GENIUS FORUMS

Dan Rowden wrote:Why are these arbitrary judgements different from anything else? Where does the cause of them end and the effect (that of them) begin?

The mere fact that the judgements exist(ie have begun) is enough. The cause of the arbitrary judgements existed before they did, by default, that's all the proof needed that they are the result of a non-arbitrary cause.

How is that not an argument for absolutely everything? i.e. that all causes and effects are non arbitrary?

Dan Rowden wrote:Why shouldn't I be indignant?

Firstly because it's emotional and by your own values you're striving for the cessation of emotion. Secondly because you criticise indignation in others, so to indulge in it yourself is hypocritical. Thirdly because rational exchanges are the most fruitful type, and indignation drags down the level of discussion and detracts from rational exchange. Fourthly because it's an emotive tactic which paints me as the bad guy to other readers, potentially colouring the way that they read my arguments. You can probably think of other reasons.

Anyway, this exchange is getting too personal and recriminatory, so from here on I'll (mostly) stick to the topic.

"being" and "be" are just synonyms for "exist". There is no useful information in those usages. None whatever. You can't redefine that which isn't defined in the first place.

To say that "exist" isn't defined merely because the dictionary uses a synonymous word to define it is disingenuous. The word is defined by common usage. Your redefinition defies common usage. I explained why by example in my last post.

Anyway, if you want a more informative definition that reflects common usage, then let's try to arrive at one. I seem to recall a definition that someone once made on-the-spot that seemed pretty good to me, so I'll try to recapture it here (I'm open to revision if it can be shown to be inadequate): "to exist is to possess properties or attributes". I don't think that it's perfect, but it's a start. The reason that I don't think it's perfect is because we can ask the question "What is the state of something such that it is capable of possessing properties or attributes?" to which the answer is "That it exists", so really the existence of the thing is more fundamental than its possession of properties and attributes, but they are at least concomitant with its existence.

Dan Rowden wrote:It's impossible for a thing to be causally unrelated.

Have you received your "Royal Imperial Certified Judge of Impossibility" badge yet?

guest_of_logic: consciousness-lacking finite universe "have actual being"? Of course it does.

Dan: I agree, of course it does! It has actual being in your imagination.

Oh very good. Simply repeat the party line, the soundness of which I rebutted in my original post - care to respond to those rebuttals?

Dan Rowden wrote:People who try to do philosophy out of a dictionary are being utterly mindless. The dictionary is not a philosophical text. It gives common usages only, and people don't commonly think in philosophical terms. The ordinary "definition" of "exist" isn't even a definition!

The word has a common usage, regardless of whether anyone has captured that common usage in a formal definition in words. The reason that you're equivocating is that you believe that you have captured the common usage of the word in your definition - i.e. you think that when you use the word under your definition you mean the same thing as everyone else does when they use it under the common usage - when really you mean something different.

Dan Rowden wrote:Btw, the etymology of the "exist" is: "[Latin existere, exsistere, to come forth, be manifest]. Sounds a lot like "present an appearance" dontcha think?

Oh jeez, Animus tried that one on too. Let me repeat to you what I wrote to him:

Etymology, whilst interesting, does not dictate meaning. The current, consensus definition of "exist" is not made with respect to appearance.

Dan Rowden wrote:I'd bet dollars to donuts you didn't know what most dictionaries said about "exist" before I challenged you to provide an example.

You'd lose that bet. I've looked it up before.

My brain aint feelin' the best right now(slight hangover), and I'm not sure I understand your last post, and I'm not sure you understand my point either, so let me just elaborate upon my previous post, and maybe you can elaborate upon your last post too for my sake.

If we apply your claim(that deciding the beginning and ending of causes and effects is an arbitrary judgement) to arbitrary judgements themselves, we find it logically incoherent to assert that arbitrary judgements have not begun - because we would be using an arbitrary judgement to assert that arbitrary judgements have not begun.

Dan Rowden wrote:You are impertinent, to the point of smugness.

You know what I really love about your use of "impertinent"? It's that the word has connotations of disobedience to authority: "the small child was impertinent in the manner in which she spoke to her teacher". You guys see yourselves as authorities, so it's very natural for you to feel that anyone who criticises you confidently is being "impertinent". Ironically enough, you also present yourselves as champions of individuality and free thought - you should be celebrating impertinence.

Dan Rowden wrote:I'm simply calling you on your bullshit.

Nice try, but there are less emotional ways to call someone on bullshit. The exclamation marks were running rampant.

Dan Rowden wrote:Let me remind you of what you wrote before:

[...]what I really find intriguing is the ability/tendency of the source to say such nonsensical things.

Yeah, and? Someone says something that seems nonsensical to me, and that I suspect truly is nonsensical, and I'm intrigued to know what was going on in their mind to produce that nonsense. What's smug about that?

Dan Rowden wrote:But heck, it's just a suspicion, right?

I'll clarify: it's not a suspicion that I currently find it nonsensical - it's a matter of strong opinion. That it truly is nonsensical as best as I can ascertain - i.e. that there's no way in which the author could explain it such that I found it to be sensible - is just a suspicion, albeit a strong one.

guest_of_logic: I'd be very interested to hear an explanation. Can you provide one? I'd also be interested in hearing one from the man who wrote it.

Dan: I'm frankly not interested.

You're pretty interested in criticising me for finding it nonsensical, but somehow that interest evaporates when you have a chance to justify its sense.

Dan Rowden wrote:How is causation not an "illusion" in the same sense that existence is?

Oh jeez. Kindly desist from the abuse that you're putting our language through.

Jason wrote:Would it be fair to say then, that at base it is you who decides to take the consensus into account?

But of course.

Jason wrote:Basically you're saying that you put more trust in your decision to trust the consensus, than any other decision you might make. Correct?

Did you phrase that correctly? I'm guessing that you meant to say (my additions in bold): "..your decision of whether or not to trust the consensus..." - correct? I'll continue on that assumption.

I actually wouldn't say that the statement is correct. The decision that I place most trust in is my ultimate opinion on the matter at stake given a weighing of all of the arguments. The decision of whether or not to trust the consensus is subordinate to the decision as to my ultimate opinion, although it plays a part in it as I outlined - I'd give the consensus opinion more thought and more credibility the more I respected the intellects involved.

Jason wrote:So, in that sense, you're really making all the final decisions, you alone are always the final arbiter.

Well sure - as is any free adult.

Jason wrote:What happens if the consensus is to not trust the consensus?

It's an interesting question, and I've spent a bit of time thinking about it - it's almost paradoxical and self-contradictory, but not quite. Anyhow, after all of that thought I'm not sure how to answer it other than saying that it wouldn't change much. It's just one consensus, and I've already told you that consensus opinion is merely an influence on my opinion, not the final determinant of it, so (a) I wouldn't necessarily accept that consensus but (b) I only have limited trust in consensuses anyway.

Jason wrote:My brain aint feelin' the best right now(slight hangover), and I'm not sure I understand your last post, and I'm not sure you understand my point either, so let me just elaborate upon my previous post, and maybe you can elaborate upon your last post too for my sake.

If we apply your claim(that deciding the beginning and ending of causes and effects is an arbitrary judgement) to arbitrary judgements themselves, we find it logically incoherent to assert that arbitrary judgements have not begun - because we would be using an arbitrary judgement to assert that arbitrary judgements have not begun.

I still don't get your point. No-one is arguing that these things haven't begun, only that where it is said that they do so is arbitrary, as any process is a continuum upon which we impose a dualism according to what is most natural for us. That includes the process by which an arbitrary judgement arises.

Saying a thing is arbitrary is not a denial of its reality, it's just a description of its nature.

guest_of_logic wrote: Where in any dictionary does "exist" make any reference to "appearance"? Why should the two be associated? One can imagine, for example, a finite universe containing no consciousness and causally unrelated to our universe. Since - being causally unrelated - it cannot appear to us, and since it has no conscious inhabitants to which it can appear, then by David's definition, it would not "exist". By the conventional definition, however, we would most definitely say that it exists. Is this then a reasonable definition of "exist"? Clearly not: it is a redefinition, and to then use this redefinition to say things about existence as it is conventionally used is equivocation.

You make the accusation of equivocation multiple times, yet it seems you don't have any idea what it is. To employ a definition different from another one, conventional or otherwise, is not equivocation. The fallacy of equivocation occurs specifically when one uses more than one meaning of a term in the same argument (which logically invalidates the argument or causes confusion). We never equivocate on the meaning of "exist". The equivocation occurs in your own mind because you project that conventional meaning into and onto the arguments.

I suggest you stop doing that.

Dan, does consciousness exist?

Nevermind, I found my answer in WOTI. More coming soon.

Dan Rowden wrote:The fallacy of equivocation occurs specifically when one uses more than one meaning of a term in the same argument (which logically invalidates the argument or causes confusion).

Equivocation doesn't have to be a formal fallacy and occur as part of an argument per se, but yeah, one way in which it can occur is as you write: when one uses more than one meaning of a term (without acknowledging it).

Dan Rowden wrote:We never equivocate on the meaning of "exist".

You just aren't aware of it yet. Here are a few annotated examples, from chapter 6 of WOTI. Apart from the first one, it's pretty subtle, so pay attention.

However, internal consistency alone is not enough to ensure that the world we experience has any resemblance to the world which exists beyond the mind.

Here is a glaringly obvious use of the conventional definition of exist: it is explicitly acknowledged that the term "existence" can be applied to that which is beyond the mind. Admittedly, this sentence occurs prior to David's argument that existence is equivalent to appearance and hence that existence applies only to that which is in the mind, but it shows that he is aware of the conventional meaning and sometimes uses it.

A schizophrenic, for example, sometimes talks to people who exist purely in his mind in the belief that he is talking to real people.

The phrase "exist purely in his mind" implies that existence is possible outside of his mind, because otherwise, given that existence is by definition (yours) constrained to the mind, then the phrase "exist purely in his mind" is tautological. The possibility of existence outside of the mind, however, only applies under the conventional meaning of "existence": hence, David is equivocating by having asserted one definition ("appearance") and then using another (the conventional one where it is possible for a thing to exist outside of the mind).

A natural question to ask at this point is what existed in the Universe before consciousness came into being.

David writes here as though "[existence] in the Universe before consciousness came into being" is a coherent notion, whereas by (his) definition it is not - existence has no meaning outside of consciousness: so here he is equivocating by returning to the conventional definition of "existed".

The bottom line is, we cannot even begin to think or speak about what occurred before the existence of consciousness because the very notion of "something occurring" is meaningless in this context.

treat the evidence supporting the existence of other people's consciousness at face value

Both of these quotes assert that consciousness exists, whereas elsewhere David describes the "constructions of consciousness" as "isolated": clearly then, these "isolated" consciousnesses are not themselves merely appearances within consciousness, but exist as more than an appearance. Again, David returns to the conventional definition of "exist", equivocating on his asserted definition.

The mere fact that a logical truth exists as an appearance has no bearing on the validity of its content.

As with an earlier example, the phrase "exists as an appearance" is tautological given that existence is appearance (according to you guys), so again, this phrase implies the possibility of existence as other than an appearance: an equivocal return to the conventional definition of "exist".

It should be clear from the analysis I have presented that the concept of the Totality does not really refer to the three-dimensional physical universe imagined by most people to objectively exist.

"Objectively exist": explicit acknowledgement of a possible mode of existence which is no mere appearance. Again, this is an equivocal return to the conventional definition of "exist".

guest_of_logic wrote:

However, internal consistency alone is not enough to ensure that the world we experience has any resemblance to the world which exists beyond the mind. - Quinn

If there appears to be something beyond the mind, then that thing is said to "exist", by definition.

. . . implies that existence is possible outside of his mind

If it appears that there is "existence outside the mind", then it exists, by definition.

David writes here as though "[existence] in the Universe before consciousness came into being" is a coherent notion

If there appears to have been "existence before consciousness" then "existence before consciousness" exists, by definition.

Dan Rowden wrote:I still don't get your point. No-one is arguing that these things haven't begun, only that where it is said that they do so is arbitrary,

If you can't coherently argue that they haven't begun, and thus you also can't coherently argue that their causes haven't ended, then there is a lack of arbitrariness here - due to the need for logical consistency.

Dan Rowden wrote:as any process is a continuum upon which we impose a dualism according to what is most natural for us. That includes the process by which an arbitrary judgement arises.

But "we" didn't impose arbitrary judgement itself, it arose by causes other than itself, and thus the dualism that is arbitrary judgement itself is not the product of arbitrary judgement.

guest_of_logic wrote:

Jason wrote:So, in that sense, you're really making all the final decisions, you alone are always the final arbiter.

Well sure - as is any free adult.

Ok. My main aim in examining these issue was to show that there may not be all that much basic difference in these areas between you and QSR. You, who chooses to value consensus more, and QSR who you think apparently choose to value consensus less or not at all. It seems that both you and they consider themselves the final arbiter when all is said and done.

Kevin Solway wrote: If there appears to have been "existence before consciousness" then "existence before consciousness" exists, by definition.

Appearances prior to consciousness...

There can't be appearances prior to consciousness, but there can be an appearance of "things prior to consciousness".

Grotesque contortions, Kevin. Ataraxia picked it well; I'll add to his response here:

Kevin Solway wrote:

guest_of_logic wrote:

However, internal consistency alone is not enough to ensure that the world we experience has any resemblance to the world which exists beyond the mind. - Quinn

If there appears to be something beyond the mind, then that thing is said to "exist", by definition.

This boils down to "if I can imagine[*] something that I have defined to be impossible, then by definition it is possible", which is obviously a hopeless contradiction.

[*] Imagination is the only sense in which something "beyond the mind" can "appear", since by your definition an appearance is confined to the mind. I want to point out that I'm being very liberal in even accepting this as meaningful - actually it doesn't even make sense, as Ataraxia pointed out - I'm just trying to ram the point home that even if we allow you a little bit of wriggle room, you're still up the creek without a paddle.

The rest of your points boil down to the same contradiction.

guest_of_logic wrote:This boils down to "if I can imagine[*] something that I have defined to be impossible, then by definition it is possible", which is obviously a hopeless contradiction.

Dude, that's not what he said at all. You are doing that equivocation thing again. "To exist" in QRS's definition is "To Appear" which necessitates consciousness. You distorted this by restating it as "to be possible".

Animus wrote:

guest_of_logic wrote:This boils down to "if I can imagine[*] something that I have defined to be impossible, then by definition it is possible", which is obviously a hopeless contradiction.

Dude, that's not what he said at all.

It is, but since you don't see it the same way as me, I'll repeat it in different words (see below).

Animus wrote:You are doing that equivocation thing again.

How am I equivocating? And when is/are the previous time/s that I've done it? This is the first time that you've accused me of it.

Animus wrote:"To exist" in QRS's definition is "To Appear" which necessitates consciousness. You distorted this by restating it as "to be possible".

I did no such thing. I was not trying to equate "existence" with "possibility". The possibility that I was talking about was the possibility of existence beyond the mind, which in one breath QRS deny (in David's words from WOTI, and which I have quoted previously (emphasis mine): 'The objects that we perceive within the construction are not mere replications or simulations of "real objects" that exist beyond the mind. There are no objects beyond the mind.') but simultaneously by (Kevin's) contorted logic try to assert (Kevin: 'If there appears to be something beyond the mind, then that thing is said to "exist", by definition.'). Do you recognise this as a contradiction? It's pretty glaring to me.

Of course, contradictions are appearances within mind and exist by definition.

guest_of_logic wrote:Ataraxia picked it well

I corrected the error in his response.

Kevin Solway wrote:If there appears to be something beyond the mind, then that thing is said to "exist", by definition.

This boils down to "if I can imagine[*] something that I have defined to be impossible, then by definition it is possible", which is obviously a hopeless contradiction.

No, this is not a view that I hold.

Firstly, you cannot imagine something that you define to be impossible. For example, a square circle. However, the impossibility of a square circle exists, by definition.

Secondly, just because something appears to the mind doesn't mean that it physically exists.

Kevin Solway wrote:

guest_of_logic wrote:Ataraxia picked it well

I corrected the error in his response.

Your "correction" contains the same hopeless contradiction as your response to me. Let's look at it:

Kevin Solway wrote:There can't be appearances prior to consciousness, but there can be an appearance of "things prior to consciousness".

First I'll note that you've been a little sneaky, by replacing "appearances" with "things" in the latter part of the sentence, presumably to avoid the obvious awkwardness of repeating the word. Anyhow, they are effectively synonymous for our purposes, so I'll run with "appearances". Now let's analyse what you've said. In the first half of the sentence you assert the impossibility of "appearances prior to consciousness". In the second half, you assert that "appearances prior to consciousness" can nevertheless present an "appearance". Since appearances prior to consciousness are actually impossible, according to the first half of the sentence, then the appearance of them must be merely an imagination. And yet later you write that "you cannot imagine something that you define to be impossible. For example, a square circle." You're contradicting yourself by on the one hand saying that you can't imagine something that you define to be impossible, and on the other hand saying that you can imagine the impossible - "appearances prior to consciousness". Basically, by asserting that they can make an appearance - in other words be imagined - you're implying that the notion of "appearances before consciousness" is a coherent one: Ataraxia was therefore correct to point out that it is actually (according to you) incoherent.

Also, let's look more deeply at your "correction". We can rephrase it as: "existence (QRS definition) prior to consciousness, can not exist (ordinary definition - "to be" in this context is synonymous with "to exist"), but it can exist (QRS definition)". You're still messing around confusingly with two definitions of "exist", and none of you have demonstrated the inadequacy of the ordinary definition of existence - indeed you continue to equivocally make use of it.

Kevin Solway wrote:[J]ust because something appears to the mind doesn't mean that it physically exists.

Hoo-boy. I gather that by "physical" existence you mean existence beyond the mind. If so, then, here, Dan, is more evidence of equivocation for you buddy. Kevin just admitted the coherence of the notion of a mode of existence beyond the mind by talking about "physical" existence. If "exist" is equivalent to "appears to the mind" then to say that something "physically exists" - i.e. "exists beyond the mind" - is to say that something "appears to the mind beyond the mind". This is obviously incoherent, hence if Kevin is to retain coherence then he can't be using your (re)definition of "exist" and must be using the conventional definition: proof of equivocation.

Firstly, in your reply you conveniently left out the most important thing Kevin stated, which was:

However, the impossibility of a square circle exists, by definition.

This is pivotal, yet, you ignored it.

"[...]an appearance of "things prior to consciousness" is a contradiction or impossibility that appears to mind as a contradiction or impossibility (and exists as such), but which has no referent for those reasons.

guest_of_logic wrote:

Just because something appears to the mind doesn't mean that it physically exists.

Hoo-boy. I gather that by "physical" existence you mean existence beyond the mind. If so, then, here, Dan, is more evidence of equivocation for you buddy.

Er, no, buddy, this is actually another example of the equivocation you are indulging in and projecting onto us. That which physically exists is still an appearance to the mind. It's just a different type of appearance to the abstract. You know, you've heard of it - the empirical. All Kevin is saying is that concepts don't necessarily have empirical referents. You know, like that God you think exists. This doesn't say anything about whether concepts and empirical referents are appearances or not, because they both necessarily are.

There can only ever be one sense of "exist" in our argument, because we only have one, though we may have to reference some other sense (used by others) for contrast or to build an argument from what is right to what is wrong about existence. This is where your "arguments" about equivocation in WOTI fall down.

And since you are so enamored of the conventional dictionary sense of "exist", can you please explain what "have being" or "be" means.

Dan Rowden wrote:Firstly, in your reply you conveniently left out the most important thing Kevin stated, which was:

However, the impossibility of a square circle exists, by definition.

This is pivotal, yet, you ignored it.

I ignored it because it's irrelevant, not pivotal. Where in Kevin's "correction" does he mention or even imply anything about "impossibility"? Here it is again for your reference:

Kevin Solway wrote:There can't be appearances prior to consciousness, but there can be an appearance of "things prior to consciousness".

Do you really think that Kevin would have made the following statement?:

There can't be a square circle, but there can be an appearance of "a square circle".

It would be plain from that statement that 'an appearance of "a square circle"' is referring to the existence of the square circle itself, and not to the existence of the impossibility of the square circle, just like in Kevin's original statement he wasn't referring to the existence of the impossibility of "things before consciousness", but to their existence itself. If he meant to refer to their impossibility, then why didn't he say so?

Dan Rowden wrote:

guest_of_logic wrote:

Just because something appears to the mind doesn't mean that it physically exists.

Hoo-boy. I gather that by "physical" existence you mean existence beyond the mind. If so, then, here, Dan, is more evidence of equivocation for you buddy.

Er, no, buddy, this is actually another example of the equivocation you are indulging in and projecting onto us. That which physically exists is still an appearance to the mind.

All that you needed to say was "what you gather is wrong". I would have accepted that. There was no need to accuse me of equivocation: how do you justify that accusation? It's a classic GF-tactic - reflect the accusation back at the accuser, as seen in "We're not the misogynists, you are!" (yes, yes, I agree that "chauvinist" is actually a better word, I'm just staying true to text).

Dan Rowden wrote:There can only ever be one sense of "exist" in our argument, because we only have one, though we may have to reference some other sense (used by others) for contrast or to build an argument from what is right to what is wrong about existence. This is where your "arguments" about equivocation in WOTI fall down.

However you want to spin it, it's still equivocation: the best way that you could have avoided it was to invent a new word. In the final analysis, though, equivocation is the least of the problems that I identified in my original post. I'd far prefer to see a comprehensive response to that post from you, Kevin, or David, than to continue to argue over equivocation. Do you intend to address it?

Dan Rowden wrote:And since you are so enamored of the conventional dictionary sense of "exist", can you please explain what "have being" or "be" means.

To me it means the same thing.

I am probably going to severely berate myself for this. Nevertheless, here goes... :)

[b]WOTI[/b] wrote:There is [a] kind of proof [...] which does conclusively demonstrate that nothing can exist beyond the construction, one that shows that things necessarily only exist within it. It is as follows:

A thing can only exist if it possesses a form of some kind. Whether it has the form of a tree, or a cloud, or an ambiguous wave/particle duality, or a flowing stream, each thing finds its existence in its form. If a thing were to lack form altogether, then it would be incapable of existence. An existing thing without form is a contradiction in terms and therefore a logical impossibility.

Form, in turn, can only exist by virtue of a perspective created by an observer. The form of an object and the observer's perspective go hand in hand. There cannot be one without the other.

[b]GL[/b] wrote:David's argument semi-formally is:
1. Every thing has a form.
2. Form exists only within consciousness.
3. Form does not exist outside of consciousness (from 2).
4. Things do not exist outside of consciousness (from 1 and 3).

This is how I essentially understand David's argument:

1. Things exist.
2. Every thing that exists has a form.
3. Thus, there cannot exist any thing without form.
4. Form exists in consciousness as the observation by an observer of a thing.
5. Thus, all things are objects.
6. Thus, the object cannot exist without the observer nor the observer without the object.
7. The observer’s observation of the thing and the object’s form are mutually inclusive—i.e., the quality of the thing’s form and the quality of the observer’s observation are identical.
8.Thus, an object of the imagination has the quality of being “an imaginary thing” to an observer in consciousness.
9. Thus, a physical object has the quality of being “a physical thing” to an observer in consciousness.
10. Thus, an abstract object has the quality of being “an abstract thing” to an observer in consciousness.
11. Thus, all things necessarily exist in consciousness.