David, you wrote a lot of words in your last post, but none of them were specific to what I wrote. I'll try again, but first I'll make a couple of incidental comments.
David Quinn wrote:I'm not advocating any kind of metaphysical system. You need to understand this. If you don't, you will continue to misunderstand WOTI and my approach to these matters.
You are describing your view of the relationship between consciousness and existence, and the origins of consciousness. That counts as a metaphysical system to me. If you want to call it something else, though, then knock yourself out.
David Quinn wrote:All I'm doing is articulating the logical consequences of what is already known for certain (at least by me) - namely, that a thing can only exist by way of having form, and that form can only occur within the framework created an observer's perspective. This is a basic process of sticking closely to the facts. It doesn't involve any metaphysical projection or overlay.
I don't accept the premise that "form can only occur within the framework created [sic] an observer's perspective". As far as I'm concerned, the conventional perspective whereby "external reality" contains structure and differentiation (the basis of form) which the senses perceive and turn into "appearances" within consciousness is entirely plausible, and you'll have to do a lot better than to merely
assert that form can only occur within the mind to convince me (or any rational person) that such is the case, or even that it is a more plausible alternative. So yes, your philosophy certainly
does involve a metaphysical projection: the projection that nothing can exist outside of the mind.
David Quinn wrote:To repeat and expand on the point I made earlier, I don't really know whether other people's minds exist (beyond my mind). It seems they do, but I could be wrong. All I have to go on is the appearance of such minds in my own mind. These appearances could be hallucinations for all I know.
Right, you
could be the only mind, but you're not a solipsist, so you don't really
believe that you are. It's then reasonable to explore the consequences of believing in the existence of other minds.
David Quinn wrote:There also appears to be causal interplay between these appearing minds - both between themselves, and between them and my own mind - so I can conclude that they are causally linked in various practical ways. That is virtually all I can say on the matter, without verging into speculation.
It seems to me that you haven't yet fully grasped that it is impossible to resolve the issue in an objective sense. You are looking for some kind of objective account of how all these minds exist and communicate with one another. Such objectivity can never be found, as we are always stuck inside our own subjective consciousness.
Not exactly. What I'm looking to do is to contrast the conventional position (that consciousnesses exist within an external reality) with your perspective (that "external reality" exists within consciousnesses) to see which is more plausible. I put a whole lot of implications of your perspective to you, but you ignored them, so what I'll do now is to put them into point form and ask you whether or not you agree with each one, and ask you to explain why you agree or disagree (all of these assume that solipsism is false - i.e. that other people's consciousnesses are ontologically equivalent to our own, which you seem to accept as plausible):
1. The causes (or messages) sent between bubbles cannot be sent through the reality in which the bubbles reside, because this would mean that things (those causes/messages) exist beyond the mind, which would contradict your premise that nothing lies beyond the mind.
2. Given the above, it must instead be the case that the set of all bubbles is arranged such that each bubble directly "touches" every other bubble, such that causes/messages can be sent directly between bubbles without passing through "external reality".
3. The causal linkage system (message-passing-between-bubbles system) must involve some pretty sophisticated processes in order to ensure consistency between all bubbles, especially given the possibility of conflicts which this system would need to resolve somehow.
4. The processes referred to in (3) must be located inside of each bubble so as to avoid contradicting your premise that nothing lies beyond the mind (except for other minds and the hidden void).
5. The processes referred to in (3) can't correctly be characterised as mere "appearances", because they actually
regulate the consistency of appearances, and therefore whilst they have effects (on appearances), they don't actually appear in and of themselves.
6. Given (5), consciousness is not equivalent to "all appearances", as Dan has elsewhere claimed (I'm paraphrasing him).
7. Given all of the above, the view that you promote (that "external reality" exists within consciousnesses) is both far less elegant and far less plausible than the conventional view (that consciousnesses exist within external reality).
I have one other new but related point to make, which I would again like you to respond to:
7.
Ultimately (according to your claims), reality consists of "bubbles" of consciousness (plus the hidden void), which must each be finite given that you admit to the possibility that there could more than one of them. Therefore, unless there are an infinite number of these bubbles, "Ultimate Reality" is actually not infinite as you claim to have proved it to be, but merely
appears to be infinite
within consciousness.
David Quinn wrote:Dan Rowden wrote:I really believe we need the Existence 101 thread I mentioned before. There's just too many concepts and levels of understanding swirling around in this discussion.
I would be against such a thread. It would be a case of codifying and setting in concrete what shouldn't be codified and set in concrete.
I don't understand why you are against clarity. You claim to be a highly logical thinker and to have understood reality through pure logic: good logic is
very clear.
Anyhow, Dan, I don't see the need for such a thread given that we can thrash it out in this one, but hey, if you want to start it then I'll probably get involved.
By the way, feel free to address any of the problems that I
summarised a few posts ago.
Here are my tallies for all of the definitions that I read on those pages:
1. Tally: 6. Definition specifies
only the belief that the self is everything.
2. Tally: 8. Definition specifies
only the position that nothing beyond the self can be known/proved to exist.
3. Tally: 3. Definition specifies that either of the above two could apply.
4. Tally: 1. Definition refers to self-indulgence/self-preoccupation/egotism.
5. Tally: 1. Defined as "The notion that it is impossible ever to know another person, so why bother?".
6. Tally: 1. Defined as "the theory that the self can be aware of nothing but its own experiences and states".
So OK, the definition that you first linked to (on Wikipedia) is not uncommon after all, but it is by no means the only one. Is it reasonable to call QRS solipsists then? Sure, but only in the weak sense, and not in the strong sense, and that's not particularly significant to me, because weak solipsism is IMO a very compelling and rational position anyhow, so I see no reason to criticise QRS for holding it.