Expectantly Ironic wrote:
Fantastic argument. Lets say we call something causal when it can be expected to act in a predictable manner. Every time I throw a bouncy ball to the ground it leaps back up in the air (provided that certain conditions exist to facilitate this). I can then say that the bouncy ball acts in a causal manner. I'll call this my inductive proof for the existence of causality in the actions of the bouncy ball. It's important here that we keep in mind that causality refers to the behavior of the ball, whereas induction refers to the method by which we can logically infer such a property.
Now lets say that I find another bouncy ball that only bounces back up half the time. This shocks and disturbs me, so I run all sorts of tests on it to try to figure out what determines when it bounces and when it doesn't. Extraordinary claims require extraordinary proofs. After doing several thousand tests, discussing with scientists the possible flaws in my experimental methods, and otherwise doing whatever I can to bring some predictability to my ball; I find that there is simply no way to determine when it will bounce back up at me. I'll call this my inductive proof for an acausal bouncy ball. I don't have such a ball, of course, as my balls are quite causal, but I can point out some scientific research that finds similarly strange behavior in electrons.
This is using a limited, anthropomorphic definition of cause, one that equates it with our own ability to make empirical predictions and models. It doesn't really deal with what is happening out there in the world, independently of our abilities.
Looking at the matter logically, a ball that bounces the same way every time could easily be uncaused and simply bouncing back the same way out of sheer coincidence.
Similarly, a ball that doesn't bounce the same way consistently could easily be caused, with the factors causing the inconsistency currently beyond our ability to perceive them.
This shows that as far as a deeper philosophical understanding is concerned empirical observation, testing, prediction, etc, cannot determine one way or the other whether a thing is caused.
Of course, if we confine ourselves to using the limited, anthropomorphic definition of cause, then we can indeed make a tentative determination through empirical means. But that is a trivial and uninteresting thing to do, philosophically speaking.
Looking at the matter more realistically, I should also point out the obvious truth that even a ball which bounces inconsistently necessarily has causes. For example, without the existence of a solid ground, the molecular structure of the ball which makes it bouncy, the space inbetween the ball and the ground, the person throwing it downwards, the existence of gravity, etc, the ball wouldn't be able to move and bounce at all, either consistently or inconsistently.
The same is true of electrons.
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