Animus wrote:I came across this basic argument attributed to British philosopher Galen Strawson
- • We do what we do, in a given situation, because we are what we are.
• In order to be ultimately responsible for what we do, we have to be ultimately responsible for what we are — at least in certain crucial mental respects.
• But we cannot, as the first point avers, be ultimately responsible for what we are, because, simply, we are what we are; we cannot be causa sui.
• Therefore, we cannot be ultimately responsible for what we do.
The key word here being "ultimately." It can be said without argument that we are what we are. Even though we are speaking of a conscious entity (our own self), this is a form of A=A, since we can also state equally without argument that we are not what we are not.
The first part of the premise is less clear. We do what we do, in a given situation, because we are what we are. But how did we come to be in that situation? Is that also necessarily because we are what we are? I think in many cases this is so, that we do not merely find ourselves in every situation, but that who and what we are contributes to the situation and our being a part of it.
No one can be ultimately responsible for who and what he is. This would entail having had control over his very conception, if we take the term "ultimately" in its most literal sense.
Strawson's conclusion reflects most people's experience. No matter how much effort one exerts over one's environment, one has not created that environment, at least not completely. Therefore, one cannot help but react to one's environment, at least to some degree. As long as this degree is not zero, one cannot possibly be ultimately responsible for one's actions.
If the question of free will arises, we can take a special case in which the degree of reaction to one's environment is zero because one does not act at all. Reaction is a form of action; if there is no action, there is no reaction. Such a case of total passivity would be finite in time, at least for most people. It is said that some yogis are able to maintain a position for years, virtually indefinitely, neither eating nor sleeping and subsisting on respiration, which is involuntary. The classic explanation for the yogi's is that he is freeing himself as much as humanly possible from the fetters of the flesh, that he is seeking or has found
freedom.
I think that, properly, the issue of free will should be confined to relative considerations. Take, for example, a slave who is beaten and starved into submission. Day after day, year after year, from his birth to the present moment, he is neither responsible for who, what, nor where he is. He is not responsible for what he does or what is done to him, except to the extent that compliance may lessen suffering. One day this slave manages to escape. He now must fend for himself the best he can. He still cannot be said to be responsible for what he does, as he still will not be responsible for what he is.
At the same time, it cannot be said that his situation has not changed. Does he now have free will? He has risked his life for his current "freedom." Here is where the notion of relative free will enters. He no longer gets regular beatings, but he also must procure his own sustenance. If asked, he will insist he prefers his new life over his previous life, and that in a very real sense he is now more free. He is now more responsible for what he does, if not ultimately so.
I think the philosophical insistence that the ex-slave is no more immune to the laws of cause and effect than he was previously misses something quite fundamental in such a scenario. Every other slave in his previous situation endured similar, if not identical, treatment. Yet they remain slaves and the ex-slave does not. None of them were ultimately responsible for what they were, and yet what one of them now is is markedly different. If ultimate responsibility is logically contradictory, the notion of responsibility itself is not. If there is no such thing as free will, it doesn't follow that will itself is merely an illusion. To rid oneself of delusion, one may decide to surrender one's will. You cannot surrender what you do not have. The delusion is not that will exists, but that it can be ultimately free.