More recently you wrote:What he means, IMO, is that, well first, 'God' is the totality and being the totality it is beyond good and evil. The reason God (the totality) is beyond good and evil is because good and evil are 'things' and the totality is not a thing. The totality is wise because it doesnt know things, because it has no counterparts to contrast itself with, or anything with. God, not being subject to things, cannot by virtue have any knowledge.
God, the totality, wisdom, is unknowing.
A human being can know this, and by knowing this he knows nothing.
What is this 'it' that is wise? Who is this 'someone' that is wise?
Exactly. You will re-note this comment as part of a whole idea (rather than several separate, disconnected ideas) proceeding from the original statement on the subject of God:
It was either wisdom or stupidity--what reason would any other form have?If God is not a thing and therefore cannot be either good or evil, that it cannot be wise. Likewise, it cannot be knowing or unknowing. To know that the Totality is not a thing, one must know what a thing is. So, one makes such a distinction only to abandon half of it in the name of wisdom?
If God is not subject to things, then he cannot speak for he cannot be asked a question. Who was it, then, that said there was no other wiser than Socrates?
They are both a part of “God,†“God’s†selflessness notwithstanding.
Not to the wise. To the wise, it is the most valuable manifestation of the infinite whilst it is egotistically valued. Later, it is merely and precisely who they are. That is, it grows from degrees of uncertainty ever closer to complete certainty.As I understand it, wisdom is beyond the reality of things, [snip]
If by beyond you mean greater than, I concur, since wisdom is necessarily a sublime understanding of both good and evil and, in the same way, either beyond or not beyond “the reality of things.â€â€¦it is beyond good and evil.
1. There is a mountain. 2. There is no mountain. 3. There is indeed a mountain.L: Likewise, it cannot be knowing or unknowing. To know that the Totality is not a thing, one must know what a thing is.
C: But by realizing you can't know what a thing is, you realize the nature of the totality. The infinite is seen in the finite. I know these things as they should be known, and by knowing things in this way, I am wisely unknowing. Most people know things in the way they shouldnt be known, and by knowing this way, they are fools unknowingly.
There is indeed a vast difference between the mountain in 1 and the mountain in 3. Yet it is very clear to me that the idea that the mountain does not exist belongs categorically in 2 and, on that basis, I say you are probably at the tail end of 2 in your understanding of this.
By realising the finite nature of things, you realise the infinite. The mountain is still a thing which is a mountain; it is not and cannot be anything else. It does not disappear with your “unknowing†of it. What disappears is the unconscious separation of it from other things or unification of it with other things.
The only reason to call this “unknowing the thing†is in the context of a belief that the thing is in fact other than it appears. But, if it is the case that a thing is other than it appears, how can there possibly be 3--how can it possibly be known that there is indeed a mountain?
For contemplation:
1. There is a self. 2. There is no self. 3. There is indeed a self.
What do you think of this?
GOOD, EVIL & WISDOM
Therefore, the individual ends up really seeing the mountain (thing). This is exactly why Socrates can say, for example:
Is he arguing, then, for his own life or for his own death? Is he arguing for things he did not know, or for things he did; and, in this, was he wise, good or evil in your estimation?For this fear of death is indeed the pretence of wisdom, and not real wisdom, being the appearance of knowing the unknown [fear of death, the thing, IS the appearance and this thing IS “the pretence of wisdomâ€]; since no one knows whether death, which they in their fear apprehend to be the greatest evil, may not be the greatest good. Is there not here conceit of knowledge, which is a disgraceful sort of ignorance?
And this is the point in which, as I think, I am superior to men in general, and in which I might perhaps fancy myself wiser than other men, - that whereas I know but little of the world below, I do not suppose that I know: but I do know that injustice and disobedience to a better, whether God or man, is evil and dishonorable, and I will never fear or avoid a possible good rather than a certain evil.
Yes, and I would definitely like to further explore it (and Socrates’ abundantly stimulating The Apology which, I must confess, I read for the first time) with you. I shall get back to it as soon as I can.C: I would like to explore the relationship thought has to perception.
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