Dan Rowden wrote:Jason wrote:But how do you prove that any particular thing, thought or otherwise, is subjective to begin with? The argument I presented in my earlier post questions the assertion that the mind is what does the "conjuring" in the first place. How do you prove any link between thoughts of beginnings and the subjective mind?
Such thoughts are what make up the subjective mind. There's no "link" that needs to be established.
You originally said that these thoughts were "conjured" by the subjective mind. That made it sound, to me, like you were proposing that subjective mind was a common
origin and
cause of thought - not that thoughts
are subjective mind, that they are one and the same thing entirely.
Let's say I accept your explanation of thought and subjective mind, how do you come to the conclusion that thoughts
are subjective mind? What proof do you have? You don't have to establish a link, do you just declare it to be so? How do you even identify a thought as being a thought as opposed to being some other phenomena?
You've also now said, as I read it, that there is
only subjective reality and there is no objective reality. Well, I think that by doing away with objective reality you threaten to seriously undermine the idea of subjective reality and also the idea that beginnings and endings are not intrinsic.
If subjective reality is the only thing that exists, and it's the only way that things can be - that starts sounding very instrinsic, very much like objective realty. You claim that thoughts are arbitrary, and beginnings and endings not intrinsic, but arbtirary compared to what? Not intrinsic compared to what? There is nothing else and no way else for things to be other than the way they are. So what does characterizing thought as "arbitrary" and "not intrinsic" bring to the table in such a scenario?
Dan Rowden wrote:Jason wrote:As Hume argued you cannot prove such links.
Hume's arguments regarding causal relation applied to the empirical realm. I'm struggling to place that in the point you're trying to make.
Why treat the supposed link between the mind and the thoughts it supposedly creates(or is), any differently to the supposed link between a match and the fire it supposedly creates?
Dan Rowden wrote:Jason wrote:If some or all thoughts are not conjured by the subjective mind to begin with, then are they still subjective?
Thoughts
are the subjective mind.
How do you prove or know this? Say I'm lost in the middle of a desert and there is no-one and nothing around for miles, except for sand, as far as I can see. It's hot and I'm tired and thirsty. I perceive a voice that sounds like my own, seemingly located inside my head "god I'm thirsty, I need to find water."
Now, can I be certain that the voice is my internal dialogue "conjured" by my "subjective mind?" Perhaps, just perhaps, the voice is coming from a tape recorder that is in my backpack, which has been unintentionally triggered by my movements, and is playing back something I recorded into it earlier - when I was considering leaving a message for those who may later find me dead in the desert. How does one differentiate for certain what is the creation of the mind and what is not?
Dan Rowden wrote:Jason wrote:I am asking how you prove that something is the product of the subjective consciousness to begin with, seeing as particular links between particular things cannot be proven with certainty - as Hume argued.
Hume only argued this with respect to our perceptions of empirical relation; he didn't argue it in the abstract realm - i.e. in terms of the relation between thoughts and concepts.
Ok, but I'm extending the hume-argument into the abstract realm of mind and thoughts.
Jason wrote:Dan Rowden wrote:Jason wrote:In short, one might say that when we say we were born is the only time that it can be said - but there's innumerable times that we can say it.
First, you're assuming that birth date is the product of subjective consciousness.
I'm not assuming anything - I'm stating unequivocally that it can't be otherwise. Mind can only experience a "beginning" by arbitrarily inventing it.
Assuming/stating unequivocally - they're not much different if you don't have valid reasons for your statements. You seem to be essentially, paradoxically, asserting that subjective arbitrary judgments are an
intrinsic reality.
Dan Rowden wrote:That's because boundaries lack inherent existence.
What a load of crap. That has no connection to the arguments you've made up to this point.
Dan Rowden wrote:Jason wrote:Second, you're assuming and predicting that said birth date can be changed innumerable times in the future.
Again, I'm not assuming anything.
Are too liar! ;p
Dan Rowden wrote:This must be the case because I can do so right now - can't you?
No I can't. And this is what it comes down to - a claim of what is theoretically possible, a prediction, and one that is even contingent upon
particular individual's predicted abilities. It's just you making declarations. This was why I made the claim earlier that "I was born only once - exactly 33 days, 5 hours, 2 mins and 17 seconds after my father's sperm penetrated my mother's ovum. Nothing arbitrary about it. How can you argue with that?"
It comes down to just "Dan: I predict I can change my birthdate!" and then "Jason: I predict I can't change my birthdate!"
Also, once again, you're trying to propose a link between "I" and what you "can do" to your birthdate. You've claimed not to be attempting to draw links, but your language clearly continues to say otherwise. So the hume-type argument of proving links comes into play again.
Dan Rowden wrote:Jason wrote:Third, you're assuming and predicting that changes in the subjective consciousness can cause changes in the birth date in the future.
I don't need to assume this where memory exists and I can juxtapose two different thoughts in the now.
Sounds like memory is in for a thrashing next. Memories, just like predictions, are potentially filled with uncertainty and error.
Dan Rowden wrote:Is your ultimate argument here that no two thoughts can be shown to be related?
No, I wouldn't say that's my
ultimate argument.
Dan Rowden wrote:Jason wrote:Being predictions they are liable to the same limits and uncertainties as scientific predictions, and being assumptions adds further uncertainty.
I can test this prediction right now, this very moment. Works every time. You seem to be saying that we can't state that 1+1=2 will remain true in the future (because we can't state with certainty that the relational movement of thought from each component will adhere). Is that what you're saying?
You're cute. Cute, but wrong. I don't think the 1+1=2 comparison is going to be a valid one, but let's see how the rest of the discussion above goes before addressing this.
