GENIUS FORUMS

Expectantly Ironic,

DQ: If an empiricist can validate his philosophy of empiricism by empirical means, then that would be fair enough. But in the example you gave, the attempt was made to validate empiricism by non-empirical means - namely, via the use of a logical truth deemed to be applicable to all. That is, by Rationalist argument.

EI: I really don't think any empiricists deny reason as a tool altogether. In fact, I'd suggest that there's ample empirical evidence to demonstrate a great deal of effectiveness on the part of reason. What the empiricists rejected was the idea that one could formulate a philosophical system on reason alone.

If you literally mean "reason alone" - as in no mind, no senses, no world, nothing at all, apart from reason - then I would agree with you.

However, if you simply mean that it is impossible to use pure logic to reach timeless truths and to validate them, then you and I would both disagree with that. For example, your belief in empiricism - which, as I have demonstrated, is ultimately supported by Rationalist argument - exposes your disagreement.

I assume you have abandoned the idea that the philosophy of empiricism can be established by empirical means? I mean, you didn't take up the challenge of demonstrating that it can be.

To the empiricist there was no Platonic realm that you could reach into using pure reason to wrangle yourself free some absolute truths.

Except the one which you just plucked that absolute truth out of, presumably.

Let's see now, that makes two absolute truths that empiricists have plucked from the Platonic ether - (1) all knowledge can only be gained through empirical experience, and (2) it is impossible to use pure reason to reach absolute truths. Not bad for a group who deny it can never be done.

And I'm sure there are others as well. For example:

- Everything is uncertain

- The scientific method is the only valid means of acquiring knowledge.

- A theory is only valid if it is falsifiable by empirical means.

And so on. There is probably no end to the number of absolute truths which empiricists pretend they are not plucking from the Platonic ether.

They more-or-less introduced the notion that if you couldn't imagine certain abstract concepts as representing actual imaginable things in the sensible world, then it was to be dismissed off-hand as being about nothing; for how could it be about anything real when all thoughts have an essential foundation in our senses, rather then a Cartesian sort-of mind filled with all possible knowledge?

This is the viewpoint of a limited mindset which is stuck in the realm of forms and cannot perceive anything beyond it.

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ExpectantlyIronic wrote:

He pointed out that all knowledge has an a priori component.

You're right, of course. Looks like I need to brush up on my Kant a bit. :)

That's what I'm doing right now. In fact, that's probably the only reason I knew that offhand :-)

It's just has to be consistent.

Solipsism tends to be quite consistent, given your willing to place quite a bit into the category of unknowable. In fact, quite a lot of philosophical systems seem quite consistent with themselves to me. I tend to think that truth should require some sort of correspondence with reality, and thus could really be as inconsistent as said reality is (if it is).

Well, consistency is the only correspondence to reality there can be. Philosophical systems can't really be 100% consistent because they are finite, a bunch of words. Only an individual mind has the possibility of being 100% consistent.

Well, fuck. That was the most apathetically self-indulgent, feeble load of shit I've read in quite a while, James.

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Matt & Trevor:

I'm done with the resident thrill-seeking nihilist, for now. Thanks for your patience. I shall reply shortly.

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David,

I assume you have abandoned the idea that the philosophy of empiricism can be established by empirical means? I mean, you didn't take up the challenge of demonstrating that it can be.

This strikes me as a straw man. I'm pretty sure I said that empiricism couldn't be established by completely empirical means. I imagine that you must be using a different definition of "empiricism" then I am. The term is rather vague after all.

Except the one which you just plucked that absolute truth out of, presumably.

Another straw man. I didn't claim it as an absolute truth. In fact, I don't find the term "absolute truth" to be particularly meaningful in most cases. Even if something I happened to claim was an "absolute truth", I'm not sure how could know as much.

This is the viewpoint of a limited mindset which is stuck in the realm of forms and cannot perceive anything beyond it.

And what would I gain from abandoning said "realm of forms"?

Expectantly Ironic wrote:

DQ: I assume you have abandoned the idea that the philosophy of empiricism can be established by empirical means? I mean, you didn't take up the challenge of demonstrating that it can be.

EI: This strikes me as a straw man. I'm pretty sure I said that empiricism couldn't be established by completely empirical means.

You said earlier in this thread:

"I think that empiricists can validate their philosophy within the framework set-up by their philosophy."

I imagine that you must be using a different definition of "empiricism" then I am. The term is rather vague after all.

It is the belief that meaningful knowledge can only validly be gained via empirical observation and testing.

DQ: Except the one which you just plucked that absolute truth out of, presumably.

EI: Another straw man. I didn't claim it as an absolute truth. In fact, I don't find the term "absolute truth" to be particularly meaningful in most cases. Even if something I happened to claim was an "absolute truth", I'm not sure how could know as much.

Something is absolutely true if it is true in all times and places, in all possible worlds, for all conscious beings - that is to say, beyond all possibility of being falsified, no matter what the circumstances.

You have put forward a number of viewpoints on this thread which attempt to fall into this category - for example, the view that "all knowledge can only be gained through empirical experience". You make it plain that this is something which you believe can never be falsified under any circumstances. In other words, whether you deny it or not, you think it is absolutely true.

DQ: This is the viewpoint of a limited mindset which is stuck in the realm of forms and cannot perceive anything beyond it.

EI: And what would I gain from abandoning said "realm of forms"?

The opportunity to enter into wisdom.

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David,

It is the belief that meaningful knowledge can only validly be gained via empirical observation and testing.

That's not what I meant by the term "empiricism". Nor is it the "empiricism" advocated by the likes of Locke, Berkeley, or Hume. Thus, you've been attacking a straw man wittingly or otherwise. I find it incredibly odd that despite my attempts to explicitly state that empiricists do not reject the utility of reason, that you continue to read into my words the opposite.

Something is absolutely true if it is true in all times and places, in all possible worlds, for all conscious beings - that is to say, beyond all possibility of being falsified, no matter what the circumstances.

How could I possibly know if something met that criteria? I only know what seems likely to me. I could suggest that I find it likely that something might fit such criteria, but I'd readily admit that I couldn't be absolutely certain of it.

You have put forward a number of viewpoints on this thread which attempt to fall into this category - for example, the view that "all knowledge can only be gained through empirical experience".

I've never stated that "all knowledge can only be gained through empirical experience". Thus, I hardly claimed it to be an absolute truth.

The opportunity to enter into wisdom.

What's wisdom?

Expectantly Ironic,

DQ: [Empiricism] is the belief that meaningful knowledge can only validly be gained via empirical observation and testing.

EI: That's not what I meant by the term "empiricism". Nor is it the "empiricism" advocated by the likes of Locke, Berkeley, or Hume. Thus, you've been attacking a straw man wittingly or otherwise.

According to Wikipedia, empiricism is:

In philosophy generally, empiricism is a theory of knowledge emphasizing the role of experience in the formation of ideas, while discounting the notion of innate ideas.

In the philosophy of science, empiricism is a theory of knowledge which emphasizes those aspects of scientific knowledge that are closely related to experience, especially as formed through deliberate experimental arrangements. It is a fundamental requirement of scientific method that all hypotheses and theories must be tested against observations of the natural world, rather than resting solely on a priori reasoning, intuition, or revelation. Hence, science is considered to be methodologically empirical in nature.

In other words, empiricism emphasizes that meaningful knowledge can only validly be gained via empirical observation and testing, and minimizes or discards the idea that such knowledge can be gained via the use of pure reason without reference to empirical realities.

I find it incredibly odd that despite my attempts to explicitly state that empiricists do not reject the utility of reason, that you continue to read into my words the opposite.

If you reject the idea that pure reason can uncover meaningful knowledge about the world, then you are either an empiricist or a religious fundamentalist.

Again, by "pure reason" I mean reasoning which does not turn to the empirical realm for support.

DQ: Something is absolutely true if it is true in all times and places, in all possible worlds, for all conscious beings - that is to say, beyond all possibility of being falsified, no matter what the circumstances.

EI: How could I possibly know if something met that criteria?

By thinking about it. By not hiding away in the realm of vagueness out of fear of reaching a firm conclusion about anything. By having trust in your reasoning powers and following them fearlessly to the very end.

I only know what seems likely to me. I could suggest that I find it likely that something might fit such criteria, but I'd readily admit that I couldn't be absolutely certain of it.

What about the conclusion that you are uncertain of everything? Are you certain of that?

DQ: The opportunity to enter into wisdom.

EI: What's wisdom?

Consciousness of the nature of Reality.

One can only make a bid for this wisdom when one comprehends the formlessness of Reality and ceases searching for truth in forms.

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David,

Lets look at the charge you originally leveled against empiricism:

This is why empiricism can never be anything more than a joke philosophy. It cannot establish the validity of itself without also contradicting itself.

To this I replied, more-or-less, that empiricism could be established through its own means. After that, we went off on a tangent, but I wish to bring this discussion back into focus. Although, admittedly, the empiricist/rationalist dichotomy is incredibly crude and dated, it is the matter at hand, and I will work with it in spite of flaws found in it by more modern writers.

I think it's beneficial to look at how Hume defended his own sort of empiricist epistemology. Firstly, he more-or-less reiterated objections against the rationalist approach. I'll not go into the entire argument, but I find it convincing, and the empiricist approach largely depends upon the acceptance of the refutation to hold up. So, thinks Hume, if one cannot find within his head the fundamental axioms necessary for understanding, then surely he would have no other place to look besides the world. Not even the rationalists denied the utility of induction as applied within the natural sciences, or the sheer necessity of using it to survive from day to day. Thus, it seems, that even if we raise our skeptical torches to such things, we cannot ever truly deny them.

We can see that Hume made no attempt to suggest that his epistemology withstood rational skepticism, but rather, that such skepticism was simply unsustainable. We can say clearly that there is no reason to trust the sensible world, but we will nevertheless find ourselves doing just that should we do anything at all. On these grounds Hume suggests it to be reasonable to accept the empiricist epistemology.

What about the conclusion that you are uncertain of everything? Are you certain of that?

This all depends upon how we use the term "certainty". I said that I hold nothing as "absolutely certain" which a peculiar thing that hardly accords with how the term "certainty" is understood in common speech. I might say that I'm certain that I have an apple on the table, which only indicates that I'm supremely confident in such things. Nevertheless, this "absolute certainty" or "philosophical certainty" seems to be used by those who claim it to suggest that something is utterly beyond philosophical skepticism. Thus, rather then representing simple supreme confidence directly about a given proposition, one who claims to certainty (in the philosophical sense) seems to suggest that they are supremely confident that something is beyond philosophical skepticism.

There is, perhaps, one thing that I would claim to be philosophically certain about, but it is fleeting and personal. It seems to me that I really can't formulate a doubt strong enough to convince me, even momentarily, that what I happen to be perceiving in any given moment isn't actually there. It quite clearly is. Nevertheless, that seems to be the full extant to which I can claim certainty, and it isn't communicable in such a way that you too can be made to understand with certainty that when I am seeing the color red, that I am seeing the color red. Keep in mind here, I'm merely supremely confident that such a thing is beyond philosophical skepticism. There could be some argument to cast doubt on such things that I'm unaware of.

Consciousness of the nature of Reality.

Okay. I'm not interested in that. I'm only concerned with reality.

I am doing everything to ensure a long, healthy and stress-free life. I eat healthy, take my vitamins, go to a gym regularly, watch my weight, do not smoke, drink only occasionally, have never tried recreational drugs, avoid everything that might stress me out (including men), go to the only once a year, and on and on. Does this mean I am wise?

Your present life is the only one you will have, so it is best to try and ensure one nurtures it. If you have more happiness and excitement in your life, then you are in a way wiser than me, as you know how to "live-long".

By your definition, it means that I'm at least wiser than you. Nyak, nyak, nyak.

Doing comparisons between things is just a matter of how far one is prepared to empirically investigate causes and effects. Do it to the infinite degree and any comparision would be foolish, but that's reality for ya.

I'd prefer to say you are acting wiser than me in some ways, but your wisdom about the nature of reality is nothing to boast about. There is a form satisfaction related to the "idea of being alive" that only wisdoms of reality can bring.

Lets imagine Reincarnation and Karma were real.

For all my sins I'd imagine that I would not return as a significantly lesser being - perhaps just one or two more rounds as self-induced suffering - but for you then I'd have have doubts. There is much you haven't "realised".

I'll probably be alive long after you're gone, which means your alleged wisdom got you nowhere. As you yourself have admitted, my wisdom is more practical than yours.

I'm living according to my goals. Are you?

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Jamesh: Your present life is the only one you will have, so it is best to try and ensure one nurtures it.

Shahrazad: I'll probably be alive long after you're gone, which means your alleged wisdom got you nowhere.

Assertion vs. assertion, neither supportable.

Expectantly Ironic wrote:

DQ: This is why empiricism can never be anything more than a joke philosophy. It cannot establish the validity of itself without also contradicting itself.

EI: To this I replied, more-or-less, that empiricism could be established through its own means. After that, we went off on a tangent, but I wish to bring this discussion back into focus. Although, admittedly, the empiricist/rationalist dichotomy is incredibly crude and dated, it is the matter at hand, and I will work with it in spite of flaws found in it by more modern writers.

I think it's beneficial to look at how Hume defended his own sort of empiricist epistemology. Firstly, he more-or-less reiterated objections against the rationalist approach. I'll not go into the entire argument, but I find it convincing, and the empiricist approach largely depends upon the acceptance of the refutation to hold up. So, thinks Hume, if one cannot find within his head the fundamental axioms necessary for understanding, then surely he would have no other place to look besides the world. Not even the rationalists denied the utility of induction as applied within the natural sciences, or the sheer necessity of using it to survive from day to day. Thus, it seems, that even if we raise our skeptical torches to such things, we cannot ever truly deny them.

We can see that Hume made no attempt to suggest that his epistemology withstood rational skepticism, but rather, that such skepticism was simply unsustainable. We can say clearly that there is no reason to trust the sensible world, but we will nevertheless find ourselves doing just that should we do anything at all. On these grounds Hume suggests it to be reasonable to accept the empiricist epistemology.

As far as scientific theorizing and our own practical affairs are concerned, Hume is correct. Empirical method and testing plays a critical role in these things. No one here is denying that.

But this is vastly different to asserting, as some sort of inviolate truth, that empirical observation and testing is the only valid method of acquiring meaningful knowledge. This is a far more extreme stance to take, and, as I've demonstrated, one that cannot be supported without making use of Rationalist argument and contradicting itself.

DQ: What about the conclusion that you are uncertain of everything? Are you certain of that?

EI: This all depends upon how we use the term "certainty".
I said that I hold nothing as "absolutely certain" which a peculiar thing that hardly accords with how the term "certainty" is understood in common speech. I might say that I'm certain that I have an apple on the table, which only indicates that I'm supremely confident in such things. Nevertheless, this "absolute certainty" or "philosophical certainty" seems to be used by those who claim it to suggest that something is utterly beyond philosophical skepticism. Thus, rather then representing simple supreme confidence directly about a given proposition, one who claims to certainty (in the philosophical sense) seems to suggest that they are supremely confident that something is beyond philosophical skepticism.

There is, perhaps, one thing that I would claim to be philosophically certain about, but it is fleeting and personal. It seems to me that I really can't formulate a doubt strong enough to convince me, even momentarily, that what I happen to be perceiving in any given moment isn't actually there. It quite clearly is. Nevertheless, that seems to be the full extant to which I can claim certainty, and it isn't communicable in such a way that you too can be made to understand with certainty that when I am seeing the color red, that I am seeing the color red.

Are you saying, then, that apart from this particular piece of knowledge - namely, that what one experiences in a given moment is in fact what one experiences in that moment - you are uncertain of everything else? And if so, how certain or uncertain would you say you are about this?

In other words, do you claim to be in a permanent state of doubt over your uncertainty with respect to everything, that piece of knowledge above excluded? Is it turtles all the way down? Or do you actually draw a line and say, "I am indeed uncertain about everything?" Remember that you do like to present this uncertainty as some sort of unshakable uncertainty when you interact with people on these forums.

Keep in mind here, I'm merely supremely confident that such a thing is beyond philosophical skepticism. There could be some argument to cast doubt on such things that I'm unaware of.

Well, in fact, no such argument can exist. This is because in order to even begin to formulate an argument against the proposition that what one experiences in a given moment is in fact what one experiences in that moment, one would have to already acknowledge that the experience in question has taken place.

For example, let's say a person perceives what appears to be an apple in a given moment. For him to formulate an argument that he may not have had this experience, he would first have to acknowledge that the experience did in fact occur. Otherwise, he would have nothing to argue against. So the attempt to formulate such an argument is doomed from the very start.

Thus, we can be absolutely sure, beyond all possible doubt, that what we experience in a given moment is in fact what we experience in that moment.

So here is a case of pure logic reaching an absolute truth that cannot be doubted. This alone is enough to blow the philosophy of empiricism out of the water.

EI: What's wisdom?

DQ: Consciousness of the nature of Reality.

EI: Okay. I'm not interested in that. I'm only concerned with reality.

The reality I am talking about is the same one that's right before your eyes. Which reality are you talking about?

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David,

But this is vastly different to asserting, as some sort of inviolate truth, that empirical observation and testing is the only valid method of acquiring meaningful knowledge. This is a far more extreme stance to take, and, as I've demonstrated, one that cannot be supported without making use of Rationalist argument and contradicting itself.

Yes. You sure did an awesome job at defeating your caricature of an epistemology.

In other words, do you claim to be in a permanent state of doubt over your uncertainty with respect to everything, that piece of knowledge above excluded? Is it turtles all the way down? Or do you actually draw a line and say, "I am indeed uncertain about everything?"

How could I say that I'm uncertain about everything, because wouldn't I then have made a claim with certainty? If only reality were as simple as the Aristotelean logic games we like to frame it in. I'm not committed to uncertainty or certainty or any other such abstracts. When I make use of them, they are used as tools used for the purpose of inquiry, rather then as masters that I twist my thoughts to serve.

I would be dishonest to say that my mind tags any thought as certain or uncertain, and I can only claim a thought, proposition, or theory to be either if I momentarily and arbitrarily set standards for how it is to qualify for either set. I could, of course, formulate different sorts of "certainty" and create a contrived framework where my philosophical perspectives fit harmoniously with them, defiant to any who might attempt to show faulty logic in my imaginary castle; but seriously, who has the patience for such nonsense?

Remember that you do like to present this uncertainty as some sort of unshakable uncertainty when you interact with people on these forums.

I believe it was Adam Smith who said "my mind changes when the facts change." That describes my approach to things perfectly. I tend to be a skeptic by nature, which is why philosophy attracts me. If that nature is reflected in my words, then that is to be expected.

For example, let's say a person perceives what appears to be an apple in a given moment. For him to formulate an argument that he may not have had this experience, he would first have to acknowledge that the experience did in fact occur. Otherwise, he would have nothing to argue against. So the attempt to formulate such an argument is doomed from the very start.

This argument is flawed. First off, it isn't after the fact that I'm certain I had an experience, and in fact, would say that I'm quite uncertain that my memory of any given experience is accurate. If one wants to formulate a counter-argument against a claim to a remembered experience, they need only attack memory itself. Regardless, your defense depends upon an assumption on the form that a counterargument to such things might take. If one were to be formulated, I imagine that it would be rooted in how the brain functions, as any argument I've seen to come close to casting doubt on such things was in such a form.

The reality I am talking about is the same one that's right before your eyes. Which reality are you talking about?

Insofar as your philosophy is clearly grounded in the sensible, it seems obvious to the point of triviality. We've discussed such things though, and I'm really not seeing either of us changing our minds any time soon.

Jamesh: Your present life is the only one you will have, so it is best to try and ensure one nurtures it.

Carl:
Assertion vs. assertion, neither supportable.

It is not an assertion, but an absolute truth. Stop being a god believer and get real. Once your mind has physically disintegrated, what will be left of you? Some non-causally attached spirit thing? Lol.

Yeah, it's just wishful thinking. It makes no sense at all.

Expectantly Ironic wrote:

DQ: But this is vastly different to asserting, as some sort of inviolate truth, that empirical observation and testing is the only valid method of acquiring meaningful knowledge. This is a far more extreme stance to take, and, as I've demonstrated, one that cannot be supported without making use of Rationalist argument and contradicting itself.

EI: Yes. You sure did an awesome job at defeating your caricature of an epistemology.

You're being evasive. As with any philosophy, the philosophy of empiricism can either be established by Rationalist argument, which mean pure logic alone, or by empirical means, which involves empirical observation and testing.

If the philosophy of empiricism cannot be established by Rationalist argument - which, I think, is the point you are making, although because of your evasiveness it is hard to be sure - then it means it can only be established by empirical means.

If that is what you think, then please provide a demonstration of how empirical methodology can establish the philosophy of empiricism.

I tend to be a skeptic by nature, which is why philosophy attracts me.

Academic philosophy, sure. Academic philosophy has always been a welcome refuge for those who mistake their own intellectual timidity for skepticism.

I have to say, though, that I haven't noticed much skepticism on your part about the nature of academic philosophy itself. Your BS meter tends to go very quiet where that is concerned.

DQ: For example, let's say a person perceives what appears to be an apple in a given moment. For him to formulate an argument that he may not have had this experience, he would first have to acknowledge that the experience did in fact occur. Otherwise, he would have nothing to argue against. So the attempt to formulate such an argument is doomed from the very start.

EI: This argument is flawed. First off, it isn't after the fact that I'm certain I had an experience, and in fact, would say that I'm quite uncertain that my memory of any given experience is accurate. If one wants to formulate a counter-argument against a claim to a remembered experience, they need only attack memory itself. Regardless, your defense depends upon an assumption on the form that a counterargument to such things might take. If one were to be formulated, I imagine that it would be rooted in how the brain functions, as any argument I've seen to come close to casting doubt on such things was in such a form.

The point I am making is more fundamental that brain functioning or memory. If, in any given moment, you want to question whatever you happen to experience in that moment, the very question itself automatically presupposes the existence of that experience. Without the actual experience occurring to begin with, there would be nothing to question.

If we want to break it down into a step-by-step process, it goes something like this:

(1) In a given moment, an experience of "A" occurs.

(2) In the next moment, one begins to question this experience of "A", thereby acknowledging that "A" occurred.

(3) One tries to delve into scientific theory about the brain or memory in order to cast doubt on the the reality of "A", thereby still acknowledging that "A" occurred.

And so it goes on. If "A" didn't actually occur, there would be no basis upon which to launch an investigation. The very existence of the investigation presupposes the occurrence of "A".

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David,

You're being evasive.

Yeah, I am. Firstly, I'm not an empiricist (per se), so I'm not overly exciting about the opportunity to convince you that the epistemology is valid. This doesn't mean that I concede my point that empiricism can be proven if its fundamental axioms are accepted, I just realize that I'm not going to convince someone of it during the course of a single thread.

As with any philosophy, the philosophy of empiricism can either be established by Rationalist argument, which mean pure logic alone, or by empirical means, which involves empirical observation and testing.

I'd contend that a philosophy can also be established through Locke's conception of reason: whereas "common sense" is explicitly accepted, rather then unconsciously accepted as it is so often in Aristotelean logic.

Academic philosophy, sure. Academic philosophy has always been a welcome refuge for those who mistake their own intellectual timidity for skepticism.

I believe it was the sophists who were known for employing emotive rhetoric in the days of Plato. How ironic.

I have to say, though, that I haven't noticed much skepticism on your part about the nature of academic philosophy itself. Your BS meter tends to go very quiet where that is concerned.

Academic philosophy includes opinions as diverse as those of Hegel and Russell. Neither of whom are in any condition to post at these forums.

And so it goes on. If "A" didn't actually occur, there would be no basis upon which to launch an investigation. The very existence of the investigation presupposes the occurrence of "A".

How is it that this argument can't be applied to reach absurd conclusions? Would you consider it fair to suggest that the Christian God must exist, due to the fact that any attempt to formulate a counter-argument to his existence presupposes it?

Expectantly Ironic wrote:

Firstly, I'm not an empiricist (per se), so I'm not overly exciting about the opportunity to convince you that the epistemology is valid.

That is news to me. In what way do you deviate from the philosophy of empiricism?

This doesn't mean that I concede my point that empiricism can be proven if its fundamental axioms are accepted, I just realize that I'm not going to convince someone of it during the course of a single thread.

Just the very existence of these fundamental axioms is enough to show that empiricism - i.e. the belief that meaningful knowledge can only be acquired by empirical methodology - is self-contradictory in nature.

A "fundamental axiom" is non-empirical by nature. If the philosophy of empiricism rests on fundamental axioms, then it is tantamount to admitting that it too is a meaningless system of knowledge.

DQ: Academic philosophy has always been a welcome refuge for those who mistake their own intellectual timidity for skepticism.

EI: I believe it was the sophists who were known for employing emotive rhetoric in the days of Plato. How ironic.

I was making a sound observation. There is definitely something in you which shies way from grabbing Nature by the throat and shaking its secrets from her. Naturally, you like to paint this as a strong position of "skepticism". But I see it as an unwillingness to let go of the curtails of celebrity thinkers and strike out on your own. Or more specifically, to trust in your own mind and form a direct relationship with Nature.

There is more to philosophy than simply reading women's magazines and gossiping about the behaviour of celebrities.

DQ: I have to say, though, that I haven't noticed much skepticism on your part about the nature of academic philosophy itself. Your BS meter tends to go very quiet where that is concerned.

EI: Academic philosophy includes opinions as diverse as those of Hegel and Russell. Neither of whom are in any condition to post at these forums.

I'm talking about academic philosophy as a whole. It is pretty evident that you haven't yet challenged the premises and methods of academia itself.

Academia is very similar to theology in many ways. There have been plenty of diverse thinkers in theology as well - e.g. Aquinus, Pascal, Merton, Pope John Paul II, and so on. But it doesn't matter how diverse these thinkers are, or how clever their arguments might be, the whole thing is still load a bunkum because of the irrationality of the Christian God concept.

DQ: As with any philosophy, the philosophy of empiricism can either be established by Rationalist argument, which mean pure logic alone, or by empirical means, which involves empirical observation and testing.

EI: I'd contend that a philosophy can also be established through Locke's conception of reason: whereas "common sense" is explicitly accepted, rather then unconsciously accepted as it is so often in Aristotelean logic.

What is "common sense" exactly? And why should anyone take it seriously?

DQ: And so it goes on. If "A" didn't actually occur, there would be no basis upon which to launch an investigation. The very existence of the investigation presupposes the occurrence of "A".

EI: How is it that this argument can't be applied to reach absurd conclusions? Would you consider it fair to suggest that the Christian God must exist, due to the fact that any attempt to formulate a counter-argument to his existence presupposes it?

Not at all. The two arguments are very different from one another, and that is because the former operates at a more fundamental level than the latter.

To illustrate the difference, let us suppose that a person experiences what he thinks is the Christian God. He might perceive that God is appearing before him and speaking to him. Now if he is skeptical enough, he could challenge this perception and arrive at the conclusion that he isn't really experiencing God at all, but rather that he is suffering from an hallucination.

It should be noted that this is a perfectly valid thing to do. At no time during the act of challenging his perception in this way does he enter into logical contradiction. On the other hand, if he were to challenge the fact that he is even having the experience at all, even as an hallucination, then he would be entering into contradiction. Worse than that, he would be committing an act of violence against his own mind.

In other words, the fact of experience in each moment is beyond the duality of real/hallucination, whereas the Christan God isn't. The experience of the Christian God can be challenged on the basis that it might be an hallucination. But the experience itself, as an appearance, can't be.

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Matt:

I am going to leave the questions/approach directed at me in your last post for the moment; I hope you'll forgive me this apparent digression. Feel free to point me to any response you may have already offered (rather than rewrite it) that addressed the following:

Kant: For example, the proposition, "Every change has a cause," is a proposition á priori, but impure, because change is a conception which can only be derived from experience.

Matt: How can it be proved that the concept of change can only be derived from experience? If that's true then it's not certain that reality always changes.

When could experience become the derived conception of change and, consequently, when would the derived conception of change become cause and effect/causality?

For instance, is moving to a whole new country experiencing change or experiencing cause and effect?

David,

That is news to me. In what way do you deviate from the philosophy of empiricism?

I see no particular reason to find a way to represent what constitutes knowledge in a system of any sort, or rather, I feel that any such system would rest upon ultimately arbitrary grounds. To say that knowledge can come only from, and be directed only towards, experience is fair enough; but even such a view runs into complications, and mathematics seems to be the Achilles heel of empiricism in particular. One can, of course, suggest that pure math doesn't represent anything real, but such seems to defy common sense. There is a way, I think, of resolving this issue, but the complexity and controversy of the matter seems to demonstrate a flaw in positing laws within philosophy, rather then simply working to facilitate understanding.

What is "common sense" exactly? And why should anyone take it seriously?

We could say that common sense constitutes that inductive knowledge which we take to be a given despite having no way of proving it. For instance, to suggest that the moon remains in the sky when nobody is looking, though such a thing cannot be deductively proven, would be to state common sense. This doesn't mean that one who accepts such a notion rules out the possibility that the moon might only exist as an idea within one's head, and that the sensations which lead to the experience of the moon might have no source isomorphic to that which we experience as the moon, but to hold strongly to such a view would seem to require more faith then the opposite. As was stated by Locke, we form beliefs largely by weighing probability, rather then by trying to proceed in a syllogistic manner to deduce things from what we already know.

I'm talking about academic philosophy as a whole. It is pretty evident that you haven't yet challenged the premises and methods of academia itself.

The only "method" that I see being used by all philosophers in academia is that of the dialectic: in which philosophy proceeds forward by way of discussion. Nevertheless, to abandon the dialectic is to simply ignore what others have to say, and that strikes me as nothing beyond foolish. Agree or disagree with a man, you gain only time by ignoring him.

Not at all. The two arguments are very different from one another, and that is because the former operates at a more fundamental level than the latter.

Allow me to approach this from a different angle. Lets say that you use argument P to demonstrate that no argument can be formed against some notion. It would seem that one would then have to formulate another argument to demonstrate argument P infallible: argument Q. Nevertheless, argument Q must then, in turn, be demonstrated infallible, and so on and so forth ad infinitum. Unless one takes there to be certain unquestionable axioms (something which, I believe, you claim not to do) that individual can prove nothing by way of deduction. Now, you can retort that one doesn't need axioms if their argument is circular, but I'm not given to accepting circular arguments.

Leyla,

I am going to leave the questions/approach directed at me in your last post for the moment; I hope you'll forgive me this apparent digression. Feel free to point me to any response you may have already offered (rather than rewrite it) that addressed the following:

It's cool, but I'm not really sure what motivates you to ask this, so I'm not sure how to reply. I'm just going to assume you're asking about Kant's views, and I'll just do my best to tell you what I think he means.

Kant: For example, the proposition, "Every change has a cause," is a proposition á priori, but impure, because change is a conception which can only be derived from experience.

Matt: How can it be proved that the concept of change can only be derived from experience? If that's true then it's not certain that reality always changes.

When could experience become the derived conception of change

I guess the first time someone notices the contrast between something that changes and something that is staying static is when change would be derived from experience.

and, consequently, when would the derived conception of change become cause and effect/causality?

I guess when an object is seen to be inducing the change in a changing object is when causality could be derived from change.

For instance, is moving to a whole new country experiencing change or experiencing cause and effect?

I guess it would be experiencing change. Hume thought cause and effect couldn't be experienced, and I think Kant views it the same way (haven't seen any evidence to the contrary).

Matt:

It's cool, but I'm not really sure what motivates you to ask this, so I'm not sure how to reply.

Did you ask the initial question "how can it be proved that the concept of change can only be derived from experience" because you wanted to know, or because you already knew?

Well, I have an inkling of an answer, but I posted that because I wanted to know.

You were posting a method of finding the answer then? I thought of that, but that method doesn't ring a bell for me. The answer lies in the definition of change. I mean, you can define your experience of change to be "change" or something like Elizabeth was saying, or try to figure out its position in the sequence of psychological events, but neither of these go very far in proving its necessity or universality.

Matt wrote:

I mean, you can define your experience of change to be "change" or something like Elizabeth was saying, or try to figure out its position in the sequence of psychological events, but neither of these go very far in proving its necessity or universality.

Let me get this straight: you think that the idea “change is a concept that can only be derived from experience” is the type of necessity Kant is calling a priori knowledge rather than a posteriori knowledge?

In another thread, you wrote:

For example, the argument that you and David Quinn were talking about in the other thread, that experiences are happening and can't be denied. This logic underpins the reasoning of every conscious being whether they realize it or not, because every conscious being has experiences, otherwise they wouldn't be conscious.

What is the difference between what you are saying here and the above Kantian quote?

When I read the quote:

For example, the proposition, "Every change has a cause," is a proposition á priori, but impure, because change is a conception which can only be derived from experience.

I understand that it is, in fact, the a posteriori element of change which makes the proposition impure a priori; i.e. the knowledge “change” is a posteriori, and the knowledge “cause” is a priori. Hence, the statement as a whole is impure a priori.

What say you?

[Edited to include quote from Matt's last post in this thread]