The nature of consciousness

Discussion of the nature of Ultimate Reality and the path to Enlightenment.
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Diebert van Rhijn
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Re: The nature of consciousness

Post by Diebert van Rhijn » Sat May 28, 2016 7:16 am

jupiviv wrote:
To identify is an act, one that you cannot know fully either unless taken as object in memory, which does not equal that act of earlier identification.
Memory doesn't create "objects of memory" out of nothing.
Certainly it would be caused. Nobody is talking about creating out of nothing. The question is if there's a one-on-one relation to "something". Even if there was in some instance, it's insanity to argue for it to be always the case. Since it's not always the case, you cannot know "fully" or with 100% certainty how your memory relates to all its causes.
A memory of doing something does not equal the supposed doing (objectified doing).
No, but it is still a memory of doing, and if it is that then by definition there has do be doing in the past.
That's all speculation or best effort guess work. A memory is a memory but even there you cannot step in the same river twice.
And an object is an object. Your point?
That it's wrong to claim that by definition (100% true) the object the memory tries to refer to, exists, now or in the past.

Unless of course, the object is declared non-existent. Including any memory-as-object or identification-as-object.
In reality you cannot really know what you're doing but can generate many reflections on it nevertheless.
How do you know that you are really thinking this thought then?
I don't!
How do you know that you don't?
I don't! You see that it doesn't change a thing? Knowing equals simply knowing that you know. We can even know that we know that we know. Or the opposite: not know that we not know that we not know. It's really not adding anything beyond the original. Only making longer sentences and potentially confuse it all further into futility.
If the act of identification is identified as instantiation then that identification is itself instantiated, which is the contradiction being pointed out.
That's like saying, what about (A=A)=A?
I was pointing out that that is what *you* are saying.
No I mean there's no contradiction. (A=A) still equals A. Just like A=A=A (know that you know that you know).

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jupiviv
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Re: The nature of consciousness

Post by jupiviv » Sun May 29, 2016 8:40 pm

Diebert van Rhijn wrote:
jupiviv wrote:Memory doesn't create "objects of memory" out of nothing.
Certainly it would be caused. Nobody is talking about creating out of nothing.
No that is exactly what you are talking about, unless you explain how one is to interpret the following statement differently:

You don't understand, this isn't a competition. You're missing out on 'enlightenment' and you should know that just by realizing your own confusion.
The question is if there's a one-on-one relation to "something". Even if there was in some instance, it's insanity to argue for it to be always the case. Since it's not always the case, you cannot know "fully" or with 100% certainty how your memory relates to all its causes.
All relations are one to one relations by definition. I don't believe I claimed to know all causal relations.
And an object is an object. Your point?
That it's wrong to claim that by definition (100% true) the object the memory tries to refer to, exists, now or in the past.
According to your own premise, one cannot know for certain whether that definition even exists, let alone whether it is wrong. So how can you assert this?
How do you know that you don't?
I don't! You see that it doesn't change a thing? Knowing equals simply knowing that you know. We can even know that we know that we know. Or the opposite: not know that we not know that we not know. It's really not adding anything beyond the original. Only making longer sentences and potentially confuse it all further into futility.
How do you know or don't know or know that you know or don't know (etc. etc.) any/all of these things? You are in fact adding a compounded fallacy to the original one because you aren't resolving the original one. This is similar to when I tried teaching maths to my 5/6 y.o. niece. As I recall she couldn't understand why/how fractions are decimalised. She thought 5/4 should 5.4. When I showed her the division required for decimalising 5/4 to 1.25 she objected that 1.25 is 1/25, not 5/4. At that point I gave up. If I were to have persisted, and showed her how 1.25 can be expressed as 125/100 and then reduced to 5/4 and then decimalised again to 1.25 she would probably have objected that 125/100 is 125.100 and not 1.25 or 5/4. Horse, water etc.
I was pointing out that that is what *you* are saying.
No I mean there's no contradiction. (A=A) still equals A. Just like A=A=A (know that you know that you know).
If A=A==A then A=A==!A, because A=A==!A=!A, so there is a contradiction.

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Dan Rowden
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Re: The nature of consciousness

Post by Dan Rowden » Sun May 29, 2016 8:52 pm

A=A doesn't involve knowing! Jesus. Knowing is what is derived from the pure experiential fact of consciousness and what mind does thereafter. Knowledge comes after A=A.

A=A is that which cannot be spoken or thought about. It is the primality of all. As soon as you think about it, you've lost it, and yet, paradoxically, when you understand this, you never lose it.

SeekerOfWisdom
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Re: The nature of consciousness

Post by SeekerOfWisdom » Sun May 29, 2016 8:54 pm

Dan Rowden wrote:
A=A is that which cannot be spoken or thought about. It is the primality of all. As soon as you think about it, you've lost it, and yet, paradoxically, when you understand this, you never lose it.

Hello Eckhart Tolle.

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Dan Rowden
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Re: The nature of consciousness

Post by Dan Rowden » Sun May 29, 2016 9:42 pm

Sadly, I've never been on Oprah. But yeah, make a point by naming someone who has no point. I see your contributions to GF haven't improved much. ...something in French about life is such or some shit ....

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Diebert van Rhijn
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Re: The nature of consciousness

Post by Diebert van Rhijn » Sun May 29, 2016 9:42 pm

Dan Rowden wrote:A=A doesn't involve knowing! Jesus. Knowing is what is derived from the pure experiential fact of consciousness and what mind does thereafter. Knowledge comes after A=A.
How do you know there was an "experiential fact"? That's not my question by the way, it was Jupiviv's. So I replied saying that's by experiential fact. Which to me is the only relevant "knowing" in this context. The topic is nature of consciousness, not about abstract knowledge.
A=A is that which cannot be spoken or thought about. It is the primality of all. As soon as you think about it, you've lost it, and yet, paradoxically, when you understand this, you never lose it.
Lets just ignore your post on the matter then before we lose sight!

Good to see you on the forum Dan. How are you these days?

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Dan Rowden
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Re: The nature of consciousness

Post by Dan Rowden » Sun May 29, 2016 9:54 pm

Diebert van Rhijn wrote:
Good to see you on the forum Dan. How are you these days?
Bored, obviously. :)

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Diebert van Rhijn
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Re: The nature of consciousness

Post by Diebert van Rhijn » Sun May 29, 2016 10:42 pm

  • "Boredom is what happens when you lose contact with the Universe".

    -- Dan Rowden

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jupiviv
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Re: The nature of consciousness

Post by jupiviv » Mon May 30, 2016 4:24 am

Dan Rowden wrote:
Diebert van Rhijn wrote:
Good to see you on the forum Dan. How are you these days?
Bored, obviously. :)
So how's the rest of the gang? Any plans for future videos and the like?

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jupiviv
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Re: The nature of consciousness

Post by jupiviv » Mon May 30, 2016 4:47 am

Diebert van Rhijn wrote:
Dan Rowden wrote:A=A doesn't involve knowing! Jesus. Knowing is what is derived from the pure experiential fact of consciousness and what mind does thereafter. Knowledge comes after A=A.
How do you know there was an "experiential fact"? That's not my question by the way, it was Jupiviv's. So I replied saying that's by experiential fact. Which to me is the only relevant "knowing" in this context. The topic is nature of consciousness, not about abstract knowledge.
No, my question was how experience and fact (object of experience) can be identical. By the way I just discovered I've misquoted you in the last response. Seems I forgot to copy your text, so the previous text (Seeker's) got pasted. So the corrected response is:
Memory doesn't create "objects of memory" out of nothing.
Certainly it would be caused. Nobody is talking about creating out of nothing.

No that is exactly what you are talking about, unless you explain how one is to interpret the following statement differently:

To identify is an act, one that you cannot know fully either unless taken as object in memory, which does not equal that act of earlier identification.
The difference between Seeker and you is that you take care not to go *full* retard. Where the former gouges out his eyes, the latter sprinkles fairy dust upon them.

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Diebert van Rhijn
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Re: The nature of consciousness

Post by Diebert van Rhijn » Mon May 30, 2016 5:55 am

jupiviv wrote:No, my question was how experience and fact (object of experience) can be identical.
Because you only ever find out about your object through experience. Be it your senses, some visualiation of memory or imagination when processing some information. It's superfluous to even talk about objects actually "being" beyond those experiences. Whatever else is there, its nature is change, infinite and causal. It has no self-nature.
[about "creating something out of nothing"]. How one is to interpret the following statement differently: To identify is an act, one that you cannot know fully either unless taken as object in memory, which does not equal that act of earlier identification.
Where or how does that imply excluding any causality?

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jupiviv
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Re: The nature of consciousness

Post by jupiviv » Mon May 30, 2016 10:10 pm

Diebert van Rhijn wrote:
jupiviv wrote:No, my question was how experience and fact (object of experience) can be identical.
Because you only ever find out about your object through experience. Be it your senses, some visualiation of memory or imagination when processing some information. It's superfluous to even talk about objects actually "being" beyond those experiences. Whatever else is there, its nature is change, infinite and causal. It has no self-nature.
Lol...so we're back where we started. I hope you do have a sliver of the wisdom you profess to have and bite the bullet about this cheap piece of sophism that anyone with half an unbiased brain will recognise and point out. Fallacies in this "argument":

i> Objects are "only ever found out" through experience - no, both the experience and its object are caused by other objects.

ii> A necessary relationship (whether observed or deduced) is not the same as identity. We find out about objects of experience through experience because that is what experience is for, but it does not follow that the two are identical. You have consistently ignored my requests for an explanation of *why* you believe the one fact demonstrates/proves the other, choosing instead to repeat the same thing all over again.

iii> The "whatever else" spoken of doesn't exist if it is assumed that there are no objects beyond experience. Anything that is not something else is an object.

iv> Change itself cannot be the nature of something, because by definition it refers to a group of things in time each with its own specific nature. Actually, it *is* time.
[about "creating something out of nothing"]. How one is to interpret the following statement differently: To identify is an act, one that you cannot know fully either unless taken as object in memory, which does not equal that act of earlier identification.
Where or how does that imply excluding any causality?
If the object of identification is in memory and it is the same as the act of identification then memory is a sovereign creator.

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Russell Parr
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Re: The nature of consciousness

Post by Russell Parr » Tue May 31, 2016 2:03 am

Nature alone is the sovereign creator. It creates the experiencer, through which experience is had. Things now exist. When the experiencer ceases, so does experience. Things cease to exist. The only constant through this entire process is the permeation of Nature.

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jupiviv
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Re: The nature of consciousness

Post by jupiviv » Tue May 31, 2016 5:45 pm

Russell Parr wrote:When the experiencer ceases, so does experience. Things cease to exist. The only constant through this entire process is the permeation of Nature.
That's your story, and it is just that until you provide a convincing argument for it being true. I've listed my objections to Diebert's argument above, so how about responding to them likewise?

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Maximiliano Vignaga
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Re: The nature of consciousness

Post by Maximiliano Vignaga » Wed Jun 01, 2016 2:33 am

i> Objects are "only ever found out" through experience - no, both the experience and its object are caused by other objects.
And these "other objects" exist only in that experience.
ii> A necessary relationship (whether observed or deduced) is not the same as identity. We find out about objects of experience through experience because that is what experience is for, but it does not follow that the two are identical.
Why not?
iii> The "whatever else" spoken of doesn't exist if it is assumed that there are no objects beyond experience.
It does exist as "whatever else".
Anything that is not something else is an object.
Yes.
iv> Change itself cannot be the nature of something, because by definition it refers to a group of things in time each with its own specific nature. Actually, it *is* time.
Change is the fundamental nature of these "group of things."
[about "creating something out of nothing"]. How one is to interpret the following statement differently: To identify is an act, one that you cannot know fully either unless taken as object in memory, which does not equal that act of earlier identification.
Where or how does that imply excluding any causality?
If the object of identification is in memory and it is the same as the act of identification then memory is a sovereign creator.
Can't dismiss that one.

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Russell Parr
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Re: The nature of consciousness

Post by Russell Parr » Wed Jun 01, 2016 2:48 pm

jupiviv wrote:
Russell Parr wrote:When the experiencer ceases, so does experience. Things cease to exist. The only constant through this entire process is the permeation of Nature.
That's your story, and it is just that until you provide a convincing argument for it being true. I've listed my objections to Diebert's argument above, so how about responding to them likewise?
My story is based on the conveyance of Nature to be the Ultimate Reality. Because Nature is infinite, things are not ultimately real.
i> Objects are "only ever found out" through experience - no, both the experience and its object are caused by other objects.
While this is true, it is irrelevant to the point being expressed, which regards a deeper truth.
ii> A necessary relationship (whether observed or deduced) is not the same as identity. We find out about objects of experience through experience because that is what experience is for, but it does not follow that the two are identical. You have consistently ignored my requests for an explanation of *why* you believe the one fact demonstrates/proves the other, choosing instead to repeat the same thing all over again.
The law of identity proves that a thing can only be what it appears to be. Further deduction reveals that there are no things independent of this process. Note that I didn't say independent of the identifier, which seems to be the fallacy you insist is being promoted. There are only so many ways to explain/demonstrate this. If you don't get it now, maybe you will later.
iii> The "whatever else" spoken of doesn't exist if it is assumed that there are no objects beyond experience. Anything that is not something else is an object.
I'll echo Max here and say that "whatever else" exists as just that.
iv> Change itself cannot be the nature of something, because by definition it refers to a group of things in time each with its own specific nature. Actually, it *is* time.
Indeed, time and change are one and the same. Time can be thought of as an arbitrary measurement of change.

But realize, just as divisions in time exist only as abstract projections decided by relativity, so does every sort of division exist, including the boundaries that demarcate things. Granted, the latter is harder to realize.

Since you asked Dan about videos, I invite you to (re?)watch his 3 part series "The Nature of Existence (part 2) (part 3)". It is very relevant to our discussion, particularly the first two parts, which are more concerned with the existence of things while the third concerns the existence of the ego.

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jupiviv
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Re: The nature of consciousness

Post by jupiviv » Wed Jun 01, 2016 4:15 pm

Maximiliano Vignaga wrote:
i> Objects are "only ever found out" through experience - no, both the experience and its object are caused by other objects.
And these "other objects" exist only in that experience.
This is an unsubstantiated assertion, hence I shall dismiss it offhand.
ii> A necessary relationship (whether observed or deduced) is not the same as identity. We find out about objects of experience through experience because that is what experience is for, but it does not follow that the two are identical.
Why not?
Because causality is not identity. The fact that X is caused by not-X doesn't make the two identical.
iii> The "whatever else" spoken of doesn't exist if it is assumed that there are no objects beyond experience.
It does exist as "whatever else".
Yes, hence why it is beyond the experience identifying it as such.
iv> Change itself cannot be the nature of something, because by definition it refers to a group of things in time each with its own specific nature. Actually, it *is* time.
Change is the fundamental nature of these "group of things."
"Change" refers to the group itself, not its nature (fundamental or otherwise). There are many different groups of things, and change refers only to some of those groups, i.e. those that span time.

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Diebert van Rhijn
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Re: The nature of consciousness

Post by Diebert van Rhijn » Sun Jun 05, 2016 7:58 pm

jupiviv wrote:i> Objects are "only ever found out" through experience - no, both the experience and its object are caused by other objects.
You're misunderstanding the claim itself. This is about the object itself. Meaning you cannot invoke more objects to explain objects. It's like explaining God by invoking "other gods". Which is of course exactly what you're doing, logically.
jupiviv wrote:ii> A necessary relationship (whether observed or deduced) is not the same as identity. We find out about objects of experience through experience because that is what experience is for, but it does not follow that the two are identical.
But the only thing you know about are those experiences! What you want to infer from those (like self-existence of objects behind the experience) will be a question of belief. So it's not me who needs to supply any proof of why your objects non-exist. Simply because I'm not asserting anything beyond the experience, the ever changing aggregate of knowledge, impression, memory and context. The experience itself has as much existence as any object. Experience happens and is a matter of responding to change. Nothing needs to be invoked or believed beyond it.
jupiviv wrote:iii> The "whatever else" spoken of doesn't exist if it is assumed that there are no objects beyond experience. Anything that is not something else is an object.
There's certainly some identification taking place. That you can know. But that's clearly not what you mean by "object".
jupiviv wrote:iiv> Change itself cannot be the nature of something, because by definition it refers to a group of things in time each with its own specific nature. Actually, it *is* time.
You're again trying to explain one ghost by invoking others. Time as "object" explained by "other objects". Change cannot be objectified because absolute nature cannot have self-nature: as it's defined as nature of everything already. The nature of reality, the absolute, is where one "starts" conceiving of reality. It's not something you can arrive at or conclude about it.
If the object of identification is in memory and it is the same as the act of identification then memory is a sovereign creator.
Only if you invoke memory as "another object" since you like to create objects by "other objects". But identification still would happen, whatever the particular combination of causes involved.

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jupiviv
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Re: The nature of consciousness

Post by jupiviv » Mon Jun 13, 2016 2:05 am

Diebert van Rhijn wrote:
jupiviv wrote:i> Objects are "only ever found out" through experience - no, both the experience and its object are caused by other objects.
You're misunderstanding the claim itself. This is about the object itself. Meaning you cannot invoke more objects to explain objects. It's like explaining God by invoking "other gods". Which is of course exactly what you're doing, logically.
I am not invoking anything. What I'm doing is pointing out the causes of the object itself, which is not the same as "invoking" them. So you've misunderstood both my understanding and my rebuttal of your claim.
jupiviv wrote:ii> A necessary relationship (whether observed or deduced) is not the same as identity. We find out about objects of experience through experience because that is what experience is for, but it does not follow that the two are identical.
But the only thing you know about are those experiences!
If the only thing you know is that they are experiences then it is impossible to differentiate or identify them, and consequently impossible to know that they are experiences or indeed anything else. I've addressed this cheap piece of sophistry multiple times but you keep parading it around like a prize pony.
What you want to infer from those (like self-existence of objects behind the experience) will be a question of belief. So it's not me who needs to supply any proof of why your objects non-exist. Simply because I'm not asserting anything beyond the experience, the ever changing aggregate of knowledge, impression, memory and context. The experience itself has as much existence as any object. Experience happens and is a matter of responding to change. Nothing needs to be invoked or believed beyond it.
If there was really *just* experience, it would be impossible for anyone - sage or fool - to infer *anything* from them, not even experience (see above).

By the way - the accusation that I believe in "self-existent objects" is your own neo-Christian postmodernist "God-as-vagueness" complex projected onto me. And if you can't nut up and face that truth then frankly you have no business moderating this forum.
jupiviv wrote:iii> The "whatever else" spoken of doesn't exist if it is assumed that there are no objects beyond experience. Anything that is not something else is an object.
There's certainly some identification taking place. That you can know. But that's clearly not what you mean by "object".
So I can identify things, but only to the extent *you* say I can? This cosmology is getting more confusing every week!
jupiviv wrote:iiv> Change itself cannot be the nature of something, because by definition it refers to a group of things in time each with its own specific nature. Actually, it *is* time.
You're again trying to explain one ghost by invoking others. Time as "object" explained by "other objects". Change cannot be objectified because absolute nature cannot have self-nature: as it's defined as nature of everything already. The nature of reality, the absolute, is where one "starts" conceiving of reality. It's not something you can arrive at or conclude about it.
Firstly, how am I objectifying time or change? Secondly, neither change nor permanence is absolute or self or any other kind of nature.

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Diebert van Rhijn
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Re: The nature of consciousness

Post by Diebert van Rhijn » Sat Jun 18, 2016 8:30 pm

jupiviv wrote: What I'm doing is pointing out the causes of the object itself, which is not the same as "invoking" them.
Your invocation happened here: "experience and its object are caused by other objects". Since those other objects are experiences with their "objects" as well, you are just invoking "object" without reason.
If the only thing you know is that they are experiences then it is impossible to differentiate or identify them, and consequently impossible to know that they are experiences or indeed anything else. I've addressed this cheap piece of sophistry multiple times but you keep parading it around like a prize pony.
Why do you think it's impossible to differentiate experiences when knowing they are experiences? What "else" could experiences be? Objects perhaps?

I'm not sure if you are asking here about truth value: the question if some some experience can be called real or delusional, shared or private, true or false. If so, then it's not clear to me how one experience would somehow be "object" and the other not. In the end it's logically impossible to know with absolute certainty if your experiences are "real" or a result of some simulation or some dream. And yet we can not do anything else but assign values, preferring one interpretation and thought over another. But that doesn't mean we have now some "object" in some actuality sitting somewhere in some of the cases and not in others.
If there was really *just* experience, it would be impossible for anyone - sage or fool - to infer *anything* from them, not even experience (see above).
That's like saying that if there was just change, it would be impossible to infer anything from that, not even change. Obviously there's a constant implied which we cannot perceive through change, just as we cannot percieve change itself by constancy. This is abstract thought. It's the same with experience, what is being implied (but not knowable by experience) is the non-experience. This is essential to any understanding of the term "absolute" and why it's called that in the first place. Simply because there's no way around it.
By the way - the accusation that I believe in "self-existent objects" is your own neo-Christian postmodernist "God-as-vagueness" complex projected onto me.
We're all projecting everywhere, that's not really big news. The question is about awareness. And you clearly argue for self-existence object but you might not be aware of that either. It's your "last temptation of Christ" I suppose.
And if you can't nut up and face that truth then frankly you have no business moderating this forum.
So that's your real issue then? You think it's about moderating truth? Or that I would reason from authority? You just show your own immaturity here.
So I can identify th[/i] your things. That's all what was being said.
Secondly, neither change nor permanence is absolute or self or any other kind of nature.
You're just invoking "no-nature" as nature. Fine by me. But in the context of discussing reality, we do speak of absolutes and nature of that reality. The alternative is not to speak about it at all. Which is fine by me as well.

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Re: The nature of consciousness

Post by jupiviv » Tue Jun 21, 2016 2:28 am

Diebert van Rhijn wrote:
jupiviv wrote: What I'm doing is pointing out the causes of the object itself, which is not the same as "invoking" them.
Your invocation happened here: "experience and its object are caused by other objects". Since those other objects are experiences with their "objects" as well, you are just invoking "object" without reason.
According to the premise wherewith you accuse me of "invoking" objects by stating they are caused by other objects without reason (blatantly untrue, unless you are now trying to refute causality itself), my invocation itself is an experience - being a vague object-experience experienced by you - and therefore valid by default (an invalid experience cannot exist and therefore cannot, according to your premise, be an object and therefore cannot be experienced by you). Thus, your premise defeats itself as nonsensically as you are trying to prove it. And besides, for the hundredth time, where is *your* *reasoning* for equating experiences with their objects?
If the only thing you know is that they are experiences then it is impossible to differentiate or identify them, and consequently impossible to know that they are experiences or indeed anything else. I've addressed this cheap piece of sophistry multiple times but you keep parading it around like a prize pony.
Why do you think it's impossible to differentiate experiences when knowing they are experiences? What "else" could experiences be? Objects perhaps?
What differentiates one experience from another? If we assume that all objects are experiences, it would be another experience, which would mean there is no difference. The exact same thing cannot differentiate two things that are exactly the same.

I understand that you're trying to show me where you think I am wrong by playing the devil's advocate. I can, through a simple search in the forum archives, show you past posts of yours that contradict many of your current assertions. But the nature of a pretense reveals the underlying motivations which led to that pretense in the first place, and that is where I'm faulting you. Your real aim here is not to teach me the virtues of vagueness (too ridiculous for you to seriously maintain) but to disabuse me of the notion that consciousness is just another part of the Grand Tapestry, and not its weaver..
If so, then it's not clear to me how one experience would somehow be "object" and the other not.
If an experience can be experienced then it is an object. But it is logically impossible to do so, and I've never made the claim that some experiences can be objects of other experiences. You're interpreting my statement about experiencing objects that way, but you have no reason to do so. It is your responsibility to justify the premise that objects equate the experiences of objects before refuting any assertions based on this premise.
In the end it's logically impossible to know with absolute certainty if your experiences are "real" or a result of some simulation or some dream.
Experiences are absolutely certain. The question of reality or simulation is not relevant here, because it refers to *other* experiences of objects. I cannot deny that all this *may* be a dream, but then what is this "dream"? It is just another object that is experienced that supposedly resembles what we call a dream.
And yet we can not do anything else but assign values, preferring one interpretation and thought over another. But that doesn't mean we have now some "object" in some actuality sitting somewhere in some of the cases and not in others.
We don't prefer or evaluate in a vacuum, which is precisely what you are suggesting.
If there was really *just* experience, it would be impossible for anyone - sage or fool - to infer *anything* from them, not even experience (see above).
That's like saying that if there was just change, it would be impossible to infer anything from that, not even change.
Indeed! If you disagree then tell me how one might do just that?
By the way - the accusation that I believe in "self-existent objects" is your own neo-Christian postmodernist "God-as-vagueness" complex projected onto me.
We're all projecting everywhere, that's not really big news. The question is about awareness. And you clearly argue for self-existence object but you might not be aware of that either. It's your "last temptation of Christ" I suppose.
No, but I'm pretty sure you are going through such a phase right now. Intercourse between mid-life crisis and disappointment in the forum and its members perhaps? In any case, I wish you the best with whatever it is.
And if you can't nut up and face that truth then frankly you have no business moderating this forum.
So that's your real issue then? You think it's about moderating truth? Or that I would reason from authority? You just show your own immaturity here.
My problem is with your lack of intellectual integrity in this discussion. Your moderation itself is almost excessively fair.
So I can identify th[/i] your things. That's all what was being said.
Looks like you messed up here. Care to repeat?
Secondly, neither change nor permanence is absolute or self or any other kind of nature.
You're just invoking "no-nature" as nature. Fine by me. But in the context of discussing reality, we do speak of absolutes and nature of that reality. The alternative is not to speak about it at all. Which is fine by me as well.
I'm speaking of change and permanence as no-nature, specifically. Nature, i.e., finite nature, is something that distinguishes one thing from another. Although we differentiate between the enduring and fugacious nature of different things, we are still not referring to endurance or fugacity itself as their nature. For example a building is more permanent than a bubble, but both of them can be called changing or permanent in different contexts. It's like saying that simplicity and complexity, or orderliness and disarray, can be the nature of things. That is not how those words are defined.

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Diebert van Rhijn
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Re: The nature of consciousness

Post by Diebert van Rhijn » Mon Jun 27, 2016 6:51 am

jupiviv wrote:....my invocation itself is an experience - being a vague object-experience experienced by you - and therefore valid by default (an invalid experience cannot exist and therefore cannot, according to your premise, be an object and therefore cannot be experienced by you).
Experiences are no objects or "existences" with some truth value. They are never valid or invalid by themselves. It's unclear why you think an experience can even be valid yet never invalid. Certainly experiences are not existing or happening somewhere. Unless we'd call it for example "formless reality".
Thus, your premise defeats itself as nonsensically as you are trying to prove it.
All I need to do, and are doing, is to show how invalid some of your premises are. Only because you're addicted to grand objects, in love with them, you just assume I have "something" to prove as well, some premise, some thing, some where.
What differentiates one experience from another? If we assume that all objects are experiences, it would be another experience, which would mean there is no difference.
The nature of reality and all appearances is change and causality. This is how differences would then appear, like the difference between what appears to change and what appears to remain. We don't need any objective marker, some inherent causer of difference, some god, to make us see the light.
Your real aim here is not to teach me the virtues of vagueness ... but to disabuse me of the notion that consciousness is just another part of the Grand Tapestry, and not its weaver..
Interesting. But my true aim is to take down your fancy "Grand Tapestry" which seems still like a manly Giant Object you're trying to wield.
It is your responsibility to justify the premise that objects equate the experiences of objects before refuting any assertions based on this premise.
It's not a premise because you say so. Lets talk about why you think objects go beyond the experience or its virtual abstract. For me, objects are declared non-existent, in philosophical terms. They don't matter. They're not in the discussion. So I question only when someone introduces them!
We don't prefer or evaluate in a vacuum, which is precisely what you are suggesting.
There's only vacuum, is what I'm suggesting. But with that I mean emptiness really.

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jupiviv
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Re: The nature of consciousness

Post by jupiviv » Tue Jun 28, 2016 12:44 am

Diebert van Rhijn wrote:
jupiviv wrote:....my invocation itself is an experience - being a vague object-experience experienced by you - and therefore valid by default (an invalid experience cannot exist and therefore cannot, according to your premise, be an object and therefore cannot be experienced by you).
Experiences are no objects or "existences" with some truth value. They are never valid or invalid by themselves. It's unclear why you think an experience can even be valid yet never invalid.
Validity wasn't really the point, nor did I mean it in the sense you seem to be implying here.
Certainly experiences are not existing or happening somewhere. Unless we'd call it for example "formless reality".
Something (a place/time where experiences do not happen) that can be contrasted with something else is not formless. This is an irrefutable proposition, and you have to explain why it does not contradict your notion of consciousness/experience creating forms out of nothing.
Thus, your premise defeats itself as nonsensically as you are trying to prove it.
All I need to do, and are doing, is to show how invalid some of your premises are. Only because you're addicted to grand objects, in love with them, you just assume I have "something" to prove as well, some premise, some thing, some where.
I didn't see an argument there.
What differentiates one experience from another? If we assume that all objects are experiences, it would be another experience, which would mean there is no difference.
The nature of reality and all appearances is change and causality. This is how differences would then appear, like the difference between what appears to change and what appears to remain.
You said the nature of all appearances is change, then went on to indicate a difference between things that appear to change and remain?
your fancy "Grand Tapestry" which seems still like a manly Giant Object you're trying to wield.
As opposed to you, who are using the concept of Vagueness-as-reality to annul the perennial conflict between the twin (dualistic) desires for the respective bosoms of virgin mother (formlessness) and demivierge (matter/form)? Rather typical given that you are a cis male hailing from a white Christian cultural background. See, I can play this game too! But seriously, what's the point of this bullshit?
We don't need any objective marker, some inherent causer of difference, some god, to make us see the light.
Doesn't make sense, since you do not specify what difference we do not require an objective marker for, or why we would imagine we would need one to begin with. If you mean that we don't need an objective marker for *all* differences, I guess I would agree but also point out that that is a nonsensical conception and also seems to be *your* proposition when you differentiate between "formless" reality and form-as-experience/consciousness.
It is your responsibility to justify the premise that objects equate the experiences of objects before refuting any assertions based on this premise.
It's not a premise because you say so. Lets talk about why you think objects go beyond the experience or its virtual abstract. For me, objects are declared non-existent, in philosophical terms. They don't matter. They're not in the discussion. So I question only when someone introduces them!
You introduced an object when you referred to "the discussion". As for the reason why objects are beyond experience, there are lots of reasons why I think so. Mainly because it is impossible to make sense of *any* object or my relationship with it (and causality in general) if the reverse is held to be true viz. the problem of differentiating experiences if they are identified with their respective experienced objects.
We don't prefer or evaluate in a vacuum, which is precisely what you are suggesting.
There's only vacuum, is what I'm suggesting. But with that I mean emptiness really.
OK, we don't prefer or evaluate in "emptiness", whatever that is. From this point onwards I won't acknowledge any connotations in your usages of the word "emptiness", instead interpreting it literally unless specified otherwise.

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Diebert van Rhijn
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Re: The nature of consciousness

Post by Diebert van Rhijn » Sun Jul 03, 2016 8:55 pm

jupiviv wrote:
What differentiates one experience from another? If we assume that all objects are experiences, it would be another experience, which would mean there is no difference.
The nature of reality and all appearances is change and causality. This is how differences would then appear, like the difference between what appears to change and what appears to remain.
You said the nature of all appearances is change, then went on to indicate a difference between things that appear to change and remain?
Any difference between what appears to change and what appears to remain would also be subject to change. That's exactly how experiences could be differentiated. The moment change would not occur, there would be no differentiation possible. This implies the appearance of a constant, non-changing subject, which only appears because we've just asserted change as appearance, as "thing", as "process", which it isn't. There doesn't exist any non-changing, eternal constant either unless it's the only thing in existence but that surely will never "make sense" beyond another appearance.
your fancy "Grand Tapestry" which seems still like a manly Giant Object you're trying to wield.
As opposed to you, who are using the concept of Vagueness-as-reality to annul the perennial conflict between the twin (dualistic) desires for the respective bosoms of virgin mother (formlessness) and demivierge (matter/form)?
Correct, reality-as-fundamental-ambiguity is the right way to approach and collapse that apparent conflict. It counters everything we made ourselves to be though, so I'd call it advanced.
As for the reason why objects are beyond experience, there are lots of reasons why I think so. Mainly because it is impossible to make sense of *any* object or my relationship with it (and causality in general) if the reverse is held to be true viz. the problem of differentiating experiences if they are identified with their respective experienced objects.
You're indeed making "sense" of objects, with the object equalling your larger, contextual relationship with it. There's a lot beyond it but your objects won't be there. That conclusion can itself cannot be anything experiential, so it must at least start logically.

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jupiviv
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Re: The nature of consciousness

Post by jupiviv » Mon Jul 04, 2016 1:00 am

Diebert van Rhijn wrote:
jupiviv wrote:You said the nature of all appearances is change, then went on to indicate a difference between things that appear to change and remain?
Any difference between what appears to change and what appears to remain would also be subject to change. That's exactly how experiences could be differentiated. The moment change would not occur, there would be no differentiation possible. This implies the appearance of a constant, non-changing subject, which only appears because we've just asserted change as appearance, as "thing", as "process", which it isn't.There doesn't exist any non-changing, eternal constant either unless it's the only thing in existence but that surely will never "make sense" beyond another appearance.
A subject that does not change at all is as inconceivable as one that is only changing. From this it follows that neither change nor permanence is the nature of anything. They are labels for temporal patterns, nothing more. From the perspective of Eternity, everything is a non-changing eternal constant.
As for the reason why objects are beyond experience, there are lots of reasons why I think so. Mainly because it is impossible to make sense of *any* object or my relationship with it (and causality in general) if the reverse is held to be true viz. the problem of differentiating experiences if they are identified with their respective experienced objects.
You're indeed making "sense" of objects, with the object equalling your larger, contextual relationship with it. There's a lot beyond it but your objects won't be there.
No, objects have to be "there" if we are experiencing them. "A lot beyond it" is just another object that you have experienced, then mistakenly equated it with "your objects".
That conclusion can itself cannot be anything experiential, so it must at least start logically.
Why is logical deduction not experiential?

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