they've failed.

Fortunately, this has nothing to do with it.

Nevertheless, you should say, we need not understand everything in the universe to understand the concept.

Right!

You may imagine that the concept of the "totality" contains within it every other concept, and that is what is real.

We can see directly that this is the case, though. We don't really need to imagine it.

On my side in this debate over perspective is the fact that your world of concepts can be reduced to my world of sensible facts.

No, it's the other way around. The world of sensible facts is a subset of the world of concepts. You can see this by looking at the physical brain and the physical senses and seeing that no object whatsoever goes directly into the brain, but only data goes through the senses and into the brain, where the brain takes it and constructs concepts, giving us the reality that appears to us. And when we look at the brain and senses themselves in this way, you can see that they can only be concepts themselves which are uncertain, so you really only have the world of concepts at your disposal to understand the world with. There are no real objects to work with except for appearances. And if you take the set of thoughts of sensible objects and add to them the sets of thoughts that aren't of sensible objects, you can see that the mental world is much larger than the sensible world that you are talking about. What you are talking about is just a model that you've created, which you believe to be the "real world".

Whereas you have to dismiss the sensible world as an "illusion", I can happily grant that your world of concepts exist.

I don't deny that the sensible world exists, nor the usefulness of it, what I am denying, however, is its capacity to show us absolute truth. The history of human science and thought shows over and over that it doesn't, and this ought to be a big factor in determining what you feel it is we can learn exactly from experience alone.

They're just a tiny blip in the universe.

I discussed this a couple of blurbs up.

The universe is not the term that we use to describe it.

Never said it was.

Things are what they are, and the phrase "all bachelors are unmarried" is simply a phrase, and is far from adequate for describing the universe.

It doesn't fully describe the universe (are you implying that empirical statements can fully describe it?) but I was more trying to express the fact that it points to the universe.

My concept of a coca-cola bottle forms when I see a coca-bottle, and if I am to lose it for whatever reason, it will reform when I see another.

If I wanted to be exact, I would say you see a coke bottle when a concept of a coke bottle forms in your mind due to the visual sense. If the concept doesn't form, then you simply wouldn't see it.

The concept is nothing beyond an impression within my brain that forms upon seeing the bottle.

When the concept of a bottle forms in your brain, how do you know that it's actually a coke bottle that causes that impression to form and not something completely different? In other words, how do you know that your mind accurately reflects what is external to you?

It isn't something transcendent of the sensible world that allows that which is in the sensible world to exist. That which we see is not a shadow cast by some transcendent reality. Plato was wrong.

I don't know where you're coming up with this, but it has nothing to do with me.

Sartre wrote that "existence precedes and rules essence". When we are born our minds are more-or-less a blank slate. It is only through our interaction with the world that we begin to form concepts of things. The brain works by abstracting things: by forming impressions of things that aren't exactly correspondent to the whole pattern they consist of when they impinge themselves upon our senses. Your computer would interpret an apple facing one way, and an apple facing another way, to be two entirely different things. The human brain, on the other hand, not only takes in a constant stream of different apple patterns when observing the object (due to eye saccades and whatnot), but also doesn't "save" the complete apple pattern, but only an invariant representation thereof. We remember only those parts of the apple pattern that remain temporally constant enough to allow for the strengthening of the correspondent synapses (the gaps between our neurons that chemicals travel across when one of the neurons releases its electrical charge). This is how we are able to always recognize an apple as an apple when we see one. Our brain doesn't connect an entire apple pattern to the sound and scribble patterns that compose the term "apple", but rather just an invariant portion thereof! The sound and scribble patterns that compose the term "apple" are also not the entire pattern as we observe it in any given moment, but rather themselves an invariant representation of the original patterns we perceived.

I'd rather not get into this topic right now. It's speculative and doesn't really have any bearing on my views.

To limit philosophy to talk of definitions and terms is to cheat philosophy out of its role in describing the world.

What you talk about is not philosophy, but scientific speculation (which scientists can do just fine without philosophers, I might add). Philosophy is about wisdom.

Passthrough,

Matt: I chose to respond, but my choice was compelled by causes. In other words, it appeared to me like I made a choice, but from a logical point of view I can see that choice is impossible.

Pass: I may come to understand that as well, but let me go through this example:

I run across a thread topic that catches my attention, which in and of itself has implications of what and why some do and some don’t, which may, in some minor way, be relevant – but not addressed herein.

I read the post. While reading the post, in my mind, I am reacting to what is written. I have found myself reacting in two different ways, which could also have implications with regard to the manner in which the posts are written, which may, in minor way, be relevant –but also not addressed herein.

With some posts, I feel compelled to respond. I react emotionally to the post and quickly launch in defending whatever it is that is challenged on a personal basis, throwing opinions right and left that are personal and not necessarily justifiable – that is, not very well supported. I used to submit the post right away, now I do not. Now, I step back and read it through the eyes of a semi-reasonable person, looking at it objectively rather than subjectively, noting that I have disclosed not only a fair amount of knowledge of my personal life but that I took what was said personally, which is running my mouth rather than thinking.

So, either I decide not to post a response at all [and don’t] or, while in my more rational objective state and with the limited abilities I have at this point, attempt to reply with objectivity and reason.

So what accounts for this change?

This thing is, it doesn't matter if we can account for it or not. Knowing that all things are caused is not the same as knowing what causes every single thing. Like I said a couple of posts ago, there are an infinite number of causes for anything, so there will always be things that can't be accounted for in any thing or event. One just has to keep following the causes until you run into your own limitations. We all have limited knowledge of the world.

Part of it could be accounted for by attending a class that forces one to think rationally or one would fail the class. The professor asked for personal opinions on certain subjects in order to write a paper or to start a discussion, but the opinions had to be justified with support.

It is the compulsion to answer that remains unresolved.

But even if we don't know the exact causes, we still know that it was necessarily caused.

Kant states in summary that there are those things by causality that we cannot change by our own will, but there are those things that are not controlled by causal laws that we can change.

Well, he was wrong on that point.

If we see objects changing externally and independent from ourselves (and not our willing them), they are causal and must adhere to the laws of causality. However, if it appears that I am changing something externally and if I reflect upon it, I will find that it is me who changed by willing it so and is not determined by causal law, [but perhaps a change in perception?]

You are not separate from causation, though. If you were, objects wouldn't be able to affect you, so you wouldn't become aware of them, and you wouldn't be able to affect objects, so you wouldn't be able to change them. You would live in a world all your own by yourself.

This summary may be objected to because I may not have interpreted him correctly.

I don't know, but it wouldn't surprise me if Kant believed in free will.

And it is to be noted that my body is most assuredly affected by causality because, according to my perception and others, it is definitely aging. I cannot go from being old to being young at will, but does this causality also affect your mind and the way you perceive things? Is your will causally determined or do you have choice?

Causality affects our minds and the way we perceive things, and our will is causally determined. If there were something about us like compulsion that was not caused, it would be random and have nothing to do with the physical world. It would be madness, but even the behavior and thoughts of mad people are entirely caused. Think about it: you could get into a bad accident and damage your brain so that your current personality gets totally wiped out and essentially replaced with a nonfunctional one, so that you had to live in a hospital bed the rest of your life and not be able to talk to anyone anymore. It seems to me that if we had free will, these types of things would be impossible.

Now, obviously we are objects (let’s drop the skeptic argument for now) that are caused. It is how we came to be. Upon birth we carry with us the genetic predisposition to act and behave in a certain manner. While maturing, we are bombarded with numerous cause and effect relationships which add [to the human condition] an environmentally created component. Together, this genetic predisposition and environmentally created component determine who I am, among other things…it has caused me to be who I am today.

If I look at my posts from 5 months ago and the posts today, something changed, but it is not external as it is more an archived state of my mind at the time, so I changed. So, why would I change from emoting to reason when posting? Because I was caused to do so? If so, why now, why at this time would causation hop in rather than at any other time?

Causation doesn't hop in and out or stop and start at random intervals. It's boundless and it forms the body of reality. It's in effect at all times.

Does this suggest a purpose or randomness?

Just complexity.

Was it determined to happen sooner or later, it was just a question of when and if the causes and effects lined up properly?

Everything is determined to happen at the exact moment it happens. There is no leeway for variation. We, as humans, can look at something, like a cracked dike, and say, "Whoa that dike's gonna blow if we don't fix it!", but that's really just a figure of speech based on human purpose vs. limited human knowledge. We don't know when anything is going to happen, and it wouldn't even matter to us if we didn't want to accomplish things in the world. That's how causation is. It just flows along and doesn't try to accomplish anything, yet it accomplishes everything.

And if I were caused to do so, it could be said that there are infinitesimal causes involved in order to do this. These causes and effects can be traced back as you traced back your causes for your reply.

We are limited in our ability to trace particular causes. We'll never be able to trace all of the endless number of causes of even one single thing.

Therefore, it leads me to think it not random but destined.

Things are destined in a sense, but nobody knows what that destiny is, not even causation itself.

What I am having a glitch on is the interrelation of this all – it is a bit overwhelming.

Just keep pondering over it and try to be patient and not rush yourself. Clarity will come to you when it's good and ready to come.

Matt Gregory wrote:

Causation doesn't hop in and out or stop and start at random intervals. It's boundless and it forms the body of reality. It's in effect at all times.

Yes causality does not “hop” in and out, but the grave mistake is that one is considering ‘causality’ as a “body” OF reality, and does not logically understand and thereby not accept that ‘causality’ is NOT the “body” OF reality, but IS reality itself; including “things”, save for causality which is reality and is NOT a THING at all. And without “things”, it is absolutely impossible for “causality” to even be.

One can also see from the very fact that causality is in effect at “all times”, (which you already know), thereby rendering ‘time’ irrelevant, since there is nothing beyond causality that it may be compared to in any logical sense. It is impossible to even think a thing beyond causality. So is it not reality itself?

I can only say… Just keep pondering over it and try to be patient and not rush yourself. Clarity will come to you when it's good and ready to come.

Not that I would really favor such an advice, for I believe there is considerable effort needed on one’s part. Which is ignited through the dissatisfaction of seeing things not falling into the category of logical reasoning, according to THAT or any particular individual, however that it may be based in and of causality, which is reality itself. That is IF one wants to call it “reality” for the sake of communication. Otherwise, what is not reality, that one may call reality a reality? Or causality - causality?

In such contexts, what can causality, reality be compared to that is not it?

You don’t have to necessarily respond to this post either; take your own advice and keep pondering.

Sapius,

Matt: I chose to respond, but my choice was compelled by causes. In other words, it appeared to me like I made a choice, but from a logical point of view I can see that choice is impossible.

Sapius: I need some clarifications.

What about the “I”? Is that too impossible from a 'logical point of view'?

Ultimately, yeah.

What does ‘it appears’ actually mean in this context? Does it mean that ‘it appears’ but in fact is not really there?

It means it's an idea that comes from an incomplete picture of reality.

That ONLY “causality” is actually there? Or even that too falls into the category of “it appears”? It should logically be so, then.

Yeah.

If choice is impossible, then I guess I should be caused, (through reason and thence a philosophical point of view), to ignore ‘you’, since “you” or “I” would actually be a figment of a causally created pure imagination.

Well, there are two different perspectives that need to be understood: one is with the "I" and the other is without it. If there's an "I" then there is choice, but if there's no "I" there's no choice. Understanding the lack of free will is a stepping stone to understanding the lack of an "I".

Since it would then stand to reason that it is NOT “you” or “ME” that actually reasons. And hence, it must be pure ‘causality’ that reasons.

Yes, although if there's an "I" then there's reasoning.

OR are you saying that it ‘appears’ that there is a ‘reasoning’ happening, but there is no real choice in that happening?

Yes, but if reasoning appears then it really is happening because the appearance of it is all that's necessary for it to happen. Any postulating of what caused it has no bearing on the content of it.

Hence, it would stand to reason that individually reasoned opposing conclusions are really an “appearance” too as seen against one another, since that too is all just ‘causality’.

Yes, and they are just as real as reasoning.

So why should I give a damn to actually care about ANY opposing views at all? Be it wise or an un-wise view. Because if I do care either way, it wouldn’t be a choice at all, since the fact of causally created appearances actually renders individual reasoning redundant.

You should care because caring is one of the causes of your actions and therefore their results.

What real meaning or value do your views hold as opposed to mine then? It would then stand to reason that reasoning is merely an ‘appearance’ with no real comparative reality at all, because either way it is merely a caused phenomena, and that nothing is really experiencing that in a meaningful way at all, actually.

Reasoning is an appearance, but it's also real because appearances are real.

Simply saying that it does hold comparative meaning and hence value, irrelevant of it being causally created appearances from either side, makes causality a joke, really.

Causality IS a joke when you follow its conclusions to the very end.

IF, “choice” is impossible from a logical point of view, (which is of course based in and of A=A), then you had no choice in saying, “MY choice was compelled by causes”, so there is no logical reason for me to take “YOU” or your conclusion seriously, since not only does that remove ‘choice’ but even ‘you’ from the equation, thereby violating the fact on which logic itself is based on, that is A=A. So what you are essentially saying is that A=A is an illusion in fact.

It doesn't remove "choice" and "me" from the CONTEXT of the communication, because obviously you are receiving the communication, but it does remove it from the CONTENT of the communication because that is what I am communicating. Truth encompasses all things, but it doesn't depend on them at all.

If “I” am merely an arbitrary ‘appearance’, I might as well lie down and die.

I don't know what you mean by "arbitrary" here, but the "I" is an appearance and dying is an appearance, too.

It is an individual’s reasoning that makes one act the way he does, however caused an individual’s reasoning may be. Those that kill themselves do it for some reason, which if is merely an ‘appearance’, then I can say that ‘appearances’ can KILL, which of course is an ‘appearance’ too, rendering either opposing choice meaningless, that is living or dieing.

What is the difference between appearance and meaning?

If there is no difference between living or dieing, then there is no meaning in either,

But there is a difference, it's just not a difference in their both being appearances.

and without meaning, nothing exists, not even totality.

Right.

If one removes a real meaning of the “I”, nothing is relevant, meaningfully. And meaning making is not an illusion of an illusory “I”, but a real fact, because what is it that is not reality, or totality so the speak; full of meaning by the fact that “I” exist in and of totality that is meaningful by the mere fact that “I” can experience meaning.

Nevertheless, these are all appearances and they have no reality beyond their appearing to the "I". Only truth has that.

Matt,

S: What about the “I”? Is that too impossible from a 'logical point of view'?

M: Ultimately, yeah.

Well… thanks, but that doesn't seem logical to me, because however Ultimately I go, I cannot logically deny consciousness, which is none other than “I”.

I will ponder on that though; thanks again.

Matt Gregory wrote:

This summary may be objected to because I may not have interpreted him correctly.

I don't know, but it wouldn't surprise me if Kant believed in free will.

Well, he did and he didn't [at least what I know of him at this point]. He based free will more on his theories of the categorical imperative...the way I interpret it to mean is that we know what is right and even though it appears that we have a choice it is imperative that we do what is right. So, in essence we really don't have free will. I think we are going to be getting into this issue a lot more after Spring Break, so I'll be back with more questions if you are up for it.

I identify a lot with him because it seems he understands the logic [not that I do that much, but I'm beginning to see the sense it makes] but just cannot let go of the metaphysics altogether, and I don't think he ever did, just as I am not sure I ever will.

BTW, I fared pretty decently on the test, so thanks for the help [you too, Leyla]! The questions related to a priori and a posteriori seemed relatively easy and clear.

BTW, I fared pretty decently on the test, so thanks for the help [you too, Leyla]! The questions related to a priori and a posteriori seemed relatively easy and clear.

Academia's a breeze, and altogether too boring and insignificant for a thinker who would do well to wake up the lecturer.

I accept your thanks, though, in the spirit of the journey from which I hope you deliver it.

Let's put forth the proposition that Kant believed a God existed despite his theory of solipsism. He then discovered a poem that went thus:

There was a young man who said "God,
I find it exceedingly odd,
that this tree I should see,
will continue to be,
when there's noone about in the quad."

"Dear sir, your astonishment's odd,
for I'm always about in the quad;
and that's why the tree,
continues to be,"
signed, Yours faithfully, God.

How would he incorporate this supposition into his concepts of both phenomena and noumena?

I feel even the most gifted spider in the world couldn't spin this web.

Then maybe you could.