Diebert van Rhijn wrote:How could any question, any reasoning, being naturally fully, infinitely caused, ever demonstrate inadequacy of the infinite causal web?
How could any so-called philosopher demonstrate its adequacy?
Laird: Hahaha, OK then, Diebert, you are hereby defined as a wombat from Katmandu. And that's absolute - you said it yourself. ;-)
Diebert: It's only absolute because of how they would be defined: "true by definition". It just means the same as a tautology, a statement that is necessarily true, under any condition ones discernment can find itself in. There are many conditions in which a wombat will cease being a wombat just as there are conditions where I'd be indistinguishable from a wombat. But it's not just because someone defines it as such. If it's not true by definition, it can only become relatively true by arriving at a provisional conclusion through other means.
The mortality or contingency of the object of a definition has no bearing on the truth of that definition, nor on the "necessity" of that truth. There is no categorical difference between the whimsical definition that I advanced and those employed by the house philosophy. Neither of the two "of necessity" better reflect reality. This "true by definition" that you apply to your privileged definitions (those of the house philosophy) is as such a nonsense - but not only because it falsely distinguishes them, also because this is a misuse of the term: the term isn't applied to definitions, it's applied to statements
based on definitions. Even then (for statements based on definitions), to say that such a statement is "true by definition" is not to say that it necessarily reflects anything truthful about reality: I could define a squasicle as a blue-coloured type of square circle, and a secsicle as a red-coloured type of square circle, and then say that it is "true by definition" that a squasicle is of the same type as a secsicle though coloured differently, but this says nothing truthful about reality.
Do you get the point? There is nothing special about definitions, including those of the house philosophy, when it comes to the truth about reality: they say nothing
necessarily true about reality - you can construct definitional systems that are as divorced from reality as Kramer was from Kramer, and the definitional system of the house philosophy has no innate or unique claim to inerrancy with respect to reality.
David: I mean, I could look at an object on my table and ask myself, "Why is that a cup and not, say, a banana?" And then, after reasoning that the cup is there due to cause and effect, I could continue to ask - like a madman - "But why? Why has cause and effect delivered a cup and not something else?"
guest_of_logic: And when you admit that you don't have an answer to that question, then you are no longer justified in going on to describe your own philosophy as "ultimate" truth.
David: It's like admitting that I don't know the answer to, "what colour is justice?"
David[cont]: You're creating a false question out of a category error.
I left the full context in so that it's plain to those who do know how to recognise a category error that
you don't.
David: The object is a cup because it isn't something else. It isn't a banana because it is a cup. It is on my table because it isn't anywhere else.
guest_of_logic: In other words, "it just is": how now can you justify labelling that answer a "parody" of your actual position? It's spot on.
David: We are talking about the very nature of existence here. Existence, by its very nature, is always one thing and not another. A cup exists as a cup and not, say, as a banana.
I don't see any refutation there of the aptness of the phrase "it just is" as your answer.
David Quinn wrote:So, as I mentioned ealier, if we take your question away from the realm of the absurd and boil it down to its real essence, it reads, "Why is there is existence? or "Why is there anything at all?"
Those questions are definitely significant, even though they aren't the question I started with.
David Quinn wrote:By contrast, the absurdity that you keep wanting to drag us all into is that of questioning why existence is existence and things along those lines. "How can you guys claim to know the ultimate truth when you don't even know why existence is existence!"
That's not a fair phrasing of my question. A fair phrasing would be, "How can you guys claim to know the ultimate truth when you can't even explain why existence has the character, properties and structure that it has?"
David Quinn wrote:Asking, "Why is there existence", is certainly a valid question, which can be fully resolved by the individual when he immerses himself in non-duality, fills his mind with its living understanding and makes peace with God.
Again, you're big on grand-sounding imagery but utterly lacking in substance. I put it to you in an earlier post and I'll put it to you again in the same words:
You've said that the question can be resolved by "immersion in non-duality" - great, so presumably you're "immersed in non-duality" and have resolved the question: so then share that resolution with us, for pity's sake.
David Quinn wrote:House logic:
Explanation requires external cause.
There can be no external cause to infinite causality.
Therefore, infinite causality can admit of no explanation.
The truth is recognized and accepted, and the issue is resolved. Time to move on.
Laird logic:
Explanation requires external cause.
There can be no external cause to infinite causality.
I still demand an explanation for infinite causality nevertheless.
I demand the impossible.
The house philosophy can't give me the impossible.
Therefore, there is a serious flaw in the house philosophy.
The truth is denied because it doesn't fit in with Laird's emotional desires.
Typical blindness. You missed a key premise: that which exists and has properties requires explanation. This is implied in the tenets of your philosophy, namely in the tenet that a thing is caused by all of that which is not it: in other words, that no thing is the way that it is in and of its own right - there is an explanation for its nature outside of itself. Now, this principle
ought to apply to the Totality, but you guys play tricks with definitions to get around this. You define a thing to be finite and existent, and the Totality to be infinite and not existent, such that the Totality is not a thing, and
by definition does not require explanation - but see here, this "by definition" goes back to what I wrote to Diebert above: a definition in and of itself doesn't necessarily say anything truthful about reality. You can play any kinds of games that you like with definitions, and at the end of it you might actually end up
obstructing truth, as you guys do here, by subverting a reasonable principle through an unreasonable definition.
So I don't grant you your definitional trickery: I maintain the premise, as supported by your "thingness" tenet, that that which exists and has properties requires explanation, and I maintain that from the definition of the Totality as "everything", it follows that it does, regardless of its infinite nature, exist, at least in the sense of the aforementioned premise. So now let's look at the logic:
1. Any set of premises that results in contradiction is not part of ultimate truth (premise).
2. That which exists and has properties requires an explanation (premise).
3. That which requires an explanation has an explanation (premise).
4. The Totality exists and has properties (premise).
5. The Totality has an explanation (from 2, 3 and 4).
6. An explanation requires external cause (premise).
7. The Totality has no external cause (premise).
8. The Totality has no explanation (from 6 and 7).
9. The set of premises {2, 3, 4, 6 and 7} results in contradiction (5 contradicts 8).
10. The set of premises {2, 3, 4, 6 and 7} is not part of ultimate truth (from 1 and 9).
The premises in that set are either explicitly affirmed by the house philosophy or are entailed by it when stripping away games of definitional trickery, from which we can conclude that the house philosophy is not ultimate truth, not to mention that contradictions
do indicate a "serious flaw in the house philosophy".