GENIUS FORUMS

David Quinn wrote:I'm sure you understood what I meant - namely, free will operating independently of all antecedent causes. Free will that is genuinely free.

We're not going to have a semantic argument, are we?

isn't that all you people do -- semantic arguments? Arguments by definition?

No, there is nothing particularly genuine about LFW.

These hypothetical souls would also either exist in a deterministic or indeterministic universe (or some combination of the two).

This is the case for the world as we know it. it doesn't have to be the case for the hypothetical world of souls, which might have completely different causal rules (which of course are never specified). This is why I prefer to regard the dualism option as incoherent rather than false.

vicdan wrote:So we don't have the ability to make decisions that affect the future ...?

No, our ability to make the decisions which affect the future is not an illusion.

I don't know even know what noumenal thinking means. Uncovering what is real, perhaps.

In your parlance, more or less yes. You are thinking about the world as being apart from what is known or knowable -- about noumena, things-in-themselves.

The error here is assuming that we can talk meaningfully about the difference between how free will appears (extant), and how it is apart from appearances (illusory).

vicdan wrote:So what is freedom then? The ability to cope with a meaningless, purposeless universe?

The ability to choose, uncoerced, based on one's own mind.

But coping with the 'meaningless, purposeless universe' was the point of the OP -- the answer I was suggesting was refusing to even see it at coping with, but rather to see it as freedom: lack of divine coercion, if you will.

You're very vague on the issue's nitty-gritty.

Because the metaphysical nitty-gritty was irrelevant to the point I was making in the OP.

David Quinn wrote:I'm sure you understood what I meant - namely, free will operating independently of all antecedent causes. Free will that is genuinely free.

We're not going to have a semantic argument, are we?

isn't that all you people do -- semantic arguments, arguments from definition?

But of course your characterization of LFW as 'genuinely free' is what is being disputed.

These hypothetical souls would also either exist in a deterministic or indeterministic universe (or some combination of the two).

No. That range of options circumscribes our universe. In a dualistic world with unspecified metaphysics, it doesn't have to. Of course the problem is that these metaphysics remain unspecified, which is why i regard the dualism option as incoherent rather than false.

So we don't have the ability to make decisions that affect the future ...?

No, this iability is not an illusion.

I don't know even know what noumenal thinking means. Uncovering what is real, perhaps.

In your own parlance, more or less so. it's the presumption that you can get at the things-in-themselves, as taken apart from all their perceptible traits. In your case, it's the assumption that behind everything that we can perceive and discern and know about free will, there is a reality of it which is contrary to all those appearances -- that there is the apparent free will, and the noumenal reality of it, which is that the said appearance is an illusion.

So what is freedom then? The ability to cope with a meaningless, purposeless universe?

Freedom from coercion. The coping with meaningless, purposeless universe was the question. The answer was that the meaninglessness and purposelessness should be seen not as something in need to be coped with, but as freedom to be embraced -- freedom from 'divine' coercion, in part.

vicdan wrote:

David Quinn wrote:I'm sure you understood what I meant - namely, free will operating independently of all antecedent causes. Free will that is genuinely free.

We're not going to have a semantic argument, are we?

isn't that all you people do -- semantic arguments, arguments from definition?

It might seem like that at face value, but actually the opposite is the case. It involves developing a flexibility of mind that is free of all semantic prisons. Exploring the logical implications of definitions is part of that process.

But of course your characterization of LFW as 'genuinely free' is what is being disputed.

I don't have any interest in such a dispute. For me, the core philosophic issue here is whether our willing is caused or not. If it isn't, then it becomes indistinguishable from a blind random event. If it is, then our willing (that is, our impression that we originate our decisions) is an illusion.

vicdan wrote:

These hypothetical souls would also either exist in a deterministic or indeterministic universe (or some combination of the two).

No. That range of options circumscribes our universe. In a dualistic world with unspecified metaphysics, it doesn't have to. Of course the problem is that these metaphysics remain unspecified, which is why i regard the dualism option as incoherent rather than false.

Determinism and indeterminism cover all possible options with regards to the arisal of events, just as the twin categories of apples and non-apples covers all possible things in the universe. There is no third category.

This is necessarily the case everywhere.

vicdan wrote:

So we don't have the ability to make decisions that affect the future ...?

No, this iability is not an illusion.

The illusion is that we originate these decisions.

vicdan wrote:

I don't know even know what noumenal thinking means. Uncovering what is real, perhaps.

In your own parlance, more or less so. it's the presumption that you can get at the things-in-themselves, as taken apart from all their perceptible traits. In your case, it's the assumption that behind everything that we can perceive and discern and know about free will, there is a reality of it which is contrary to all those appearances -- that there is the apparent free will, and the noumenal reality of it, which is that the said appearance is an illusion.

Again, the complete opposite is the case. I do not believe in any kind of hidden reality, and I find the very concept of "things-in-themselves" a joke.

Uncovering the illusion of free will simply involves examining the very concept of free will and finding it to be incoherent. No metaphysical overlay is required.

vicdan wrote:

So what is freedom then? The ability to cope with a meaningless, purposeless universe?

Freedom from coercion. The coping with meaningless, purposeless universe was the question. The answer was that the meaninglessness and purposelessness should be seen not as something in need to be coped with, but as freedom to be embraced -- freedom from 'divine' coercion, in part.

What about freedom from Nature's coercion? How do you go about doing that?

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You can think of all the arguments and where each leads, so what's the point of all this arguing? The question then is: why don't you have anything better to do with your time? Don't answer that! ...`

Happy New Year!

David Quinn wrote:For me, the core philosophic issue here is whether our willing is caused or not. If it isn't, then it becomes indistinguishable from a blind random event. If it is, then our willing (that is, our impression that we originate our decisions) is an illusion.

Of course any origin is itself originated by something else, so no origin we ever deal with is the 'ultimate' origin. What you are really saying is that only ultimate origin counts.

Since the most ancient known origin -- Big Bang -- origin is such that we cannot currently know anything about its origin (the very question is quite likely meaningless), you have just done a wonderful job of erasing a perfectly good concept -- origin -- from human discourse. Congratulations, dude, your wankery continues unabated.

Determinism and indeterminism cover all possible options with regards to the arisal of events, just as the twin categories of apples and non-apples covers all possible things in the universe. There is no third category.

Sure there is -- hypothetically, consider 'free will' as the third category. in a dualist metaphysics, one could postulate that decisions are atomic, irreducible, and uncaused, yet also not random. One could even construct a test to distinguish such decisions from random decisions (let's say this dualistic consciousness is a Turing Oracle, it can solve undecidable problems and is distinguishable from random decisions thereby).

The problem with metaphysics is that with enough cleverness, you can postulate anything you fucking want.

The illusion is that we originate these decisions.

You mean that we aren't the ultimate source of these decisions. See above about your totally wanky abuse of English language and semantics.

Uncovering the illusion of free will simply involves examining the very concept of free will and finding it to be incoherent. No metaphysical overlay is required.

i already showed you how compatibilist free will is coherent. You can only declare it 'incoherent' by importing your own undeclared meaning of 'free will' into the discussion -- i.e. by ignoring my compatibilist thesis, and instead reverting to the colloquial LFW meaning to make your points.

Note BTW that this argument -- about how to define free will -- is the exact opposite of your silly definition arguments. instead of simply defining free will to be whatever I need to achieve my conclusion, I show that the old definition is incoherent, and then propose an alternative definition which is coherent, and yet represents about the same set of semantic contexts as the old one; i.e. my alternative definition is the conclusion, not the premise, of the argument.

vicdan wrote:What about freedom from Nature's coercion? How do you go about doing that?

As I said earlier on, coercion is an attribute of agency. Nature is not an agent, and being unable to merely fly by flapping your arms cannot be reasonably said to be a form of coercion.

DQ,

For me, the core philosophic issue here is whether our willing is caused or not. If it isn't, then it becomes indistinguishable from a blind random event. If it is, then our willing (that is, our impression that we originate our decisions) is an illusion.

What you say here is the same as Hume's fork. Either our actions are determined, in which case we are not responsible for them, or they are the results of random events, in which case we are not responsible for them.

vicdan wrote:

David Quinn wrote:For me, the core philosophic issue here is whether our willing is caused or not. If it isn't, then it becomes indistinguishable from a blind random event. If it is, then our willing (that is, our impression that we originate our decisions) is an illusion.

Of course any origin is itself originated by something else, so no origin we ever deal with is the 'ultimate' origin. What you are really saying is that only ultimate origin counts.

Since the most ancient known origin -- Big Bang -- origin is such that we cannot currently know anything about its origin (the very question is quite likely meaningless), you have just done a wonderful job of erasing a perfectly good concept -- origin -- from human discourse. Congratulations, dude, your wankery continues unabated.

It isn't wankery as the belief that one is the originator of one's decisions is a very popular one. It is what people generally mean by free will. As a result, they feel guilty if they feel they have done something wrong, or triumphant if they feel they have succeeded. Our entire society is built on such a belief.

And yet the truth is people's decisions and actions never originate with them. Their guilts and triumphs are based on an illusion.

vicdan wrote:

Determinism and indeterminism cover all possible options with regards to the arisal of events, just as the twin categories of apples and non-apples covers all possible things in the universe. There is no third category.

Sure there is -- hypothetically, consider 'free will' as the third category. in a dualist metaphysics, one could postulate that decisions are atomic, irreducible, and uncaused, yet also not random. One could even construct a test to distinguish such decisions from random decisions (let's say this dualistic consciousness is a Turing Oracle, it can solve undecidable problems and is distinguishable from random decisions thereby).

A Turing Oracle is a fully causal entity, so I'm not sure why you brought that one up.

I suppose one could postulate that "decisions are atomic, irreducible, and uncaused, yet also not random", but it would still remain nonsensical nonetheless. Uncaused and random go hand in hand.

An uncaused event is random by definition, there being no causal factors to regulate the event in any way.

The problem with metaphysics is that with enough cleverness, you can postulate anything you fucking want.

Yes, it is better to do away with metaphysics altogether and stick to logic and facts.

vicdan wrote:

What about freedom from Nature's coercion? How do you go about doing that?

As I said earlier on, coercion is an attribute of agency. Nature is not an agent, and being unable to merely fly by flapping your arms cannot be reasonably said to be a form of coercion.

It would be experienced as coercion if it was your desire to flap your wings and fly. Nature opposes such a desire and dictates that it isn't possible for humans in their current form.

I'm sure you have plenty of desires and ambitions (or perhaps you had them when you were younger) that are unrealistic because of the way Nature has fashioned you. Perhaps you had once dreamed of winning a Nobel Prize only to realize that Nature had other plans for you.

Nature isn't an agent as such, but its powers over us are very real and there is very little we can do about it.

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David Quinn wrote:It would be experienced as coercion if it was your desire to flap your wings and fly. Nature opposes such a desire and dictates that it isn't possible for humans in their current form.

nature neither opposes nor dictates. That's just anthropomorphisation.

Nature isn't an agent as such, but its powers over us are very real and there is very little we can do about it.

So what? nature doesn't coerce, except in a purely metaphorical sense. You might as well declare that your you are chained because you can't make 2+2=5. It's nonsense.

Are you now going to equate coercion with causality, thereby destroying yet another perfectly good concept? You seem to be rather fond of such cheap equivocations; and if you destroy meaning in the process, why, Paris is worth the mass, right?

vicdan wrote:

David Quinn wrote:It would be experienced as coercion if it was your desire to flap your wings and fly. Nature opposes such a desire and dictates that it isn't possible for humans in their current form.

nature neither opposes nor dictates. That's just anthropomorphisation.

It doesn't do these things in a conscious sense. Yet the reality remains that if Nature determines - via physical laws, evolution, genetics, culture, etc - that a person cannot fly, then he cannot fly.

To dismiss this as an anthropomorphism is to deny reality.

vicdan wrote:

Nature isn't an agent as such, but its powers over us are very real and there is very little we can do about it.

So what? nature doesn't coerce, except in a purely metaphorical sense. You might as well declare that your you are chained because you can't make 2+2=5. It's nonsense.

So what is stopping you from winning the Nobel prize?

vicdan wrote: Are you now going to equate coercion with causality, thereby destroying yet another perfectly good concept? You seem to be rather fond of such cheap equivocations; and if you destroy meaning in the process, why, Paris is worth the mass, right?

I don't equate coercion with causality. The coercion aspect only arises when we have desires which are unrealistic - that is, at odds with what our causal circumstances have determined what is possible for us.

We cannot, for instance, be in two different places at once. If a person did have the desire to be in two different places at once - e.g. to spy on two different groups of people - then he would experience the inability to do so as a form of coercion exerted by Nature.

All the while, the causal processes driving everything in this scenario unfold in a non-coercive fashion. That is to say, they unfold in an effortless fashion with no aim in mind and no opposition to overcome.

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David Quinn wrote:Yet the reality remains that if Nature determines - via physical laws, evolution, genetics, culture, etc - that a person cannot fly, then he cannot fly.

To dismiss this as an anthropomorphism is to deny reality.

I obviously don't dismiss those facts. What i dismiss is the characterization of them as coercion.

By doing so, you erase the distinction between coercion and causality.

vicdan wrote:I don't equate coercion with causality.

Sure you do. Every instance of coercion is already an instance of causality, and now you are necessarily implying that every instance of causality is a case of coercion. This makes 'causality' and 'coercion' strictly equivalent.

The coercion aspect only arises when we have desires which are unrealistic - that is, at odds with what our causal circumstances have determined what is possible for us.

Meaning, as long as you don't want 2+2 to be 5, the fact that it can't be is not coercion against you. The fact that you can't want otherwise (due to causality) of course doesn't count. :)

Since the very causal processes in question determine what you want and don't want, this is a wholly meaningless distinction. If a hostile hypnotist manipulated you into wanting to give him all your money, this would be coercion, even though that's what you want now. Why aren't you applying the same standard to the laws of nature?

As long as you ignore the presence of agency, there is no qualitative difference between hypnotist manipulating you into wanting to give him $$, and natural laws causing you to want 2+2=4.

All the while, the causal processes driving everything in this scenario unfold in a non-coercive fashion. That is to say, they unfold in an effortless fashion with no aim in mind and no opposition to overcome.

Non-agency processes always unfold with no aim in mind and no opposition to overcome. Which is kinda the point.

vicdan wrote:

David Quinn wrote:I don't equate coercion with causality.

Sure you do. Every instance of coercion is already an instance of causality, and now you are necessarily implying that every instance of causality is a case of coercion. This makes 'causality' and 'coercion' strictly equivalent.

While every instance of coercion is causally-driven, not every causal process is coercive in nature. For example, Nature causing clouds to form in the sky isn't a coercive act, as the clouds lack the will or desire to oppose it.

vicdan wrote:

The coercion aspect only arises when we have desires which are unrealistic - that is, at odds with what our causal circumstances have determined what is possible for us.

Meaning, as long as you don't want 2+2 to be 5, the fact that it can't be is not coercion against you. The fact that you can't want otherwise (due to causality) of course doesn't count. :)

That's right. I've met plenty of people who want to believe that 2+2 can equal 5 because they feel oppressed by the demands of logic and the causal consequences of their actions. They would love nothing better than to discover that Nature is an "anything goes" affair. The fact that Nature always operates within logical parameters is experienced by them as a form of coercion.

The popularity of religious fantasies is a testament to the level of coercion people feel at the hands of Nature.

Since the very causal processes in question determine what you want and don't want, this is a wholly meaningless distinction. If a hostile hypnotist manipulated you into wanting to give him all your money, this would be coercion, even though that's what you want now. Why aren't you applying the same standard to the laws of nature?

As long as you ignore the presence of agency, there is no qualitative difference between hypnotist manipulating you into wanting to give him $$, and natural laws causing you to want 2+2=4.

Being hypnotized in such a manner is a form of coercion, certainly. And it is analogous to Nature hypnoting people - via genetics and cultural upbringing, etc - into believing in all sorts of irrationalities, such as the Christian myths. I mean, who in their right mind would subscribe to the fantasies of Christian fundamentalism? It is not something they would do if they were rational. Nature has hypnotized them into it.

vicdan wrote:

All the while, the causal processes driving everything in this scenario unfold in a non-coercive fashion. That is to say, they unfold in an effortless fashion with no aim in mind and no opposition to overcome.

Non-agency processes always unfold with no aim in mind and no opposition to overcome. Which is kinda the point.

True, they always unfold in this way. Yet it is also true that these aimless, effortless processes, being responsible for utterly everything that occurs, have the power to create unrealistic desires in people, leading them to clash with the restrictions effortlessly amd aimlessly imposed upon them by Nature.

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Aside from the fact that "freedom" isn't meaningfully defined, it's a decent little ditty. Undoubtedly a fairly moving rallying cry for the crowd which values freedom (whatever that may be) above all other concerns.

"They may take our lives, but they'll never take our freedom!!!!!!!!!!!!"

Not sure what dead guys do with freedom, but, there you go.

Hehe, Braveheart? I actually admire that sort of thing a lot more than I do ordinary lip service about freedom, precisely because the primary value being upheld is not so much the value being proclaimed (freedom) but the more laudable value of self-sacrifice for the sake of others. Dead guys, as you suggest, do nothing with freedom. Sacrificing oneself for any positive value, however, is much more admirable than simply writing peans to one's own worldview.

William Wallace didn't tack up hymns to freedom on the doors of his local pub, he went out and fought and died for what he believed, which is why he was the subject of a movie while typical American libertarians are the subject of mug shots when they get busted for weed or tax evasion (their two favorite "freedom-loving" pastimes).

David Quinn wrote:While every instance of coercion is causally-driven, not every causal process is coercive in nature. For example, Nature causing clouds to form in the sky isn't a coercive act, as the clouds lack the will or desire to oppose it.

But such lack is also coerced by nature! :)

Anyway, fine, then you define coercion as causality applied to human action -- i.e. you stipulate that every single human action is therefore a coerced action. This is a ludicrous redefinition, and a destruction of meaning. A semanticide, if you will. You are a perpetrator of semanticide.

You are also using the words in a way at odds with how it's normally used, and therefore at odds with what the word actually means:

Dictionary.com
Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy
Wikipedia

Every meaning of 'coercion' listed there, David, entails at least one agent on each side of the coercive relationship. your usage of 'coercion' to mean the application of causality to people -- i.e. your willingness to not require the coercer to be an agent -- is at odds with what the word means. once again, you are up to your pathetic redefinition games.

Being hypnotized in such a manner is a form of coercion, certainly. And it is analogous to Nature hypnoting people

Right. There is no distinction between 'action' and 'coerced action'. Bloody good show.

Unidian wrote:Aside from the fact that "freedom" isn't meaningfully defined, it's a decent little ditty. Undoubtedly a fairly moving rallying cry for the crowd which values freedom (whatever that may be) above all other concerns.

I am glad you agree. Of course people who have no clue about freedom wouldn't be in much of a position to value it.

Unidian wrote:William Wallace didn't tack up hymns to freedom on the doors of his local pub, he went out and fought and died for what he believed, which is why he was the subject of a movie while typical American libertarians are the subject of mug shots when they get busted for weed or tax evasion (their two favorite "freedom-loving" pastimes).

I publicly dissented against a dictatorial regime for the sake of freedom, putting my entire future at risk. Does that count?

I publicly dissented against a dictatorial regime for the sake of freedom, putting my entire future at risk. Does that count?

You quit work?

Just kidding. I assume you mean the USSR. I dunno, it might count. I guess that would depend on how much actual danger you were in. Was it likely they were going to send some schoolkid to gulag? Hell, I dunno, maybe they did things like that.

Genuine willingness to die for a value is the antithesis of freedom.You are prisoner to that value;even if that value is some sort of freedom conception.

That is what is so amusing about soldiers.Unless one is supremely confident of success in battle without risk of death, then the rational thing to do in the face of tyranny is to attempt escape,not fight.

Unidian wrote:You quit work?

yeah, you would consider work a dictatorial regime.

Just kidding. I assume you mean the USSR. I dunno, it might count. I guess that would depend on how much actual danger you were in.

I was in danger of getting blacklisted, and being denied a chance to get higher education, or to ever occupy any position requiring education or responsibility. Yeah, i know, you don't consider it worthwhile to be able to do something you find fulfilling.

yeah, you would consider work a dictatorial regime.

I'm sure bosses worldwide will be relieved to know it isn't. It's got to a burden giving orders all day.

I was in danger of getting blacklisted, and being denied a chance to get higher education, or to ever occupy any position requiring education or responsibility. Yeah, i know, you don't consider it worthwhile to be able to do something you find fulfilling.

On the contrary, oh sarcastic one. I happen to find freedom fulfilling.

Go figure, eh?

So should a true freedom lover travel to Iran and talk about the insanity that is islam and how it enslaves one both mentally and physically? Maybe someone should start up a game show where people compete to see who loves freedom the most by traveling around the world to the most freedom hating countries in the world and screaming from the roof tops how anti-freedom they are. I would so tune in for that.

Besides, Victor, you apparently fail to notice that there are numerous people in this very forum who have flushed their entire conventional lives down the toilet for the sake of what they value. Whether you and I happen to agree with those particular values does not change this fact. When you are done bragging (for the umpteenth time) about your brush with danger in the USSR, you might want to look around this very forum and notice some of the people who have thrown everything overboard for the sake of their own values.

But meh, I have a feeling you won't acknowledge that to be the case, so let's see why not.

Unidian wrote:I'm sure bosses worldwide will be relieved to know it isn't. It's got to a burden giving orders all day.

Right, because our dictatorial regime requires you to go and take any specific employment. Of course you consider yourself oppressed when someone else has something you want but are unwilling to earn, so that much is a given.

Unidian wrote:I happen to find freedom fulfilling.

But only as long as it's achieved by forcing other people to support your freedom against their will. Right. Nice vision of freedom you got.

Unidian wrote:Besides, Victor, you apparently fail to notice that there are numerous people in this very forum who have flushed their entire conventional lives down the toilet

I didn't compare myself to any people, here or elsewhere. i compared myself to your hypothetical libertarian who risks nothing for their protestations about freedom.

Nice try at topic change, dude. You are as weasely as ever.

And you are as egotistical and comical.

It doesn't really matter who you are comparing yourself to, because one can always be assured the result will be in your favor. It's like watching one of those intentionally-cheesy superhero parodies.

Oh well, I pity you. Have fun with your Ubermensch fantasies.

Of course you consider yourself oppressed when someone else has something you want but are unwilling to earn, so that much is a given.

I consider all people oppressed by the entire "earning" paradigm. Yourself included, not that you'd be interested in actual liberation. You'd rather spend most of your life slaving and pretend it's freedom. Meh - what else is new? It's the American Way.

Seriously, though. Do you actually want to talk about this shit yet again? LOL...

vicdan wrote:

David Quinn wrote:While every instance of coercion is causally-driven, not every causal process is coercive in nature. For example, Nature causing clouds to form in the sky isn't a coercive act, as the clouds lack the will or desire to oppose it.

But such lack is also coerced by nature! :)

It would be if such a lack was opposed by the clouds.

Anyway, fine, then you define coercion as causality applied to human action -- i.e. you stipulate that every single human action is therefore a coerced action. This is a ludicrous redefinition, and a destruction of meaning. A semanticide, if you will. You are a perpetrator of semanticide.

If a person was fully rational and consequently fully accepted every scenario created by Nature (in the knowledge that Nature cannot do otherwise), then he wouldn't experience any coercion by Nature.

You are also using the words in a way at odds with how it's normally used, and therefore at odds with what the word actually means:

Dictionary.com
Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy
Wikipedia

Every meaning of 'coercion' listed there, David, entails at least one agent on each side of the coercive relationship. your usage of 'coercion' to mean the application of causality to people -- i.e. your willingness to not require the coercer to be an agent -- is at odds with what the word means. once again, you are up to your pathetic redefinition games.

I don't even recognize that people are agents, let alone Nature itself. Yet it is useful to pretend that they are, for the purposes of simplifying communication. It is easier to say, "Victor decided to go to the shop and buy bread", rather than go through a list of the zillions of causal factors which contribute to the formation of such a decision.

You seem to be forgetting that words are mere figures of speech, at bottom, and don't actually contain any significant truth within themselves.

vicdan wrote:

Being hypnotized in such a manner is a form of coercion, certainly. And it is analogous to Nature hypnoting people

Right. There is no distinction between 'action' and 'coerced action'. Bloody good show.

When a person is fully rational, he is no longer being hypnotized.

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