The amazing self-undermining argument

[Philosophaster]

The possibility of faulty memories may make it impossible to distinguish good arguments from bad ones:

1) We cannot know that our memories are reliable, since checking our memory involves acts that require memory (circular justification).

2) If we cannot know that an argument is based on a proper chain of reasoning, then we cannot know that the argument is valid.

3) If we cannot know that our memory is reliable, then we cannot know that we have used a proper chain of reasoning (for if memory were not reliable, we could not correctly remember which steps we had taken, etc.).

4) We cannot know that we have used a proper chain of reasoning (from 1 and 3).

5) We cannot know that an argument is valid (from 4 and 2).

Formally:

KMR = Know that one's memory is reliable.
KAV = Know that one's argument is valid.
KPCR = Know that one's argument is based on a proper chain of reasoning.

"p" represents just any old person:

Premises:

1) !KMR(p)
2) !KPCR(p) -> !KAV(p)
3) !KMR(p) -> !KPCR(p)

----------------------

Conclusions:

4) !KPCR(p) [-> Elim: 1, 3]
5) !KAV(p) [-> Elim: 4, 2]

And yes, I know that the argument ends up denying that we can tell whether it is valid. There is also the problem that we only way we can conclude that we sometimes remember things incorrectly is to first assume that our memory is reliable the rest of the time. And I guess one could also point out that the argument treats memory as a way of "looking" at an actual entity (the past) -- is that really an accurate way to think of memory? I just found it interesting.

[Lennyrizzo]

If you were to find this argument consistently good in certain places while consistently bad in others, what would that suggest about the reliability of your memory? How many times would this have to occur before you're certain that your memory at least, is good?

[Philosophaster]

I'm not sure what you mean by "places." Which steps do you find fault with?

[David Quinn]

The main problem with the argument is that it falsely equates the logical process with memory. While it is certainly true that we can never be certain of the validity of our memories, the actual deductive process differs in that it is a primary act of perception in the here and now and does not rely on the validity of memory. In other words, an act of logic is the act of recognizing identity between two different statements that happen to be present directly before us.

For example, consider the geometrical proof of Pythagoras' Theorem, which can be viewed here. The process of grasping the truth of this proof is a direct act of perception that occurs in the present. The possibility that our memory is playing tricks on us is irrelevent in the face of this supreme act of perception. Given the materials presented to the mind, a truth has been grasped.

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[Philosophaster]

I encountered that objection on another board as well. The only answer I have is that even in a very short proof or theorem (such as Pythagoras's) we grasp the different elements in a sequential order that depends on the passage of time. Perhaps that isn't correct, though.

[Sapius]

David wrote:

While it is certainly true that we can never be certain of the validity of our memories, the actual deductive process differs in that it is a primary act of perception in the here and now and does not rely on the validity of memory.

Logically speaking, how can one move from A to B without memory. Isn't now but a memory of the perceived moment that just passed by? By the time you register anything at all it has already passed by. For example, when saying per-cep-tion, by the time you reach n all the other alphabets (or the sound) has passed by, and if you don’t remember what you have just said, or are planning to say, which also requires memory, then how can you form a coherent sentence? The here and now doesn’t seem to hang around that long.

The 'deductive process' you speak of; has it nothing to do with time? You first need to remember something to even compare it to something else. Logic does the deduction, but I don't think it can take a single step without memory.

Regarding knowing the reliability of memory, I think one can always use logic to check it out. Any ways, memory on its own has nothing to do with reasoning, but reasoning seems to be very much reliant on memory.

The possibility that our memory is playing tricks on us is irrelevent in the face of this supreme act of perception. Given the materials presented to the mind, a truth has been grasped.

Sure, this supreme act of perception has been grasped; but did it take no time to grasp? And where is it being placed while it is being grasped? I think what is being said here is, that a moment later one cannot rely on the "truth" of that supreme act of perception, since memory may not be reliable.

[Diebert van Rhijn]

Not unlike the computer's microprocessor with its registers and stacks to perform binary calculations, there must be some use of memory in the brain to make any rational thought possible.

Therefore questioning the inablity to determine the reliability of memory is the same as questioning if reason could be infallible or perfect at all.

The question in itself is flawed in my opinion. Reason in its very essence is the ability to reflect upon itself, to bite its own tail. The more this reasoning ability does not have a notion of its own nature and working, able to monitor and errorcheck itself, the less it can function properly at all.

If the supposed shared 'flaw' in memory is hidden from any methods to expose it, perhaps it isn't a flaw really. By which standards it would be?

[Andrew]

Hello there everyone.

I wonder if anyone remembers me from Genius-L? I've been meaning to join the forum for the past 2 years and only just motivated myself to get round to doing so for two reasons. A) I'm in the middle of revision for my maths exams so need a reason to procrastinate and B) I much prefer this new phpBB environment.

Anyway, for those of you who don’t already know me, rather than giving an introduction here, I'll let you learn more about me as I make visits here.



This thread took my attention because its very similar to arguments I have been having with Rhett for ages. I have felt for some time that there exists an inescapable element of uncertainty in our own logical deductions, even when we can find no fault in the logical process, and even in such a case that David Quinn speaks of whereby we are “directly” aware of the certainty of a given conclusion in a single act of perception.

I have usually give the argument that thoughts are no more inherently real than physical objects, and we cannot be any more certain of their existence than we can physical objects (ie, they could both be the product of a computer simulation that runs our perceived reality). I place a distinction between “actual” (or abstract existential) thoughts and the perception *of* thoughts. Eg, just as we can argue that there is never any certainty over the attributes of physical things beyond the unquestionable fact that “there exists the experience of an apple”, we can similarly argue that there is never any certainty over the attributes of thoughts other than the fact that “there exists the experience of a thought”.

It seems to me that David Quinn makes the assumption that the perception of a “certainty” is enough to justify its (abstract) logical certainty in an analogous sense to claiming that the perception of an apple is enough to justify its abstract physical existence. Even though I agree that in the majority of cases where intelligent people perceive in an instant a “truth”, they have correctly discovered a truth (in the sense that this truth can then be tested to be consistent with Nature), I don’t think that they can actually claim absolute certainty simply because they have perceived “truthness”. They can certainly claim that they have the experience of a truth, for the same reason that I can claim that I have the experience of an apple, but to then claim that a given proposition is abstractly certain in its computational application to Reality is just as big a mistake as claiming with certainty that there is an apple there in Reality, and that everyone else should be able to see it.

To back up my point, I can see no reason at all why a “genius” may not all of a sudden have the profound sense of enlightenment in the realisation of some “truth”, yet later realise that he was completely mislead. Or to give an extreme example – once I banged my head off the floor after falling badly, was unconscious for about 2 minutes, and woke up with exactly this profound sense of finally understanding a particular problem which seemed to be something on the scale of understanding metaphysics completely. But later this feeling subsided, and I decided that it was just a perception that was triggered by something other than my actual thought processes.

In both of these cases, you could perhaps argue that a truth had been perceived, but is this what we are really concerned about? Are we really only concerned about the “sensation” of experiencing a truth (in the same sense that I would describe the experience of the appearance of an apple a “sensation”) or are we really more interested in the abstract level of logic that we can all argue about?:-

At the time of my accident, surely it was not wrong of me to suppose that something other than my thoughts caused this feeling of “certainty”, and does this not indicate the likelihood that the feelings/impressions we attribute to thoughts themselves are actually entirely separate and can be motivated by things other than thoughts themselves? This mirrors the fact that our perception of physical objects is not concretely connected to the physical objects themselves as much as most people accept them to be. This underlines the real possibility that our impression or experience of certainty is not as intimately linked to our actual thoughts as we would like to think.

Science is about trying to form rules that predict and make mathematical sense of our perceptions of physical things. Logic is about forming rules that predict and make mathematical sense of our perceptions of thoughts. Its only because everything we think has to go first through the logic stage (obviously) that we suppose it is more concrete. Fundamentally though, the only thing that I believe is absolutely concrete is experience itself.

Andrew

[Leyla Shen]

Logically speaking, how can one move from A to B without memory.

One can't. Memory is "here and now." It is knowing without referral. Recollection and rememberance must presuppose the passage of time.

There is only now.

"One" is never really moving; especially if it lacks inherent existence -- or represents unity...

:)

[Leyla Shen]

Not unlike the computer's microprocessor with its registers and stacks to perform binary calculations, there must be some use of memory in the brain to make any rational thought possible.

How materialistic of you, Diebert!

In the brain?

What is a brain?

Where is a memory?

[David Quinn]

Sapius wrote:

The 'deductive process' you speak of; has it nothing to do with time? You first need to remember something to even compare it to something else. Logic does the deduction, but I don't think it can take a single step without memory.

Regarding knowing the reliability of memory, I think one can always use logic to check it out. Any ways, memory on its own has nothing to do with reasoning, but reasoning seems to be very much reliant on memory.

The logical process obviously uses memories - they are, after all, the very materials it works with. My point is that the validity or correctness of the deductive step doesn't hinge on the infallibility of memory.

Even if our memories are faulty, the deductive step can still be perfectly executed. The final result of this step will be faulty, of course, but that's solely due to the faulty memories themselves and not to the execution of the logical step.

So how do we get around the problem of our memories possibly being faulty? Well, as far as empirical and scientific knowledge is concerned, we can't. Empirical knowledge will always be uncertain because of our memories, among other things. However, we can achieve certainty in the realm of philosophic logic.

Consider the truth that Reality is not nothing whatsoever, for example. When we reason our way into this truth, it doesn't matter if our memories are faulty or not. This is because the very existence of our memories, faulty or otherwise, automatically confirms the truth. As such, the problem that Philosophaster articulated has been bypassed.

Another example is the truth that what we directly observe in the here and now is in fact what we observe in the here and now. Again, this is absolutely certain. It doesn't matter how faulty our memories are, this truth will always remain true.

For those who are interested, I discussed this issue in some detail in Genius News, in a section called Space Aliens.

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[David Quinn]

Philosophaster wrote:

I encountered that objection on another board as well. The only answer I have is that even in a very short proof or theorem (such as Pythagoras's) we grasp the different elements in a sequential order that depends on the passage of time. Perhaps that isn't correct, though.

It's more the case that we grasp, in a single instant of time, the common element of two or more disparate strands of information. That these strands tend to be presented to the mind in different moments of time, such as when we are reading through a logical argument, doesn't really matter. The very existence of the common element which is grasped in that "eureka moment" automatically implies a logical connection between these different strands.

Of course, whether the logical connection grasped in this way actually tells us something meaningful and valid about the world is another issue. It may or may not, depending on the quality of thinking skill involved.

-

[David Quinn]

Andrew Wiseman wrote:

It seems to me that David Quinn makes the assumption that the perception of a “certainty” is enough to justify its (abstract) logical certainty in an analogous sense to claiming that the perception of an apple is enough to justify its abstract physical existence.

I'm not saying that at all. Obviously, people can feel "certain" about something they have reasoned and yet be mistaken. Feelings of certainty are clearly not enough. What one really needs is the clarity of mind which can reason with great skill and penetrate to the very depths of an issue. True certainty isn't really a feeling at all. It is clear-sighted perception.

I gave a couple of examples of the kind of true certainty enjoyed by philosophers to Sapius above. What are your thoughts on them?

-

[Kevin Solway]

Philosophaster wrote:

The possibility of faulty memories may make it impossible to distinguish good arguments from bad ones:

"Faulty memory" really means no memory.

Take the case of a person who has no memory. They would not even be able to identify anything (A=A), so they would in fact be totally unconscious, and unable to distinguish anything at all, let alone good arguments from bad ones.

As soon as a person has memory they become able to distinguish good arguments from bad ones.

In the case where a person goes into and out of consciousness - and most people have flashes of consciousness to various degrees - they become more able to reason correctly the more conscious they are at the time.

[Dave Toast]

There's always imperfect and therefore unreliable memory.

My memory is pretty shit sometimes. A pen and paper usually do the trick!

Some peculiarities:



A - Just Knowledge
The possibility of faulty knowledge may make it impossible to distinguish good arguments from bad ones:

1) We cannot know that our knowledge is reliable, since checking our knowledge involves acts that require knowledge (circular justification).

2) If we cannot know that an argument is based on a proper chain of reasoning, then we cannot know that the argument is valid.
3) If we cannot know that our knowledge is reliable, then we cannot know that we have used a proper chain of reasoning (for if knowledge were not reliable, we could not correctly know which steps we had taken, etc.).

4) We cannot know that we have used a proper chain of reasoning (from 1 and 3).

5) We cannot know that an argument is valid (from 4 and 2).



B - Knowing & Reliably Remembering
The possibility of faulty memories may make it impossible to distinguish good arguments from bad ones:

1) We cannot reliably remember that our memories are reliable, since checking our memory involves acts that require memory (circular justification).

2) If we cannot reliably remember that an argument is based on a proper chain of reasoning, then we cannot reliably remember that the argument is valid.

3) If we cannot reliably remember that our memory is reliable, then we cannot reliably remember that we have used a proper chain of reasoning (for if memory were not reliable, we could not correctly remember which steps we had taken, etc.).

4) We cannot reliably remember that we have used a proper chain of reasoning (from 1 and 3).

5) We cannot reliably remember that an argument is valid (from 4 and 2).



C - Reliably Knowing & Remembering/Reliable Knowledge/Memory
The possibility of faulty memories may make it impossible to distinguish good arguments from bad ones:

1) We cannot know that our memories are reliable, since checking our knowledge involves acts that require reliable memory (circular justification).

2) If we cannot reliably remember that an argument is based on a proper chain of reasoning, then we cannot know that the argument is valid.

3) If we cannot reliably remember that our knowledge is reliable, then we cannot know that we have used a proper chain of reasoning (for if memory were not reliable, we could not correctly know which steps we had taken, etc.).

4) We cannot know or remember that we have used a proper chain of reasoning (from 1 and 3).

5) We cannot know or remember that an argument is valid (from 4 and 2).



D - Reliably knowing/Checking/reliable memory
1) We cannot check that our memories are reliable, since reliably knowing our memories are reliable involves acts that require reliable memory (circular justification).



E - Know/Distinguish/Remember
The possibility of faulty memories/knowledge may make it impossible to know/remember good arguments from bad ones:



F - Faulty Memory/Unreliable Memory & Reliable Knowledge/Distinguishing
The possibility of unreliable memories may make it impossible to reliably know good arguments from bad ones:



G - The Real Kicker - Cannot/Can
The possibility of reliable memories may make it possible to distinguish good arguments from bad ones:

1) We can know that our memories are reliable, since checking our memory involves acts that require memory (circular justification).

2) If we can know that an argument is based on a proper chain of reasoning, then we can know that the argument is valid.

3) If we can know that our memory is reliable, then we can know that we have used a proper chain of reasoning (for if memory were reliable, we could correctly remember which steps we had taken, etc.).

4) We can know that we have used a proper chain of reasoning (from 1 and 3).

5) We can know that an argument is valid (from 4 and 2).

[Andrew]

Feelings of certainty are clearly not enough. What one really needs is the clarity of mind that can reason with great skill and penetrate to the very depths of an issue. True certainty isn't really a feeling at all. It is clear-sighted perception.

Well I would class perceptions specifically as the experience/feeling of thoughts; just as I would class sensations as the experience/feeling of physical things or emotions as the experience/feeling of being in specific reactive states (in the sense that the emotion of fear is an indication of being in the [human] reactive state of fear). But all of that is just based on how I choose to define the words...

I would have said that the perception of a thought, no matter how clear, is still only an impression/feeling/experience of the abstract thought. And it’s this abstract thought that most people are really talking about when they talk about logic - not the perception of the thought. I think you would still argue that thoughts are just perceptions, and that my reference to them as abstract things that we perceive is a mistake. That’s something I can't argue with because I have yet never found a problem with either way of understanding thoughts.

But having said this, I can still raise the point: How do you know if your perceptions are "clear" (in fact, what does it actually mean for a perception to be clear??) And is this not still the only way we have access to truth - the degree to which our perception of truth seems to us to be "clear"?

I gave a couple of examples of the kind of true certainty enjoyed by philosophers to Sapius above. What are your thoughts on them?

Well I agree that the uncertain degree of the effectiveness of our memory does not undermine the actual logical derivation of the truth that “Reality is not nothing” when we think about it just now from our armchairs; it would simply be illogical to claim that it does. However, this does not get round the fact that if someone does have a faulty memory, regardless of the fact that he or she may be capable of being (correctly) aware in a flash of insight of the truth that “Reality is not nothing”, this insight will not necessarily be accurately translated into a remembered fact – meaning no other logical derivations can rely on the truth of the matter that “Reality is not nothing” without acknowledging the fact that truth of this claim is based on the set of assumptions such as “I have an intact memory, I am not insane, etc etc”.

E.g. If someone has a faulty memory, yet perfectly sound logical reasoning, he may all of a sudden experience the truth of the proposition that “experience is happening”, but in the next second may feel very proud of himself in having derived beyond doubt that “experience is *not* happening”.

I’d Imagine that you would point out that having to remember the truth that “Reality is not nothing” is never actually necessary because its truth can be perceived at any given moment and can be combined in an instant with any other set of propositions – never requiring memory. Well I would agree that this is perhaps possible, but it would undermine the entire point of “learning”. Although, you might also point out that even though what we have learned can be seen with suspicion at all times, it is nevertheless useful as a guide which will keep knocking us back onto the continual experience of instantaneously derived truth. So even if our memory is not accurate, its only if it becomes completely inaccurate that our hopes of experiencing truth will become impossible.

To highlight this possibility, the man in the former example would, rather than acknowledging what he has only just realised, would instead strive to be continually aware of truth, regardless of whether he remembers deriving seconds ago the absolute unquestionable certainty that experience is not happening.

In my view, the really devastating blow to absolute certainty comes when we not only question our memory, but also question the effectiveness of our own ability to combine propositions logically in the instant of thought-perception. For example, we can always question whether or not our perception of A is really A rather than not-A.

I’ll point out again that in my view, when people argue about “logic”, they are really arguing about “abstract logic” (as a system that we use to make sense of our perceived thoughts in the same way that science is a system that we use to make sense of the perceived world). Because of this, even though everything about the actual perception of our own thoughts may beyond any doubt, it is a mistake to believe that truths that we experience can be transcribed unquestionably into the system that is abstract logic that we remember and talk about.

Andrew

[sevens]

The higher the consciousness of an individual, the less 'abstract logic' is involved in deduction - perception becomes refined to near perfection. It is the combination of intuition and a subtle memory recall that allows 'reality to think for you.'

(In a 'sense,' of course.)

(Innocence?)

(Bedtime.)

[Blair]

The higher the consciousness of an individual, the less 'abstract logic' is involved in deduction - perception becomes refined to near perfection. It is the combination of intuition and a subtle memory recall that allows 'reality to think for you.'

And you know this how, you pretentious asshat?

[Sapius]

Philosophaster

1) We cannot know that our memories are reliable, since checking our memory involves acts that require memory (circular justification).

If I think from the obvious POV. Subjectively, yes, we cannot, but when confirmed by sources other than myself, it becomes objectively reliable. I agree that all other sources of confirmations could also be prone to faulty memories, and if that were so, then it would logically become the norm until experienced or proven otherwise.
...and as Diebert puts it....

If the supposed shared 'flaw' in memory is hidden from any methods to expose it, perhaps it isn't a flaw really. By which standards it would be?

David wrote:

The logical process obviously uses memories - they are, after all, the very materials it works with. My point is that the validity or correctness of the deductive step doesn't hinge on the infallibility of memory.

No argument there, but what I was thinking on was...

David: While it is certainly true that we can never be certain of the validity of our memories, the actual deductive process differs in that it is a primary act of perception in the here and now and does not rely on the validity of memory.

.. that the deductive process requires time, and hence cannot be equated to just the "primary act of perception". And further more, I don't think we are even built to perceive the 'here and now' since events keep fleeting by at the speed of light. For example the firing of our neurons. And what is Really 'here and now' could be just emptiness, which cannot be perceived but only logically realized. So, what we experience is actually the continuity of fleeting events rather than the events themselves, which would be entirely based on memory.

Strangely enough, there is memory in the DNA strand as well, and that too has "flaws" at times, correctable though.

Kevin wrote:

As soon as a person has memory they become able to distinguish good arguments from bad ones.

Not necessarily. I'm sure you mean subjectively, otherwise it leaves no room for disagreements, and the world would be a rather "happy" but undoubtedly a boring place.

[Kevin Solway]

. . . otherwise it leaves no room for disagreements, and the world would be a rather "happy" but undoubtedly a boring place.

If everyone were equally rational then everyone would eventually arrive at the same conclusions, after hearing all the arguments. However this still leaves room for people to have differing intuitions or hunches about various things.

If the whole world were full of adults who were fully enlightened Buddhas, I don't think the world would be a boring place. It would be teeming with knowledge and invention. In any case it's impossible for enlightened people to become bored.

[Philosophaster]

What about ethical arguments?

[Sapius]

Well, Kevin, your statement....

As soon as a person has memory they become able to distinguish good arguments from bad ones.

.... simply means that one is able to distinguish good arguments form bad ones as soon as he has memory, not that he is simply able to distinguish because of it.

If everyone were equally rational then everyone would eventually arrive at the same conclusions, after hearing all the arguments.

Exactly. I was simply pointing out that memory does not equal rationality, which your previous statement suggests.

If the whole world were full of adults who were fully enlightened Buddhas, I don't think the world would be a boring place.

So, do you see a possible world full of adults? We shall talk about all of them being enlightened later.

It would be teeming with knowledge and invention.

Inventing what? What could a fully enlightened Buddha possibly invent that a non-Buddha team of dedicated inventors could not? I'm not very well read, so could you please mention who all you consider are fully enlightened Buddha’s, and what all have they invented? Does any one hold a Patent?

In any case it's impossible for enlightened people to become bored.

And why is that? Are they not human any more? Do they physically or mentally stop experiencing? Does a bad weather or hungry mosquito not bother them? Do they stop experiencing moods? I would say that being in a single continuous state of mind is like being unconscious. Does being enlightened mean unconsciousness?!

(Sorry for going a bit off topic folks, but being non-enlightened, I seem to have funny mood at times.) :)

[Sapius]

What about ethical arguments?

What about it? Are you saying that either side’s argument cannot be correct since both rely on an un-reliable memory?

[Philosophaster]

If a great many people were enlightened (in the sense that Kevin uses the term), then they would certainly have large amounts of free time, since they would care little for the social and consumptive behaviors that occupy a lot of time in other people's lives. Also, they would not believe that the world is subject to magical forces. Those two things by themselves could lead to a great deal more invention, I think.

[Leyla Shen]

.. that the deductive process requires time, and hence cannot be equated to just the "primary act of perception".

So, you consider thought itself as perception? What determines the speed of thought?

And further more, I don't think we are even built to perceive the 'here and now' since events keep fleeting by at the speed of light.

I think you have it backwards, somewhat. Time itself is determined entirely by perception.

For example the firing of our neurons. And what is Really 'here and now' could be just emptiness, which cannot be perceived but only logically realized.

Are thought and logic perceptions, Sapius? Awareness? Consciousness?