GENIUS FORUMS

Leyla Shen wrote:Matt wrote:

I mean, you can define your experience of change to be "change" or something like Elizabeth was saying, or try to figure out its position in the sequence of psychological events, but neither of these go very far in proving its necessity or universality.

Let me get this straight: you think that the idea “change is a concept that can only be derived from experience” is the type of necessity Kant is calling a priori knowledge rather than a posteriori knowledge?

Yeah, Kant implies that it's á posteriori, but all sages (Lao Tzu, Quinn, etc.) imply that it's universal and thus á priori, so I think it's something I need to look into because I realized that I can't think of a proof for change other than the fact that it is experienced.

In another thread, you wrote:

For example, the argument that you and David Quinn were talking about in the other thread, that experiences are happening and can't be denied. This logic underpins the reasoning of every conscious being whether they realize it or not, because every conscious being has experiences, otherwise they wouldn't be conscious.

What is the difference between what you are saying here and the above Kantian quote?

In terms of what? I'm giving a proof for experience and Kant is explaining the á priori nature of the statement "every change has a cause".

When I read the quote:

For example, the proposition, "Every change has a cause," is a proposition á priori, but impure, because change is a conception which can only be derived from experience.

I understand that it is, in fact, the a posteriori element of change which makes the proposition impure a priori; i.e. the knowledge “change” is a posteriori, and the knowledge “cause” is a priori. Hence, the statement as a whole is impure a priori.

What say you?

Yeah, that's what it says. But notice that he is assuming that change exists. He doesn't attempt to figure out why or anything.

Hate to be a pain in the arse but, while you're looking at those other sages would you mind posting the text in question?

Thanks in anticipation...

:)

Matt:

Yeah, Kant implies that it's á posteriori, but all sages (Lao Tzu, Quinn, etc.) imply that it's universal and thus á priori, so I think it's something I need to look into because I realized that I can't think of a proof for change other than the fact that it is experienced.

But isn’t the proof for change precisely that there are experiences, which everyone seems to agree cannot be denied?

The conception “change” is derived from experiences, which makes the conception a posteriori knowledge. That conception itself is no less certain because one’s experiences are, ultimately, uncertain.

That is the extent of the “proof for change”.

What would happen to the idea “experiences” if that were not the case?

Another mental challenge: how could one prove the proposition, “Every change must have a cause”: (a) a posteriori; (b) a priori; or, (c) impure a priori?

Would it be an empirical proof, or otherwise?

[Edit: emphasis and an extra question]

Yeah, that's what it says. But notice that he is assuming that change exists. He doesn't attempt to figure out why or anything.

In fact, there couldn't even be such a thing as empirical uncertainty if it was not certain that reality changes.

Leyla,

In fact, there couldn't even be such a thing as empirical uncertainty if it was not certain that reality changes.

That depends on what one means by reality, doesn’t it?

I don’t think ‘reality’ in such contexts actually makes much sense.

I would say that 'change' itself is necessary for anything to be happening (one cannot deny that), but the faculty of ‘change’ itself is not subject to change into not-change so to speak, since existence cannot not be due to its infinite nature of being, and hence simply IS, and even being or not being doesn’t really apply.

Hence ‘change’ itself is reality if one wants to call it as such, but not some separate “thing” that is subject to change or not in any way. Since change or otherwise cannot be applied to the faculty of ‘change’ itself as that IS existence/reality, so saying that it does or doesn’t would necessarily be a part of it, just like causality.

Without change, there is no existence, and that is impossible in my opinion.

Of course, I know next to nothing about academic philosophy, so you can disregard this if you find it academically illogical to begin with.

Expectantly Ironic wrote:

DQ: Not at all. The two arguments are very different from one another, and that is because the former operates at a more fundamental level than the latter.

EI: Allow me to approach this from a different angle. Lets say that you use argument P to demonstrate that no argument can be formed against some notion. It would seem that one would then have to formulate another argument to demonstrate argument P infallible: argument Q. Nevertheless, argument Q must then, in turn, be demonstrated infallible, and so on and so forth ad infinitum.

This bizarre quoting of academic scripture is irrelevant to the matter at hand. If a particular viewpoint, P, is self-contradictory in nature, then one doesn't need to turn to Q or R or any other argument. It simply collapses of its own accord.

Your other responses are far too vague and devoid of meaning to address.

It truly is a waste of time conversing with you. As soon as anyone looks in your direction, you immediately retreat into increasing vagueness, which makes further discussion impossible. It is ridiculous.

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I would say that 'change' itself is necessary for anything to be happening (one cannot deny that), but the faculty of ‘change’ itself is not subject to change into not-change so to speak, since existence cannot not be due to its infinite nature of being, and hence simply IS, and even being or not being doesn’t really apply.

What, Sapius, is "the faculty of change"? Sounds rather academic to me!

And,

Of course, I know next to nothing about academic philosophy, so you can disregard this if you find it academically illogical to begin with.

That depends on what you mean by knowing "academic philosophy" and what you mean by "academically illogical"!

David,

This bizarre quoting of academic scripture is irrelevant to the matter at hand. If a particular viewpoint, P, is self-contradictory in nature, then one doesn't need to turn to Q or R or any other argument. It simply collapses of its own accord

Is this view that an argument either contradicts itself (and thus is false) or is consistent (and thus is true) axiomatic, or do you have a logical justification for it? If so, do you have a logical justification for the axioms used in that deduction, and so on and so forth ad infinitum?

It truly is a waste of time conversing with you. As soon as anyone looks in your direction, you immediately retreat into increasing vagueness, which makes further discussion impossible. It is ridiculous.

I'll agree that discussion forces rigor. If the matters of philosophy were simple or clear there would be no need to discuss them. Unfortunately, they're not.

Leyla,

What, Sapius, is "the faculty of change"? Sounds rather academic to me!

No other word came to mind then (I got to go and I’m in a hurry); You can replace ‘faculty’ with, system, process… I don't know..

That depends on what you mean by knowing "academic philosophy" and what you mean by "academically illogical"!

I mean things like “á posteriori, á priori”, which I do not generally know much about or indulge in, hence one might consider me a nitwit to begin with.

Leyla Shen wrote:Hate to be a pain in the arse but, while you're looking at those other sages would you mind posting the text in question?

Like in Luke 21:5 when Jesus said, "There is no stone that won't be cast down." Or when Lao Tau said, "The ten thousands things rise and fall while the self watches their return."

Leyla Shen wrote:

Yeah, Kant implies that it's á posteriori, but all sages (Lao Tzu, Quinn, etc.) imply that it's universal and thus á priori, so I think it's something I need to look into because I realized that I can't think of a proof for change other than the fact that it is experienced.

But isn’t the proof for change precisely that there are experiences, which everyone seems to agree cannot be denied?

I don't know. Probably. I'm just not seeing it, I guess.

The conception “change” is derived from experiences, which makes the conception a posteriori knowledge. That conception itself is no less certain because one’s experiences are, ultimately, uncertain.

That is the extent of the “proof for change”.

Eh? Knowledge derived from experience is neither necessary nor universal. For one reason being, like Kant mentioned, that experience tells us that an object is the way it is, but not that it couldn't be otherwise.

If change is a finite object, then the above reasoning applies to it: that I see change doesn't necessarily mean that I must see change. In fact, I see things that are not changing all around me. Science tells us that they change, but science is fallible, maybe they're wrong? Maybe there is something in universe that doesn't change. Maybe somewhere at zero Kelvin or something.

On the other hand, if change is infinite, then there should be no problem finding a simple proof or indicator...anything beyond a merely asserting it.

What would happen to the idea “experiences” if that were not the case?

You mean if change totally disappeared? We definitely wouldn't have experiences. But that's still something I'm deriving from experience. I mean, yeah this is really fucked up talking about experience in terms of knowledge based on experience, but there is really nothing that tells me that I must experience change all the time.

Another mental challenge: how could one prove the proposition, “Every change must have a cause”: (a) a posteriori; (b) a priori; or, (c) impure a priori?

Would it be an empirical proof, or otherwise?

If there is a proof for change then it would be (b), pure logical proof.

On the other hand, if change is infinite, then there should be no problem finding a simple proof or indicator...anything beyond a merely asserting it.

I think I'll just go an slit my throat.

Would that be enough proof for change?

[Edit to add quote]

I think one has to get over the mortality of things. To my mind, it is clearly impossible to understand the infinite whilst being attached to the finite.

Matt:

If change is a finite object, then the above reasoning applies to it: that I see change doesn't necessarily mean that I must see change.

You don't see change. In Kantian terms, it is a concept derived from experiencing corporeal things corporeally. It's impure a priori.

Change is not a finite object.

Well Kant said that causation is impure a priori and that the concept of change is a posteriori (derived from experience). That's the reason why the a prioriority of causation is impure.

Ok yeah, change is not an object, but why couldn't it be finite? }:-)

Expectantly Ironic,

DQ: This bizarre quoting of academic scripture is irrelevant to the matter at hand. If a particular viewpoint, P, is self-contradictory in nature, then one doesn't need to turn to Q or R or any other argument. It simply collapses of its own accord

EI: Is this view that an argument either contradicts itself (and thus is false) or is consistent (and thus is true) axiomatic, or do you have a logical justification for it? If so, do you have a logical justification for the axioms used in that deduction, and so on and so forth ad infinitum?

A self-contradictory viewpoint violates the principle of A=A. It is a case of affirming and negating the identity of the thing in question in the very same moment, which makes it incoherent.

If the matters of philosophy were simple or clear there would be no need to discuss them. Unfortunately, they're not.

Philosophical matters are indeed simple and clear for those who think clearly and possess the desire to understand. They only become artificially complicated when the mind revels in its own confusion and doesn't want to know anything.

Being permanently uncertain and confused is evidence of a lack of character.

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Matt:

Well Kant said that causation is impure a priori [snip]

Oh, he so did not, Matt Gregory! At least not in the few paragraphs we have had under scrutiny in this thread. Is it somewhere else?

What he has said is that the statement “Every change must have a cause” is impure a priori due to the a posteriori element of “change” which is a concept derived from experience.

If we take that whole statement to mean causation, then causation is impure a priori. But I think that is an error because once one has derived the concept change from experiences, one then opens the door to further a priori knowledge--through reason--to causality since, just as with change, one never actually sees causality either.

Reconsider this; Kant:

Besides, without seeking for such examples of principles existing á priori in cognition, we might easily show that such principles are the indispensable basis of the possibility of experience itself, and consequently prove their existence á priori. For whence could our experience itself acquire certainty, if all the rules on which it depends were themselves empirical, and consequently fortuitous?

…and that the concept of change is a posteriori (derived from experience).

This might seem pedantic but I think it's quite the contrary: the concept of change is not itself a posteriori (since it is not a corporeal object) but is derived a posteriori-ly…what do you think?

That's the reason why the a prioriority of causation is impure.

Refer above comments.

And, more from Kant:

Not only in judgements, however, but even in conceptions, is an á priori origin manifest. For example, if we take away by degrees from our conceptions of a body all that can be referred to mere sensuous experience—colour, hardness or softness, weight, even impenetrability—the body will then vanish; but the space which it occupied still remains, and this it is utterly impossible to annihilate in thought. Again, if we take away, in like manner, from our empirical conception of any object, corporeal or incorporeal, all properties which mere experience has taught us to connect with it, still we cannot think away those through which we cogitate it as substance, or adhering to substance, although our conception of substance is more determined than that of an object. Compelled, therefore, by that necessity with which the conception of substance forces itself upon us, we must confess that it has its seat in our faculty of cognition á priori.

~

Ok yeah, change is not an object, but why couldn't it be finite? }:-)

I’ll get back to this one later.

ExpectantlyIronic wrote:Is this view that an argument either contradicts itself (and thus is false) or is consistent (and thus is true) axiomatic, or do you have a logical justification for it? If so, do you have a logical justification for the axioms used in that deduction, and so on and so forth ad infinitum?

This sounds like an idea Douglas Hofstadter presented, in Godel, Escher, Bach, I think it was, as a kind of a koan.

As I recall, he put it something like this. Suppose you accept P is true, and you accept that P implies Q (meaning If P then Q, sometime written P -> Q). Are you then forced to accept that Q is true?

Well, first you have accept the meta-theorem that { P and (P implies Q) } implies Q.

But to get to that, you must first accept that { P and (P implies Q) } and { P and (P implies Q) and [ P and (P implies Q)] } implies Q.

And so on, to infinity. You must first accept an infinite number of these statements before you are forced to accept Q.


Of course, to avoid this infinite regress, you must cut if off at the beginning. If you don't accept Q, then you have not accepted P and (P implies Q). All those meta-theorems are contained in the original syllogism.

David,

A self-contradictory viewpoint violates the principle of A=A. It is a case of affirming and negating the identity of the thing in question in the very same moment, which makes it incoherent.

I know that you understood what I was getting at, and furthermore, I can't imagine that your claiming such things as axiomatic after dissing such things. So, what are your justifications for believing the above arguments, and what are your justifications for believing those justifications?


DHodges,

Of course, to avoid this infinite regress, you must cut if off at the beginning. If you don't accept Q, then you have not accepted P and (P implies Q). All those meta-theorems are contained in the original syllogism.

Yep. Hence why it's impossible to formulate a philosophical system that doesn't rest upon unproved assumptions.

ExpectantlyIronic wrote: Hence why it's impossible to formulate a philosophical system that doesn't rest upon unproved assumptions.

Short of nihilism, some things can be sufficiently proven to form a valid premise. If a premise is valid, then the logical conclusion would also be valid. Logic itself has been sufficiently proven to be valid through consitently providing true results wherever the premise and the conclusion have been independently sufficiently provable.
.

Elizabeth,

Short of nihilism, some things can be sufficiently proven to form a valid premise.

It's rather a matter of intuition or opinion what constitutes a valid premise if we can't logically determine such things. One might almost say that, at its heart, every philosophical claim makes a necessary appeal to common sense.

ExpectantlyIronic wrote:One might almost say that, at its heart, every philosophical claim makes a necessary appeal to common sense.

I like that. It boils an essential point down to a very quotable phrase.
.

Expectantly Ironic wrote:

DQ: A self-contradictory viewpoint violates the principle of A=A. It is a case of affirming and negating the identity of the thing in question in the very same moment, which makes it incoherent.

EI: I know that you understood what I was getting at, and furthermore, I can't imagine that your claiming such things as axiomatic after dissing such things.

The only thing I accept as an "axiom" is A=A. But it isn't really an axiom as such. Since it is impossible to dispute A=A without entering into contradiction, it qualifies as a brute fact.

So, what are your justifications for believing the above arguments, and what are your justifications for believing those justifications?

Recognizing and accepting the universality of A=A requires no justification. It's simply a matter of opening one's eyes and seeing a brute fact.

One might almost say that, at its heart, every philosophical claim makes a necessary appeal to common sense.

On the contrary, if a philosophical claim makes an appeal to "common sense", it is guaranteed to be false.

Genuine philosophical claims make an appeal to logic, and logic alone - which, in this very irrational world we live in, is far removed from "common sense".



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I recall a saying, but don't recall who the quote came from

"Common sense" is said to be that sense which most men do not have in common.