GENIUS FORUMS

Expectantly Ironic wrote:

Faust: Quantum physics is incomplete and I'm sure there are hidden variables.

EI: I really can't argue with faith. I just don't have it.

Let's say you are watching a conjurer's trick and he seemingly produces a rabbit out of thin air. Your companion turns to you and says, "Look at that! It's magic!"

Since you are a man of truth, you might reply, "No, it is merely a trick. There is sure to to be a mundane explanation for it."

Your companion: "But look at the evidence before you! He just produced the rabbit out of nothing! How can you argue with that?"

You: "There are bound to be hidden factors involved".

Your companion: "I didn't see any of these so-called 'hidden factors'. I'm sorry, but your theory sounds a bit flimsy to me."

You: "Your picture of what occurred is incomplete."

Your companion: "Well, I really can't argue with faith. I just don't have it."

Sound convincing to you?

The philosopher Popper suggested that anything that isn't falsifiable isn't within the realm of science. We can always insist that something that appears random has hidden factors at play, and if we are to do so, then we render universal determinate causality a dogma that can never be proven wrong. Thus, we should say, that such a notion isn't testable, and any evidence you claim to have for such a thing is worthless.

The trouble is, determinism is a philosophical principle, not a scientific one. It is indeed testable, not through empirical evidence, but through the exercise of pure logic.

The second type of freewill is compatibilist freewill, whereas its believed absurd to think that decisions aren't determined by physical reality, but that such a fact doesn't change anything about their phenomenal reality. To a compatibilist it makes no difference if the world were entirely random or entirely determined.

It should make a difference. If the world was indeed entirely random, then it would mean that your own thoughts and decisions would also be entirely random, which would undermine the very concept of "will" from the outset. In a random world, there wouldn't be any mechanism for will, let alone free-will.

From Wisdom of the Infinite:

Where Does Our Will Begin?

The question of free will is first and foremost a question of origins. Do our thoughts and decisions originate in our brains (or minds)? Or are they like everything else in the Universe and have innumerable antecedent causes which stretch back into the beginningless past? The answer to this is crucial to the resolution of the question of whether free will exists. For if our thoughts and decisions have no ultimate origination, then free will cannot ultimately exist.

We can go further. Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that origins are possible, be it in the brain or wherever, it would still be impossible for free will to exist. An event that originates without cause is, by definition, a completely spontaneous and random event, which is totally incompatible with the concept of free will. Decisions that mysteriously pop into our brains without rhyme or reason cannot be classed as an act of will on our parts. They are no more a product of our will than is the toss of a coin, or the random generation of lottery numbers.

Here lies the essential irony of free will. On the one hand, free will, as a process, needs the existence of causality in order for it to function. It needs causality because free will is a concept that refers to the mind willing or causing things to happen. And yet, at the same time, it is the sheer reality of causality which nullifies its existence. Thus, the very conditions which are needed to support it are also the very conditions which erode all possibility of it existing. It therefore cannot exist.

-

Pye wrote:

Hard determinism fails in this on many counts precisely because it refuses to deal with the experience of the self. It fails in the same manner that its religio-spiritual cousins ("there is no self") does. It does not accurately describe the human experience, nor has it any capacity to predict the world of thoughts, creations, and individual wills that occupy the world.

There is that gaunt caricature again. You can't shake it off, can you?

If you perceive causality and human experience to be at odds with one another, then it is a sure sign that your current understanding of causality, and human experience, is limited.

As for making predictions, the future is unpredictable regardless of the truth of determinism. Even though the Universe is fully causal, we will never be able to have access to enough information to make 100% certain predictions.

In fact, it is inherently impossible for anyone or anything to ever gain a complete set of data about the present to make a 100% certain prediction about the future. The very nature of measurement precludes it. Thus, even in a fully-deterministic universe, the future in inherently unpredictable.

P.P.S. I pause on this occasion for a nicely self-serving observation that I am glad to see bert back. He has no idea I have read/understood/ and even admired his thinking, and so I tell him now. In addition, there is another excellent thinker on this forum - Expectantly Ironic. This is just to say.

Ah, it's nice to see the woolly-minded flocking together, nuzzling each other's ears, and worshiping the glories of vagueness.

-

worshiping the glories of vagueness

If one looks at the spectrum of fundamentalist belief systems, including yours, then one could say your side overall worships absoluteness to a higher degree, than do those who seek the dualistic centre as opposed to such polarisation.

Of course though, the most correct are those who can encompass the two poles and everything in between.

David,

Let's say you are watching a conjurer's trick and he seemingly produces a rabbit out of thin air.

If the conjurer could consistently preform this feat in a controlled experiment, I'd be inclined to believe that he wasn't using standard stage tricks. It's from nature that we find things that seem to be random though, and nature isn't a stage magician.

The trouble is, determinism is a philosophical principle, not a scientific one. It is indeed testable, not through empirical evidence, but through the exercise of pure logic.

I'm unaware of any purely logical proof for determinism: whereas one could theoretically determine everything in the future from a knowledge of the exact state of affairs at present and a complete understanding of natural "laws". I'm inclined to believe that one could pretty accurately predict the future given such knowledge, but not to the extent that they'd know where every particle would be at any given point in time.

It should make a difference. If the world was indeed entirely random, then it would mean that your own thoughts and decisions would also be entirely random, which would undermine the very concept of "will" from the outset. In a random world, there wouldn't be any mechanism for will, let alone free-will.

Which was my point. I wasn't suggesting that compatibilist freewill would likely exist in a completely random system, but rather that incompatibilist freewill fails regardless of whether or not we accept determinism. Compatibilist freewill is true when determinism is true, and is true if determinism is false due to the world having a few random elements. If the world is completely random, then the highly improbable consistency that we observe is still there (though it won't necessarily continue in the future), and thus such a notion of freewill sustains itself even then.

As for my take on freewill:

A man is nothing more then that which he remembers of the past, and (rather redundantly) the physical circumstances that are or lead to his conscious experience or physical actions at present. If these circumstances lead him to do as he does or will what he will, then how is it that we can say that a man is not free to do as he'll do or will as he will? It strikes me as absurd to suggest that a man is a slave to physical circumstances that he psychologically wraps into his sense of being. A man is nothing beyond a somewhat arbitrarily defined chunk of the causative web that composes everything. He is free to will what he will, because that which he'll will is determined by causal circumstance, and said causal circumstance is part of his being.

The topic of discussion reminds me of a rather interesting notion. It is possible that what happens in the world is completely random. Lets say that a system operated in an utterly chaotic manner for a week. It wouldn't be unfeasible that it would appear to act in an orderly manner for a second or two. Now if we imagine a system that operates for an infinite amount of time, it shouldn't be unfeasible that it could operate in an orderly manner for unimaginable spans of time. Such a notion could offer up an explanation for such things as the origins of the universe: as it could have emerged from random excitations of a quantum field or some such (I'm not a physicist so forgive me if my terminology is incorrect here). It is a cheap explanation, and not one that I'd likely accept as anything beyond a possibility, but I do find the notion interesting.

ExpectantlyIronic wrote:nature isn't a stage magician.

True, but once people thought lightning came from the magical powers of Zeus. Then people obtained the technology to determine where lightning really came from.

edit to put addendum in a new post.
.

EI,

If these circumstances lead him to do as he does or will what he will, then how is it that we can say that a man is not free to do as he'll do or will as he will?

If a man is addicted to alcohol, and he wants to stop drinking, but can't, how is it that you can say that his will is free?

.

True, but once people thought lightning came from the magical powers of Zeus. Then people obtained the technology to determine where lightning really came from.

True. Hence why I'm not quick to accept determinism. It could very well be the Zeus we posit to explain that which we can't currently understand.

ExpectantlyIronic wrote:He is free to will what he will, because that which he'll will is determined by causal circumstance, and said causal circumstance is part of his being.

So you're saying people are free to will because the causes lead them to will? That sounds like causality.
.

Shah,

If a man is addicted to alcohol, and he wants to stop drinking, but can't, how is it that you can say that his will is free?

If he would claim to want to stop drinking, then his will would be enslaved to a part of physical reality that he doesn't consider an aspect of his being. We would say that the state of his brain results in his drinking, but he doesn't consider such aspects of his brain to be an aspect of his will, rather he considers it to be an impediment to his will.

ExpectantlyIronic wrote:

True, but once people thought lightning came from the magical powers of Zeus. Then people obtained the technology to determine where lightning really came from.

True. Hence why I'm not quick to accept determinism. It could very well be the Zeus we posit to explain that which we can't currently understand.

I am flexible enough to give you that there is a chance (I believe the phrase is "a snowball's chance in hell" - but a chance nevertheless) that Zeus is the explanation for all we do not know - but I would not go so far as to say there could very well be that Zeus is the explanation for all we do not know. The thing is if we attribute it to Zeus without proving it is Zeus, we stop looking for the real cause.
.

Elizabeth,

So you're saying people are free to will because the causes lead them to will?

They have freewill because they consider themselves to be the causes that lead them to will.

That sounds like causality.

It is causality, just not necessarily universal causality. I don't see the notion of causality as being in opposition to my conception of freewill.

EI,

If he would claim to want to stop drinking, then his will would be enslaved to a part of physical reality that he doesn't consider an aspect of his being. We would say that the state of his brain results in his drinking, but he doesn't consider such aspects of his brain to be an aspect of his will, rather he considers it to be an impediment to his will.

Ok, I agree. How does that make his will free? And how can he claim to have an illusion of free will?

.

ExpectantlyIronic wrote:... he doesn't consider such aspects of his brain to be an aspect of his will, rather he considers it to be an impediment to his will.

First, I need to know if in philosophical language, one does not differentiate "wish" or "desire" from "will" - they seem like different things to me.

Second, I agree that the outer world (like whether or not one drinks) and the inner world (like will), but they interact as causes and effects on each other. The will, though is also effected by causes. Here is an obvious example: if one loses one's will, then takes medication, then one's will returns. This will was caused by the medication. Another observable one, someone watches some porn, then wills to masterbate. Less easy to see are when the will is effected by changes in hormone levels, byproducts of recently eaten foods, subconcious activity in the mind, concious thoughts, etc - but all these are wills that were caused.
.

ExpectantlyIronic wrote:Elizabeth,

So you're saying people are free to will because the causes lead them to will?

They have freewill because they consider themselves to be the causes that lead them to will.

The answer to the following question will also answer if these people are deluded. Who/what would "themselves" be?
.

Elizabeth,

The thing is if we attribute it to Zeus without proving it is Zeus, we stop looking for the real cause.

Which is why I've consistently said that I'm not committed to determinism or the existence of random elements in the world. Any strongly held opinion can lead one to stop looking.

Shah,

Ok, I agree. How does that make his will free? And how can he claim to have an illusion of free will?

He is free to desire that he stop drinking, even though the chains of alcoholism prevent him from doing so. A man who is in jail might want to take a walk on a beach. Should we say that he doesn't really want to take a walk on the beach because he can't actualize his wish?

Elizabeth,

First, I need to know if in philosophical language, one does not differentiate "wish" or "desire" from "will" - they seem like different things to me.

I consider them to be the same. I'm pretty sure that the term "will" is too vague to be commonly used philosophical journals these days though. What do you consider to be the will?

but all these are wills that were caused.

I never said that the will wasn't affected by factors outside the brain. Nobody would say that if one saw an apple, and desired to eat it, that such a desire wasn't partially caused by the presence of the apple. I'm not arguing for freewill independent of physical reality.

Who/what would "themselves" be?

Whatever they consider themselves to be. When we talk of an apple we don't talk of the essence of an apple, but rather speak of the phenomena of an apple. One doesn't have to talk of an essential "self" to accurately use the the term "self". One merely needs to talk of the phenomenal self: which could be conscious experience taken as conscious experience or ones physical body.

I'd say the phenominal self is caused It just seems to me like the word "free" as you are describing "free will" is meaningless. Why not just say people have will?

I would differentialte will from desire or wish as will including determination to accomplish, desire being an emotional want, and wish being a daydream.
.

Elizabeth,

I'd say the phenominal self is caused It just seems to me like the word "free" as you are describing "free will" is meaningless. Why not just say people have will?

Because they are free in the sense that they can will whatever they like, so far as we understand the "self" to include (upon common reflection) some of the causes of their will. Wrapped into what I consider to be my "self" are the emotions caused when I see an apple I want to eat. How can one be a slave to a desire he considers to be within his being? As Sartre said: "We are condemned to be free". In the eyes of others we will always be seen as responsible for that which we do, and will be seen as nothing more then what we do, how we appear, and whatever imaginary figments or perceptual filters are applied to us by the minds of such people. In my view we shouldn't deny the self when we deny the soul, for then we deny our existence (Sartre would have said we do this in order to not have to face the possibility of real non-existence I'd imagine), and by denying our existence we deny our responsibilities towards whatever ends we seek.

I would differentialte will from desire or wish as will including determination to accomplish, desire being an emotional want, and wish being a daydream.

It seem to me then, that the will would always be accompanied by both desire and wish.

ExpectantlyIronic, just a little note: if Zeus caused lightning, that would still be a cause. If you knew the will of Zeus, you could even predict the lightning. It would still be a deterministic universe.

ExpectantlyIronic, just a little note: if Zeus caused lightning, that would still be a cause. If you knew the will of Zeus, you could even predict the lightning. It would still be a deterministic universe.

I'm not suggesting that Zeus might exist. I'm pretty sure you're misreading me. I'm suggesting that random events may occur due to the fact that there is evidence to suggest as much. Insofar as I'm concerned, and what I meant to convey, is that determinism could be a modern Zeus; in that it's taken to be true because of its intuitively appealing nature, despite having no evidence to suggest it's true. To liken my views to a belief in Zeus without similar grounds seems extremely odd to me, and nobody has yet provided me with such grounds (save for the suggestion that, like a belief in Zeus, my views may lead one to stop looking for other explanations, which I've already addressed).

ExpectantlyIronic,

I'm suggesting that random events may occur due to the fact that there is evidence to suggest as much.

How could a totally random event occur? I've always had a hard time conceiving of anything like that, so if you can give me an example....

[As to the Zeus bit, I probably misread you... I'm not following this thread with my full attention, but I thought I caught you defending Zeus as an example of non-deterministic universe.]

EI,

He is free to desire that he stop drinking, even though the chains of alcoholism prevent him from doing so. A man who is in jail might want to take a walk on a beach. Should we say that he doesn't really want to take a walk on the beach because he can't actualize his wish?

But the desire to stop drinking or to take a walk is also caused. I don't see in what sense you say we choose our desires.

If I could choose my desires, I would choose to desire to eat rice every day instead of meats, seafood and everything else I eat. That would make my life a lot easier, as I wouldn't even have to work.

.

.

How could a totally random event occur?

The word is a word associated with how beings see the universe. Random should not actually mean or infer that something is uncaused.

In truth, all events are random in that they are not planned and orchestrated, but occur only as a result of some inherent inequality within the totality. It is causal determination that, within a defined spatial locality, first causes randomness, and then causes evolution, the devolution and back to randomness again. Randomness will cause synergy from non-synergy and non-synergy from synergy.

There are no laws of nature that make things random or not random - there are only boundaries relative to other boundaries that cause certain outcomes.

Shah,

If I could choose my desires, I would choose to desire to eat rice every day instead of meats, seafood and everything else I eat. That would make my life a lot easier, as I wouldn't even have to work.

I'm not saying you choose your desires, but rather that you are (in part) those desires. You are (in small part) what you want to eat. The decision to eat a steak over rice is caused, but it is caused by you. Like everyone (including myself of course), you selectively acknowledge aspects of your being when talking about such desires. They aren't me(desires) but "my desires", by habit of speech. Nevertheless, your desire to not work (which makes you want to desire to eat rice) is acknowledged as an aspect of your being when you suggest that you want to desire to eat rice.