Talking to the wall is not Genius

[Diebert van Rhijn]

However, having wisdom of no-self does not stop consciousness from operating as if it is still ignorant, as if there is a self. After all, its very reason d'etre is "idea of self."

Self-consciousness that is. But what about the idea of a false-self? Or the idea of no-self? Do you think there can be a consciousness of truth of no-self without invoking the ignorance of self at the same time? Or in other words, a way to conceive of ignorance without becoming ignorance itself. If that wouldn't be possible, would the word "ignorance" still have any meaning?

Solution: Reasoning that upon death of the body (consciousness) that the wise can put down their bow and arrow never to pick it up again (back to the idea of truth - wisdom - being independent of consciousness). This reasoning relates to the Buddhist idea of stopping the turning of the wheel of birth and death.

The wheels of illusion which never stop simply because they never start either. Or at least it's completely arbitrary, relative and human to say where the starting and finishing points are.

Note that I am not saying (any more) that reasoning the putting down of the bow and arrow of consciousness is absolute truth. However, to me, it makes damn fine sense!

You're "making sense" and weaving illusion at the same time. Which is, really, the insight we're talking about.

[jupiviv]

It isn't "meaningless" to distinguish between what can appear and what cannot. Even falsehood appears as a mental process or a deception evincing ignorance or denial of truth, which is itself real. The only thing that doesn't appear, yet is real, is the source of the real. It has to be believed in; a belief in anything else is necessarily a lie - conscious or otherwise.

How do you determine "what cannot appear"? Couldn't it appear to do so anyway, as falsehood?

As for the "source of the real", it's really undefined isn't it? A whole universe of causes which "cannot appear" but are real to you. Since you cannot distinguish between real appearing effects and real non-appearing causes, such distinction would become meaningless. It would me more consistent to say that cause and effect is real: appearance here being effect, the source being cause.

The "source" of real things is Reality itself. It's not a literal cause, since its "effects" are not separate from it.

The distinction between what appears and doesn't appear is not truth and falsehood or cause and effect. There are countless things that simply do not appear to our minds specifically, yet do appear *indirectly*, as a logical entity/category.

Are you saying the senses pervade physicality? Why then are the senses limited even for palpable things?

The physicality you're invoking here is an abstract, like a physical model of some kind. It's something we can only relate as long we can link it to a memory of a sense experience: something we saw, touched or lifted. Like "the Earth has an area of about 200 million square miles". That's 127877236000 football pitches or 17000 Belgiums. You need to relate to something in your memory to "make sense" of the numbers. You need to make sense or attribute meaning first. That's sensibility!

All measurement is abstract, as is all understanding and conceptualisation. Can you make sense of 5.6744 ft, or 5 ft and .6744/12 ins? That could be the height of a man you have seen, touched or lifted.

sensed objects are among the physical things that cause sensations, ergo sensations are not sensed objects.

The object does not equal the sensed object, you mean?

I mean the sensed object is not the sensation of same because they are causally related. A cause/effect of something is not that thing.

That's true but that's because the object "in itself" does not even exist that way. It exists as appearance, which is captured by the sense (eg "mentation"). But even that appearance we cannot really capture as so much is already happening through interpretation and memory processing that it doesn't stand still anywhere; it keeps adding or losing attributes or definition. Only by the mighty power of abstraction we can arrive at a faith in some "original object" out there being part of the causal processes. All we've done here is modelling, making meaning and procedure to go through our "things". It determines our "functioning". But should we then attribute "existence" to something beyond the sense making?

No one has said anything about an object existing "in itself", but it does exist as something, and that something can appear either directly or indirectly. The appearance itself, in consciousness, might be caused by sensations or by deductive reasoning.

Re the ending question - what appears is what there is. But it's illogical to conclude from this fact that an appearance *is* what appears, or that there is nothing *but* what appears, or any other permutation of these. You're confusing the *event* of an appearance (in consciousness) with the the actual *thing* that appears.

[Pam Seeback]

However, having wisdom of no-self does not stop consciousness from operating as if it is still ignorant, as if there is a self. After all, its very reason d'etre is "idea of self."

Self-consciousness that is. But what about the idea of a false-self? Or the idea of no-self? Do you think there can be a consciousness of truth of no-self without invoking the ignorance of self at the same time? Or in other words, a way to conceive of ignorance without becoming ignorance itself. If that wouldn't be possible, would the word "ignorance" still have any meaning?

Solution: Reasoning that upon death of the body (consciousness) that the wise can put down their bow and arrow never to pick it up again (back to the idea of truth - wisdom - being independent of consciousness). This reasoning relates to the Buddhist idea of stopping the turning of the wheel of birth and death.

The wheels of illusion which never stop simply because they never start either. Or at least it's completely arbitrary, relative and human to say where the starting and finishing points are.

Note that I am not saying (any more) that reasoning the putting down of the bow and arrow of consciousness is absolute truth. However, to me, it makes damn fine sense!

You're "making sense" and weaving illusion at the same time. Which is, really, the insight we're talking about.

All a wise man or woman who is born into the ignorance of self can do is to walk the wisdom path of unselving. Which in answer to your question means that the idea of self is always present in consciousness.

And yes, you are correct when you say that no human knows the beginning or ending of things, in this case, the ending of the idea of self. However, what a human can know is the here and now, and in the case of idea of self, what they can know is the difference between the effects of clinging to self and the effects of releasing of self.

[Pam Seeback]

having wisdom of no-self does not stop consciousness from operating as if it is still ignorant, as if there is a self. After all, its very reason d'etre is "idea of self."

Doesn't this mean that wisdom can't be attained?

Hopefully my answer to Diebert above clears things up. If I were to expand a little on my answer, I would say that wisdom can be attained, but that within the attainment of wisdom is the seed of the ignorance that is being "undone."

[Pam Seeback]

Seeker: Lots of people wishing for immortality, and here moving is going for an never ending Rest In Peace.

The wishes of most people for immortality is the wish for the immortality of consciousness or idea of self. I claim no knowledge of existence beyond consciousness. I "am going for" rest-in-peace for consciousness, not for the totality of existence.

Existence is endless, the wisdom of eternal life allows one to be liberated from many things, such as the belief in duty and the fear of death/loss, as does recognition of the ephemeral nature of the worldly. The "now what" is to allow the wisdom of causality to continue to guide one away from suffering and toward *insert your stuff here*, so long as you understand that 'the mind at rest', or a 'being finished with consciousness of form' will only ever be temporary. This is not a negative thing, you can still get plenty of rest, but it's true, your 'problem' is a meaning-making, it's no matter either way.

It appears as if you equate the appearance of consciousness with the whole of existence whereas I do not.

Picture Jupiviv programming on monday morning. The great comedy is the belief in duty, or the hysteria of the woman experiencing loss. I wonder about the extreme prevalence of ignorance in the world, it reminds me of the bible and the devil, it is as if ignorance is a constant force, like gravity. Oh well, the supposedly wrongly attributed internet Buddha quote: "There has to be evil, so that good can prove its purity above it." - Buddha

And yet, here you are, trying to dispel ignorance. Is that not all a conscious (wise) person can do? Being conscious of ignorance because of wisdom is not the same thing same thing as declaring that there has to be ignorance (so that wisdom can prove its righteousness above it). Where the first is not declaring knowledge of the absolute (why "God" made good and evil) the second is boldly declaring just such knowledge.

[Diebert van Rhijn]

The "source" of real things is Reality itself. It's not a literal cause, since its "effects" are not separate from it.

Reality is another word for causality then?

All measurement is abstract, as is all understanding and conceptualisation. Can you make sense of 5.6744 ft, or 5 ft and .6744/12 ins? That could be the height of a man you have seen, touched or lifted.

All sense is abstract then as well because our senses are being interpreted before they can be conceived as such. For example, you feel pain which is interpreted as being different from joy, located in a specific place and labelled with a certain sense of urgency, to even start occurring. This is how the mind processes impulses to "make sense". It seems like a primitive form of abstraction and modelling to me. Thought is not that much different but involves just a bit more "higher order" connections before a "thought-sense" is formed. And just like we can feel a phantom pain or dream of holding something real, there's a lot of room for error, or grave misleading, in conceptions of physicality and even more so when conceiving of any higher order abstracts.

I mean the sensed object is not the sensation of same because they are causally related. A cause/effect of something is not that thing.

Of course more causes/effects could be imagined. But you need to make sense of these first, experience them as thought, sensation, association or reference to such. How else could you claim there would be another aspect to a thing. something we don't "know" or experience? Perhaps you want to distinguish between experiencing a thing through one sense or through another. Ultimately I don't see a reason to do that.

No one has said anything about an object existing "in itself", but it does exist as something, and that something can appear either directly or indirectly. The appearance itself, in consciousness, might be caused by sensations or by deductive reasoning.

"Exist as something" is another way of saying an object would be existing "in itself" or inherently. Sometimes I wonder if you really get the notion of inherent existence and what it would mean to drop the illusion of that to be real in any way.

But it's illogical to conclude from this fact that an appearance *is* what appears, or that there is nothing *but* what appears, or any other permutation of these. You're confusing the *event* of an appearance (in consciousness) with the the actual *thing* that appears.

The confusion is to think that the "thing" is actually anywhere else! Naturally a lot of things conspired to give rise to the "event of the appearance" but since you can only infer or imagine what's going on exactly, for all ends and purposes it should be clear that the thing appearing is nowhere to be found but in the appearence.

This is a fundamental issue. Not much at this forum would in my opinion make much sense without it.

[Diebert van Rhijn]

However, what a human can know is the here and now

All knowledge will be about something not here, not now, conceived not here, not now.

and in the case of idea of self, what they can know is the difference between the effects of clinging to self and the effects of releasing of self.

Since it's about clinging to nothing at all, there's less actual difference here than you might imagine. The act of clinging will result in the act of release since it's the same movement. Naturally, what we're doing, is to become aware of the movements.

[Leyla Shen]

j: No one has said anything about an object existing "in itself", but it does exist as something, and that something can appear either directly or indirectly. The appearance itself, in consciousness, might be caused by sensations or by deductive reasoning.

Contra Occam: "Exist as something" is another way of saying an object would be existing "in itself" or inherently.

Maybe, but not necessarily. It might also simply be just be another way of saying the object exists. (Please, no—tell me this is not where have to suffer the whole "no thing exists" nonsense again.) So, the direct appearance of an orange to the senses involves—well, the senses. Picking it off the tree, peeling and eating it, segment by juicy segment, for example. However, the appearance of an orange at the time of eating it and the appearance of an orange caused by an act of deductive reasoning (a scrape of peel here, a slop of juice and a pip there) and that bingo moment, “Orange!” are two different appearances of the same some thing we call orange.

If you interpret the above statement any other way, there’s no way this one will make sense to you either:

j: But it's illogical to conclude from this fact that an appearance *is* what appears, or that there is nothing *but* what appears, or any other permutation of these. You're confusing the *event* of an appearance (in consciousness) with the the actual *thing* that appears.

[Diebert van Rhijn]

However, the appearance of an orange at the time of eating it and the appearance of an orange caused by an act of deductive reasoning (a scrape of peel here, a slop of juice and a pip there) and that bingo moment, “Orange!” are two different appearances of the same some thing we call orange.

Maybe, but not necessarily :-) Subject of that exchange was to question if it could be true that the appearance was of some "orange" existing "somewhere else" trying to get some action in our field of attention, or something. And it never really is, only seems that way. Practically of course the views are interchangeable but logically and philosophically one should distinguish.

"You're confusing the *event* of an appearance (in consciousness) with the the actual *thing* that appears".

There's no confusion the moment it's seen that they are the same thing as far as determination of any thingness or its actual existence goes. Any other view is based on imaginary worlds, which might work well for you but imaginary worlds can be highly functional, like models, until they increasingly start to mislead.

[SeekerOfWisdom]

The confusion is to think that the "thing" is actually anywhere else! Naturally a lot of things conspired to give rise to the "event of the appearance" but since you can only infer or imagine what's going on exactly, for all ends and purposes it should be clear that the thing appearing is nowhere to be found but in the appearence.

This is a fundamental issue. Not much at this forum would in my opinion make much sense without it.

Exactly. This seems to be something materialists such as Jup don't seem to grasp, when you refer to the orange, you're referring to the appearance. At best you can postulate the existence of some other thing which is not the appearance "orange", and then say that this thing is causally related.

[jupiviv]

All measurement is abstract, as is all understanding and conceptualisation. Can you make sense of 5.6744 ft, or 5 ft and .6744/12 ins? That could be the height of a man you have seen, touched or lifted.

All sense is abstract then as well because our senses are being interpreted before they can be conceived as such. For example, you feel pain which is interpreted as being different from joy, located in a specific place and labelled with a certain sense of urgency, to even start occurring. This is how the mind processes impulses to "make sense". It seems like a primitive form of abstraction and modelling to me. Thought is not that much different but involves just a bit more "higher order" connections before a "thought-sense" is formed. And just like we can feel a phantom pain or dream of holding something real, there's a lot of room for error, or grave misleading, in conceptions of physicality and even more so when conceiving of any higher order abstracts.

The sensations are abstract to the extent they are mental events like thoughts, but they are caused and indeed made up of physical things. Abstraction and physicality are qualities of finite things, hence interdependent.

I mean the sensed object is not the sensation of same because they are causally related. A cause/effect of something is not that thing.

Of course more causes/effects could be imagined. But you need to make sense of these first, experience them as thought, sensation, association or reference to such. How else could you claim there would be another aspect to a thing. something we don't "know" or experience? Perhaps you want to distinguish between experiencing a thing through one sense or through another. Ultimately I don't see a reason to do that.

To clarify - you are saying that there are aspects of a thing we do not sense yet can infer to exist, correct? But how does that change anything? Even the impalpable aspects aren't identical to their appearance in the mind (as reasoning or models etc.).

"Exist as something" is another way of saying an object would be existing "in itself" or inherently.

That's a bit disingenuous unless you believe that existence is the only quality attributable to objects.

But it's illogical to conclude from this fact that an appearance *is* what appears, or that there is nothing *but* what appears, or any other permutation of these. You're confusing the *event* of an appearance (in consciousness) with the the actual *thing* that appears.

The confusion is to think that the "thing" is actually anywhere else! Naturally a lot of things conspired to give rise to the "event of the appearance" but since you can only infer or imagine what's going on exactly, for all ends and purposes it should be clear that the thing appearing is nowhere to be found but in the appearence.

And here you've proven just how little you get the notion of inherent existence not being real, since you attribute it to things in no uncertain terms while accusing me of doing precisely that. This is genuine ignorance, not maieuticism. Even 9/10 isn't enough my friend.

I could take apart this argument yet again, but I respect your intelligence over that of SeekerOfWisdom's so I'll just point out the crucial error: if a thing is the same as its appearance because "it can only appear to you", then that itself is something you *claim* *appears*. The mere fact that a thing is what it appears to be does not substantiate it in the least, so at *best* it is a positive claim that needs to be explained further and/or demonstrated.

Another case in point:

There's no confusion the moment it's seen that they are the same thing as far as determination of any thingness or its actual existence goes. Any other view is based on imaginary worlds, which might work well for you but imaginary worlds can be highly functional, like models, until they increasingly start to mislead.

You're positing an unnecessary *third* entity here - the appearance of the thing that is the same as its appearance. Try all you want but you won't get around this error.

And another, from the lovechild of Chesterton and Gok Wan:

when you refer to the orange, you're referring to the appearance.

Translation - "your wrong".

[Diebert van Rhijn]

The sensations are abstract to the extent they are mental events like thoughts, but they are caused and indeed made up of physical things.

They are caused. Period. Like all other appearances, like everything else. That's a given.

Abstraction and physicality are qualities of finite things, hence interdependent.

Finite things could be just as easily called "qualities of abstraction" or artefacts of any notion of physicality. Interdependence -- sure but the idea of one thing being a quality of another introduces already way too many intricate issues. But most of all it would imply again some "inherent existence", that of your imaginary finite thing.

"Exist as something" is another way of saying an object would be existing "in itself" or inherently.

That's a bit disingenuous unless you believe that existence is the only quality attributable to objects.

All objects are nothing but impossible beliefs, fabrications, ultimately inconstant and stressful. Like attempts to draw a circle around nothing using nothing concrete. Only through this deception the magical circus starts. Underneath it you'll find a will, a desire operating, to will things into some "existence", to have imagination become "real". With this magical act, we, collectively have created worlds to inhabit as beings. When saying this is illusion, it's not meant to negate any function or causality to it. The reason to talk about illusion only takes place in a discussion about finding truth or meaning - any solidness indeed.

if a thing is the same as its appearance because "it can only appear to you", then that itself is something you *claim* *appears*. The mere fact that a thing is what it appears to be does not substantiate it in the least, so at *best* it is a positive claim that needs to be explained further and/or demonstrated.

The positive, fancy claim here is the idea that there's a thing somewhere operating independent of its appearance, in some way existing in or of itself, as entity or object. This goes way beyond admitting there "are causes" attached to a thing. It's about realizing we can only speak about things as a certain practical, contextual modelling of experiences or calculations. Beyond that framework, which will change with every use or slightly different orientation, it doesn't have any existence.

There's no confusion the moment it's seen that they are the same thing as far as determination of any thingness or its actual existence goes. Any other view is based on imaginary worlds, which might work well for you but imaginary worlds can be highly functional, like models, until they increasingly start to mislead.

You're positing an unnecessary *third* entity here - the appearance of the thing that is the same as its appearance. Try all you want but you won't get around this error.

You're not counting right. If they're the same thing, there's no third entity introduced but one removed: its "double", the one you try to introduce as some kind of reality or faith in a physical thing trying to "get through" our senses. It's a by-product of your natural desire to exist, become real, to project a creative drive on the world, even to philosophize about it. But I know where it will end.

[Pam Seeback]

Diebert: All objects are nothing but impossible beliefs, fabrications, ultimately inconstant and stressful. Like attempts to draw a circle around nothing using nothing concrete. Only through this deception the magical circus starts. Underneath it you'll find a will, a desire operating, to will things into some "existence", to have imagination become "real". With this magical act, we, collectively have created worlds to inhabit as beings. When saying this is illusion, it's not meant to negate any function or causality to it. The reason to talk about illusion only takes place in a discussion about finding truth or meaning - any solidness indeed.

Nice to see such a blunt description of the nature of consciousness. Hard to accept at first, but eventually its truth sinks in, attachment is released and one finds themselves relaxing into the circle around nothing using nothing concrete, even enjoying/loving its foolish desire to have imagination become "real."

As I see it the only thing that transcends circle making is wisdom of circle making which means wisdom brings circle making to an end. Wisdom is also the ground upon which one rests "their head" until this moment comes.

[jupiviv]

The sensations are abstract to the extent they are mental events like thoughts, but they are caused and indeed made up of physical things.

They are caused. Period. Like all other appearances, like everything else. That's a given.

It is not trivial that their causes are physical, especially given our context. So do you agree with that assertion?

Abstraction and physicality are qualities of finite things, hence interdependent.

Finite things could be just as easily called "qualities of abstraction" or artefacts of any notion of physicality.

Not when they appear to be otherwise.

All objects are nothing but impossible beliefs, fabrications, ultimately inconstant and stressful. Like attempts to draw a circle around nothing using nothing concrete.

If so, then how can you make that very statement about them?

if a thing is the same as its appearance because "it can only appear to you", then that itself is something you *claim* *appears*. The mere fact that a thing is what it appears to be does not substantiate it in the least, so at *best* it is a positive claim that needs to be explained further and/or demonstrated.

The positive, fancy claim here is the idea that there's a thing somewhere operating independent of its appearance, in some way existing in or of itself, as entity or object.

And here we have the inevitable straw man - "but but but....you believe in things existing independently of consciousness/appearances!" In fact, the person who argues thus is the one who really believes in the noumenon, i.e., the appearance-in-itself. This belief, "a thing appears to be its own appearance" is the inverse of the false materialist belief held by *some* materialists viz. "a thing appears not to be its own appearance" - two sides of the same deluded coin.

This goes way beyond admitting there "are causes" attached to a thing. It's about realizing we can only speak about things as a certain practical, contextual modelling of experiences or calculations. Beyond that framework, which will change with every use or slightly different orientation, it doesn't have any existence.

A model requires something that is modelled, which exists outside it by definition. So models of physical phenomena require those phenomena to have existence beyond themselves. They wouldn't make any sense otherwise.

There's no confusion the moment it's seen that they are the same thing as far as determination of any thingness or its actual existence goes. Any other view is based on imaginary worlds, which might work well for you but imaginary worlds can be highly functional, like models, until they increasingly start to mislead.

You're positing an unnecessary *third* entity here - the appearance of the thing that is the same as its appearance. Try all you want but you won't get around this error.

You're not counting right. If they're the same thing, there's no third entity introduced but one removed: its "double", the one you try to introduce as some kind of reality or faith in a physical thing trying to "get through" our senses.

A thing is whatever it appears to be. If you now say that the thing *is* the appearance, you have posited *another* appearance, viz. the appearance of the thing being its own appearance. An appearance cannot appear because it is the event of something appearing already as that same appearance. There is no "double", just the duality of cause and effect - appearance and everything else except appearance, including the thing that *appears*.

The most common objection, i.e. "but things cannot appear except as appearances, so they *are* the appearances", is a woefully palpable sophism. Why does the supererogatory *semantic* limit imposed by the premise overlap into *ontology*? Besides a thing being the same as its appearance means that it appears to itself, which is logically impossible.

It's a by-product of your natural desire to exist, become real, to project a creative drive on the world, even to philosophize about it. But I know where it will end.

Who's projecting here? "If I can't have my square circles, then no one can have their polygons. It's only fair!"

[Diebert van Rhijn]

As I see it the only thing that transcends circle making is wisdom of circle making which means wisdom brings circle making to an end. Wisdom is also the ground upon which one rests "their head" until this moment comes.

There are no beginnings or endings to circles or their making, Pam. Wisdom doesn't start or stop anything. It's not like we finally see "how the mountain really is". In that sense there's no ground any more to rest anything on. But there's nothing in need to rest, to settle, to land on anything -- so no problem here.

[Diebert van Rhijn]

The sensations are abstract to the extent they are mental events like thoughts, but they are caused and indeed made up of physical things.

They are caused. Period. Like all other appearances, like everything else. That's a given.

It is not trivial that their causes are physical, especially given our context. So do you agree with that assertion?

Physicality would be a property with particular causes to appear as physical to a sense or reasoning.

Or do you mean with physicality the inherent existence of a particular set of causes? Or in other words: things?

All objects are nothing but impossible beliefs, fabrications, ultimately inconstant and stressful. Like attempts to draw a circle around nothing using nothing concrete.

If so, then how can you make that very statement about them?

My statement is removing, not adding anything.

In fact, the person who argues thus is the one who really believes in the noumenon, i.e., the appearance-in-itself. This belief, "a thing appears to be its own appearance" is the inverse of the false materialist belief held by *some* materialists viz. "a thing appears not to be its own appearance" - two sides of the same deluded coin.

It seems to me you are conjuring the two sides by speaking of things appearing or not appearing to be this or that. My context was the abolishment of things, including any idea of any appearance turned in yet another "thing". It's because a thing cannot be anything more than its appearance that the thing as "thing" or "appearance" does not exist. The appearance is not "true" or self-consistent unless everything is true, real or existing which would make it meaningless to even assert.

A model requires something that is modelled, which exists outside it by definition. So models of physical phenomena require those phenomena to have existence beyond themselves. They wouldn't make any sense otherwise.

You're arguing here for some original physical, existential factual, inherent existence which causes all the rest. You're better off going to church and kneel before God with that attitude!

If you now say that the thing *is* the appearance, you have posited *another* appearance, viz. the appearance of the thing being its own appearance.

Right, unnecessary doubling. There's not the appearance of a thing, there's just appearances but they don't have any existence or truth in themselves in any way.

Besides a thing being the same as its appearance means that it appears to itself, which is logically impossible.

How could it appear "to itself"? You are doubling to make that idea even theoretical possible. You are the one thinking in terms like "the same as". But my point was that there are no things doing some "appearing", let alone "appearing as".

[jupiviv]

The sensations are abstract to the extent they are mental events like thoughts, but they are caused and indeed made up of physical things.

They are caused. Period. Like all other appearances, like everything else. That's a given.

It is not trivial that their causes are physical, especially given our context. So do you agree with that assertion?

Physicality would be a property with particular causes to appear as physical to a sense or reasoning.

Or do you mean with physicality the inherent existence of a particular set of causes? Or in other words: things?

I cannot think of anything that isn't physical. Even abstract things, like thoughts, can be reduced to physical things. Maybe "physical" *does* mean finiteness; but that's for the scientists to (tentatively) figure out, not us philosophers. The fact that you and most others on this forum are so concerned with this issue tells me that you have delusions that *depend* on a denial of physicality. I would guess that, for you, the grapes are so sour that you've decided you haven't even tasted them.

It's because a thing cannot be anything more than its appearance that the thing as "thing" or "appearance" does not exist.

Appearances are things appearing to/in the mind. That's the definition. You can change it of course but you must have good reasons for doing so, which you don't.

If you now say that the thing *is* the appearance, you have posited *another* appearance, viz. the appearance of the thing being its own appearance.

Right, unnecessary doubling. There's not the appearance of a thing, there's just appearances but they don't have any existence or truth in themselves in any way.

You're basically saying that there are no things that appear but nevertheless their appearances appear not to have any existence in themselves. Same error, different day. This second appearance (and forcibly introduced third entity) necessarily exists in itself; for one thing it lets you qualify the word "appearances" with the word "just" even though they aren't appearances *of* anything to begin with.

Besides a thing being the same as its appearance means that it appears to itself, which is logically impossible.

How could it appear "to itself"?

It can't, but that's what your definition of it implies!

[Russell Parr]

I cannot think of anything that isn't physical. Even abstract things, like thoughts, can be reduced to physical things.

Are you proposing that the physical world has some sort of absolute substantiality above and beyond all other categories of experience? Couldn't it simply be that "physical reality" is nothing more than the prevailing, most readily agreed upon, and/or most convincing models of causality?

Maybe "physical" *does* mean finiteness; but that's for the scientists to (tentatively) figure out, not us philosophers.

Science deals with nothing but finites, and cannot do otherwise. The very purpose of science is to finitize Reality into workable categories and details. Physical reality is a category of such experiential investigations. To deal with the Infinite is to deal with the absolute, unbounded. Science cannot even begin to approach this, as it assumes boundaries and uncertainties.

The fact that you and most others on this forum are so concerned with this issue tells me that you have delusions that *depend* on a denial of physicality.

The allotment of what "physical reality" is is easily one of the most challenging problems for anyone concerned with philosophy, so naturally it will be discussed often.

[jupiviv]

I cannot think of anything that isn't physical. Even abstract things, like thoughts, can be reduced to physical things.

Are you proposing that the physical world has some sort of absolute substantiality above and beyond all other categories of experience?

The problem is that nobody really understands what "physical" even means. I find it convenient to define it as "finite", since I can't conceive of any finite thing that can't be shown to be composed of so-called physical things.

In any case, you should read back in the discussion because it's not about physicality per se but rather about a deluded notion of consciousness that seems to be very common amongst certain forum members.

The fact that you and most others on this forum are so concerned with this issue tells me that you have delusions that *depend* on a denial of physicality.

The allotment of what "physical reality" is is easily one of the most challenging problems for anyone concerned with philosophy, so naturally it will be discussed often.

Perhaps, but it has nothing to do with wisdom.

[Diebert van Rhijn]

Physicality would be a property with particular causes to appear as physical to a sense or reasoning.

Or do you mean with physicality the inherent existence of a particular set of causes? Or in other words: things?

I cannot think of anything that isn't physical. Even abstract things, like thoughts, can be reduced to physical things. Maybe "physical" *does* mean finiteness; but that's for the scientists to (tentatively) figure out, not us philosophers. The fact that you and most others on this forum are so concerned with this issue tells me that you have delusions that *depend* on a denial of physicality. I would guess that, for you, the grapes are so sour that you've decided you haven't even tasted them.

It's hard to even start denying your concept of physicality since you are describing it as some property-less aspect of everything. But it's confusing as hell to describe totality as "physical reality" and call thoughts, ideas and concept "physical things". The problem I have with attributing everything with a quality like that, is that is becomes rather meaningless since there's nothing non-physical left! It's like calling everything real, or true. It would be like saying X*A/2Y = X*A/2Y would be more clear than A=A.

To me your " physical" sounds like the "X*" or "/2Y" in that equation. It's not adding anything of interest, it's not needed unless you want to believe in it as something "real" in metaphysical sense out there, like the sun actually moving across the sky beyond the appearance.

Appearances are things appearing to/in the mind. That's the definition. You can change it of course but you must have good reasons for doing so, which you don't.

The good reason is that the only idea you can have of mind is what you infer from appearances and logic. Subject and object arise together, notably through some communication, some exchange. Mind and appearance rise in the same way. You’re free to examine the intricates of both but there's no solid ground in any claim of one appearing inside or "to" the other. That's really an artefact of the way language works, for communication to work. It functions in that context but you shouldn't start believing it!

[jupiviv]

It's hard to even start denying your concept of physicality since you are describing it as some property-less aspect of everything.

Where? All I said was that all the finite things I know of appear to be physical, i.e., what is conventionally defined as being "physical". I didn't introduce a *new* concept of physicality. Perhaps the current concept of physicality is erroneous or at least too vague, but that is a *scientific* question.

What you don't seem to understand is that I don't care either way! The real issue here is a deluded notion of consciousness.

call thoughts, ideas and concept "physical things".

That is what they appear to be. And even if they aren't, they are still demonstrably caused by physical things in both empirical and purely logical terms.

Appearances are things appearing to/in the mind. That's the definition. You can change it of course but you must have good reasons for doing so, which you don't.

The good reason is that the only idea you can have of mind is what you infer from appearances and logic.

I agree but that isn't a reason for saying that a thing is the same as its appearance (i.e. the mind's awareness of it). Just because the mind cannot appear directly to itself doesn't mean that it is the same as the things appearing to it. In fact making such a claim would actually require the mind to appear to itself for reasons previously stated.

Subject and object arise together, notably through some communication, some exchange.

This is false since the past indubitably appears, and cannot (by definition) be coetaneous with the mind it appears to.

[Russell Parr]

The allotment of what "physical reality" is is easily one of the most challenging problems for anyone concerned with philosophy, so naturally it will be discussed often.

Perhaps, but it has nothing to do with wisdom.

Anything that presents an obstruction to wisdom has a lot to do with wisdom. A delusional notion of physicality is just as bad as a delusional notion of consciousness.

That is what they appear to be. And even if they aren't, they are still demonstrably caused by physical things in both empirical and purely logical terms.

Statements like these, particularly the last part, make it seem that you see physicality as some sort of inherent, fundamental aspect of Reality, something more than an appearance amongst or beneath all other appearances.

It begs the question, what exactly is physicality? Is the Tao physical?

The problem with this viewpoint is that physicality is a dualistic designation, whereas Reality is fundamentally non-dualistic. I assume you understand this, but your language seems to suggest otherwise.

Subject and object arise together, notably through some communication, some exchange.

This is false since the past indubitably appears, and cannot (by definition) be coetaneous with the mind it appears to.

Duality (subject and object) arises in the moment of conscious awareness, and "the past" is merely a subject. It can only arise in the moment as with every other subject. Otherwise, the separation of the past from the present and future (and the mind, and everything else) simply does not occur.

[Diebert van Rhijn]

Where? All I said was that all the finite things I know of appear to be physical, i.e., what is conventionally defined as being "physical". I didn't introduce a *new* concept of physicality. Perhaps the current concept of physicality is erroneous or at least too vague, but that is a *scientific* question.

What is conventionally defined as physical, that is "relating to the body", "sexual interest or activity" or "relating to material things" even "matter and energy " -- perhaps, but it has nothing to do with wisdom.

The "finite", as you seem to define it, cannot exist either. For it to be truely, not appearantly finite, it has to have inherit beginning and endings, boundaries which are not dependant on some ever-changing context, perspective or situation. There's no such thing!

What you don't seem to understand is that I don't care either way! The real issue here is a deluded notion of consciousness.

You should care if notions of consciousness are your concern. Consciousness has everything do with appearances, desire and ignorance.

call thoughts, ideas and concept "physical things".

That is what they appear to be. And even if they aren't, they are still demonstrably caused by physical things in both empirical and purely logical terms.

Saying this or that is a physical thing just because it's caused by other physical things, is not advancing any thought.

This is false since the past indubitably appears, and cannot (by definition) be coetaneous with the mind it appears to.

Here indubitably means just strict faith in God the Father as embodiment of all things past, laws of nature and a point of creation.

The whole notion of thing is being tied up with the notion of self and desire. Take one thing out and it all collapses: the end of world.

[Pam Seeback]

Diebert: The whole notion of thing is being tied up with the notion of self and desire. Take one thing out and it all collapses: the end of world.

And the beginning of understanding that anything that is distinguished from any other thing is an activity of the flow of life itself. And because thinking is an uninterrupted flow, it is impossible to stop the flow to ascertain 'its qualities' (the function of the notion of self and desire - ignorance). This inability to stop the flow of thinking to 'think objectively about thinking' applies both to what is called science and what is called philosophy. Thinking/distinguishing 'just' happens - what a relief!

[jupiviv]

The allotment of what "physical reality" is is easily one of the most challenging problems for anyone concerned with philosophy, so naturally it will be discussed often.

Perhaps, but it has nothing to do with wisdom.

Anything that presents an obstruction to wisdom has a lot to do with wisdom. A delusional notion of physicality is just as bad as a delusional notion of consciousness.

That is what they appear to be. And even if they aren't, they are still demonstrably caused by physical things in both empirical and purely logical terms.

Statements like these, particularly the last part, make it seem that you see physicality as some sort of inherent, fundamental aspect of Reality, something more than an appearance amongst or beneath all other appearances.

It begs the question, what exactly is physicality? Is the Tao physical?

If it is then physicality is just the way things appear to us, and we are mistaken when we ascribe any specific qualities or attributes to the word "physicality". But we simply don't know enough about our environment to decide one way or the other.

The problem with this viewpoint is that physicality is a dualistic designation, whereas Reality is fundamentally non-dualistic. I assume you understand this, but your language seems to suggest otherwise.

Non-duality lies within Duality itself.

Physicality may not be a dualistic designation at all, but I don't care either way since it has nothing to do with wisdom. There could be angels auctioning off one of Shariputra's dingleberries to a room full of angry beige on the tip of my nose - I still wouldn't care.

Duality (subject and object) arises in the moment of conscious awareness, and "the past" is merely a subject.

The past, by definition, cannot arise in the moment of consciousness. Consciousness causes the three times to exist by distinguishing them. They cause consciousness by arising before, after or concurrently with it. So each of those four things cause each other by being whatever they are.