GENIUS FORUMS

Immanuel Kant wrote in Critique of Pure Reason:

For example, the proposition, "Every change has a cause," is a proposition á priori, but impure, because change is a conception which can only be derived from experience.

How can it be proved that the concept of change can only be derived from experience? If that's true then it's not certain that reality always changes.

Matt Gregory wrote:How can it be proved that the concept of change can only be derived from experience?

"Experience" here is analagous to "time." Change merely means that a thing was one way, and subsequently it was another way. In order for this to occur, time must elapse. In order for change to be perceived, a memory of how the thing was, an observation of how it is, and cognition of the difference is all required for change to be noted. Primarily the elapsed time, but almost equally important the cognitions, are what both experience and the perception of change are.

So, how do you prove that change is real? How do you know it isn't something that just exists in the mind, like an hallucination?

Also, how do you prove that change is something that happens over the whole of reality and not just select parts of it? Or would you disagree that this is the way it is?

Heh. Heraclitus and Parmenides had this argument in 600 BC. I'm not sure it's totally resolved yet, but it pretty much inaugurated Western philosophy as we know it.

For what it's worth, I think the opposing arguments of the two ancient thinkers perfectly illustrates what I term the "universal dialectic," an understanding of which integrates and makes sense of both positions.

Kant is often hard to interpret. There are lots of arguments among Kant-readers about what a priori means. In this passage, I am not sure what he means by "experience." He is obviously not using "experience" in the sense of pragmatism or phenomenalism, in which it means pretty much "everything."

Can you provide a bit more of the context, Matt.

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Matt Gregory wrote:So, how do you prove that change is real? How do you know it isn't something that just exists in the mind, like an hallucination?

Also, how do you prove that change is something that happens over the whole of reality and not just select parts of it? Or would you disagree that this is the way it is?

Essentially, it is all a hallucination. To function within the hallucination, we have to find out what is at least fairly consistent. Chunks of my hallucination that I consider to be people tend to have memories, and certain of those people who I remember as being clustered with other people report similar memories to each other and to my memories. I extrapolate out what is consistent over various parts of the globe, and I recognize that change happens everywhere here.

I understand that not much change happens on the moon because there is not as much there to effect change. Logic backs that up in that not much cause would mean not much effect - but molecules still move, etc., so even at that, there is still change.

I hinge my perception of reality on logic, but I recognize it could nevertheless all be a hallucination. Since growing up, my dreams are quite logical in that walking produces movement, if I get bitten it hurts, sometimes people behave illogically, but no more so than in waking life, gravity functions as in waking life - the basic rules still apply, so all of this could be just a long dream. The fact that I dream means nothing as a verification that this is real, as I have dreamed that I fell asleep and dreamed, then woke up in my dream, remembering the dream I dreamed I was dreaming, which faded away shortly after I "woke up" into the next level up of dreaming. It was quite convincing because I'd dreamed that I woke up, and was later befuddled by waking up from that state and realizing I had still been dreaming. I could be in a coma and have been here since childhood, and this could all be just another layer of a dream. To an extent, it is all just a dream. I have no proof of reality being otherwise.

You have to understand what it would logically mean for something to not change. It couldn't have an existence for a start.

One could say the totality never changes, but that is rubbish when everything that makes up the totality changes.

A hallucination, or even awareness, knowing one has a mind is still experience, so I don't see the difference here.

I detest questions like this - they are so pointless. It is just the game playing of academic philosophy. They are irrational -they say ignore everything you think you know, but then use what you know to think about the question.

James wrote:

One could say the totality never changes, but that is rubbish when everything that makes up the totality changes.

The totality doesn't change in the sense that it never turns into something else. It always remains the totality.

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Unidian wrote:Heh. Heraclitus and Parmenides had this argument in 600 BC. I'm not sure it's totally resolved yet, but it pretty much inaugurated Western philosophy as we know it.

For what it's worth, I think the opposing arguments of the two ancient thinkers perfectly illustrates what I term the "universal dialectic," an understanding of which integrates and makes sense of both positions.

I know a lot of thinkers have noted that change is everywhere, eternal, etc., but I think it needs some kind of proof beyond simple observation and I don't think I've ever heard one. I've always assumed that change was the norm, but when I was reading Kant I realized that I'm not even sure if it's really true or not. I can't think of an argument. It seems very possible for there to be finitudes in reality that don't change. Like space, for example. Does space change? Assuming it's correct to think of it as nothingness, I don't think it does.

Philosophaster wrote:Kant is often hard to interpret. There are lots of arguments among Kant-readers about what a priori means.

Pretty funny considering the book was supposed to explain it, according to the introduction. Maybe he was trying to be like Plato, not really trying to answer the questions, just raising them so others could answer them.

In this passage, I am not sure what he means by "experience." He is obviously not using "experience" in the sense of pragmatism or phenomenalism, in which it means pretty much "everything."

I was thinking about this problem just the other day. The way I see it, "experience" either means the five senses or the six senses (five + thinking). I don't really know any other way to conceive of it. What does pragmatism or phenomenalism say about it? I haven't really found any succinct answers on that.

Leyla Shen wrote:Can you provide a bit more of the context, Matt.

I was really just trying to ask about change, but here is some Kant for ya:

http://home.earthlink.net/~msgregory/th ... son.html#4

Immanuel Kant wrote:Secondly, an empirical judgement never exhibits strict and absolute, but only assumed and comparative universality (by induction); therefore, the most we can say is—so far as we have hitherto observed, there is no exception to this or that rule.

See here, if the universality of change is assumed through empirical induction, then we can't ever be certain of it. But if we derive the universality of change by deduction, then it ought to be perfectly provable through logical argument. I don't think this is merely an academic exercise, but a true pursuit of self-knowledge.

Matt Gregory wrote:

Leyla Shen wrote:Can you provide a bit more of the context, Matt.

I was really just trying to ask about change, but here is some Kant for ya:

http://home.earthlink.net/~msgregory/th ... son.html#4

Yes, well---you know me, I'm selfish like that.

Ta.

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Are the comments in red yours, Matt? If so, I think your answer lies in the following passages to which your lack of comment indicates a failure to understand their meaning (which I can definitely appreciate, but I personally find it difficult to paraphrase what he is saying in any way that would do it more justice, at the moment! I am inspired to work on it, though :)

Kant, with comments in square brackets by me:

Empirical universality is [i.e. every change has a cause], therefore, only an arbitrary extension of validity, from that which may be predicated of a proposition valid in most cases, to that which is asserted of a proposition which holds good in all; as, for example, in the affirmation, “all bodies are heavy.” When, on the contrary, strict universality characterizes a judgement, it necessarily indicates another peculiar source of knowledge, namely, a faculty of cognition á priori. Necessity and strict universality, therefore, are infallible tests for distinguishing pure from empirical knowledge, and are inseparably connected with each other. But as in the use of these criteria the empirical limitation [criterion 1] is sometimes more easily detected than the contingency of the judgement [criterion 2], or the unlimited universality which we attach to a judgement [criterion 1] is often a more convincing proof than its necessity [criterion 2], it may be advisable to use the criteria separately, each being by itself infallible.

Now, that in the sphere of human cognition, we have judgements which are necessary, and in the strictest sense universal, consequently pure á priori, [criterion 2] it will be an easy matter to show. If we desire an example from the sciences, we need only take any proposition in mathematics. If we cast our eyes upon the commonest operations of the understanding, the proposition, “every change must have a cause,” will amply serve our purpose. In the latter case [criterion 2], indeed, the conception of a cause so plainly involves the conception of a necessity of connection with an effect, and of a strict universality of the law, that the very notion of a cause would entirely disappear, were we to derive it, like Hume, from a frequent association of what happens with that which precedes, and the habit thence originating of connecting representations—the necessity inherent in the judgement being therefore merely subjective. [That’s really rather a brilliant expression of the truth!] Besides, without seeking for such examples of principles existing á priori in cognition, we might easily show that such principles are the indispensable basis of the possibility of experience itself, and consequently prove their existence á priori [Wow, that's truly a potentially insurmountable paradox!].

In other words, this “every change has a cause” is an example of [Hume-type] impure a priori knowledge.

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PS: Take that, Expectantly Ironic!

:)

Leyla Shen wrote:PS: Take that, Expectantly Ironic!

:)

You're getting better.

You think? How about you hold that thought until/if he engages.

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Matt Gregory wrote:Does space change? Assuming it's correct to think of it as nothingness, I don't think it does.

When a comet shoots through space, does space move out of the way for the comet? There was space there, then there was a comet there, then there was space again. Did space change? I say it did.


Leyla - I was referring to your sense of humor. Perhaps I was being too optimistic.

I may not be getting the point here. The style in which Kant writes is too complex for my IQ. Is he just saying - There is no absolute logical basis by which generalisations form into absolute notions of truth. Well there is - If one can imagine a concept that if experienced would destroy the perceived absoluteness of a particular truth, but one never experiences this in reality, then one's definitions relating to the absolute do not require modification.

We can imagine an uncaused thing, a Creator God for example, but as we have never experienced this God, then our pre-existing absolute truth that everything is and must be caused, can remain absolute.

In other words, this “every change has a cause” is an example of [Hume-type] impure a priori knowledge.

How could it be impure, if there is no competing rational experience to make it impure. A non-rational experience, like a emotional belief in God could make it impure.


Does Kant want to have his cake and eat it to. Here he is saying well Ok there is zero proof of the existence of any god, but we might as well believe it for practical reasons. Whereas with the a priori crap, all the evidence we have ever seen is being "made impure".

Idea of God
Kant stated the practical necessity for a belief in God in his Critique of Pure Reason. As an idea of pure reason, "we do not have the slightest ground to assume in an absolute manner...the object of this idea..." (A685/B713), but adds that the idea of God cannot be separated from the relation of happiness with morality as the "ideal of the supreme good". The foundation of this connection is an intelligible moral world, and "is necessary from the practical point of view" (A810/B838). Later, in the Logic, § 3 (1800) argued that the idea of God can only be proved through the moral law and only with practical intent, that is, "the intent so as to act as if there be a God".

Why does subjectivity matter - it's all you'll ever have. If there is anything that does not change then within the Totality then no entity, present or future, will ever know about it - in order to be observed it has to change. So why bother.

I just don’t see how Kant is adding any value to knowledge at all. I sense a trickster.

I guess Kant does have apoint in the context of trying to imagine "what reality is really like".

For example, I beleive everything is caused, and this means that dimensions themselves are caused, which in turn makes dimensions really just an effect. No effect is the true nature of a thing.

Our perceptions are impure in this regard - impure from a non-perspective based basis, but pure from a subjective basis. The reality might be that there is no such thing as big or small, or movement or distance. The Totality itself may be dimensionless, and probably is, as what causes it must be dimensionless. As all beings have to have a perspective however, we shall never know, so it becomes pointless, other than a matter of curiosity.

in order to be observed it has to change

I believe that a theoretically unchanging thing, if it were to exist, would be able to be observed - it just would not be observed to change. Look at your floor for a moment. Under most circumstances your floor changes so slowly that change can only be observed over significant time, and possibly only with the aid of photography - so in a general sense, we could say that in the short term, your floor is unchanging - yet you can observe your floor.

Idea of God
Kant stated the practical necessity for a belief in God in his Critique of Pure Reason. As an idea of pure reason, "we do not have the slightest ground to assume in an absolute manner...the object of this idea..." (A685/B713), but adds that the idea of God cannot be separated from the relation of happiness with morality as the "ideal of the supreme good". The foundation of this connection is an intelligible moral world, and "is necessary from the practical point of view" (A810/B838). Later, in the Logic, § 3 (1800) argued that the idea of God can only be proved through the moral law and only with practical intent, that is, "the intent so as to act as if there be a God".

I'm still learning about the historical philosophers, but what I gather from this quote is that Kant was referring to the Christian God rather than our perception of the Totality - which makes a huge difference. He seems to be advocating for the Christian God as a necessary fiction.

I'm not up on my academics, and an initial scan of the internet didn't reveal a lot, so all this is would be my read of the quote. I would also appreciate input from someone who has studied Kant.

I believe that a theoretically unchanging thing, if it were to exist, would be able to be observed - it just would not be observed to change. Look at your floor for a moment. Under most circumstances your floor changes so slowly that change can only be observed over significant time, and possibly only with the aid of photography - so in a general sense, we could say that in the short term, your floor is unchanging - yet you can observe your floor.

This is not correct.

Sight - one couldn't see the thing unless light that hit it, caused changes in the thing that altered the light coming back to one's eyes.

Smell/Taste - pretty obvious that atoms must emmanate from the thing, so it must be changing if we smell or taste it.

Touch - to feel the thing a force would have to emmanate from the thing. We may be able to feel a lack of change in our own forces involved in touch - not sure on this point.

Hearing - well hearing is similar to touch. It would not emit any sound, but sound reflected from it may allow for it to be observed.

Well Ok, those last too senses, kind of raise doubts about observablity, but I do still do not believe it would be observable.

I see causes as always being of a two way nature. Forward causality and reverse cauality. Reverse causality is of course no different from any other cause. It is just that "side" of a causal event, that instead of pushing, pushes back.

The effect we call time appears to work one way - things flow in one direction, in a forward wave. Even the destruction of a thing still occurs in a forwards direction.

If the totality cannot change, then the set of all causes may have an ending at the level of the totality. At this level they, as a total set, may reverse polarity, and become reverse causal agents, and begin again as that part of the duality of causal action that pushes back. In things both sides of causal action push against the boundary of the totality and reverse in the moment.

Now back to the point:

If a thing did not change, it would have ability to push back, causes could only flow through it without altering the causes polarity. In the case of unchanging things, all of our sensory tools would have no impact on the thing, so we could not observe it.

None of this is to say that relative non-change between one whole thing and another whole thing is not observable, as per your floor example.

Anything of form will always change it's form due to the fact that it is interconnected with the causal actions of that which surrounds it. An unchaging thing could not have any form of connection with all the rest of the totality that is changing - in a partial sense it would be outside of the universe.

One could say that that which creates the form of things does not change, but you cannot say this if you are not a fundamental dualist. If the cause of all things was one thing, then it would have to change to create form, but if the form of all things was merely conincidence, then two things whose causal nature - which is their entire nature - does not change then form can be created as a result of successive layers of cuasal relativity.

That is why I said a theoretically unchanging thing. Theoretically there could be a thing that did not change by light (or anything else) reflecting off of it, therefore it would be able to be seen without changes occurring. I am aware that at the quantum physics level, in reality things change just by being observed - but in a theoretical model it is logically possible that a thing could be unchanging and perceptible.