GENIUS FORUMS

Passthrough wrote to Leyla,

I don't know where you stand with the belief in God (according to your signature you don't believe), but if God is in the noumena and our true selves are also there, but we can only know what we perceive of ourselves, not our true nature...then, perhaps we cannot see God for these same reasons....

I know you weren't asking me, but my view is that God and the noumena are the same. God is infinite and can't exist within anything else, because something within another thing would have to have boundary, which makes something finite, and which God can't have because it is infinite. Another aspect of God is that nothing can be separate from it, because that would mean, again, that God has a boundary between what is God and what is not God. But there is nothing that is not God, because God is infinite by definition. At least my definition of God is that God is infinite.

L:

If it is true that one cannot step outside of mind or have access to that which is beyond mind, on what grounds can it be said that there is anything other than what you are perceiving, in whatever form you choose to articulate it?

In answer to your question, you cannot. BUT if you go down that road you end up in either solipsism or extreme skepticism, both of which are not workable to me.

I think Matt said that “around here” all things are noumena and everything else, including our perceptions, are phenomena…which, if I'm not mistaken, has been termed “around here” as delusional. Therefore, “around here” there is only one true reality and if you are going to use a term to otherwise define amongst Kant’s terms, it would be the noumena. I tend to understand and accept this theory academically but that is another discussion I guess.


L:

Is not "the painting is noumenal" a part of mind and, therefore, phenomenal?

I thought about this too. What I came up with is that you have a choice to either doubt everything, as did Descartes at first, and wander around completely disillusioned OR you can choose to live in your perceived world. If you choose to live in your perceived world, then you have to accept the objects within that world as real. HOWEVER, If YOU are real (and I have to take that as a given based on my choice), you have your opinion about the object and so do I, both of which may not be the same. Therefore, we both conclude that the object exists, but our perception clouds its true nature…thus causing the true object to be in the noumena, which can never be truly known or observed, and is perceived by us phenomenally.


L:

To elaborate: The Buddhist concept Emptiness--"all things lack inherent existence"--also means that there can be no such thing as an absolute form.

And this does not necessarily refute what I’m saying. There can never be an absolute form because we cannot ever define it outside the mind. Everyone has their opinion about how something should be defined and no one has the same definition, therefore no absolute. Locke had spoken
about this in referring to innate ideas, which he refuted, but on one condition, that is – universal consent, however, he stated that no human being is aware of the same idea, therefore, it doesn’t exist.

However, this Buddhist concept speaks of inherent existence which could mean also that the thing-in-itself does not actually exist at all. All is one delusion. And in some ways, going back to the Unified Field Theory issue, if you take away those forces that hold objects together, you will be left with a field devoid of matter….so, in effect no thing exists but for these energy forces holding them together.

L:

As my son puts it, nothing can ever have a true form since every observer perceives it differently according to their senses. So, there can’t be noumena--that is, no thing has a true (absolute) form even though all things have form.

Well, I commented on Word and hadn’t got this far before I see where your son’s conclusion pretty much came to what I said. He is right, except for the fact that it is backwards, to me. Noumena is what truly exists and what we perceive is illusory. I suppose this might be a determiner of who believes in God and who believes this is as good as it gets….and maybe I am backwards.

L:

For instance, we see a spider web as a particular form. A spider’s perception of the form is based primarily on its strongest sense perception, which is sound. How do you suppose “spider web” looks to a spider? Does that difference necessarily mean it has an absolute form none can know, or it has all forms perceptible to all possible observers?

This kind of gets into Plato’s forms theory, where he said that in Heaven there exist the perfect forms of every object and the objects we see are imperfect copies of the true forms. While I’m not sure about the reality of his theory, his theory has its merits here. There exist objects in every day life that you would consider round, an orange, a circular drive, but none of them are perfect circles. No one can draw or create the perfect circle, so there is a perfect form that will never be known. So the spider’s web, in this theory, would be an imperfect form of the true spider’s web. But then, where would the true spider’s web be?

So this must be a different argument than what I am thinking about because the way I see it everything inherently exists based on perceptions of objects, but no one can define a particular mass of something as an absolute. The spider’s web could be destroyed with the swipe of a hand. The web matter is still there but it is not in the same form. Matt spoke of burning the painting. The painting is still there but it is in a different form. You could mix up the charred remains into some concoction that is now used to fertilize plants. So you could not define any object as absolute because of its transient nature.

Which is why the noumena or true reality must be God, in my opinion, the creator of all things and from which we came and to where we will go for I believe we have a soul. Some would rather see it as being a victim of causality, you and your mind that was once conscious but now is not will be buried in the ground when you die. Others see a reincarnation of their conscious into another person or animal until they are liberated from samsara. I think samsara is a viable theory but in one person’s lifetime there can be many liberations, but I do not believe in many lifetimes…but no one knows the answer to that one, and I would be highly skeptical of the person that told me they had been reincarnated from a _________ (fill in the blank).

M:

Just keep in mind that David's book is a difficult one, mostly because he's talking about deep and subtle truths that can take a lot of effort to understand.

P: I am not averse to a challenge. I realize I am green and perhaps I may never understand what he thinks, but I’m not walking away either. He put it in the public domain so that others may learn, so I am going to attempt to learn what I can and move on…and possibly return to it again later on. Nothing like this is easy nor is it really attainable by an academic understanding. While I believe there are many things we can do - should do, I also believe there is more to it than what we can do by ourselves...for we are limited by...

Fear.

And yes, I do understand this much… it can be paralyzing.

M:

I've read through it five or six times over the course of however many years ago he released it. Three or four, I guess? And I've been on this forum reading his posts forever. Of course, that could just be a reflection of my own limitations, but I think it's safe to say that it's difficult.

P: I may not understand a lot about what he says based on his use of language in order to verbalize what he thinks, but I do not underestimate God wherein the wise are made fools and those who know their limitations are wise beyond means. I would venture to guess and that I am not far off by stating that submitting to this Totality means striving for perfection while remaining perfect in humility.

L: If it is true that one cannot step outside of mind or have access to that which is beyond mind, on what grounds can it be said that there is anything other than what you are perceiving, in whatever form you choose to articulate it?

p: In answer to your question, you cannot. BUT if you go down that road you end up in either solipsism or extreme skepticism, both of which are not workable to me.

Can you demonstrate how that is necessarily the case?

As a subject, my conception of reality is necessarily a conception of it and confined to self as a subject and all concomitant experience. I conceive, objectively and subjectively, the existence of others but since I hold that it is my mind so conceiving and therefore posit only the possibility of the existence of others and deduce from that certain logically sound conclusions about all possible subjects and existences (such as the absolute truth of A=A), are such conclusions solipsistic or extremely sceptical?

I think Matt said that “around here” all things are noumena and everything else, including our perceptions, are phenomena…which, if I'm not mistaken, has been termed “around here” as delusional.

I don’t know why Matt is doing this. I see no need to replace the term Infinite with the term “noumena.” To my mind, these point to different understandings, and one of them is deluded. The Infinite ultimately points to a truthful understanding of the finite. It is not the opposite of finitude, “around here.” Perhaps whoever it was you mentioned in your initial post meant exactly this when they said Kant was showing bad faith using noumena as an explanation for what cannot be known--mind you, I think it would be using bad faith (not to mention logic) using anything as an explanation for what cannot be known. This forum is plagued by that problem at the moment.

Again, one can only comprehend the Infinite by understanding and explaining finitude. This is one of the reasons people get into trouble with causality. Having not understood it in terms of finitude, the attempt is made to make it finite by looking for its beginning (a cause of causality--aka, a creator God; *or a scientific singular dual-force theory :)).

More later.

[Edited to add comment at *]

Passthrough,

I think Matt said that “around here” all things are noumena and everything else, including our perceptions, are phenomena…which, if I'm not mistaken, has been termed “around here” as delusional.

I don't know what you're talking about. By "around here", I meant the Genius Forum.



Leyla,

I don’t know why Matt is doing this. I see no need to replace the term Infinite with the term “noumena.” To my mind, these point to different understandings, and one of them is deluded.

I think they are useful categories, despite Kant's misguided usage of them. By noumena, I just take it to mean "what's real", and phenomena is "what appears".

L:

As a subject, my conception of reality is necessarily a conception of it and confined to self as a subject and all concomitant experience. I conceive, objectively and subjectively, the existence of others but since I hold that it is my mind so conceiving and therefore posit only the possibility of the existence of others and deduce from that certain logically sound conclusions about all possible subjects and existences (such as the absolute truth of A=A), are such conclusions solipsistic or extremely sceptical?

You are correct, it is not necessarily the case – thank you for pointing out my error. Do you personally hold your conclusion as a belief?

L:

I don’t know why Matt is doing this. I see no need to replace the term Infinite with the term “noumena.” Perhaps whoever it was you mentioned in your initial post meant exactly this when they said Kant was showing bad faith using noumena as an explanation for what cannot be known--

He isn’t really doing anything, it is I that asked what Kant meant by these terms. I think he was trying to put them into perspective for me.

L:

mind you, I think it would be using bad faith (not to mention logic) using anything as an explanation for what cannot be known. This forum is plagued by that problem at the moment.

And how are you not doing that yourself by stating this:

To my mind, these point to different understandings, and one of them is deluded. The Infinite ultimately points to a truthful understanding of the finite. It is not the opposite of finitude, “around here.”

Also, I am not sure that is what is being said. If God is noumena then God is true reality, all things less illusion/delusion through mind’s perception. How is this stating that the Infinite is the opposite of finitude? I think what was trying to be explained is that there is no singular thing that can be defined as absolute because of its transient nature, but a part of the Absolute, yes. Perhaps, I am not grasping what it is you are trying to question.

L:

Again, one can only comprehend the Infinite by understanding and explaining finitude. This is one of the reasons people get into trouble with causality. Having not understood it in terms of finitude, the attempt is made to make it finite by looking for its beginning (a cause of causality--aka, a creator God).

And this is where we may part ways, which is fine, but if it cannot be known whether there is a beginning or is not a beginning, using your logic above…why is it necessarily that there is no God, the creator, and no beginning?

I find myself in disagreement with all camps in this debate. I can identify with Leyla's idealistic skeptisism, but I've pushed such skeptisism as far as it can go, and found the path to be empty and contradictory. It's true that we can't demonstrate the noumena to exist with certainty, but we can't demonstrate anything with that degree of certainty given the problem of regress. G. E. Moore gave a subtle and excellent argument against idealism, in which he held up his hand and exclaimed that he knew it existed with certainty. We can see in his demonstration that if we accept ourselves seeing his hand, and we accept the fact that he too can see it in order to make a claim about it; that there must be some sort of reason for our shared understanding. Some reason outside of both of our minds. Hence, the noumena.

Matt seems to be making an old mistake that began with Berkeley, in merging the concept of the noumena with God (or Platonism in Matt's case). Berkeley was termed an idealist, and perhaps coined the term, but he didn't truly reject the noumena as a modern anti-realist does; rather he simply replaced the world outside our minds with the mind of God. I think this is more intelligent mistake then that made by the naive realist who assumes that everything he/she sees is physical, but it is nevertheless a mistake in that it assumes too much. What we call "physical" is understood only in our minds through appearances, and whatever the noumena is, I don't think we should simply assert that it is mind of a transcendent anthropomorphic deity.

Matt's mistake is a little more subtle then that of Berkeley though, so I need to give it some special consideration. Whereas we know that Kant rejected the notion that we could know anything about the noumena, it seems that Matt is suggesting that facts that correspond to tautological truths hide there. Thus, for Matt, it seems that the noumena is what we might call the Platonic realm. It strikes me as apparent that such tautological truths are true in a different manner then an empirical truth such as "the snow is white". Whereas "the snow is white" is generally taken to be true because we can see snow and it appears to be white, a truth such as "all bachelors are unmarried" doesn't lend itself to such correspondence. One can take from this the fact that "all bachelors are unmarried" must then correspond to a deeper fact, perhaps one hidden in the noumena, but I feel that notion to be a mistake. A more simple explanation for the truth of our infamous unmarried bachelors is the simple fact that we call true any identity drawn between synonyms.

Here I'll point to Occam's razor: "one should not multiply entities beyond necessity". The notion that "bachelor" and "unmarried man" refer to two different concepts, and yet the same thing, is faulty. We simply have two different terms for the same basic concept. A word is simply a noise or a scribble that we use to preform some task (Wittgenstein gives a brilliant overview of how our language-game is learned in his Philosophical Investigations). That task can be anything from getting someone to act in a specific manner ("RUN!"), to reporting something that we saw ("The cow was green."). We can even imagine a language where someone could say only "green" to preform the same task as reporting "the cow was green". Such a language would be designed to report color only as it concerned cows. In short, the Platonist refuses to accept that his transcendental posits report truths that are made true by rules of the language-game, rather then a correspondence to reality (or even Reality).

Ironic,

I think you're closely, but not quite understanding my view of noumena and phenomena. I'm not a Platonist. I'm assuming a Platonist would classify actual ideas as noumena, but I don't do it like that. Nor do I think of thought itself as noumena, nor the sources of thoughts for that matter.

Ideas and thoughts are things that appear to us. They are finite, they have causes, they are dependent on a consciousness to exist, etc., and so they are phenomena. But what they do enable us to do is to become conscious of the noumena, and I think it could be legitimately argued that this is the only thing that thoughts enable us to do and is their only purpose, but I'll leave that question for some other time.

Anyway, thoughts, true thoughts, give us consciousness of the noumena, because the noumena is truth. When two people have a true thought, like 2+2=4, they both arrive at that thought independently. The appearance of the thought is causally dependent on many things, like the proper context being in place, the symbols being defined properly and consciousness being present and logically functional and so forth. So all of these causes must be present in both people. But the truth they both individually arrive at is the same exact truth. Truth is not causally dependent and is infinite. 2+2=4 is true at every time and in every place in the universe, because this is the nature of truth.

So, although all ideas are finite phenomena, true ideas point to truth, which is the noumena.

Another difference I have with Platonists is that to me there is no separate noumenal world. Phenomena are simply the noumena (or should I say, the Noumenon), divided and differentiated by consciousness. The noumenal world is the whole and phenomena are its parts. But it's useful to divide them into two categories because the noumena can't be grasped by the intellect the way phenomena can. It has to be realized in the mystical sense in order to grasp it. This can only be done with solid and extended concentration directly on the noumena, on truth.

I do call it "God", but that's only poetic. The noumena is not conscious or anything, other than through beings like us. God is simply the whole. I just like to call it that as an argument against other, finite conceptions of God.

ExI:

It's true that we can't demonstrate the noumena to exist with certainty, but we can't demonstrate anything with that degree of certainty given the problem of regress. G. E. Moore gave a subtle and excellent argument against idealism, in which he held up his hand and exclaimed that he knew it existed with certainty. We can see in his demonstration that if we accept ourselves seeing his hand, and we accept the fact that he too can see it in order to make a claim about it; that there must be some sort of reason for our shared understanding. Some reason outside of both of our minds. Hence, the noumena.

Of course, I disagree that this is an excellent argument against idealism and refute it thus; the "some sort of" reason to which he refers is outside each human observer’s subjective mind in that it appears (IS) to each observer as an external, three-dimensional object (occupying space). However, it is not and never has been an object outside of any mind.

This cannot be logically or empirically falsified—and that means that I am certain of it.

Has mind ever not observed and come to conclusions about all things?

.

Matt writes:

By noumena, I just take it to mean "what's real", and phenomena is "what appears".

If you mean to be Kantian here, you miss; but that's okay since you say clearly what you do mean by these two terms.

The noumenal/phenomenal distinction in Kant means to put forth a world of things-in-themselves for which human subjectivities absolutely and entirely are not and never will have access too; one will never sneak up on the noumenal and get a peek. The only sure thing we can bank on a la Kant is that there is this noumenal quality to things - that things have a thing-in-itself space to which no one has access, and that our reasoning process surely tells us this is so.

This can be seen, genealogically, as a statement of the condition of our own minds. For the blue-billionth time, this isolatory self does not rest on definitions of inherency; inherency is not the point, or the point value. But this is part of the story of the increasing, waking subjectivity of human consciousness, and a scan of philosophy shows this historically evolving, we-are-the-subject drive. We are so the subject now, that materialist philosophy makes its appearance on the stage, and all discussion of mind is reviewed through the microscopic movements in brain science.

Kant is that strange moment in the genealogy of human thought where the divided world of old metaphysics and the increasingly existential one begin a reversal of values. He still has one foot rooted in eternal essence and takes a step out with the other to occupy the human being, the human being that in arriving to itself must inhabit exactly what it is. Kant is that hingepin in western philosophic thinking that makes the workings of the instrument as important as that which it believes it sees.

Happily, Kant can rest assured he is free of blasphemous negations of an eternal in-itself essence to existence; but he has moved science, philosophy, psychology, the structures of logic - moved them all onto the human stage. Our intellectual structure only tells us that there is noumenal, thing-in-itself space to which we do not have access. Now what becomes interesting is the structure of understanding in the mind. This is a no-mountain/mountain moment in western philosophy. I don't know too many paths to enlightenment that are not all about an undeluded occupation of what we are, and Kant's on the slow coach there.

Expectantly Ironic writes:

G. E. Moore gave a subtle and excellent argument against idealism, in which he held up his hand and exclaimed that he knew it existed with certainty. We can see in his demonstration that if we accept ourselves seeing his hand, and we accept the fact that he too can see it in order to make a claim about it; that there must be some sort of reason for our shared understanding. Some reason outside of both of our minds. Hence, the noumena.

Here again, a use for noumenal with which I'm unfamiliar. The description above speaks entirely to the existential, the phenomenal, to me. It is safe at all times to reason that a hand or an apple is there, for what boundaries we can obliterate in the categorical abstractions of thought will certainly reappear when the hand slaps us or we bite down on the apple.

Moving, moving everso slowly to occupy what we are . . . to go past the need to believe in a noumenal apple or a hand, or set a phantom essence for them any further away from how we experience them, to speak this way in magic. Centuries, for centuries, the phenomenal has suffered the downgrading of the metaphysicans - and sometimes in a sweeping act of bad faith or amnesia - that in our very fibers we both value and fear temporality. We forget that temporality has set the value to things, and this we are scarcely conscious of. Instead our fear for our own temporality has driven us for many thinking centuries onto the cool blue planes of eternality, where surely only things-that-last - eternal essences - are worth anything at all. We forget ourselves. And most all paths of enlightenment, most all work of the rising consciousness, is in some degree directed toward bringing ourselves home to ourselves as the phenomena we are, where for centuries we have been too frightened and discouraged, dazzled and dreaming, to fully occupy. Appearance - bah! - it can be deceptive, illusory, disappointing for its ephemerality, not worth anything because of it . . . so many humans still resting in the shade of a thousand different ways to avoid themselves as phenomena.

Nietzsche was bright to envision (or at least hope-for) the next stage in the evolution of consciousness to belong to a life form that not only knows what it is and loves same, but knows what it wants to become and loves that more (and further, can make it happen). Existence that does not run from itself to its imaginary, noumenal forever-friends, taking naps there and cool sips, waving righteously its arms for the eternal; its own feet sunk down in clay . . . .


.

EI:

I find myself in disagreement with all camps in this debate. I can identify with Leyla's idealistic skeptisism, but I've pushed such skeptisism as far as it can go, and found the path to be empty and contradictory. It's true that we can't demonstrate the noumena to exist with certainty, but we can't demonstrate anything with that degree of certainty given the problem of regress. G. E. Moore gave a subtle and excellent argument against idealism, in which he held up his hand and exclaimed that he knew it existed with certainty. We can see in his demonstration that if we accept ourselves seeing his hand, and we accept the fact that he too can see it in order to make a claim about it; that there must be some sort of reason for our shared understanding. Some reason outside of both of our minds. Hence, the noumena.

P: I suppose this is where I was headed with her about the skepticism because if you take Moore ’s scenario and think: how do I even know the other person exists? If you accept that what you see exists, then you have to accept that the other person exists. If both existences are accepted as true, and their shared experience of an object allows them to concur that something does exist..that this concurrence is in the noumena ? I don't agree, I still see it as a perception, two people’s perception of an object that is in the noumena.

EI:

Matt seems to be making an old mistake that began with Berkeley , in merging the concept of the noumena with God (or Platonism in Matt's case). Berkeley was termed an idealist, and perhaps coined the term, but he didn't truly reject the noumena as a modern anti-realist does; rather he simply replaced the world outside our minds with the mind of God. I think this is more intelligent mistake then that made by the naive realist who assumes that everything he/she sees is physical, but it is nevertheless a mistake in that it assumes too much.

P: Because this world outside isn’t necessarily a god or God? And why is it a mistake to attribute what would take a book to define (and then not even be perfectly defined) as God vs any other word, such as Ultimate Reality, Totality, the Infinite?

EI:

What we call "physical" is understood only in our minds through appearances, and whatever the noumena is, I don't think we should simply assert that it is mind of a transcendent anthropomorphic deity.

P: Why do you limit Matt’s understanding to a transcendent anthropomorphic deity (TAD)? I suppose Matt may have made this understanding known in other threads, but I didn’t understand him to make this claim in this one. And while I understand that an explanation of the noumena is not necessarily God (non-TAD) or this TAD, it can still be a theory, can it not? If not, why not?

M:

I do call it "God", but that's only poetic. The noumena is not conscious or anything, other than through beings like us. God is simply the whole. I just like to call it that as an argument against other, finite conceptions of God.

P: For argument’s sake, let’s assume your definition of God exists, synonymic with noumena. You have already stated earlier that you are in the noumena, correct? If you are in the noumena, as a part, and conscious, such that you can come to understand noumena; and the noumena, as a whole, is not conscious, then you are something that the noumena is not…therefore, the noumena appears to be limited. It would seem that this conclusion would make you more of a god than God.

To me, God would have to be the Supreme Consciousness of which our conscious, if we have any at all, is but a part. This opens up the notion of thoughts not being individually derived from Kantian categorical or a priori theory or sensory perception. I don't see how you can have it both ways. If I am missing the boat completely...well, I'm sure you will let me know.

Matt,

So, although all ideas are finite phenomena, true ideas point to truth, which is the noumena.

It's my opinion that tautological truths point to nothing. Something like "2+2=4" is true because of the language-game, save for where it's obviously intended to point to an empirical concept like two apples and two apples making four apples. If it speaks of any fundamental laws of the universe, it merely speaks of the fact that the universe is consistent enough so that one can make inductive determinations about it.


Leyla,

However, it is not and never has been an object outside of any mind.

Your refutation seems to consist of restating your position. I realize that the hand as it is seen is phenomenal, but that doesn't mean the phenomenon of the hand doesn't isomorphically reflect a noumenal hand. I believe that our subjective experience emerges from something outside of it. Lets call this "something" noumenal neurons. It is my opinion that subjective experience happens because "noumenal light particles" stimulate "noumenal retinal nerves" which then send signals through "noumenal axon bundles" (I do realize that all those things appear to us as phenomena, but they could also have a non-subjective existence...). Nevertheless, I can't prove this to you, and we'll just have to agree to disagree.

This cannot be logically or empirically falsified—and that means that I am certain of it.

I don't happen to think you can logically falsify anything (due to the problem of regress), and such things are obviously not an empirical matter. Regardless, you may have your skeptisism on this matter. It certainly isn't misguided, I just don't think such skeptisism is overly pragmatic.

Has mind ever not observed and come to conclusions about all things?

That really depends on what you mean by this.


Pye,

Here again, a use for noumenal with which I'm unfamiliar. The description above speaks entirely to the existential, the phenomenal, to me.

The description is phenomenal by necessity. I'm not sure of how I'd go about giving a noumenal description (as it can't be done). I think your position on this matter consists in "why talk of the noumenal?". I can't give a good answer to that. I'd abandon talk of the noumenal if anti-realists abandoned talk of it, but that isn't being done here. Perhaps a "Whereof one cannot speak..." treaty needs to be signed amongst all parties. :) Regardless, if you're saying what I think your saying, I tend to agree.


passthrough,

I don't agree, I still see it as a perception, two people’s perception of an object that is in the noumena.

That's my point. I'm not saying that the hand as it is seen is noumena, but rather the fact that we accept that two people are seeing the same thing suggests to us the existence of the noumena.

Because this world outside isn’t necessarily a god or God? And why is it a mistake to attribute what would take a book to define (and then not even be perfectly defined) as God vs any other word, such as Ultimate Reality, Totality, the Infinite?

I don't think one should call the world outside anything beyond the noumena. The word "noumena" is relatively neutral and free of properties that we attribute to things like Gods or Totalities or whatnot. We have reason to suspect the noumena, but we don't have reason to tag on additional properties to it.

Why do you limit Matt’s understanding to a transcendent anthropomorphic deity (TAD)?

I was talking about Berkeley. I realize that Matt doesn't advocate a TAD.

then you are something that the noumena is not…therefore, the noumena appears to be limited.

I don't automatically deny panpsychist thought. The noumena could very well be pure consciousness. I don't know. Whatever "phenomena" and "noumena" is, we define the terms somewhat arbitrarily, so it isn't saying anything about the nature of reality (or God if you believe in that sort of thing) by suggesting that the noumena doesn't involve conscious thought (if we were to define it as such), but rather simply speaks of how we tend to categorize things. Of course, all philosophy is basically just a discussion over how things should be spoken of, but that's really besides my point here.

This opens up the notion of thoughts not being individually derived from Kantian categorical or a priori theory or sensory perception.

That it would. You seem to be suggesting that the consciousness of God is the place from where we pull our thoughts from. A very Platonist god. Perhaps, but I always go with mundane explanations when they are available, and I feel that there are perfectly solid mundane explanations for the things that Platonism attempts to explain. There's nothing inherently wrong with your view, but I tend to abide by Occam's law as a matter of habit. I'd say that I also abide by Wittgenstein's law (Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must remain silent), but I'm really doing a lousy job of that in this thread. :)

ExI:

I realize that the hand as it is seen is phenomenal, but that doesn't mean the phenomenon of the hand doesn't isomorphically reflect a noumenal hand. I believe that our subjective experience emerges from something outside of it.

If you are defining subjective experience as an effect point located in space, then I could agree with this. I can appreciate the reasoning behind a subjectivity confined to the idea of that spatial effect which is consequent to the experience of external (spatial) objects to it. However, with such a reckoning I cannot also reason the idea of the existence of thought. What space does thought itself occupy? Memory? “I”? None of these things could exist within the confines of your reasoning, yet you would somehow reasonably posit such a thing as a noumenal hand?

So, when you say “emerges,” do you mean begins and develops from--or do you mean that that is what constitutes it entirely?

Lets call this "something" noumenal neurons. It is my opinion that subjective experience happens because "noumenal light particles" stimulate "noumenal retinal nerves" which then send signals through "noumenal axon bundles". Nevertheless, I can't prove this to you, [snip]

Well, that’s a problem to me!

…and we'll just have to agree to disagree.

No, not necessarily. I can still fight you, you know. And, you know why? Because I exist!

I don't happen to think you can logically falsify anything (due to the problem of regress), and such things are obviously not an empirical matter.

Yes, I realised (at least in good enough part) the significance of regress to your position but had decided to shy away from it, temporarily.

I’ll address it as soon as I consider I have given the matter appropriate thought (which, unlike noumena, also exists).

Leyla,

Allow me to back up here. I was getting a bit muddled with my thinking. What would it mean for me to suggest that the noumena exists? The apparent answer is nothing. We can look and report, but we can't look at the noumena, so what would it be that we would be reporting about it? So, quite obviously, the noumena doesn't exist. Yet, what would it mean for me to say the noumena doesn't exist? The apparent answer is nothing.

What's the phenomenal? It seems we've defined the term so that it means everything we can experience. Can we speak knowledgeably of that beyond that which we can experience? No, that doesn't seem reasonable. Does that mean that only experience exists? No, that doesn't seem reasonable either. It would almost seem here as if we don't know what we're saying. Could it be that one of the most controversial and hotly debated topics in modern philosophy is just so many moves in a language-game prettied up with suggestive imagery?

Metaphysics eat themselves.

Because I exist!

Nevertheless, if I were to say you exist, I'd be merely reporting my subjective experience of you. Should I conclude from that that you don't exist?

Pye wrote:

We forget that temporality has set the value to things, and this we are scarcely conscious of. Instead our fear for our own temporality has driven us for many thinking centuries onto the cool blue planes of eternality, where surely only things-that-last - eternal essences - are worth anything at all. We forget ourselves. And most all paths of enlightenment, most all work of the rising consciousness, is in some degree directed toward bringing ourselves home to ourselves as the phenomena we are, where for centuries we have been too frightened and discouraged, dazzled and dreaming, to fully occupy.

While you tend to overwrite*, this section is beautiful.

*but not in a bad way, just a little flowerly, a little too spiritually, as if it was an appeal to accept the poeticness of the ideas, rather than the ideas themsleves. in your posts however there is very little I actually disagree with.

ExI:

Allow me to back up here. I was getting a bit muddled with my thinking. What would it mean for me to suggest that the noumena exists? The apparent answer is nothing. We can look and report, but we can't look at the noumena, so what would it be that we would be reporting about it? So, quite obviously, the noumena doesn't exist. Yet, what would it mean for me to say the noumena doesn't exist? The apparent answer is nothing.

What's the phenomenal? It seems we've defined the term so that it means everything we can experience. Can we speak knowledgeably of that beyond that which we can experience? No, that doesn't seem reasonable. Does that mean that only experience exists? No, that doesn't seem reasonable either. It would almost seem here as if we don't know what we're saying.

[laughs] Yeah, thanks for that. But I‘m not done yet!

L: Because I exist!

ExI: Nevertheless, if I were to say you exist, I'd be merely reporting my subjective experience of you. Should I conclude from that that you don't exist?

Sure you’d be reporting your subjective experience, and even if you did conclude that I don’t exist that would be your subjective experience--but, then, you‘d have to stop talking to me or else you‘d be contradicting yourself--or talking to yourself; and if the latter were the case, I hardly think “we‘d” be having so much trouble!

What you cannot falsify is that either one of these situations being the case of your subjective experience would be exactly that; your subjective experience.

In the case of noumena, an absolute proposition is posited regarding the absolute nature of things, not a particular object “Leyla.”

Are you trying to show me there is no difference?

Pye,

Matt: By noumena, I just take it to mean "what's real", and phenomena is "what appears".

Pye: If you mean to be Kantian here, you miss; but that's okay since you say clearly what you do mean by these two terms.

The noumenal/phenomenal distinction in Kant means to put forth a world of things-in-themselves for which human subjectivities absolutely and entirely are not and never will have access too; one will never sneak up on the noumenal and get a peek.

Well, the only difference is that Kant puts the concept of existence in the category of noumena, whereas I put it in with phenomena. Existence is a conceptual construction and can therefore be fully known.

Passthrough,

Matt: I do call it "God", but that's only poetic. The noumena is not conscious or anything, other than through beings like us. God is simply the whole. I just like to call it that as an argument against other, finite conceptions of God.

Passthrough: For argument’s sake, let’s assume your definition of God exists, synonymic with noumena.

Whoa there, hold the phone. We can define a thing however we want, it's just a matter of imagining the definition. So, there's no question that my definition exists, at least in my head.

You have already stated earlier that you are in the noumena, correct? If you are in the noumena, as a part, and conscious, such that you can come to understand noumena; and the noumena, as a whole, is not conscious, then you are something that the noumena is not…therefore, the noumena appears to be limited. It would seem that this conclusion would make you more of a god than God.

Let me give you an illustration of what I'm talking about. Let's take the United States, the continental United States. It's a hunk of land divided into 48 states. But where are the states? Are they in the land or are they in human consciousness? You could go to the border of two states and study the land, looking for the exact border, but you'll never find it. The United States is in human consciousness; if the human race were wiped out, there could be no United States.

The situation is the same with the distinction between phenomena and noumena. The United States represents the world of phenomena and the land represents the noumena. A state is not part of the land, and yet it is. A phenomenon is not part of the noumenon, and yet it is.

To me, God would have to be the Supreme Consciousness of which our conscious, if we have any at all, is but a part.

So would God have to be the Supreme Person in order for there to be persons? Or the Supreme Rock in order for there to be rocks? Consciousness is just like anything else. It may be mysterious as to how it works, but it's not anything special. Everything is just as mysterious at bottom.

Leyla,

What you cannot falsify is that either one of these situations being the case of your subjective experience would be exactly that; your subjective experience.

True enough. Now lets say we abandon this talk of noumena for a moment. My perspective doesn't hinge on it for obvious reasons. Lets also change up how we're using the term "subjective", because we've rendered it useless as things currently are. Lets say that something is only subjective if it is subject to one's thoughts. If my experience were controlled by my thoughts, then we should say that that experience is subjective. It's not though. I imagine that even if I were to deny your existence, I'd still see you post a reply to this. We'll call this immanent realism, as opposed to the transcendental realism of Kant.

I'd suggest that I have knowledge that Leyla is a conscious individual who exists in the world (the world being merely the totality of facts or true states of affairs). My grounds for this claim is that knowledge is only justified true belief. I have a justified belief that you exist, and thus I think it is true. Now if you accept my definition of knowledge, then you should agree that I have objective knowledge of your existence, insofar as you happen to think my claim is true. Remember here that by "objective" I merely mean that any sensory information I gather about you isn't controlled by whatever my opinion happens to be. (Mind you, I'm not pulling any of my definitions out of thin air to prop up my preferred method of speaking about things. Rather, these definitions are quite common insofar as I can tell.)

So, in short, I feel it's safe to say that I have objective knowledge of your existence. Agree?

In the case of noumena, an absolute proposition is posited regarding the absolute nature of things, not a particular object “Leyla.”

If we reject the noumena, as you've convinced me to do, then I'd say that the term "absolute" is useless as defined with the noumena in mind. What would it mean to propose something as an "absolute truth" if our beliefs are justified only by logic and sense-data, and don't pretend to be about a reality beyond our phenomenal experience? If we redefine "absolute truth" so that something is true "absolutely" insofar as we can have knowledge about it, then we should say that suggesting the noumena can't possibly be absolute, as we can't check the proposition against our only method of determining objective truth (sensory data). We should say, rather, that if one proposes the noumena as a truth regarding the absolute, then they do not know what they are saying.

Ironic,

Matt: So, although all ideas are finite phenomena, true ideas point to truth, which is the noumena.

Ironic: It's my opinion that tautological truths point to nothing. Something like "2+2=4" is true because of the language-game,

I don't know what you mean by "language-game", I suppose you mean to say that logic has no relevance, but 2+2=5 is something that points to nothing. 2+2=4 is the opposite: it's consistent and therefore can be applied to anything in the universe.

Logic is always universal. Even the qualification, "it's my opinion", is a testament to this feature of logic. In saying this, you're creating a universal proposition that takes your doubt into account in that anything in the universe is either your opinion, in which case the statement applies to it, or it's not your opinion, in which case the statement doesn't apply. In covering all possibilities, the statement reflects the universe. All sensible statements are universal like this: if they're not universal, they're qualified until they are. If they're not, then they are either false or nonsense. It's not a game, it's how a sane mind operates.

Something like "2+2=4" is true because of the language-game, save for where it's obviously intended to point to an empirical concept like two apples and two apples making four apples.

A proposition can't have two justifications. And numbers aren't empirical concepts.

If it speaks of any fundamental laws of the universe, it merely speaks of the fact that the universe is consistent enough so that one can make inductive determinations about it.

And deductive determinations, which is what philosophy is about. You need to snap out of the belief that the sensate world is objective reality. It's only as objective as a dream. The universe itself, however, is always consistent. It can never be something other than itself. It's the star you want to navigate by if you really want to get anywhere in thought. All that Wittgensteinian postmodernistic crap is the real game. That doesn't teach you anything about life. All it's good for is to act as a smokescreen for academic philosophers to hide behind so no one can understand what they say and how worthless it is.

ExI:

L: What you cannot falsify is that either one of these situations being the case of your subjective experience would be exactly that; your subjective experience.

ExI: True enough. Now lets say we abandon this talk of noumena for a moment (1). My perspective doesn't hinge on it for obvious reasons (2). Lets also change up how we're using the term "subjective", because we've rendered it useless as things currently are (3).

A(1) & A(2): OK.
A(3) We did? I’m not sure about that, but I’m listening.

ExI: Lets say that something is only subjective if it is subject to one's thoughts (4). If my experience were controlled by my thoughts, then we should say that that experience is subjective. It's not though (5). I imagine that even if I were to deny your existence, I'd still see you post a reply to this (6). We'll call this immanent realism, as opposed to the transcendental realism of Kant (7).

A(4) Sure, we can go with that definition. Subject: the object of thought.

A(5) So, The fact that I’m about to get up and experience cooking lasagne for dinner is not in any way related to any thoughts about or reasons for doing so and is therefore, by definition, not a subjective experience, despite the fact that I have been having thoughts about avoiding doing so for the last two hours. Hm. Maybe you mean if were to walk outside and get knocked down by a car without having an thought of doings so, this experience would not be subjective. Must be the latter. OK--moving on.

A(6) You imagine? So, that means that you have the thought that even if you were to deny my existence, you would still somehow not deny it enough to be able to deny that its there by virtue of seeing a post of mine? Returning to the car analogy in A(5), if follows then that if I were to see the car then deny that I had seen the car, I’d still get run over. I agree with this! I also agree that it would, by the aforesaid definition, also be a subjective experience.

A(7) I think I’d call it imminent death caused by deluded thinking. :)

I know the above sounds funny, but that’s really what your thinking sounds like to me.

I have to cook now before my kids starve (two teen boys tend to eat rather regularly), but I am finding your thinking interesting, ExI. Probably, I will have added more by the time you get around to replying again.

See you then.

Matt Gregory wrote:Passthrough,

Passthrough: For argument’s sake, let’s assume your definition of God exists, synonymic with noumena.

Whoa there, hold the phone. We can define a thing however we want, it's just a matter of imagining the definition. So, there's no question that my definition exists, at least in my head.

This forum is aggressive which is good in one way because it makes you think before you speak lest you get bulldozed...and as it should, but it also has a tendency for false perceptions of others intent...in other words, I was not saying that your definition does not exist at all, I was using it as argument form. As I told Leyla and I will tell you, I am a simple person with no agenda other than to learn here...if it sounds anyways other than that, it is due to my writing skills and not the person. Why would I bite the hand of one who feeds me?

The situation is the same with the distinction between phenomena and noumena. The United States represents the world of phenomena and the land represents the noumena. A state is not part of the land, and yet it is. A phenomenon is not part of the noumenon, and yet it is.

A helpful and interesting analogy.

Consciousness is just like anything else. It may be mysterious as to how it works, but it's not anything special.

I'm not sure I agree with you that it is nothing special, if it wasn't why are all things not as seemingly perceptive, such as rocks? I suppose we could slip-slide into how do you know rocks aren't conscious or the skeptic's argument about existence, in general...but let's not go there. Here is something I wrote elsewhere in thinking about it, and I'd like to read your opinion because it may also assist me in understanding "around here" better.

Kant agreed with Hume regarding knowledge through sensory experience. However, he thinks Hume missed the boat because we do not experience these sensations randomly, but rather as objects that seem to exist outside ourselves. He argued that we have a type of knowledge of space and time that we know prior to experience - a priori. This knowledge is used to organize and make sense of the outside world and is necessary and not dependent on objects for it to exist. Without it, sensations would be nothing more than something akin to individual frames of a movie film. It is our a priori knowledge that makes the movie connect from frame to frame.

Like a movie, objects appear in space and time to change. Kant explained that to show change in an object the mind has to receive the many separate sensations provided by the senses, like individual frames in a movie. The mind then has to remember each of these sensations from the past, like collecting all the individual frames together. Then the mind has to connect or relate the later sensations to the earlier ones, organize the frames in a certain logical order, to form a unity…or in this case the movie, by use of such knowledge as space and time.

The sensory experiences are just bits of random knowledge and cannot relate themselves together. Hume stated that we were like a bundle or collection of perceptions, a constant flow of sensation, such that we can never perceive an inner self. Kant suggests that it takes the mind to synthesize them into a cause and effect relationship through a priori knowledge. In order to make the connection of change the mind must be pure unchanging consciousness, what Kant termed transcendental apperception. The mind is single consciousness that remains the same throughout space and time as an “enduring identity.”

The implication is that through this knowledge one may have the ability to perceive one's inner self but also come to know oneself. Using these Kantian ideas of unity through synthesis we can know not only ourselves but our actions and relate them to a moral path.

Is this moral path a priori? I don't know if Kant thought so because we haven't gotten around to that part of his philosophy, but I think it is. So, in this connection process, we can determine past experience and relate it to future choices. We may not have knowledge about the outside world, but we have knowledge of the inside world.

Matt,

I apologize for the length of this post, but the only way I know how to properly demonstrate my point is by pointing to it with examples.

I don't know what you mean by "language-game", I suppose you mean to say that logic has no relevance,

Wittgenstein coined the term "language-game" and described his usage of it as "consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven". Of course, a good chunk of both Philosophical Investigations and the Brown Book are dedicated to the concept, so I can't really hope to do justice to it here. As for logic, I don't hold that it has no relevance, but rather that it is incredibly useful for bringing consistency to discussion or understanding how things work based upon previous measurements and observations. Computer programmers often use the phrase "garbage in, garbage out", and that's how I tend to think of logic. A computer program operates in a perfectly logical manner, but if you feed it with nonsense, expect to get only nonsense back.

but 2+2=5 is something that points to nothing. 2+2=4 is the opposite: it's consistent and therefore can be applied to anything in the universe.

If we divorce 2+2=4 from any empirical foundation, then we can say that it is true due the fact it follows from the axioms of mathematics. I'll use the term "jululu" to denote 2+2=4, its proof, and the axioms used in the proof. So now we have the problem of what makes jululu true, rather then 2+2=5. Obviously we can't derive 2+2=5 from the same axiom set as is contained in jululu. So lets imagine a different axiom set that would render 2+2=5 true. I'll use the term "johnsmith" to represent 2+2=5, its proof, and the axiom set used in its proof. So if jululu can be applied to anything in the universe, we should also say that johnsmith can be applied to anything in the universe. Both are consistent with themselves.

Now I run up against the problem of how I apply my knowledge of johnsmith and jululu to anything in the universe. Both seem utterly divorced from reality. I can imagine demonstrating to someone the great truth of jululu, but I can't imagine they'd be overly impressed. I'd say how various symbols relate to each other, and how this necessitates the truth of jululu, but I might as well just be saying that "unicorns have horns, because a unicorn is nothing besides a horse with a horn": which I'll call the "Grand Unitruth". Now there does seem to be a significant difference between jululu and the Grand Unitruth. It seems that I can demonstrate many of the concepts that jululu represents empirically. Rather then having the symbol 2 defined by its relation to other symbols, I could pull out some coins and demonstrate what it represents ostensively. Young children don't memorize all the foundational axioms of mathematics at a young age (how could they?), but they are shown pictures of what numbers represent. It would seem here that jululu directs us towards an observable concept. Now thinking back, the Grand Unitruth could seemingly be demonstrated by a drawing of a horse with a horn, and the ostensive teaching from that of the word unicorn.

So our question here is what makes jululu, johnsmith, and the Grand Unitruth true. Think about it.

All sensible statements are universal like this: if they're not universal, they're qualified until they are. If they're not, then they are either false or nonsense.

So the job of the philosopher is to tediously qualify various statements until they cannot be questioned? I could do as much to the statement "unicorns are magical" but my results would vastly uninteresting, and quite frankly, I'd find the results of any such drudgery to be similarly uninteresting. Sane people don't bother to qualify statements until they can't be misunderstood, but rather only do as much when necessary. The reason we don't bother to do this is because most propositions don't derive their truth from grammatical structure, but rather by correspondence to facts which exist in the world.

Lets say I were to suggest that "George Washington was the third president of the United States". If I were to say that to someone they would call me out as speaking falsehood immediately. If I then elaborated on my statement by adding a number of qualifiers to make my statement true, they would think me a liar or a nut. Why? The fact of the matter is that George Washington was the first president of the United States. Sure, I can dink about with language to make any statement true by adding qualifiers, but if I did as much I'd be only working to make myself incomprehensible.

A proposition can't have two justifications. And numbers aren't empirical concepts.

I've already demonstrated how a proposition can have two justifications with my George Washington proposition, so we'll just go right on ahead and dismiss the notion that such a thing isn't possible. Note here that a proposition isn't a fact, but merely corresponds to a fact insofar as it is true. Facts don't have justifications, as facts simply are. I've also addressed the notion that numbers aren't empirical concepts, but I'll give that a bit more attention.

Lets say that I have 2 coca-cola bottles (because the fact of the matter is that I do, and also because coca-cola is delicious). Now you'll object here that I'm applying a non-empirical concept to an empirical matter, whereas a "coca-cola bottle" is merely an overlay which we place over our observations. I'd agree with you here up to a point. The term "coca-cola bottle" could be applied to a bottle with the word "coca-cola" scribbled on it, just as easily as it could apply to a bottle of the familiar branded beverage we all know and love. So does this mean that coca-cola bottles aren't empirical concepts? I'd suggest not, and I'll demonstrate this to you by showing it's similarity with the obvious empirical concept of 2.

If you were to look around a room you'd probably be able to easily identify cases where 2 similar objects sat besides each other. Now you'd also be able to easily identify the presence of a coca-cola bottle. This is because you understand what empirical concepts both terms are intended to denote. If the fact of the matter was that you had a coca-cola bottle before you, then you could indicate in proposition form "there is a coca-cola bottle in front of me" and be speaking the truth. There's a complicated learning process that goes into the discovery of how people use terms like "2" or "coca-cola bottle". We can imagine a situation in which someone were to abstract the term "coca-cola bottle" to convey a concept that's incredibly different from what it is usually meant to convey. For instance, I could say "that water is coca-cola bottle clear". How is it that I can understand such a statement? Simple. I simply understand the full extent of what is potentially indicated by a term such as "coca-cola bottle", and determine what the term is being used to reference from context. Just like if I were to say that "there are 2 cats on my head".

And deductive determinations, which is what philosophy is about.

It was what ancient Greek philosophy was all about, but we've since moved well past that, and for our efforts we now have science, sociology, psychology, etc. It's amazing what one can do if they don't limit their thinking to the deductive.

All that Wittgensteinian postmodernistic crap is the real game. That doesn't teach you anything about life. All it's good for is to act as a smokescreen for academic philosophers to hide behind so no one can understand what they say and how worthless it is.

I'll let my views stand on their own merits. I'm not part of an academic institution so I'm not sure how such condemnations are relevant to the topic at hand. In philosophy it isn't enough to simply say that a particular approach to philosophy leads to incorrect conclusions, but rather you have to put your money where your mouth is and demonstrate it.

Leyla,

Allow me to clarify. Imagine that a bunch of folks were led into a room with a Monet hanging on the wall. They are then instructed to report their impressions of the painting. Whereas we'd expect some aspects of their descriptions to correspond with each other, others parts of their report might be drastically different. Whereas I might report "an unimpressive bunch of water-lilies and a bridge", someone else might report "a lovely bunch or water-lilies and a bridge". It isn't difficult here to cull the subjective from the objective statements.

Of course, it isn't always easy to separate subjective and objective observations or judgments. Hence why fields like history or science are so rigorous. Although, if we deny the distinction outright, then there should be no reason for us to read history, as a book that began "Socrates was an asshole" would be as valid as one that began "Socrates was a philosopher". Either they'd both be subjective opinions or they'd both be objective fact (assuming proper methodology was used to determine their truth). My opinion is simply that there can be no sound methodology to determine the truth of a statement like "matter is totally lame", whereas one could determine if the statement "matter is composed of magical unicorns" was true. One can be tested (is a claim to objective fact) whereas the other is an untestable opinion (is a subjective report of the lameness of matter).

Whereas I'm not sure that I could give a definition of subjective or objective that would ensure that one could properly identify to which set any given observation belonged, I still happen to think that the distinction is valid. Perhaps objective truth is derived through consensus, or the existence of facts that can be discovered in the world, or even a pragmatic methodology; but it certainly seems that such a thing exists. If I wanted to find out about Socrates, I'd probably avoid a book that began "Socrates favorite food was hemlock, which he ate every day while painting his philosophies", as I happen to think that there's a fact to the matter, and that the aforementioned proposition doesn't correspond to it.

ExI:

Allow me to clarify. Imagine that a bunch of folks were led into a room with a Monet hanging on the wall. They are then instructed to report their impressions of the painting. Whereas we'd expect some aspects of their descriptions to correspond with each other, others parts of their report might be drastically different. Whereas I might report "an unimpressive bunch of water-lilies and a bridge", someone else might report "a lovely bunch or water-lilies and a bridge". It isn't difficult here to cull the subjective from the objective statements.

OK. So we might more usefully now make such a distinction with the terms “personal” and “impersonal” since subjectivity and objectivity are common to all objects “person” but not all subjectivities between one person and the next could be considered to apply to any particular object.

Of course, it isn't always easy to separate subjective and objective observations or judgments.

Well, I know what you’re saying but I would go so far as to say that “Maggie Thatcher” is a subjective judgement as it is entirely based on one’s personal conceptions of the subject associated with the physical object . I include also in that category the following: Jesus, Jew, Muslim, Muslim fundamentalist, Christian, Christian fundamentalist, dickhead, saint, terrorist, soldier, good, bad, and so on. If they were to find scientific evidence of the body of “Jesus,” for example, it still would not prove Jesus’s existence--only that of a body associated to the name and every possible personal (subjective) conception of it.

Hence why fields like history or science are so rigorous.

My view: hence, the distinction between philosophy and science.

Although, if we deny the distinction outright, then there should be no reason for us to read history, as a book that began "Socrates was an asshole" would be as valid as one that began "Socrates was a philosopher".

They are both necessarily subjective. Socrates apparently was an asshole; enough so that they put him to death. Now, he could only ever be something other than an asshole to those who could so understand him. If we were to exhume his body, the only proof we could find of Socrates is a dead body. He exists moreso in the minds of others--and for much longer--than any corporeal proof of his existence. If that were not the case, Socrates would have been gone long ago together with his bones like the majority of the mortal masses.

Either they'd both be subjective opinions or they'd both be objective fact (assuming proper methodology was used to determine their truth).

See above.

Do you think science will one day be able to give a 100% accurate account of the specific thoughts and apparently unique minds of Socrates or Jesus?

Whether it be Jesus the Jew or Socrates the asshole, have these these men ever existed in any other way than in the minds of those who speak their names?