Sapius,
If at all, I would rather say that every state of affair is exactly what it is, rather than it is merely a state of affairs.
"Rose is a rose is a rose is a rose." -Gertrude Stein
"Now listen! I’m no fool. I know that in daily life we don’t go around saying 'is a … is a … is a …' Yes, I’m no fool; but I think that in that line the rose is red for the first time in English poetry for a hundred years." -Gertrude Stein
"5.5303 Roughly speaking: to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing." -Ludwig Wittgenstein
It's simply redundant to say that something is what it is. If you're suggesting that a state of affairs is anything beyond exactly what it is, then it should be obvious that a difference exists; and if you're suggesting that a state of affairs is simply what it is, then you are being entirely too wordy in order to express something that is only true due to grammar, and that is entirely obvious on top of that.
So as long as one is not aware that it is a mirage, it is logically correct up until then that it is water. Once I KNOW that it is a mirage, then that becomes logically correct. So when was it that I was not indulging in reasoning based in and of logic (A=A)?
"'Counterwise,' continued Tweedledee, 'if it was so, it might be; and if it were so, it would be; but as it isn't, it ain't. That's Logic'" -Lewis Carroll
To say that "what looks like water is water", is to say that something is what it clearly isn't. It would be much more accurate to say that "what looks like water is what looks like water". Of course, we all use the term "water" to describe what appears to be water, for what is water besides an appearance? Nevertheless, this doesn't make it logically correct to say that "what looks like water is water" if we intend for "water" to be understood as anything besides "what looks like water". If we should understand "what looks like water" to have the same meaning as "water", then we are saying too much by saying that "what looks like water is water" and should really just say "" (nothing at all).
I shall think those things which I see,
are those things that I think them to be,
for what does it mean for me to see,
beyond simply having things being for me?
Such thoughts make for nice poetry, but you're falling into the same trap that infected medieval theologians and led Occam to insist something along the lines of "plurality ought never be posed without necessity!" If what one sees is to be something beyond that which it appears as, we should say that the process of recognition is not one of recognizing something for what it is, but rather at attempting to do so. If we are to say that what one sees is nothing beyond that which it appears as, we should say that it is terribly redundant to say that it is what it is.
The problem is that you take “logic†as in a formal system of reasoning only, rather than it also being an inherent system and the foundation of consciousness itself. Which is A=A.
Logic is merely the study of inference, and a handy name for said inference. You seem to suggest that the structure of logic is isomorphic or perhaps indistinguishable from the structure of the world as it appears to us. Thus, it would seem, that what we experience is dependent upon logic for its getting experienced. What argument can you advance for such a view? We can't empirically determine that the world is anything beyond those states of affairs that appear to be the case, and we can't use sound logic to determine determine anything about the world. If your defense of tautological logic depends upon the notion that all things are dependent on tautological logic, then I should tell you that your argument simply begs the question it pretends to answer.
On what grounds can you suggest that a rose is a rose is a rose, and be expressing something that isn't more easily expressed by saying "a rose"?
We have been made to trade-in our physical evolution in favor of a mental one. Why? You tell me.
Thought doesn't depend upon language. A cougar cannot speak, but it is better at thinking then the beasts it hunts. Language gave us a number of edges over other beasts, but none of them have much to do with the discovery of truth. For instance, language can be used to give instructions, which is helpful for hunting. I could shout "arg!" and point in the direction I want my fellow hunter to go, and after enough times of doing this, and then forcing him over to where I want him to go, he'll eventually get the message and just bloody move when I do such things. Meaning tends to be use, as language is used to do things. I keep saying that language serves a functional purpose. You seem to be thinking of language merely as a means of reporting things, perhaps even to oneself. It's absurd to think that thought should consist in us talking to ourselves, and to think that language is limited to the mere reporting of events is to take on a rather selective blindness.
No, it was not particularly developed to get at truth, but discover it, and understand what is false, as in a mirage, so the next time you don't run after it to quench your thirst;
Are you being metaphorical? It's quite obvious that a mirage is identified through sensory characteristics that one doesn't need language to identify. We either identify the mirage as a mirage, or we don't identify the mirage as a mirage. Either way, we have only our experience and memory to thank for our success or failure.