Suggestion
Suggestion
I've been thinking about what seems to be a common trend at this board. Namely, the tendency to counter claims that there is no such thing as "absolute truth" by pointing out that this claim in itself is a claim that purports to be absolutely true. And I'm considering the idea that this kind of refutation misses the point by failing to understand something about the nature of language: that words, sentences and language as a whole are first and foremost refined evolutionary tools which serve to enable humans to expand the range of actions available to them. As such, utterings are not to be taken as literal depictions of things, but as actions in and of themselves. And so the claim that there is no such thing as absolute truth need not be taken as a literal account of some state of affairs when it could be just as easily be seen as an attempt to direct the discourse into what the agent perceives as a more useful way of talking about things. That is to say that the proponent of the view that there is no absolute truth might contend that if she was to be express her points with more accuracy, she would begin every single uttering by adding the following disclaimer: "at the current moment and place in time and space I lean towards the following understanding of (insert any subject matter here)".
But that would be very impractical, and even more so if one's current understanding of language leaned towards the notion that language is about utility rather than literal depiction.
And so, to refute the claim that there is no absolute truth by pointing out that it undermines itself self-referentially is to insist on the exact same rules of discourse which the proponent of the original uttering wishes to move on from. In this case the convention that the absolute-relative disctinction is of much use. That the job of language is to depict the true state of affairs rather than to enable humans to reinvent themselves and their notions of the good and the beautiful in hitherto unforeseen ways.
This is all somewhat abstract, I know, but I'm still trying to develop my thinking on the matter and don't feel ready to be more specific. Hopefully I'll trigger some responses anyway...
But that would be very impractical, and even more so if one's current understanding of language leaned towards the notion that language is about utility rather than literal depiction.
And so, to refute the claim that there is no absolute truth by pointing out that it undermines itself self-referentially is to insist on the exact same rules of discourse which the proponent of the original uttering wishes to move on from. In this case the convention that the absolute-relative disctinction is of much use. That the job of language is to depict the true state of affairs rather than to enable humans to reinvent themselves and their notions of the good and the beautiful in hitherto unforeseen ways.
This is all somewhat abstract, I know, but I'm still trying to develop my thinking on the matter and don't feel ready to be more specific. Hopefully I'll trigger some responses anyway...
- Trevor Salyzyn
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Re: Suggestion
When a person wants to move on from logic, they end up squarely in illogical thought processes. It is important to combat this urge that many people have to be illogical. It is not original, and does not lead to any deep insights; even calling it "postmodern" is a misnomer, since even Aristotle was calling it idiocy.And so, to refute the claim that there is no absolute truth by pointing out that it undermines itself self-referentially is to insist on the exact same rules of discourse which the proponent of the original uttering wishes to move on from.
Re: Suggestion
But your insistance on the importance of combatting "the urge of many people to be illogical" isn't logical in and of itself. It's a matter of personal preference and thus out of the scope og logic altogether, Likewise, I have explained why the uttering that there's no absolute truth isn't necessarily meant as a logical truth-candidate because it doesn't necessarily purport to convey a state of affairs as much as it seeks to convey an attitude which is perceived as helpful in the emancipative project that some people might want philosophical discourse to be rather than maths with letters.
- Trevor Salyzyn
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Re: Suggestion
I agree that there is no way to convince someone who does not value logic to think logically. As I said, this dates back (at least) to Aristotle, who bewailed this fact. Quite eloquently, he said something to the effect of "no use talking to voluntary idiots."
Of course, even were there a logical reason to think logically, it wouldn't work since it presupposes that the person will be logical enough to accept it as valid. So there is an element of faith in logic. But it's not hard for a clear thinker to find this faith, since the alternative is nonsense.
Of course, even were there a logical reason to think logically, it wouldn't work since it presupposes that the person will be logical enough to accept it as valid. So there is an element of faith in logic. But it's not hard for a clear thinker to find this faith, since the alternative is nonsense.
Re: Suggestion
Logic is applicable to all thought. As long as one is thinking, the strictures of logic apply, and to ignore them is be irrational.
It is not necessary to think in order to perceive truth directly. All reality is truth. Truth in the "Zen" sense cannot be found, because it is already where we are. More than that, it is already what we are. It is closer that any thought, more immediate than any concept. However, the ironic catch is that this cannot be realized until thought has exhausted itself, because until this has occurred, concepts will always arise and interfere.
While we are thinking and conceptualizing, logic applies. Clinging to irrational thoughts and irrational concepts is no more a path to reality than any other kind of thinking. In fact, it is less so, because only logical thinking can reveal the limits of thought itself. And because we are thinking animals by nature, we cannot perceive truth directly until we realize the absolute necessity of transcending our thoughts and concepts of it. Only pushing logic to its limits can do this. Those seeking "truth" through irrationality are destined for an endless struggle with concepts.
It is not necessary to think in order to perceive truth directly. All reality is truth. Truth in the "Zen" sense cannot be found, because it is already where we are. More than that, it is already what we are. It is closer that any thought, more immediate than any concept. However, the ironic catch is that this cannot be realized until thought has exhausted itself, because until this has occurred, concepts will always arise and interfere.
While we are thinking and conceptualizing, logic applies. Clinging to irrational thoughts and irrational concepts is no more a path to reality than any other kind of thinking. In fact, it is less so, because only logical thinking can reveal the limits of thought itself. And because we are thinking animals by nature, we cannot perceive truth directly until we realize the absolute necessity of transcending our thoughts and concepts of it. Only pushing logic to its limits can do this. Those seeking "truth" through irrationality are destined for an endless struggle with concepts.
I live in a tub.
- David Quinn
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Re: Suggestion
Andreas wrote:I've been thinking about what seems to be a common trend at this board. Namely, the tendency to counter claims that there is no such thing as "absolute truth" by pointing out that this claim in itself is a claim that purports to be absolutely true. And I'm considering the idea that this kind of refutation misses the point by failing to understand something about the nature of language: that words, sentences and language as a whole are first and foremost refined evolutionary tools which serve to enable humans to expand the range of actions available to them. As such, utterings are not to be taken as literal depictions of things, but as actions in and of themselves. And so the claim that there is no such thing as absolute truth need not be taken as a literal account of some state of affairs when it could be just as easily be seen as an attempt to direct the discourse into what the agent perceives as a more useful way of talking about things.
The trouble is, if this moving away into "a more useful way of talking about things" is performed on the back of self-contradictory lines of thoughts, then there is already something deeply unhealthy about it from the outset. Its foundations are very flaky, to say the least. They have no more substance than the self-contradictory fantasies that Christians like to believe in.
It is no good saying that once we leave all absolute frameworks behind, it ceases to be an issue. The rotting nature of the first movement is still there in existence. We can try to deny that it is there by trying to avoid absolute thinking altogether, but at best that can only lead to an increase in our own subjective blindness, which is hardly a solution.
To me, the whole thing smacks of mental corruption. It is like watching a politician engaging in underhanded, corrupt behaviour and and then covering it up so that no one can see. It might be very useful for the corrupt politician to engage in this kind of behaviour - it might give him all sorts of shady benefits - but it still remains corrupt, nonetheless.
She should at least refrain from speaking on behalf of the human race and imposing her own biases onto them. I'm not saying that you do this, but in my experience most postmodernists do this without even blinking. It is part of their subjective blindness.That is to say that the proponent of the view that there is no absolute truth might contend that if she was to be express her points with more accuracy, she would begin every single uttering by adding the following disclaimer: "at the current moment and place in time and space I lean towards the following understanding of (insert any subject matter here)".
When a postmodernist speaks on behalf of the human race (and thereby slips back into an absolutist framework), it isn't the language which is at fault. It is her own corrupt behaviour.But that would be very impractical, and even more so if one's current understanding of language leaned towards the notion that language is about utility rather than literal depiction.
And so, to refute the claim that there is no absolute truth by pointing out that it undermines itself self-referentially is to insist on the exact same rules of discourse which the proponent of the original uttering wishes to move on from.
Unfortunately, it is the postmodernist herself who makes these self-contradictory references. It has nothing to do with anyone else. It is not other people's fault if they see the problem with her behaviour. It isn't encumbered on them to change their ways simply to accommodate her irrationality.
Again, a postmodernist cannot help but engage in absolutist thinking in order to make the movement away from all absolute frameworks. And she cannot help but engage in it whenever she is called upon to defend this decision.
A postmodernist is simply an absolutist in denial wanting other people to share in her denial.
We don't have to jettison our consciousness of absolute truth in order to continue evolving. The two aren't incompatible in any way.In this case the convention that the absolute-relative disctinction is of much use. That the job of language is to depict the true state of affairs rather than to enable humans to reinvent themselves and their notions of the good and the beautiful in hitherto unforeseen ways.
A sign of a first-rate thinker is the ability to distinguish between what is certain in life and what is uncertain and to openly embrace both. Postmodernist fail dismally on this count, which makes them very stunted and close-minded.
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Re: Suggestion
If the mind is incapable of finding absolute truth, you can follow St. Paul's advice, and have faith, or- you can drop acid. Neurologically, we now know this puts the mind in turbo mode, empowering it to make connections across a broader array of inputs that commonly result in a direct experience called "enlightenment".
In the pre-Christian era, Europe had many 'mystery' religions, most famously at Eleusis. But the reports of those who've gone with a Mayan shaman on a vision quest with pscilocybin come away with the same kind of certainty in what they think they now know. The Navajo use Peyote, other Indians Mescaline. The original Aryans used "Soma".
But whatever, reasonably rational intelligent individuals come away with a direct experience of the divine, which they realize is not Jesus. Which has a lot to do with why the Church so vigorously suppressed what anthropology now calls the use of 'entheogens'. Atheists have a hard time with it too because it does not result in a strawman concept like Jehovah, God the Father, or Allah, either.
Like meditation, which also works altho it takes diligent practice, the sacred potions clear the mind of all external input allowing a focus on the *immanent* state of pure being. Not doing anything, just being. There is the irrefutable experience that something exists. IOW, an 'absolute truth'.
Amanita Muscaria, which you can order online, can be used to make Soma so that you can perform the test on your own central processing unit. Nothing I, or anyone else, can say here, or anywhere else, will provide the proof of absolute truth. All I can do is provide the scientific procedure so you can perform your own experiment; and after you have done that, nothing I, or anyone else, can say will refute the evidence you collected in your own mind. That's basically why those who speak do not know, and those who know do not speak. You either get it, or you dont.
In the pre-Christian era, Europe had many 'mystery' religions, most famously at Eleusis. But the reports of those who've gone with a Mayan shaman on a vision quest with pscilocybin come away with the same kind of certainty in what they think they now know. The Navajo use Peyote, other Indians Mescaline. The original Aryans used "Soma".
But whatever, reasonably rational intelligent individuals come away with a direct experience of the divine, which they realize is not Jesus. Which has a lot to do with why the Church so vigorously suppressed what anthropology now calls the use of 'entheogens'. Atheists have a hard time with it too because it does not result in a strawman concept like Jehovah, God the Father, or Allah, either.
Like meditation, which also works altho it takes diligent practice, the sacred potions clear the mind of all external input allowing a focus on the *immanent* state of pure being. Not doing anything, just being. There is the irrefutable experience that something exists. IOW, an 'absolute truth'.
Amanita Muscaria, which you can order online, can be used to make Soma so that you can perform the test on your own central processing unit. Nothing I, or anyone else, can say here, or anywhere else, will provide the proof of absolute truth. All I can do is provide the scientific procedure so you can perform your own experiment; and after you have done that, nothing I, or anyone else, can say will refute the evidence you collected in your own mind. That's basically why those who speak do not know, and those who know do not speak. You either get it, or you dont.
Goddess made sex for company.
Re: Suggestion
Open mouth in error.
Open mouth in truth.
Where is the preference?
Open mouth in truth.
Where is the preference?
Let him who has ears hear.
Re: Suggestion
Andreas,
Thank you for seeing my point of view on this. Apparently the geniuses here don't understand that when we say "there is no absolute truth" we are not trying to make an "absolute truth" claim, whatever that is, since we don't even believe it is anything meaningful at all except in a metaphysical sense. Clearly they are taking what we say out of context and applying the very thing at question in a refutation.
And logic.... Logic is just another evolved tool for dealing with concepts. But this will need its own thread I think.
Thank you for seeing my point of view on this. Apparently the geniuses here don't understand that when we say "there is no absolute truth" we are not trying to make an "absolute truth" claim, whatever that is, since we don't even believe it is anything meaningful at all except in a metaphysical sense. Clearly they are taking what we say out of context and applying the very thing at question in a refutation.
And logic.... Logic is just another evolved tool for dealing with concepts. But this will need its own thread I think.
Re: Suggestion
Wonder what David's and others' take would be on this, a quote I read from one of his favorite enlightened genius thinkers. :)
WTP 516We are unable to affirm and to deny one and the same thing: this is a subjective empirical law, not the expression of any "necessity" but only of an inability.
If, according to Aristotle, the law of contradiction is the most certain of all principles, if it is the ultimate and most basic, upon which every demonstrative proof rests, if the principle of every axiom lies in it; then one should consider all the more rigorously what presuppositions already lie at the bottom of it. Either it asserts something about. actuality, about being, as if one already knew this from another source; that is, as if opposite attributes could not be ascribed to it. Or the proposition means: opposite attributes should not be ascribed to it. In that case, logic would be an imperative, not to know the true, but to posit and arrange a world that shall be called true by us.
In short, the question remains open: are the axioms of logic adequate to reality or are they a means and measure for us to create reality, the concept "reality," for ourselves.?--To affirm the former one would, as already said, have to have a previous knowledge of being--which is certainly not the case. The proposition therefore contains no criterion of truth, but an imperative concerning that which should count as true.
Supposing there were no self-identical "A", such as is presupposed by every proposition of logic (and of mathematics), and the "A" were already mere appearance, then logic would have a merely apparent world as its condition. In fact, we believe in this proposition under the influence of ceaseless experience which seems continually to confirrn it. The "thing"--that is the real substratum of "A"; our belief in things is the precondition of our belief in logic. The "A" of logic is, like the atom, a reconstruction of the thing--If we do not grasp this, but make of logic a criterion of true being, we are on the way to positing as realities all those hypostases: substance, attribute, object, subject, action, etc.; that is, to conceiving a metaphysical world, that is, a "real world" (--this, however, is the apparent world once more--).
The very first acts of thought, affirmation and denial, holding true and holding not true, are, in as much as they presuppose, not only the habit of holding things true and holding them not true, but a right to do this, already dominated by the belief that we can gain possession of knowledge, that judgments really can hit upon the truth;--in short, logic does not doubt its ability to assert something about the true-in-itself (namely, that it cannot have opposite attributes).
Here reigns the coarse sensualistic prejudice that sensations teach us truths about things--that I cannot say at the same time of one and the same thing that it is hard and that it is soft. (The instinctive proof "I cannot have two opposite sensations at the same time"--quite coarse and false.)
The conceptual ban on contradiction proceeds from the belief that we are able to form concepts, that the concept not only designates the essence of a thing but comprehends it--In fact, logic (like geometry and arithmetic) applies only to fictitious entities that we have created. Logic is the attempt to comprehend the actual world by means of a scheme of being posited by ourselves; more correctly, to make it formulatable and calculable for us--
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Kevin Solway
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Re: Suggestion
The last paragraph is the significant one:
Because it doesn't follow that anyone who has a concept believes that their concept fully comprehends an empirical thing.
No person with half a brain believes that a concept can fully comprehend any empirical thing. For a start, there's no way we can even know if the empirical thing even exists - let alone can we have any accurate concepts about it.
Nietzsche's argument is directed only at those people who think that their concepts accurately comprehend empirical objects.
You will notice that Nietzsche tries to avoid being contradictory in his reasonings, and that is because he knows full well that if an argument contradicts itself, it is wrong.
Let's examine it:The conceptual ban on contradiction proceeds from the belief that we are able to form concepts, that the concept not only designates the essence of a thing but comprehends it--In fact, logic (like geometry and arithmetic) applies only to fictitious entities that we have created. Logic is the attempt to comprehend the actual world by means of a scheme of being posited by ourselves; more correctly, to make it formulatable and calculable for us--
This is true enough so far, for if we were not able to form concepts, there would be no such thing as "contradiction"The conceptual ban on contradiction proceeds from the belief that we are able to form concepts, . . .
And this is where his argument is limited.. . . , that the concept not only designates the essence of a thing but comprehends it
Because it doesn't follow that anyone who has a concept believes that their concept fully comprehends an empirical thing.
No person with half a brain believes that a concept can fully comprehend any empirical thing. For a start, there's no way we can even know if the empirical thing even exists - let alone can we have any accurate concepts about it.
Nietzsche's argument is directed only at those people who think that their concepts accurately comprehend empirical objects.
You will notice that Nietzsche tries to avoid being contradictory in his reasonings, and that is because he knows full well that if an argument contradicts itself, it is wrong.
- David Quinn
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Re: Suggestion
I found this passage depressingly limited as well:
It only takes a moment's thought to see this.
This is extremely substandard material from Nietzsche. It's no wonder he didn't want to publish it.
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It is easy to see that the affirmation of A=A and logic doesn't require a belief in "things", or a belief in a real world. All it requires is awareness of appearances.Supposing there were no self-identical "A", such as is presupposed by every proposition of logic (and of mathematics), and the "A" were already mere appearance, then logic would have a merely apparent world as its condition. In fact, we believe in this proposition under the influence of ceaseless experience which seems continually to confirrn it. The "thing"--that is the real substratum of "A"; our belief in things is the precondition of our belief in logic. The "A" of logic is, like the atom, a reconstruction of the thing--If we do not grasp this, but make of logic a criterion of true being, we are on the way to positing as realities all those hypostases: substance, attribute, object, subject, action, etc.; that is, to conceiving a metaphysical world, that is, a "real world" (--this, however, is the apparent world once more--).
It only takes a moment's thought to see this.
This is extremely substandard material from Nietzsche. It's no wonder he didn't want to publish it.
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- David Quinn
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Re: Suggestion
If you consistently adhered to your view that "there is no absolute truth" and refrained from making absolutist claims on behalf of the human race, I would grant you some leeway on this. But you're doing the opposite of this, which is why I call you a hypocrite.Neil Melnyk wrote:Andreas,
Thank you for seeing my point of view on this. Apparently the geniuses here don't understand that when we say "there is no absolute truth" we are not trying to make an "absolute truth" claim, whatever that is, since we don't even believe it is anything meaningful at all except in a metaphysical sense.
The very attempt to convince yourself, and others, that absolute claims are meaningless itself rests on absolute claims which you regard to be meaningful - e.g. "all concepts ultimately derive from the empirical world".
So the ball is in your court. Stop making use of absolute claims in your arguments and I will stop picking you up on your hypocrisy.
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Re: Suggestion
I think Nietzsche sees a parallel between the "thing-in-itself" and the A that is the basic unit of logic. He also sees parallels with the "atom", the basic unit of chemistry, etc. In short, he is saying logic is just a tool to manipulate made up concepts, the basic units of logic, with. Insofar as concepts are real logic can provide "truths".David Quinn wrote:It is easy to see that the affirmation of A=A and logic doesn't require a belief in "things", or a belief in a real world. All it requires is awareness of appearances.
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Re: Suggestion
The parallel that he sees isn't really there. One doesn't have to subscribe to any particular belief to affirm the reality of A=A and the validity of logic. One only has to open one's eyes to their nature.
Apart from anything else, this is evidenced in the fact that Nietzsche continued to use logic and affirm the reality of A=A, even after discarding his belief in objective existence.
Appearances are "things-in-themselves". They are also irrefutable to those who experience them. This alone is enough to get the logical ball rolling. Nothing further is required.
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Apart from anything else, this is evidenced in the fact that Nietzsche continued to use logic and affirm the reality of A=A, even after discarding his belief in objective existence.
Appearances are "things-in-themselves". They are also irrefutable to those who experience them. This alone is enough to get the logical ball rolling. Nothing further is required.
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Re: Suggestion
Nietzsche doesn't reject the use of logic. We need concepts, and we use logic to manipulate them. This comes down to our utility and survival though, not "truth".
"...in short, logic does not doubt its ability to assert something about the true-in-itself (namely, that it cannot have opposite attributes)."
And:
"We are unable to affirm and to deny one and the same thing: this is a subjective empirical law, not the expression of any "necessity" but only of an inability."
"...in short, logic does not doubt its ability to assert something about the true-in-itself (namely, that it cannot have opposite attributes)."
And:
"We are unable to affirm and to deny one and the same thing: this is a subjective empirical law, not the expression of any "necessity" but only of an inability."
- David Quinn
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Re: Suggestion
Neil,
For example, "logic does not doubt its ability to assert something about the true-in-itself (namely, that it cannot have opposite attributes)". This is something which he is asserting as being true.
Again, Nietzsche's material here is amazingly poor. It is embarrassing. He is a zillion miles away from the great clarity and depth of vision expressed in Zarathustra. Here he is like a dottering old man.
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Nevertheless, he continued to use logic to arrive at things he thought were true.Nietzsche doesn't reject the use of logic. We need concepts, and we use logic to manipulate them. This comes down to our utility and survival though, not "truth".
For example, "logic does not doubt its ability to assert something about the true-in-itself (namely, that it cannot have opposite attributes)". This is something which he is asserting as being true.
I reject that form of limited thinking, just as I reject the objective metaphysical viewpoint which underpins it - namely, that all concepts ultimately derive from the empirical world.This comes down to our utility and survival though, not "truth".
And yet every appearance we experience is true-in-itself. Each appearance is definitely what it is and not something else. Logic doesn't add anything to this. It simply recognizes this reality and examines its consequences."...in short, logic does not doubt its ability to assert something about the true-in-itself (namely, that it cannot have opposite attributes)."
The appearances we experience in each moment are what they are out of necessity. That we lack the ability to refute them is precisely due to this necessity."We are unable to affirm and to deny one and the same thing: this is a subjective empirical law, not the expression of any "necessity" but only of an inability."
Again, Nietzsche's material here is amazingly poor. It is embarrassing. He is a zillion miles away from the great clarity and depth of vision expressed in Zarathustra. Here he is like a dottering old man.
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Re: Suggestion
I'm pretty new to Kierkegaard, so I'd be interested in comments on this piece.
When K. uses the term 'historical knowledge' is he refering to merely empirical knowledge,or all knowledge?
Kierkegaard;
When K. uses the term 'historical knowledge' is he refering to merely empirical knowledge,or all knowledge?
Kierkegaard;
The positiveness of historical knowledge is illusory, since it is approximation-knowledge; the speculative result is delusion. For all this positive knowledge fails to express the situation of the knowing subject in existence. It concerns rather a fictitious objective subject, and to confuse oneself with such a subject is to be duped. Every subject is an existing subject, which should receive an essential expression in all his knowledge. Particularly, it must be expressed through the prevention of an illusory finality, whether in perceptual certainty, or in historical knowledge, or in illusory speculative results. In historical knowledge, the subject learns a great deal about the world, but nothing about himself. He moves constantly in a sphere of approximation-knowledge, in his supposed positivity deluding himself with the semblance of certainty; but certainty can only be had in the infinite, where he cannot as an existing subject remain, but only repeatedly arrive. Nothing historical can become infinitely certain for me except the fact that of my own existence (which again cannot become infinitely certain for any other individual, who has infinite certainty of only his own existence), and this is not something historical.
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ChaoticMelody
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Re: Suggestion
It IS impossible to prove anything within this reality when we are uncertain of the reality itself.
Just like a AI in a computer might believe their truths are true, When they aren't absolute.
We have the same problem as we can NEVER be certain of anything
Just like a AI in a computer might believe their truths are true, When they aren't absolute.
We have the same problem as we can NEVER be certain of anything
Re: Suggestion
Neitzsche, Kirkegard, & Campbell even were writing to audiences that were more totally immersed in the Christian tradition, in this case of viewing scripture as historical truth. Which many now know from archeology is bullshit. Archeology magazine, couple years ago, had a rap about where a certain fort, mapped out in the archives in Madrid was. They could never find it in Florida.
But then it was realized that the fort had never actually been completed. the map sent to the administrators in Spain was bullshit. Hazor was a might city all right, and it was destroyed, but that was 200 years before the putative time of Joshua. What he destroyed was a village built on the rubble, but which we know looked good in the reports. This is one problem with "historical knowledge".
We also see the postings all over the net by people who are absolutely convinced they know what happened at 911. But- any shrink report archive is also full of direct personal experience that he regards as delusion.
But then it was realized that the fort had never actually been completed. the map sent to the administrators in Spain was bullshit. Hazor was a might city all right, and it was destroyed, but that was 200 years before the putative time of Joshua. What he destroyed was a village built on the rubble, but which we know looked good in the reports. This is one problem with "historical knowledge".
We also see the postings all over the net by people who are absolutely convinced they know what happened at 911. But- any shrink report archive is also full of direct personal experience that he regards as delusion.
Goddess made sex for company.
Re: Suggestion
Are you certain of that?ChaoticMelody wrote:It IS impossible to prove anything within this reality when we are uncertain of the reality itself.
Just like a AI in a computer might believe their truths are true, When they aren't absolute.
We have the same problem as we can NEVER be certain of anything
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Re: Suggestion
I interpreted the line: "we believe in this proposition under the influence of ceaseless experience which seems continually to confirm it" as Nietzsche admitting A=A is not only belief in things but also (belief in or realization of) awareness of appearances. That's why he writes that we believe in that principle. But I agree overall Nietzsche could have written more carefully here and it shows the difference between a finished, redacted thought and an unfinished 'previewing' one.David Quinn wrote:I found this passage depressingly limited as well:
It is easy to see that the affirmation of A=A and logic doesn't require a belief in "things", or a belief in a real world. All it requires is awareness of appearances.Nietzsche wrote:Supposing there were no self-identical "A", such as is presupposed by every proposition of logic (and of mathematics), and the "A" were already mere appearance, then logic would have a merely apparent world as its condition. In fact, we believe in this proposition under the influence of ceaseless experience which seems continually to confirrn it. The "thing"--that is the real substratum of "A"; our belief in things is the precondition of our belief in logic. The "A" of logic is, like the atom, a reconstruction of the thing--If we do not grasp this, but make of logic a criterion of true being, we are on the way to positing as realities all those hypostases: substance, attribute, object, subject, action, etc.; that is, to conceiving a metaphysical world, that is, a "real world" (--this, however, is the apparent world once more--).
This passage was discussed as well in the thread Nietzsche on Principle of Non-Contradiction earlier this year where I also gave a slightly better translation of parts.
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Re: Suggestion
His use of the term "approximation-knowledge" would indicate that he was talking about empirical knowledge, but I have a feeling that he was talking about conceptual knowledge as a whole, which would include math, academic concepts, philosophic logic, etc, as well as empirical knowledge.Ataraxia wrote:I'm pretty new to Kierkegaard, so I'd be interested in comments on this piece.
When K. uses the term 'historical knowledge' is he refering to merely empirical knowledge,or all knowledge?
Kierkegaard;The positiveness of historical knowledge is illusory, since it is approximation-knowledge; the speculative result is delusion. For all this positive knowledge fails to express the situation of the knowing subject in existence. It concerns rather a fictitious objective subject, and to confuse oneself with such a subject is to be duped. Every subject is an existing subject, which should receive an essential expression in all his knowledge. Particularly, it must be expressed through the prevention of an illusory finality, whether in perceptual certainty, or in historical knowledge, or in illusory speculative results. In historical knowledge, the subject learns a great deal about the world, but nothing about himself. He moves constantly in a sphere of approximation-knowledge, in his supposed positivity deluding himself with the semblance of certainty; but certainty can only be had in the infinite, where he cannot as an existing subject remain, but only repeatedly arrive. Nothing historical can become infinitely certain for me except the fact that of my own existence (which again cannot become infinitely certain for any other individual, who has infinite certainty of only his own existence), and this is not something historical.
To my mind, he was saying that we cannot find ourselves in the forms of conceptual knowledge, that we have to go beyond all forms into the infinite, which is where our subjectivity resides. It is only then that we can begin to make all of our knowledge our own ("Every subject is an existing subject, which should receive an essential expression in all his knowledge"). Everything becomes grounded in that infinite understanding.
The following sentence he wrote is an interesting one: "Particularly, it must be expressed through the prevention of an illusory finality, whether in perceptual certainty, or in historical knowledge, or in illusory speculative results." The certainty gained in the infinite isn't one of finality, in the sense of reaching a bottom-line conceptually. Rather, the certainty arises from realizing that there can be no finality anywhere. In the end, there is really nothing to be certain about.
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Re: Suggestion
Yes,I got the feeling too.David Quinn wrote:His use of the term "approximation-knowledge" would indicate that he was talking about empirical knowledge, but I have a feeling that he was talking about conceptual knowledge as a whole, which would include math, academic concepts, philosophic logic, etc, as well as empirical knowledge.
This would indicate to me that K. doesn't believe there is a such a thing as an 'Absolute truth'.Or if there is,then it is only to be found in his(christian)God.
Hmm ok.I was thinking when he uses the term 'infinite' he means 'God'.And furthermore 'Infinite understanding' = understanding God.To my mind, he was saying that we cannot find ourselves in the forms of conceptual knowledge, that we have to go beyond all forms into the infinite, which is where our subjectivity resides. It is only then that we can begin to make all of our knowledge our own ("Every subject is an existing subject, which should receive an essential expression in all his knowledge"). Everything becomes grounded in that infinite understanding.
I'm trying to work out if he's right about this, or whether it is mere 'special pleading' on behalf of his Christian God.
This is for me to discover,I guess.
Yes,that makes alot of sense.The following sentence he wrote is an interesting one: "Particularly, it must be expressed through the prevention of an illusory finality, whether in perceptual certainty, or in historical knowledge, or in illusory speculative results." The certainty gained in the infinite isn't one of finality, in the sense of reaching a bottom-line conceptually. Rather, the certainty arises from realizing that there can be no finality anywhere. In the end, there is really nothing to be certain about.
Thanks for your input. :)
- David Quinn
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Re: Suggestion
Ataraxia,
I think he would agree that there are absolute truths to be found in math and philosophic logic - truths like 1+1=2 which cannot be falsified - but he would have considered them trivial when compared to the big picture issue of forming a personal relationship with the Infinite. To him, uncovering the Absolute Truth (i.e. the Infinite) is meaningless unless you immerse your entire subjectivity into it.
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His God wasn't really Christian. His understanding of the Infinite, which is beyond all religions, was genuine.DQ: His use of the term "approximation-knowledge" would indicate that he was talking about empirical knowledge, but I have a feeling that he was talking about conceptual knowledge as a whole, which would include math, academic concepts, philosophic logic, etc, as well as empirical knowledge.
A: Yes,I got the feeling too.
This would indicate to me that K. doesn't believe there is a such a thing as an 'Absolute truth'.Or if there is,then it is only to be found in his(christian)God.
I think he would agree that there are absolute truths to be found in math and philosophic logic - truths like 1+1=2 which cannot be falsified - but he would have considered them trivial when compared to the big picture issue of forming a personal relationship with the Infinite. To him, uncovering the Absolute Truth (i.e. the Infinite) is meaningless unless you immerse your entire subjectivity into it.
Yes, that is how I use the term also.DQ: To my mind, he was saying that we cannot find ourselves in the forms of conceptual knowledge, that we have to go beyond all forms into the infinite, which is where our subjectivity resides. It is only then that we can begin to make all of our knowledge our own ("Every subject is an existing subject, which should receive an essential expression in all his knowledge"). Everything becomes grounded in that infinite understanding.
A: Hmm ok.I was thinking when he uses the term 'infinite' he means 'God'.And furthermore 'Infinite understanding' = understanding God.
Yes. You won't be able to properly resolve it without breaking into infinite understanding yourself.I'm trying to work out if he's right about this, or whether it is mere 'special pleading' on behalf of his Christian God.
This is for me to discover,I guess.
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