GENIUS FORUMS

Sapius wrote:

K: If you visually saw arms and legs, you would be having a visual experience of arms and legs. But there might not be any arms and legs there.

So this particular immediate appearance in not certain? Where as immediate appearance of hunger is certain?

The appearance is certain, the arms and legs aren't.

S: I can see things, but they might not be there for certain, but I’m certain that I see. So drawing conclusions for certain is not possible from what I see for they might not be there for certain. Is that right?

You couldn't be certain that you had arms and legs just because you saw them.

K: Some conclusions you can safely draw, and others you can't.

So in some cases I can take empirical evidence as certain and others not?

Logical conclusions you can draw safely, while empirical conclusions you cannot.

K: It is purely mental, purely analytical, certain reasoning. All it requires are the things that occur to the mind.

To analyze, to reason, one has to necessarily rely on definitions, concepts, and those are based on what? Sensual perceptions… which are all immediate appearances before analyzing, and by the way, uncertain.

We don't know for certain that the things that occur to our minds have any relation to sense perceptions.

And any way, even if there were such thing as sense perceptions, they would be certain, such as when I perceive my arms and legs, or my hunger. [which doesn't require that I have either arms and legs, or hunger].

S: Do you have any doubts about cause and effect?

K: No.

How come? What is your certainty based on?

A thing is dependent on there being something other than itself.

S: Do animals have any idea of cause and effect?

To the degree that they're conscious.

K: Beings are only capable of certainty to the degree that they are conscious.

Conscious of what?

Anything.

Kevin,

We don't know for certain that the things that occur to our minds have any relation to sense perceptions.

And any way, even if there were such thing as sense perceptions, they would be certain, such as when I perceive my arms and legs, or my hunger. [which doesn't require that I have either arms and legs, or hunger].

Well, my mistake then. I thought you considered feeling hungry different than feeling arms and legs. So, what you are saying is that you are certain that you feel, or may be perceive, but not certain of what you feel or may be perceive. OR is it that you are not certain of perception either since you say, “even if there were such thing as sense perceptions”, so that leaves only feeling as certain., or is it that the appearance of feelings are certain, and not the feelings itself?

S: Do you have any doubts about cause and effect?

K: No.

S: How come? What is your certainty based on?

K: A thing is dependent on there being something other than itself.

So C&E, a thing, is dependant on there being something other than C&E, say non-C&E, hence you are certain that C&E is. Well, that explains it then, crystal clear. So, how about non-arms and non-legs? Would arms and legs bepend on there being something other than itself, hence no doubt about arms and legs?

Kevin,

L: Now, Christianity is an experience of the appearance of the Christian God to the mind of a fundy Christian. Thus, according to these premises, it is absolutely certain that this God exists

K: No, it is an absolute certainty that they are experiencing a God, but the specific causes of their experience are uncertain. Their experience of God might be caused by the fact that they are dreaming, or mad, etc.

But aren’t the specific causes of your experience (that which appears to your mind) just as uncertain being that they require you to also verify, to make suppositions?

Since none of us can be sure we aren’t dreaming, how do we know what dreaming is with certainty and thus conclude from there that we aren‘t mad?

L: You, on the other hand, are certain that the Christian God cannot exist. This also is a thing that has occurred to the mind. These are opposing things which have, by virtue of nature, immediately appeared: occurred to the mind. “Popped” out of nature. Certain.

K: The experiences of wise people are more in accordance with reality. That's what makes them wise.

A noumenon outside of experience (the mind) would seem to be a contradiction in terms.

When I mentioned "in accordance with reality" I was thinking more along the lines of being in accordance with logic. A fool says that "A" is "not-A", while a wise person says that it is what it is.

The fundamentalist's belief in God is more a violation of logic than anything else, before we even begin to look at things such as empirical evidence.

OK. Time to look at dreams, I reckon.

Defns:

Dream: a series of thoughts, images and/or emotions occurring during sleep.
Sleep: a state of suspended consciousness.

If it is absolutely true that we cannot be certain whether we are “asleep” or “awake” and that therefore we cannot be absolutely certain that those things appearing to our minds are not a dream, how is your conception of logic wiser than a fundamentalist’s? How is what you know as consciousness even consciousness since, according to the definitions above, it loses all meaning?

A fundamentalist’s view is still A=A. The Christian God is who the Christian God is. He will tell you that, flat out. What he will not agree with you on is the idea of evolution, for example. Now, this theory just so happens to rest on the assumptions that we do have arms and legs. And, as a wise man, your thoughts are more in alignment with this theory than creationism, why? Is it not because you accept the appearance that you have arms and legs, stomach, penis, hormones, hair, etc, even though you cannot be absolutely certain of it -- which translates to being the same as certainty in the appearance of having arms and legs, stomach etc?

I still don’t get how, in this mish-mash of thought, you find pure logic and supposition (empiricism) so utterly separate and lacking inherent existence.

If there's no such thing as noumenon, why is his potential dream less conscious than yours?

Are you saying that his A (thing) is not A (that thing) in relation to his A (thing). Or, is it more likely that his A (thing) is not your A (thing). If his A (thing: Christian God) was not A, you could not possibly argue the point with him, could you?

Sapius wrote:so that leaves only feeling as certain., or is it that the appearance of feelings are certain, and not the feelings itself?

Feelings are appearances.

So, how about non-arms and non-legs? Would arms and legs bepend on there being something other than itself, hence no doubt about arms and legs?

You asked me if I was certain about cause and effect, and I replied that I was, because all things must necessariliy be caused (by that which is other than themselves).

So I'm not sure what you point is with regard to arms and legs. If there is an appearance of arms and legs, then the appearance is certain. And you can also be certain that whatever "arms and legs" is, it is caused by that which is other than itself.

Leyla Shen wrote:

No, it is an absolute certainty that they are experiencing a God, but the specific causes of their experience are uncertain. Their experience of God might be caused by the fact that they are dreaming, or mad, etc.

But aren’t the specific causes of your experience (that which appears to your mind) just as uncertain being that they require you to also verify, to make suppositions?

Everything has causes. But the experience is the end result of all the causes. We can't know what the causes are of our experiences.

In the case that person is totally insane, or wholly unconscious, then they won't be able to have conscious experiences. They would be similar to an earthworm. No recognition of anything would be possible. The very moment the idea of "hunger" began to form in the mind, it would be immediately swept away (so far as consciousness is concerned).

Since none of us can be sure we aren’t dreaming, how do we know what dreaming is with certainty

We can never possibly know we aren't dreaming. But that isn't a hurdle to becoming wise.

. . . and thus conclude from there that we aren‘t mad?

The wise will conclude they aren't mad, as will many of the unwise. The wise will be correct, even though they don't know whether they are dreaming or not.

OK. Time to look at dreams, I reckon.

Defns:

Dream: a series of thoughts, images and/or emotions occurring during sleep.
Sleep: a state of suspended consciousness.

Sleep is composed of two basic states - so far as we know: unconscious sleep, and dreams.

Dreams can be of varying levels of consciousness - not unlike what we call "waking life".

If it is absolutely true that we cannot be certain whether we are “asleep” or “awake” and that therefore we cannot be absolutely certain that those things appearing to our minds are not a dream, how is your conception of logic wiser than a fundamentalist’s?

It is possible to be conscious though still in a dream. The more conscious a person is, the more logical, and the more wise.

A fundamentalist’s view is still A=A.

No. A=A is the summit of all consciousness - the realm of the Buddhas.

The fuzzy thinking of fundamentalists results in illogic, which is the opposite of A=A.

The Christian God is who the Christian God is. He will tell you that, flat out. What he will not agree with you on is the idea of evolution, for example.

Perhaps, but the Christian God of the Pope, for example, seems to think that evolution is not incompatible with Christianity. Nevertheless . . .

Now, this theory just so happens to rest on the assumptions that we do have arms and legs.

Not really. In its pure form, science asks questions like, "If we have arms and legs, how did we come to have them?"

Science can still be done perfectly well without assuming that we definitely have arms and legs. In its pure form, it deals only with what appears to us.

And, as a wise man, your thoughts are more in alignment with this theory than creationism, why? Is it not because you accept the appearance that you have arms and legs, stomach, penis, hormones, hair, etc, even though you cannot be absolutely certain of it

Yes. I look at a chimpanzee, and then I look at myself, and immediately it is apparent to me that we are closely physically related. I accept the appearance.

The irrational person compares a chimpanzee with a human being and refuses to believe his own eyes. His mind revolts at A=A.

I still don’t get how, in this mish-mash of thought, you find pure logic and supposition (empiricism) so utterly separate and lacking inherent existence.

Science can be made over into pure logic when it is performed by wise people. The empirical world becomes an object of logic.

If there's no such thing as noumenon, why is his potential dream less conscious than yours?

The noumenon would seem to have a very "noumenous" meaning, when used by some people. That is, I'm not sure how the term his being used in the context of this thread.

We don't know anything but what appears to us. So we could say there is nothing but the Noumenon, the mind.

As to why one person is less conscious than another; why is an earthworm less conscious than a human being? Why is an earthworm's "dream" less conscious? Simply because it is.

Are you saying that his A (thing) is not A (that thing) in relation to his A (thing).

His identifications are mis-made, mis-identified, through a kind of insanity, or cross-wiring.

Or, is it more likely that his A (thing) is not your A (thing). If his A (thing: Christian God) was not A, you could not possibly argue the point with him, could you?

If he was conscious, and right, then you would not be able to argue with him.

David: If a person is starving, he needs food before he can strive for enlightenment. Otherwise, he won't have the capacity or strength to go very far.

Leyla to Kevin: Is he [David] certain about this because the thought appeared to him in knowing consciousness without recourse to supposition -- that is, without recourse to the fact that one must first suppose they have a body (arms, legs, stomach) even if they don’t?

Kevin: David is only saying that if a person is starving, then they need food. This is a truth by definition, since "starving" means "in need of food".

There's a big difference between a person feeling like they're starving, like a massively overweight American, and a person who is actually starving, like someone in Ethiopia who might lack the energy to even feel hungry.

But in the event that David comes across a person who is actually starving -- an Ethiopian, for example -- and David thinks/says, “This person is starving,” this is also true, by definition.

It’s like saying that pure logic itself allows for uncertainty/supposition -- “if I have arms and legs, then…,” -- when I thought that was empiricism.

The minute you establish having arms and legs in order to fulfil the “then,” the uncertainty/supposition was already in that which was claimed to be certain/pure logic. Why does the “if, then” part of this logic not qualify as supposition? He is saying that a person is starving if they are in need of food, which is obviously true by definition. But this requires that one establishes empirically that the person is starving -- requiring measurement -- both before that conclusion is reached and after if you intend to do anything about it. That his measurements may be more accurate than that of an Ethiopian -- who may not consider himself starving -- is definitely empirical. I mean, you are going to feed a starving man food, and not ideas, right?

Jason: How do you identify what is empirical and what is abstract?

Kevin: The empirical is that which has errors of measurement built into it. It involves interpretations and suppositions.

That which is abstract is immediately true, and is purely mental.

Yet:

"If a person is starving, then their body is in need of food.", is an example of purely logical reasoning.

It is purely mental, purely analytical, certain reasoning. All it requires are the things that occur to the mind.

When I consider all of this together, you seem to be saying that if that which is objective is considered as that which determines one’s logic, then any logic built upon such a foundation is empirical and therefore uncertain and that that perspective which builds itself first on the foundation of logic is considered abstract/pure. In other words, that the materialist holds the empirical and uncertain view, and the idealist the pure and certain one simply because one can be certain of their own reasoning and definitions, if conscious enough.

So, if I, as a thinking, abstract being, consider objective things -- such as a body -- as determining existence, that’s empiricism. Conversely, if I, as a thinking, abstract being, understand that nothing can exist or be understood short of my own abstractions, then I am engaging in conscious, pure logic.

Leyla Shen wrote:But in the event that David comes across a person who is actually starving -- an Ethiopian, for example -- and David thinks/says, “This person is starving,” this is also true, by definition.

When a wise person says "This person is starving", he means that the person appears to be starving, and is probably starving. The former part is a certainty (the "appears" part) and the second part (the "probably") is uncertain because it concerns an empirical matter.

It’s like saying that pure logic itself allows for uncertainty/supposition -- “if I have arms and legs, then…,” -- when I thought that was empiricism.

There's nothing wrong with empiricism, so long as it falls within the bounds, and the control of logic.

Problems only arise when a person attempts to base a philosophy on what is only possibly true, but wrongly imagines it to be definitely true.

For example, it would be an empirical contention that Jesus of Nazareth existed, or that he was crucified, etc. Such matters can be dealt with perfectly well by logic, but logic itself, and philosophy, should not be founded on such things.

. . . when I thought that was empiricism.

Whenever there is doubt about physical matters, there is empiricism.

If I say, "If I have arms and legs, then . . . " there is no doubt involved in such thinking, since I am making a mental assumption, for whatever reason, that I have arms and legs.

The minute you establish having arms and legs in order to fulfil the “then,” the uncertainty/supposition was already in that which was claimed to be certain/pure logic. Why does the “if, then” part of this logic not qualify as supposition?

It is just making a mental experiment, to see what the result would be. There's no uncertainty in creating a mental world.

Empiricism says, "Maybe I have arms and legs, what do you think?"

That his measurements may be more accurate than that of an Ethiopian -- who may not consider himself starving -- is definitely empirical.

Yes, you would have to take punt on whether any particular person is starving, based on whatever data you have.

But once you have decided which way you are going to guess (ie, starving or not), then you are back in the realm of certainty again, and past the doubt.

When I consider all of this together, you seem to be saying that if that which is objective is considered as that which determines one’s logic, then any logic built upon such a foundation is empirical and therefore uncertain and that that perspective which builds itself first on the foundation of logic is considered abstract/pure. In other words, that the materialist holds the empirical and uncertain view, and the idealist the pure and certain one simply because one can be certain of their own reasoning and definitions, if conscious enough.

Well, that's a complicated paragraph, and I'm not sure I understand what you are saying.

But yes, the materialist bases his philosophy on things that are uncertain. So he is the person who builds his house on sand.

By contrast the thinker bases his philosophy on that which is certain. So he builds his house on rock. The thinker still has access to the material, so he can build a house if he wants, but he is in control of it, so it can't fail. He is prepared for anything.

So, if I, as a thinking, abstract being, consider objective things -- such as a body -- as determining existence, that’s empiricism.

I'm not sure what you mean.

A Christian thinks that all existence is determined by the fact that Jesus rose physically from the dead. They are shattered if this belief doesn't work out. So that would be a case of basing life on an uncertainty.

Most people base their lives upon receiving love from other people, or giving love to other people. This too is basing life on an uncertainty, and they are shattered if it doesn't work out.

A Buddha depends for his life on air, food, shelter, and the good-will or indifference of other people. But if he doesn't receive these things he is not shattered, since his roots go deeper still. Deeper than life.

Kevin wrote:

S: So, what you are saying is that you are certain that you feel, or may be perceive, but not certain of what you feel or may be perceive. OR is it that you are not certain of perception either since you say, “even if there were such thing as sense perceptions”, so that leaves only feeling as certain, or is it that the appearance of feelings are certain, and not the feelings itself?

K: Feelings are appearances.

Right... So that’s all that one are certain about. Thanks.

Sapius wrote:Right... So that’s all that one are certain about. Thanks.

Yes, appearances, and anything logical. Remembering that appearances are the simplest case of logic, ie, A=A.

(Firstly, I’d like to say that I appreciate the language problem -- and, even more so, the substance of this discussion.)

L: So, if I, as a thinking, abstract being, consider objective things -- such as a body -- as determining existence, that’s empiricism.

K: There's nothing wrong with empiricism, so long as it falls within the bounds, and the control of logic.

Problems only arise when a person attempts to base a philosophy on what is only possibly true, but wrongly imagines it to be definitely true.

For example, it would be an empirical contention that Jesus of Nazareth existed, or that he was crucified, etc. Such matters can be dealt with perfectly well by logic, but logic itself, and philosophy, should not be founded on such things.

Yes, exactly.

Further to this, however, and on the subject of logic, I would like to add to the idea that an earthworm has no philosophy at all. This may be so. But to imply there is no logic in its existence is inaccurate. An earthworm’s logic is founded entirely on empirical matters dealt with perfectly well with logic. Since it, too, appears to have a physical manifestation, it must be having experiences -- it must at least feel something in order to act in any way: it would function, as you say below, on the simplest case of logic (appearances on the basis of A=A).

Yes, [feelings are] appearances, and anything logical. Remembering that appearances are the simplest case of logic, ie, A=A.

A=A could not be absolute (true in all possible worlds), otherwise.

Its logic is governed not by conscious abstraction (thinking or, philosophy), but by what can only be deemed by a perspective of conscious abstraction (thinking or, philosophy) as unconscious abstraction -- unless we assume an earthworm does not have a mind (with accompanying definition).

An earthworm is a mute materialist and functions on the basis of the same philosophy:

K:But yes, the materialist bases his philosophy on things that are uncertain. So he is the person who builds his house on sand.

By contrast the thinker bases his philosophy on that which is certain. So he builds his house on rock. The thinker still has access to the material, so he can build a house if he wants, but he is in control of it, so it can't fail. He is prepared for anything.

Christians and lovers are speaking earthworms:

K: A Christian thinks that all existence is determined by the fact that Jesus rose physically from the dead. They are shattered if this belief doesn't work out. So that would be a case of basing life on an uncertainty.

Most people base their lives upon receiving love from other people, or giving love to other people. This too is basing life on an uncertainty, and they are shattered if it doesn't work out.

Yes. For example:

It certainly appears that I am rather fond of “Kevin”: that particular category of mind, thought and physical appearance. Now, if I were to objectify all of that -- “you” -- within what might reasonably be considered your physical incarnation and as something entirely separate to my own conscious abstractions, only then may I engage in what is thereby such a falsity as “love.” But, at the same time, I must also objectify “my” self. Scary.

Same deal with the physical incarnation of Jesus -- whether there was such an individual or not. His physical crucifixion actually represents the death of the individual so incarnating him and, thus, his absolute life-and-death dependence upon a literal, physical resurrection.

Objectification: logic governed by those experiences which are “outside” of mind.

Leyla Shen wrote:An earthworm’s logic is founded entirely on empirical matters dealt with perfectly well with logic. Since it, too, appears to have a physical manifestation, it must be having experiences -- it must at least feel something in order to act in any way: it would function, as you say below, on the simplest case of logic (appearances on the basis of A=A).

As far as I'm concerned, there must be consciousness for there to be logical thinking (and A=A).

My computer, for example, works on logical principles, and responds to various inputs in an ordered way, and yet I would not say it is logical, in the philosophic sense, because it is not conscious.

An earthworm is just like that.

Yes, [feelings are] appearances, and anything logical. Remembering that appearances are the simplest case of logic, ie, A=A.

Actually, I was saying that all appearances are certain (and anything logical), while feelings are one sub-category of appearances.

A=A could not be absolute (true in all possible worlds), otherwise.

Its logic is governed not by conscious abstraction (thinking or, philosophy), but by what can only be deemed by a perspective of conscious abstraction (thinking or, philosophy) as unconscious abstraction -- unless we assume an earthworm does not have a mind (with accompanying definition).

There can be a sort of "definition" without it being conscious, such as what my computer is doing now. Or take a male who meets an attractive female and automatically starts to show off. This is rarely a conscious activity, but still a "definition" has been made by the man's earthworm-brain - his unconscious mind. I still wouldn't call this behaviour "logical", in the philosophic sense, though it is indeed logical in the computer-sense, or earthworm-sense.

An earthworm is a mute materialist and functions on the basis of the same philosophy:

Yes, and a materialist is likewise an earthworm, and has philosophy to the same degree - which is not at all.

Christians and lovers are speaking earthworms

Quite so.

Since you had to add logic in there, kevin,

Yes, appearances, and anything logical.

No, I don’t think you can include 'logical' (Human verbal logic I take it, which is capable of asking how, when and why, and the most fascinating, IF) in there. All you are certain about is that appearances appear… that’s all. You cannot say anything beyond that since you cannot be certain about that which appears, because that which appears may be a dream, although you certainly experience the appearance. Certainty within a dream? Hell, you may be my dream character for all I know, right? So can I safely ignore you?

Remembering that appearances are the simplest case of logic, ie, A=A.

Sure, and all that you can be certain of is this simplest case of logic only, that is, recognition through differentiation, same as the earthworm, however, the earthworm may not bother about certainty, but we do, simply because we are logically self-aware through verbal definitions and reasoning.

Sapius wrote:

Yes, appearances, and anything logical.

No, I don’t think you can include 'logical' (Human verbal logic I take it, which is capable of asking how, when and why, and the most fascinating, IF)

I don't believe there is any such thing as "verbal logic". There is just logic, of the A=A variety.

All you are certain about is that appearances appear… that’s all.

There are countless purely logical consequences to things appearing. We can be certain of all those logical consequences.

You may be my dream character for all I know, right? So can I safely ignore you?

It's not wise to ask a dream character such questions. Only you can discover the answer for yourself.

Remembering that appearances are the simplest case of logic, ie, A=A.

Sure, and all that you can be certain of is this simplest case of logic only, that is, recognition through differentiation, same as the earthworm,

An earthworm isn't conscious, so far as we know, so it doesn't have "recognition" any more than, say, your desktop PC does.

Conscious recognition, which is the element of logic, is quite an advanced operation.

My point is that all pure logical reasoning is the very same kind of logic that is involved in the direct conscious experience of apppearances, and is therefore equally as certain.

Historic data:

Sapius: Well, my mistake then. I thought you considered feeling hungry different than feeling arms and legs. So, what you are saying is that you are certain that you feel, or may be perceive, but not certain of what you feel or may be perceive. OR is it that you are not certain of perception either since you say, “even if there were such thing as sense perceptions”, so that leaves only feeling as certain., or is it that the appearance of feelings are certain, and not the feelings itself?

Kevin quoted and replied to Sapius as follows:

Sapius wrote:
so that leaves only feeling as certain., or is it that the appearance of feelings are certain, and not the feelings itself?

K: Feelings are appearances.

Then, to that:

S: Right... So that’s all that one are certain about. Thanks.

K: Yes, appearances, and anything logical. Remembering that appearances are the simplest case of logic, ie, A=A.

Then I wrote, adding contents of square brackets in the quote:

Quote
Kevin: Yes, [feelings are] appearances, and anything logical. Remembering that appearances are the simplest case of logic, ie, A=A.

L: A=A could not be absolute (true in all possible worlds), otherwise.

Its logic is governed not by conscious abstraction (thinking or, philosophy), but by what can only be deemed by a perspective of conscious abstraction (thinking or, philosophy) as unconscious abstraction -- unless we assume an earthworm does not have a mind (with accompanying definition).

Current:

To which K replied:

Actually, I was saying that all appearances are certain (and anything logical), while feelings are one sub-category of appearances.

Well, that’s not the way it reads to me but, I’ll run with it.

If feelings are a sub-category of appearances they can then be relegated as phenomena of the unconscious mind. I’m cool with that because, obviously, the only option left to an unthinking entity is feeling. But this sheds the same light on the generally held idea of unconscious mind (which I have been thinking about, lately).

Traditionally, the unconscious mind is held to be a container of “forgotten” things: ideas, memories, sensations, events, etc. These things, not occurring in consciousness (or, consciously) are "felt."

A single lifetime could be considered as an unbroken series of experiences. In this way, consciousness itself creates time: the individual. I recall your piece on the practicality of our beginnings and the dependence of that practicality upon our values. Thus, the ego and time, come into existence together with the potential for individuality -- even though “you” do not.

But when Weininger speaks of the genius, he speaks of him as the only man who transcends time -- who is the only one that is timeless. He speaks not of individuality but of universality. The genius is the one who understands every man; has every man in him and in so being is not born into “his” age, or “his” generation, but was and will be always beyond such temporality.

The universal man is immortal.

The individual is thus a creation of time and will live and die within his generation and their values and petty squabbles, forever lost to the seeing of all men.

Just when one thought that “woman” was the lowest one could get…

Leyla Shen wrote:If feelings are a sub-category of appearances they can then be relegated as phenomena of the unconscious mind.

I'm not really concerned as to what kind of phenomena feelings might be, only that they appear to the mind - the conscious mind. Once we become conscious of any feeling, it appears to the conscious mind.

I’m cool with that because, obviously, the only option left to an unthinking entity is feeling.

Unthinking, unconscious entities, never even become conscious of feelings.

Traditionally, the unconscious mind is held to be a container of “forgotten” things: ideas, memories, sensations, events, etc. These things, not occurring in consciousness (or, consciously) are "felt."

It is possible for one to be conscious of a feeling, without being conscious of what is causing that feeling.

But when Weininger speaks of the genius, he speaks of him as the only man who transcends time -- who is the only one that is timeless. He speaks not of individuality but of universality.

The genius, who is conscious, creates time through his consciousness. Since he creates time, his is himself beyond time.

By contrast the eathworm-person has time forced upon them, but they never become fully aware of this. As soon as they do, they become free of it.

The universal man is immortal.

The individual is thus a creation of time and will live and die within his generation and their values and petty squabbles, forever lost to the seeing of all men.

The genius creates his own individuality, but being the creator of it, he is beyond it.

K: It is possible for one to be conscious of a feeling, without being conscious of what is causing that feeling.

Yes, as in love, hate, boredom, pain, fear and all things commensurate -- you name any feeling, that applies.

If earthworms are not even conscious of feelings and speaking earthworms are only conscious of and certain about feelings and genius is conscious of and certain about both feelings and logic (as appearances), but he uses pure logic to understand the causes of feelings and thus removes himself from them and becomes an individual beyond time (and feelings). Given that, how can you say the following:

L: If feelings are a sub-category of appearances they can then be relegated as phenomena of the unconscious mind.

K: I'm not really concerned as to what kind of phenomena feelings might be, only that they appear to the mind - the conscious mind. Once we become conscious of any feeling, it appears to the conscious mind.

There is no difference between male and female earthworms.

Leyla Shen wrote:If earthworms are not even conscious of feelings and speaking earthworms are only conscious of and certain about feelings . . .

Unconscious people (ie, non-geniuses) are not certain even of their feelings. They can only be certain to the degree that they are conscious.

There's no difference between being conscious of feelings and being conscious of anything else, since they are all objects of consciousness.

There is no difference between male and female earthworms.

There's no difference betwen unconscious males and unconscious females, yes.

There's no difference betwen unconscious males and unconscious females, yes.

I swear there is! Sex. It's only logical.

Hi everyone!

Ahhh it's good to be back!

suergaz wrote:Ahhh it's good to be back!

You'll have to present some more cogent arguments than last time, or you won't be back for long.

That's fine. Thank you for letting me back in.

suergaz wrote:

I swear there is! Sex. It's only logical.

Ironic.

You did notice that he said unconscious males and unconscious females, rather than simply saying unconscious people, right?

I guess that's what happens when you think with your genitals.

K to s: You'll have to present some more cogent arguments than last time,...

s: That's fine.

Perhaps you can start here.

Leyla:

Ironic.

You did notice that he said unconscious males and unconscious females, rather than simply saying unconscious people, right?

Right. Hence my exclamation!

I guess that's what happens when you think with your genitals.

You're not pleased to see me?
I really am pleased to be back and to see you all again!

Really, to say there is no difference between males and females, whether unconscious or not, geniuses or not, strikes me as odd, particularly in a thread titled "A=A represents making distinctions".

Are we speaking different languages?

Perhaps you can start here.

With an argument you mean?! There is none. I'm sure Kevin will agree.
You've changed! Not so much as to warrant me calling you a stepford wife, but...well, you've changed!

Are we speaking different languages?

Considering that you are the third person to say that I have changed in recent times, I think I am speaking a different language. Multilingualism is a good thing, though.

You've changed! Not so much as to warrant me calling you a stepford wife, but...well, you've changed!

Cute. (You may call me Joanna.)

I think if you start talking about Superman again you’ll find I haven’t changed that much. You know, same basic programming.

L: I guess that's what happens when you think with your genitals.

z: You're not pleased to see me?

I didn’t say that to be nasty, but I did mean it. I said it because of the way this discussion has been unfolding so far. You haven’t read it thoroughly, have you? This topic has been going on for a while now. Your sudden appearance resembled a clown jumping out of nowhere in between two people having a thoughtful discussion and honking his big, red bicycle horn. Not that it bothers me, really; just to give you an idea of how it looks to me.

I really am pleased to be back and to see you all again!

Well, that’s good. What took you so long?

What were your reasons for finally deciding to reapply?

Welcome back, zag. ["kiss, kiss" -- raising a suspicious left eyebrow]

I think if you start talking about Superman again you’ll find I haven’t changed that much. You know, same basic programming.

I am sure you aren't completely closed to the idea of the superhuman.
If you start talking about 'god' again, you'll find I haven't changed much either. I'm a superatheist.

L: I guess that's what happens when you think with your genitals.

z: You're not pleased to see me?

L:I didn’t say that to be nasty, but I did mean it. I said it because of the way this discussion has been unfolding so far. You haven’t read it thoroughly, have you? This topic has been going on for a while now. Your sudden appearance resembled a clown jumping out of nowhere in between two people having a thoughtful discussion and honking his big, red bicycle horn. Not that it bothers me, really; just to give you an idea of how it looks to me.

I have read it thoroughly now (thank you) and my honking appears even more justified than I had at first thought.

Well, that’s good. What took you so long?

I don't think you were around when I was banned.

What were your reasons for finally deciding to reapply?

There are intelligent people here.

Welcome back, zag. ["kiss, kiss" -- raising a suspicious left eyebrow]

Thanks.

I am sure you aren't completely closed to the idea of the superhuman. If you start talking about 'god' again, you'll find I haven't changed much either. I'm a superatheist.

No, I’m not completely closed to the idea of the superhuman -- I wouldn’t be posting to a genius forum if I were. However, I am not a philosophically well-read individual so, if anyone expects to speak of Nietzsche and his superhuman to me, they are going to have to do so in such a way that does not merely refer to the man and his labels, but speaks his ideas articulately.

I do recall telling you that this superhuman was your God -- so, I do not consider you to be a superatheist: just a conventional one.

I am not a fan of poetry and art, preferring to side with the likes of Socrates in Ion on such matters, ie. finding poets and artists as “divinely inspired” rather than what I would consider genius.

When is philosophy genius and when is it art?

I have read it thoroughly now (thank you) and my honking appears even more justified than I had at first thought.

(My pleasure.)

I thought you might think it so. However, do you intend to just honk and disappear, or to contribute a cogent argument?

Reminds me of David’s desire to become a Diogenes(ish)-style apostle. Did he just honk and run away, too? Was there nothing to follow the honking, or was it that this was some sort of divinely inspired honking, made especially for certain ears?

I don't think you were around when I was banned.

That bad, eh?

When my modem blew somewhen in 2003, I didn’t bother to replace it until my PC blew up also, which took about a year. So, I did not write to this forum again until mid-to-late 2004. I noticed you had gone.

I remembered you for your honking and exclamation marks, mostly.

Thanks.

No worries.