GENIUS FORUMS

Leyla,

If we take this billiard ball causation to be an exact kind of a posteriori conception of causality, we notice that even in this very sentence where I have used the word "causality" (bolded) that that concept (causality) is not the same as the billiard ball concept. With the former (billiard ball conception), clearly we have a mental image of a sequence of events. That is not true of the latter.

There is some kind of mental representation, though, otherwise it wouldn't be distinguishable from other concepts.

The conception of causality, no matter how it is defined, refers to all causal events, as opposed to one particular imaginable event. Even the conception of billiard ball causality is a class of a wide variety of causal events, billiard balls being just one example that was more or less arbitrarily used to label the class. The conception of billiard ball causality is in the same boat as generic causality in that it can't really be imagined concretely without being applied to a specific situation. But I do think that concepts, even abstract ones, each have a mental representation associated with it. The mind appears to us as more than mere words.

I think a thinker shouldn't focus on words, thinking that he can reason with them, but keep clarifying and molding his underlying mental representations, no matter how indescribable they are and how nonsensical they may seem, and use those for the basis of reason instead. We really ought to free ourselves from the seduction of words!

We need to look not at the words used to communicate a concept, but the concept's meaning and its impact on the mind--to deepen the impact of worthwhile meanings by meditating and reasoning about them and to mitigate the impact of worthless meanings by not thinking about them, or thinking truthfully about them at least. That's the concept of causality put into practice.

Hi, Matt:

I think a thinker shouldn't focus on words, thinking that he can reason with them, but keep clarifying and molding his underlying mental representations, no matter how indescribable they are and how nonsensical they may seem, and use those for the basis of reason instead. We really ought to free ourselves from the seduction of words!

We need to look not at the words used to communicate a concept, but the concept's meaning and its impact on the mind--to deepen the impact of worthwhile meanings by meditating and reasoning about them and to mitigate the impact of worthless meanings by not thinking about them, or thinking truthfully about them at least. That's the concept of causality put into practice.

I agree; and, in that spirit:

There is some kind of mental representation, though, otherwise it wouldn't be distinguishable from other concepts.

That distinction wouldn’t happen to be what Kant is referring to as a priori knowledge as opposed to a posteriori? What mental representation do you get with the conception "generic causality"?

The conception of causality, no matter how it is defined, refers to all causal events, as opposed to one particular imaginable event. Even the conception of billiard ball causality is a class of a wide variety of causal events, billiard balls being just one example that was more or less arbitrarily used to label the class.

Kant’s argument centres around the question: could there even be the concept “billiard ball causality” without the “generic” a priori knowledge causality?

He says:

But, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience…(sensuous impressions [empiricism] giving merely the occasion), an addition which we cannot distinguish from the original element given by sense, till long practice has made us attentive to, and skilful in separating it.

~

M: The conception of billiard ball causality is in the same boat as generic causality in that it can't really be imagined concretely without being applied to a specific situation.

I think you are falling into contradiction. Why have you introduced subjectivity in the form of “applied” a posteriori imagination, here? An absolute truth is, by definition, not subjective (or objective, for that matter). It is ultimately true.

Leyla,

Matt: There is some kind of mental representation, though, otherwise it wouldn't be distinguishable from other concepts.

Leyla: That distinction wouldn’t happen to be what Kant is referring to as a priori knowledge as opposed to a posteriori?

No, he (probably wisely) avoided all those types of subjectivities.

Leyla: What mental representation do you get with the conception "generic causality"?

Beats me. I try to throw that crap out as soon as I find it :)

Matt: The conception of causality, no matter how it is defined, refers to all causal events, as opposed to one particular imaginable event. Even the conception of billiard ball causality is a class of a wide variety of causal events, billiard balls being just one example that was more or less arbitrarily used to label the class.

Leyla: Kant’s argument centres around the question: could there even be the concept “billiard ball causality” without the “generic” a priori knowledge causality?

I don't even think he's really addressing causation specifically. He's just trying to show the a priori knowledge exists and what its nature is.

He says:

But, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience…(sensuous impressions [empiricism] giving merely the occasion), an addition which we cannot distinguish from the original element given by sense, till long practice has made us attentive to, and skilful in separating it.

Yeah, he's saying that an object we perceive consists of both types of knowledge, until we learn how to distinguish between them. I don't see what causality has to do with it, other than indirectly.

Matt: The conception of billiard ball causality is in the same boat as generic causality in that it can't really be imagined concretely without being applied to a specific situation.

Leyla: I think you are falling into contradiction. Why have you introduced subjectivity in the form of “applied” a posteriori imagination, here?

Because you were saying that you can visualize billiard ball causality, but I don't think we really can, unless we think of a certain situation that the concept of billiard ball causality can characterize. Billiard ball causality is just a chain of linked events, but I think it's impossible to imagine a chain of events without imagining specific events.

An absolute truth is, by definition, not subjective (or objective, for that matter). It is ultimately true.

I'm not sure what you mean, nor how this is related to the previous thing you said. An absolute truth is subjectively realized by an individual and objectively true for everybody, so I would think it's both.

Matt:

L: Kant’s argument centres around the question: could there even be the concept “billiard ball causality” without the “generic” a priori knowledge causality?

M: I don't even think he's really addressing causation specifically. He's just trying to show the a priori knowledge exists and what its nature is.

Yes, I agree that’s what he’s trying to do. I should have properly qualified my above statement. Something more along the lines of, “Kant’s fundamental argument, specifically in relation to causality, would be proposed as follows:…” etc.

Because you were saying that you can visualize billiard ball causality, but I don't think we really can, unless we think of a certain situation that the concept of billiard ball causality can characterize. Billiard ball causality is just a chain of linked events, ...

I can visualise “billiard ball causality” because I have played billiards. Whether that visualisation suits the intended definition of “billiard ball causality,” I have no idea--since I’ve never studied it. So, my question to you here is; if “billiard ball causality” is just a chain of linked events, why don’t we just call it “chain of linked events” instead of “billiard ball causality”?

…but I think it's impossible to imagine a chain of events without imagining specific events.

You mean, such as any linked chain of events that occur when you hit a group of billiard balls with the white ball? Could you even link multiple events without the a priori knowledge causality?