Alright Geniuses get your thinking caps on

[visheshdewan050193]

Ok people. I'd sent these questions to David Quinn to his personal email, but I thought I'd bring it up here in the hope to get some stimulating conversation going. Have a crack at my questions - you just need to be well read with Quinn's work (causality, A=A, etc. etc.) in order to follow the statements.

1.
Topic: 'Regarding a possible contradiction to the statement 'the Infinite is uncaused'

The proof of the statement 'everything is caused' is basically that all things can be considered to have constituents, and that things exist only relative to other things.

Constituents that make up a thing (say A) must be 'distinguishable' in appearance from the object A - in order to be considered as causes for A.

Now although the Infinite can't be considered to be a thing that exists in relation to another separate thing (out of logical necessity), we do say that the Infinite comprises/ constitutes of 'everything' that is.

Thus it would seem that everything (i.e. say a set of an infinite number of individual 'things') could be considered to be a 'cause' for the Infinite, since it is a constituent. Hence it is logically incorrect to say that the Infinite is uncaused (or deathless/unborn as sages have mentioned)

The only way I can see around this conclusion (holding the proof of causality that you provided as valid) is to consider the assumption that constituents of 'A' are distinguishable from A to be false. But that throws up another pickle, because according to the law of non-contradiction - one can either say that constituents of an object A are either distinguishable from it or they are not (in which case they are same). If constituents and the whole were truly the same (in all respects) we can't meaningfully talk about 'constituents' and a 'whole'.

The only other statement that can be made that doesn't violate the law of non-contradiction is that 'constituents of the Infinite are neither distinguishable nor not distinguishable from the Infinite'.

You've (i.e. David) clearly mentioned that all 'things' can be considered to be 'partly nibbanic'. In other situations (such as in the final chapter of WOTI), you've mentioned that appearances of things and the 'void beyond the construction of conciousness' are expressions of the same Reality, and the question that why there exist appearances of things (or khandas as the Buddha called them) in the first place is logically unanswerable and therefore meaningless. I think you've also mentioned somewhere (discussions recorded on Genius news/forum) that things are distinguishable from the Infinite. How would you explain the contexts of these statements you've made?

Of course, another solution to this problem is you simply do not treat the Infinite as some 'A' to which we can apply this proof of causality.

But if we do that then it would seem that we have to chuck the whole description of the difference between the henid perception of the unconcious mind/Nature/Reality ( as 'A' ) and an enlightened/ perfectly concious perception of Reality (as 'A=A')


2.
Topic: 'Regarding applying the complete proof of causality to noumena'

The logical proof for causality that you've (i.e. David) provided states that things can only exist in relation to each other and things comprise of constituents.

Its seems reasonable to consider both parts as necessary for a complete proof (especially at first when intuitively evaluated) - but when one attempts to apply this proof to specific things, is it necessary to evaluate/determine whether things have a causal relation with other 'external' things AND with its constituents?

The reason I ask this is because if you take 'things' such as feelings/emotions/thoughts/dhammas or states of mind or 'citta' - they do not have obvious 'constituents'. This is because these are noumena, and have no direct association with the concept of 'physical space'. Your proof that all things have constituents is based on the property of being able to divide physical space infinitely, either literally physically or via mental conception.

I tried to think of feeling/emotions/thoughts having constituents using a temporal context - since it is obvious that we 'experience' feelings/emotions/thoughts over some period of time - and any finite time interval can be infinitely divided up as well. But to be honest this approach seems to be quite stretching and not convincing.

I don't have an answer for 1) and my guess for 2) is that it isn't necessary to determine if specific things have causal relationships with 'constituents' when it comes to the exercise of verifying the principle of causality.

[Russell Parr]

1. The constituents of the Infinite are ultimately illusory; there are actually no "parts" of the Infinite. There is only oneness. The contradiction you mention disappears upon remembering that the things/parts of the Infinite are only illusory projections of consciousness.

I don't see how you got your description for A=A. For me, it simply describes that what is identified is what is identified. It is the premise on which logical consciousness is built upon. It doesn't describe a progression of events or differences in perceptions.

2. As far as Ultimate Reality goes, there is no such thing as noumena, unless in reference to the unknown/void. Anything and everything that could possibly exist must run through the filter of consciousness in order to do so (exist).

I am not sure how you can posit that feelings/emotions/thoughts are part of noumena. They are obviously part of the sensed reality. Their causes, as with all things, can be linked back to the unknown, but if we can name and categorize it, it is part of phenomena.

Physical reality is only one category of phenomena. It doesn't have any more "realness" than anything else. Sure, it looks and feels more substantial than thoughts and feelings, there's no denying that, but ultimately speaking, it is nothing more than another category within the perceptions of consciousness.

[Bobo]

It would be better if you provided quotes of what you think DQ is arguing for. If one regards the totality to be a thing then it is caused by its constituents and it is self-caused as there's no other thing to cause it, that is far from being uncaused. I think DQ uses these two definitions for causality, it seems that for him this reasoning is throw out of the window as the infinite is not a thing by definition.

[visheshdewan050193]

2. As far as Ultimate Reality goes, there is no such thing as noumena, unless in reference to the unknown/void. Anything and everything that could possibly exist must run through the filter of consciousness in order to do so (exist).

I am not sure how you can posit that feelings/emotions/thoughts are part of noumena. They are obviously part of the sensed reality. Their causes, as with all things, can be linked back to the unknown, but if we can name and categorize it, it is part of phenomena.

well I define noumena as simply mental phenomena. Although undoubtedly they have causes that are physical, it's a pragmatic categorization, and a valid one. I might be wrong in my conception of the term (as used/ expanded upon by Kant I think), but here I basically meant mental events.

Ultimately you can describe all things (that exist or are consciously perceived) as either being physical phenomena or mental, it's an arbitrary label.

I don't see how you got your description for A=A. For me, it simply describes that what is identified is what is identified. It is the premise on which logical consciousness is built upon. It doesn't describe a progression of events or differences in perceptions.

It's not a generic description of A=A but a specific instance. It can be used to clarify the distinction between the egolessness of an animal and that of a sage.

[visheshdewan050193]

It would be better if you provided quotes of what you think DQ is arguing for. If one regards the totality to be a thing then it is caused by its constituents and it is self-caused as there's no other thing to cause it, that is far from being uncaused. I think DQ uses these two definitions for causality, it seems that for him this reasoning is throw out of the window as the infinite is not a thing by definition.

Yeah exactly, I wrote that as one of the ways you can avoid the conclusion that Totality is caused.

It's just that Totality is talked by QRS sometimes as 'all there is'. It would be natural to think of things that appear to conciousness as being 'constituents'

[visheshdewan050193]

1. The constituents of the Infinite are ultimately illusory; there are actually no "parts" of the Infinite. There is only oneness. The contradiction you mention disappears upon remembering that the things/parts of the Infinite are only illusory projections of consciousness.

DQ mentions in the last chapter of WOTI that both the appearance of things and Totality are of the same nature - and both are absolutely 'real'. I would be weary of using phrases such as 'there is only oneness' and 'things of the Infinite are only illusory projections of the consciousness (from an ultimate point of view there is no absolute distinction between the categories 'real' and 'illusory' in the first place)

DQ also mentioned that it logically impossible to know 'why' there are things/appearances and not just 'undivided' Totality.

And depending upon context, DQ or KS will mention that Totality 'lends itself to be carved up in certain ways', just as they can emphasize the seamlessness of all things. Neither seamlessness nor discreteness are apt descriptors for Totality.

[Diebert van Rhijn]

DQ also mentioned that it logically impossible to know 'why' there are things/appearances and not just 'undivided' Totality.

What's the difference between any notion of "there is" and the definition of "thing" or "appearance"? And if it's determined that there's none, how could there still be the question why? It's like asking how A becomes or remains A. But since this was declared as being axiomatic, like a starting point, one doesn't get to ask this at all. For the simple reason that there wouldn't be any reason or foundation to ask that question without already accepting the given. Hence, every question brings already the assertion. This is what needs to be caught in action.

[Pam Seeback]

visheshdewan050193 wrote:
DQ also mentioned that it logically impossible to know 'why' there are things/appearances and not just 'undivided' Totality.

Since logic requires the appearance of things, it can't possibly explain an 'undivided' reality. And since the mind can't explain 'undivided' things, letting go of this futile desire opens one up to truth. You asked about ardy. He cannot see the futility of trying to explain the 'undivided reality' (oneness as he calls it) because he has dismissed logic as being pertinent to enlightenment. He desires to "enter the empty (oneness) stuff inside the circle" so he can experience/transcribe "it", as if the hole in the circle is separate from the circumference.

As for A = A, this references the truth that the hole and the circumference are not separate, there is always only one world: consciousness and its interpretation of things. The logic of one, non-contradictory world browbeats the ego that contradicts until it cries uncle.

[Bobo]

Yeah exactly, I wrote that as one of the ways you can avoid the conclusion that Totality is caused.

It's just that Totality is talked by QRS sometimes as 'all there is'. It would be natural to think of things that appear to conciousness as being 'constituents'

It seems that they are talking about 'everything', saying that it is not a thing, is a totality and is infinite. That aside it may be that DQ definition of causation is that a thing must be caused by all of its parts AND not itself otherwise a thing would be caused by its parts only. 'Everything' fails in the not being caused by itself part of the definition.

[Russell Parr]

well I define noumena as simply mental phenomena. Although undoubtedly they have causes that are physical, it's a pragmatic categorization, and a valid one. I might be wrong in my conception of the term (as used/ expanded upon by Kant I think), but here I basically meant mental events.

Ultimately you can describe all things (that exist or are consciously perceived) as either being physical phenomena or mental, it's an arbitrary label.

I see. Well, as far as proof of causality is concerned, the same proof for the physical realm applies to the mental, since, as you mention, the separation is arbitrary. You could say the physical realm is the outward principle of consciousness, while the mental is inward.

DQ also mentioned that it logically impossible to know 'why' there are things/appearances and not just 'undivided' Totality.

As Diebert explained, the fault of this question of 'why' lies in the effort to negate the premise within it. It is a bit like asking "why is the color green green?"

And depending upon context, DQ or KS will mention that Totality 'lends itself to be carved up in certain ways', just as they can emphasize the seamlessness of all things. Neither seamlessness nor discreteness are apt descriptors for Totality.

Context is always important when discussing these things. A dimly lighted closet can be considered dark or bright in relation to the lighting in the rest of the room. In describing the nature of the Totality, nothing exists. In describing the nature of consciousness, things exists.

If the carvings of reality are ultimately illusory, then 'seamlessness' works as a description for the Totality. (edit: I admit, I should be more mindful of my use of the word "ultimately"; again, context is important)

[visheshdewan050193]

Here's what David had to say.
"

The constituent argument states that a particular thing can only exist if its constituent parts exist and are assembled in the correct manner. The Infinite doesn't require any particular constituent parts to exist or be assembled in any particular manner. It doesn't matter what happens in the world, the Infinite always remains the Infinite. The Infinite doesn't have any form, it doesn't have any existence, it cannot appear or disappear, and thus causality and non-causality become meaningless terms in the face of it.

Describing the Infinite as "everything there is" is just a figure of speech, since at root nothing really exists.
Calling something a figure of speech is not to imply that it signifies nothing, only that its meaning isn't literal. The Infinite is "everything there is" in the sense that it literally comprises everything, but this becomes false the moment we imagine this "everything" being composed of actual discrete things.

In all of these matters, it is the concepts which matter and how you personally conceive of them. The words that happen to point to them are of little consequence. So as much as possible always seek the logical connection in the concepts and leave behind the words. It is your own subjective understanding which is the most important thing, not the creation of nice objective proofs set down on paper.

We can treat the Infinite as a thing for practical purposes - e.g. when we want to reason about it. For example, we can reason that since the Infinite has no beginning or end (A), it cannot possess a form (A=A). We can reason like this even while knowing that the Infinite isn't really a thing. The same goes for when we are distinguishing between conscious and unconcious experiences of Reality."

On the subject of applying the proof for causality to various dharmas, it was straightforward:
"
A complete proof, as you're framing it, isn't necessary. All that needs to be proven is that it is impossible for things to arise without cause, and either the constituent argument or the external things argument is sufficient for this.

Regarding feelings/thoughts/emotions, these are dependent on consciousness at the very least and this alone proves that they cannot arise without cause. But more than that, like everything else, *their very existence* is proof of their causality, given that it is impossible for a thing to exist without the rest of Nature existing to distinguish it. Anger, for example, cannot exist without there being at least some part of Nature not being that anger - in order to provide the necessary contrast. "

[Bobo]

I think David is equivocating something which is independent of configuration or parts with something which have no configuration or parts. Any configuration is distinct from no configuration.

[Glostik91]

Thinking cap on, and by thinking cap I mean liberal amounts of nicotine and ethanol.

Ok people. I'd sent these questions to David Quinn to his personal email, but I thought I'd bring it up here in the hope to get some stimulating conversation going. Have a crack at my questions - you just need to be well read with Quinn's work (causality, A=A, etc. etc.) in order to follow the statements.

I hope I needn't be too familiar.

1.
Topic: 'Regarding a possible contradiction to the statement 'the Infinite is uncaused'

Fair enough. What's the apparent contradiction?

The proof of the statement 'everything is caused' is basically that all things can be considered to have constituents, and that things exist only relative to other things.

Constituents that make up a thing (say A) must be 'distinguishable' in appearance from the object A - in order to be considered as causes for A.

Now although the Infinite can't be considered to be a thing that exists in relation to another separate thing (out of logical necessity), we do say that the Infinite comprises/ constitutes of 'everything' that is.

I think that what the infinite comprises and constitutes of is entirely unknown to us. Are your typing fingers really constituents? How have you come to know what your fingers are in-themselves?

Thus it would seem that everything (i.e. say a set of an infinite number of individual 'things') could be considered to be a 'cause' for the Infinite, since it is a constituent. Hence it is logically incorrect to say that the Infinite is uncaused (or deathless/unborn as sages have mentioned)

Say you actually had a set of an infinite number of individual things. What would that make you? A God?

Of course, another solution to this problem is you simply do not treat the Infinite as some 'A' to which we can apply this proof of causality.

But if we do that then it would seem that we have to chuck the whole description of the difference between the henid perception of the unconcious mind/Nature/Reality ( as 'A' ) and an enlightened/ perfectly concious perception of Reality (as 'A=A')

Ah yes clearly, if we cannot apply the law of causality to that which is infinite, then clearly there is no difference between a block of wood and an enlightened sage. Perfectly reasoned.

2.
Topic: 'Regarding applying the complete proof of causality to noumena'

The logical proof for causality that you've (i.e. David) provided states that things can only exist in relation to each other and things comprise of constituents.

Its seems reasonable to consider both parts as necessary for a complete proof (especially at first when intuitively evaluated) - but when one attempts to apply this proof to specific things, is it necessary to evaluate/determine whether things have a causal relation with other 'external' things AND with its constituents?

The reason I ask this is because if you take 'things' such as feelings/emotions/thoughts/dhammas or states of mind or 'citta' - they do not have obvious 'constituents'. This is because these are noumena, and have no direct association with the concept of 'physical space'. Your proof that all things have constituents is based on the property of being able to divide physical space infinitely, either literally physically or via mental conception.

I tried to think of feeling/emotions/thoughts having constituents using a temporal context - since it is obvious that we 'experience' feelings/emotions/thoughts over some period of time - and any finite time interval can be infinitely divided up as well. But to be honest this approach seems to be quite stretching and not convincing.

I don't have an answer for 1) and my guess for 2) is that it isn't necessary to determine if specific things have causal relationships with 'constituents' when it comes to the exercise of verifying the principle of causality.

Oh boy, let's all now invoke the great, blessed, and of course transcendent KANTIAN JARGON!

If I could only teach one thing about noumena, it would be this: noumena is unknown. A thought/feeling/emotion/whatever which is experienced =/= noumena. Noumena is not experienced. Anything experienced is phenomena. I have no knowledge of myself as I am, but merely as I appear to myself.

We experience thoughts, but thoughts as they truly are in themselves are not experienced. We have no knowledge of what a thought truly is or how it occurs or if it 'occurs' at all. We only have knowledge of a thought according to how it appears to us. Its appearance occurs according to the Categories of Understanding. Kant's tomb, literally known as the Critique of Pure Reason, could definitely not have been written on Kant's tomb due to its unreadable verbosity and length, yet this should not be your excuse as to why you have not read it, and before you go on using such jargon, go and read it. At least Quinn had the decency not to steal Kant's jargon.

[Diebert van Rhijn]

We experience thoughts, but thoughts as they truly are in themselves are not experienced. We have no knowledge of what a thought truly is or how it occurs or if it 'occurs' at all. We only have knowledge of a thought according to how it appears to us. Its appearance occurs according to the Categories of Understanding. Kant's tomb, literally known as the Critique of Pure Reason, could definitely not have been written on Kant's tomb due to its unreadable verbosity and length, yet this should not be your excuse as to why you have not read it, and before you go on using such jargon, go and read it. At least Quinn had the decency not to steal Kant's jargon.

The major difference between the Kantian approach or a Nietzschen-Quinnian one would be the assumption that "thoughts as they truly are" would be an acceptable or logical coherent thought. Or even that we even need "noumena", "things an sich" as concept to classify as unknowable, as some meaningful statement. While Kant refused to reason about appearances "without anything that appears", this is exactly what in any more existentialist sense is being proposed with the appearance being the only game in town. Not even the illusion of the unknown, like some mysterious behind-the-world being manifested bit by bit. Of course one can talk about causality, however, since that's not a thing and not existing (unless it would be the only thing existing), it cannot count as any noumenon. Not in any discourse about reality.

[Bobo]

The major difference between the Kantian approach or a Nietzschen-Quinnian one would be the assumption that "thoughts as they truly are" would be an acceptable or logical coherent thought.

Do you mean that the Quinnian position assumes 'thoughts as they really are"? Kant rejects more 'thoughts' about the world than DQ does.

If the world is a whole existing in itself, it must be either finite or infinite. But it is neither finite nor infinite, [as shown...]. Therefore the world - the content of all phenomena - is not a whole existing in itself. It follows that phenomena are nothing, apart from our perceptions.

-
I can oly imagine a discussion between both:
K: ... So, you cannot use reason to describe it.
DQ: You are using reason to describe it right now.
K: So you agree that my method is the most rational?
DQ: You agree that you are describing it with Reason?
K: Reason cannot aid us here, only my method can.
DQ: You are using reason and throwing it away.
K: Your reason is metaphysical dogma.
DQ: Your thing in itself is delusional nonsense.

[Diebert van Rhijn]

The major difference between the Kantian approach or a Nietzschen-Quinnian one would be the assumption that "thoughts as they truly are" would be an acceptable or logical coherent thought.

Do you mean that the Quinnian position assumes 'thoughts as they really are"? Kant rejects more 'thoughts' about the world than DQ does.

What I said is that Kant refused to reason about appearances without asserting that something in existence is actually giving some appearance. But one can reject final truths in terms of a thought or thing "as they really are". Any appearance is not like anything but its own appearance. A moving image, contextual, shifting and illusionary. Any potential meaning and existence lie way beyond it.

[Pam Seeback]

Diebert: What I said is that Kant refused to reason about appearances without asserting that something in existence is actually giving some appearance. But one can reject final truths in terms of a thought or thing "as they really are". Any appearance is not like anything but its own appearance. A moving image, contextual, shifting and illusionary. Any potential meaning and existence lie way beyond it.

"A" potential meaning and existence which also moves but unlike the shifting illusory movement of looking outward at the appearance is like a shining, pulsing permanent sun (not a thing-in-itself, rather, all things waiting to come).

[Bobo]

I quoted from Kant's book Critique of Pure Reason, DQ is coming from a position of pure reason. You wrote earlier that causality is a principle unless it is the only thing existing, Kant says that cause is a category of understanding not something really there it seems. I think he argues somewhere in the book that existence is not a predicate of things, that is quite a clear view. It seems that DQ position is closer to advocate something existing behind appearences, eg. appearances are caused by what it is not. Perhaps you are mistaking K's view that things in themselfz are unknowable for the proposition of things in themselves. You are saying things-in-themselves do not exists, K is saying ultimate reality is unknown

[Aniihya]

The fact that you cannot imagine the infinite without causation proves that it goes beyond your way of thinking.

[visheshdewan050193]

the Way I understand Kant is that he simply made synthetic reasoning a priori.

1+1 =2 or Newton's Laws of Physics for examples

what he is essentially saying that differing subject and predicate can be treated as 'logical entities' of whose equivalency can be determined only in mind (referring to A=A principle that underlies all thought - and specifically accurate logical thought)

His transcendentalism is really just similar to Platonic idealism - it's really just a consequence of limiting the applicability of A=A to logical thought rather than making it applicable to all of experience - the way DQ goes about it