Email to Sam Harris:

Discussion of the nature of Ultimate Reality and the path to Enlightenment.
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jupiviv
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Re: Email to Sam Harris:

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The empirical observation of the enactment of a moral principle would have to be guided by that principle itself.

Besides, a person can observe an act that contradicts a principle while at the same time being ignorant that it does so, even if he knows full well what the principle is. Or he may be simply too lazy to do anything about it. In this case, the conclusion would be the opposite of what you say, i.e., no amount of empirical observation can suffice to convince us of the immorality of an act if we proceed from vague or fallacious moral premises.
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Re: Email to Sam Harris:

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The empirical observation of the enactment of a moral principle would have to be guided by that principle itself.


Yes, that's right, that's what it means to observe any principle, including a moral one.
Besides, a person can observe an act that contradicts a principle while at the same time being ignorant that it does so, even if he knows full well what the principle is.
That's like saying a blind man can see simply because he knows full well what eyes are.
Or he may be simply too lazy to do anything about it. In this case, the conclusion would be the opposite of what you say, i.e., no amount of empirical observation can suffice to convince us of the immorality of an act if we proceed from vague or fallacious moral premises.
Would you consider him moral, immoral, or perhaps amoral, in this case?
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Re: Email to Sam Harris:

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Leyla Shen wrote:
The empirical observation of the enactment of a moral principle would have to be guided by that principle itself.


Yes, that's right, that's what it means to observe any principle, including a moral one.

Without formulating a given moral principle, one cannot relate an observation to it. Thus, no moral principle is derived from observation, or exists within anything that may be observed.
Besides, a person can observe an act that contradicts a principle while at the same time being ignorant that it does so, even if he knows full well what the principle is.
That's like saying a blind man can see simply because he knows full well what eyes are.

No it's like saying that a man may observe something but fail to properly relate his observation to a principle. E.g., he may observe the act of overeating but fail to see that it is contrary to the principle of health.
Or he may be simply too lazy to do anything about it. In this case, the conclusion would be the opposite of what you say, i.e., no amount of empirical observation can suffice to convince us of the immorality of an act if we proceed from vague or fallacious moral premises.
Would you consider him moral, immoral, or perhaps amoral, in this case?
Either immoral or amoral, depending on how rational he is. He may consider laziness immoral and be aware of the causes of his own laziness, yet be too lazy to do anything about it, which would make him immoral. Or he may be too stupid to even understand that he is being lazy, which would make him amoral.
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Re: Email to Sam Harris:

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Without formulating a given moral principle, one cannot relate an observation to it. Thus, no moral principle is derived from observation, or exists within anything that may be observed.
I think you're confusing "principles" with "definitions of terms":
No it's like saying that a man may observe something but fail to properly relate his observation to a principle. E.g., he may observe the act of overeating but fail to see that it is contrary to the principle of health.
No, it is indeed like that; here you've really only paraphrased what you said the first time and not dealt with the reasoning implicit in the simile at all.

Health is no more a principle than eye (and they are arguably each as complex as the other). "Health" is a general term denoting the limitations around and within which one may construct principles (propositions) in greater or lesser complexity which, in so doing, serve to further define it.
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Re: Email to Sam Harris:

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Leyla Shen wrote:
Without formulating a given moral principle, one cannot relate an observation to it. Thus, no moral principle is derived from observation, or exists within anything that may be observed.
I think you're confusing "principles" with "definitions of terms":
All principles are essentially definitions. A moral principle is the definition of what a moral action/thing is.
No it's like saying that a man may observe something but fail to properly relate his observation to a principle. E.g., he may observe the act of overeating but fail to see that it is contrary to the principle of health.
No, it is indeed like that; here you've really only paraphrased what you said the first time and not dealt with the reasoning implicit in the simile at all.
That's because the simile is irrelevant. A blind man seeing because he knows about eyes would be analogous to a immoral man being moral because he knows about morality. That is certainly not what I said.
Health is no more a principle than eye (and they are arguably each as complex as the other).
To the extent it is a definition, it is a principle. The term 'eye' is also a principle in the sense of being the functions which an organ must perform to be called such.
"Health" is a general term denoting the limitations around and within which one may construct principles (propositions) in greater or lesser complexity which, in so doing, serve to further define it.
If 'health' means 'not being dead' then it's a specific term. Then again, it may not be specific enough for a chiropractor. On the other hand, it may be too specific for a philosopher concerned about the survival of wisdom.

But no matter how specific or general we choose to make this term, we cannot be guided by observation. At best, observation can inform us whether our purpose would be served by specialising or generalising in the way we conceive.
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Re: Email to Sam Harris:

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That's because the simile is irrelevant. A blind man seeing because he knows about eyes would be analogous to a immoral man being moral because he knows about morality. That is certainly not what I said.
What you said is:
Besides, a person can observe an act that contradicts a principle while at the same time being ignorant that it does so, even if he knows full well what the principle is.
And yet you argue at the same time that what guides moral behaviour (observable actions) are appropriately defined and reasoned moral principles. How can it possibly follow from this that a man who "knows full well" (has appropriately defined and reasoned) a given moral principle can at the same time be ignorant of an action/s that contradict it?
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Re: Email to Sam Harris:

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Leyla Shen wrote:How can it possibly follow from this that a man who "knows full well" (has appropriately defined and reasoned) a given moral principle can at the same time be ignorant of an action/s that contradict it?
For the same reason a blind man who knows what eyes are can't see. Something else other than his knowledge of the moral principle prevents him from believing or enacting them, like laziness, contradictory moral principles, overriding desires/instincts, or shallow understanding.
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Re: Email to Sam Harris:

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laziness, contradictory moral principles, overriding desires/instincts, or shallow understanding
And like well-being (as you have suggested), these non-specific abstractions do not occur in the natural world/nature and therefore are not a measure of concrete things (nature knows no morality).

Isn't that reason enough to promote a morality which embraces rather than rejects open and sincere enquiry about the natural world?
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Re: Email to Sam Harris:

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Leyla Shen wrote:And like well-being (as you have suggested), these non-specific abstractions do not occur in the natural world/nature and therefore are not a measure of concrete things (nature knows no morality).

If by "nature" you mean all things that can be logically conceived to exist, then they do occur in nature. If you mean the empirical world, i.e, the world directly or indirectly perceptible to the senses, they occur there as well.

However, any judgment about those things or even things more "concrete" than them cannot be derived from observation.

Observation can inform empirical judgment, i.e., provide the material which is to be judged. It cannot however determine what the judgment will be on, why it is made, or what its premises are.

Observation cannot inform moral judgment, since it’s not a judgment of the nature of the observed thing, but of its value. The nature of pork, or the process of consuming it, tells us nothing of its value (or lack thereof) to us in any situation.

The only way you can reasonably oppose the above argument is by claiming that the certain things have an intrinsic value, i.e., a value built into their very nature. This claim, however, is false for a variety of reasons. The most obvious among these to me is that it must necessarily rest on the self-contradictory assumption that the value of things exist independently of their valuation by rational beings.

In short, all correct moral judgments are really judgments about conscious intent. One may observe an intent (either directly as, say, brain activity, or indirectly from its supposed effects). One cannot, however, *judge* an intent to be moral or not, because making such a judgment would require reasoning about it oneself, and one cannot observe one's own reasoning.
Isn't that reason enough to promote a morality which embraces rather than rejects open and sincere enquiry about the natural world?

It is completely wrong to believe that a morality which claims it is derived from empirical observation embraces open inquiry about the natural world, since such a morality would have to dissemble its own metaphysical premise, which is that some things in the observable universe are inherently valuable.
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Re: Email to Sam Harris:

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The only way you can reasonably oppose the above argument is by claiming that the certain things have an intrinsic value, i.e., a value built into their very nature.
I think that's rather optimistic of you!
Observation can inform empirical judgment, i.e., provide the material which is to be judged. It cannot however determine what the judgment will be on, why it is made, or what its premises are.

Observation cannot inform moral judgment, since it’s not a judgment of the nature of the observed thing, but of its value. The nature of pork, or the process of consuming it, tells us nothing of its value (or lack thereof) to us in any situation.
Observation involves the quanitification and/or qualification of the observed thing/s. I argue exactly that it is only on the basis of such observations (as crude as they may be) that one can make a judgment about the nature, and therefore the value, of that thing/s.
The only way you can reasonably oppose the above argument is by claiming that the certain things have an intrinsic value, i.e., a value built into their very nature. This claim, however, is false for a variety of reasons. The most obvious among these to me is that it must necessarily rest on the self-contradictory assumption that the value of things exist independently of their valuation by rational beings.


I don't see why that necessarily follows.
In short, all correct moral judgments are really judgments about conscious intent.
In short, reason is good.
One may observe an intent (either directly as, say, brain activity, or indirectly from its supposed effects).
By which you mean in this context, "impulse/autonomic responses" so as to associate it with instinct as a contrast to reason?
One cannot, however, *judge* an intent to be moral or not, because making such a judgment would require reasoning about it oneself, and one cannot observe one's own reasoning.
Equivocation? This appears to be a differnt use of the term "intent".

You will need to clarify before I go anywhere near this:
It is completely wrong to believe that a morality which claims it is derived from empirical observation embraces open inquiry about the natural world, since such a morality would have to dissemble its own metaphysical premise, which is that some things in the observable universe are inherently valuable.
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Re: Email to Sam Harris:

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Leyla Shen wrote:
The only way you can reasonably oppose the above argument is by claiming that the certain things have an intrinsic value, i.e., a value built into their very nature.
I think that's rather optimistic of you!
I think the word you're looking for is 'correct.'
Observation involves the quanitification and/or qualification of the observed thing/s.
The quantification and qualification of observed phenomena is a function of the observing mind, not the phenomena themselves. Thus, observation of these phenomena is a product of that function, and not the other way around.
I argue exactly that it is only on the basis of such observations (as crude as they may be) that one can make a judgment about the nature, and therefore the value, of that thing/s.
It is not the job of observation to judge or value itself in any sense. The reason why anything is observed to begin with is because of the judgment that it needs to be observed as opposed to, say, imagined. And that judgment is itself made without any observation. Unless you address this argument (already), this discussion is pointless.
The only way you can reasonably oppose the above argument is by claiming that the certain things have an intrinsic value, i.e., a value built into their very nature. This claim, however, is false for a variety of reasons. The most obvious among these to me is that it must necessarily rest on the self-contradictory assumption that the value of things exist independently of their valuation by rational beings.


I don't see why that necessarily follows.

You are equating judgment with observation, which would mean that the observed contains the content of the judgment (distinction, meaning, value etc.) within it.
One may observe an intent (either directly as, say, brain activity, or indirectly from its supposed effects).
By which you mean in this context, "impulse/autonomic responses" so as to associate it with instinct as a contrast to reason?
No I'm talking about the brain activity that appears to be the process of reasoning.
One cannot, however, *judge* an intent to be moral or not, because making such a judgment would require reasoning about it oneself, and one cannot observe one's own reasoning.
Equivocation? This appears to be a differnt use of the term "intent".
Oops! I should have said 'observe an intent'.
It is completely wrong to believe that a morality which claims it is derived from empirical observation embraces open inquiry about the natural world, since such a morality would have to dissemble its own metaphysical premise, which is that some things in the observable universe are inherently valuable.
I don't know what you want me to explain. It seems lucid enough to me.
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Re: Email to Sam Harris:

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It is not the job of observation to judge or value itself in any sense. The reason why anything is observed to begin with is because of the judgment that it needs to be observed as opposed to, say, imagined. And that judgment is itself made without any observation. Unless you address this argument (already), this discussion is pointless.


No, it's not made without any observation. It's true that I can decide to observe whether or not eating pork is a sin without first eating pork, but this is only because of a capacity observe (which includes knowing what is meant by it).

To suggest that accurate observations or judgments can be made purely on the basis of lexical semantics ("definition" as it appears you would have it), then sure—you'd be a genius by that definition.

Do words inherently exist?
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Re: Email to Sam Harris:

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Leyla Shen wrote:
It is not the job of observation to judge or value itself in any sense. The reason why anything is observed to begin with is because of the judgment that it needs to be observed as opposed to, say, imagined. And that judgment is itself made without any observation. Unless you address this argument (already), this discussion is pointless.


No, it's not made without any observation. It's true that I can decide to observe whether or not eating pork is a sin without first eating pork, but this is only because of a capacity observe (which includes knowing what is meant by it).
The capacity for observation is irrelevant to the purpose of observation, or the a priori definitions used in observation. The reason I want to observe something is not influenced by whether I am able to observe it or not. If that were the case, then no one would ever get around to observing anything, since there is never any absolute certainty of our capacity to observe something, and in the way we want to.
To suggest that accurate *observations or judgments* can be made purely on the basis of **lexical semantics ("definition" as it appears you would have it)**, then sure—you'd be a genius by that definition.
Clearly, you believe that changing the terms used by another negates his position(*), and using a conjunction between two words for different things makes those things identical(**). Therefore, by the definition which you have wrongly defined to have its origin in my argument, you are the genius.
Do words inherently exist?
No, but I don't see how that is relevant. We're dealing with the meaning of words as we use them, not their existence.
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Re: Email to Sam Harris:

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The capacity for observation is irrelevant to the purpose of observation, or the a priori definitions used in observation.
Gobsmacked.

There's no relation whatsoever between a capacity to observe and the use to which we put observation, or between the capacity to observe and the a priori definitions/assumptions used to make observations?
The reason I want to observe something is not influenced by whether I am able to observe it or not.
The reason I want to make an observation is to have some degree of predictability, and that is definitely influenced by whether I can devise an appropriate framework from which to do so.
If that were the case, then no one would ever get around to observing anything, since there is never any absolute certainty of our capacity to observe something, and in the way we want to.
What?

Perhaps you should elaborate some more on the reason you might want to observe something.
Clearly, you believe that changing the terms used by another negates his position(*), and using a conjunction between two words for different things makes those things identical(**).
I didn't change the terms. Neither observations nor judgments can accurately be made purely on the basis of lexical semantics. You have a problem with that?
No, but I don't see how that is relevant.
I can see that.
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Re: Email to Sam Harris:

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Leyla Shen wrote:There's no relation whatsoever between a capacity to observe and the use to which we put observation, or between the capacity to observe and the a priori definitions/assumptions used to make observations?
No. If we're *unable* observe something, we may still *want* to observe it. You are either being deliberately obtuse or stupid if you are genuinely surprised by this.
The reason I want to make an observation is to have some degree of predictability, and that is definitely influenced by whether I can devise an appropriate framework from which to do so.
We're talking about a specific kind of influence here, namely the influence of observation on any kind of judgments about observation. The judgment about the appropriate model of prediction to be used for a situation doesn't influence the degree of predictability desired after any number of successes or failures.

I can predict something with 'x' accuracy as many times I want, but the mere fact of that 'x' accuracy has nothing to do with what I've judged as being its usefulness or value.
If that were the case, then no one would ever get around to observing anything, since there is never any absolute certainty of our capacity to observe something, and in the way we want to.
What?

Perhaps you should elaborate some more on the reason you might want to observe something.
There could be any number of reasons, none of which are relevant. The point is that if the capacity to observe things influenced the judgment of the usefulness of doing so, then no one would care to observe anything beyond that which they were capable of observing at any moment, which means science would not progress at all.
Clearly, you believe that changing the terms used by another negates his position(*), and using a conjunction between two words for different things makes those things identical(**).
I didn't change the terms. Neither observations nor judgments can accurately be made purely on the basis of lexical semantics. You have a problem with that?
If 'on the basis of' means 'having the object of' then it doesn't apply to observations, because observation is aimed at observing things and not defining them. Vice versa for judgments.

Also, a definition is not the same as lexical semantics if one doesn't consider a lexicon to be the source of meaning.
No, but I don't see how that is relevant.
I can see that.
Show it to me.
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Re: Email to Sam Harris:

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LS:There's no relation whatsoever between a capacity to observe and the use to which we put observation, or between the capacity to observe and the a priori definitions/assumptions used to make observations?
j: No. If we're *unable* observe something, we may still *want* to observe it. You are either being deliberately obtuse or stupid if you are genuinely surprised by this.
Yes, reasoning is not knowledge.

Since assumptions and definitions are already taken to be a priori, the point of any observation is to a) justify a priori reasoning, or b) further investigate a posteriori justification. In other words, the relevance of a capacity to observe to the purpose of observation is to determine the empirical value of reasoning.
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Re: Email to Sam Harris:

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Leyla Shen wrote:Yes, reasoning is not knowledge.

If you think so then you have a completely different definition of reasoning than that used conventionally on the planet I inhabit (if not on this forum), and are thus responsible for explaining it to me honestly and like a true Christian.
Since assumptions and definitions are already taken to be a priori, the point of any observation is to a) justify a priori reasoning, or b) further investigate a posteriori justification.
A priori reasoning is already justified, or else no valid observation could proceed therefrom. I don't know what you mean by investigating an "a posteriori justification". Observation *is* investigation, and its purpose is a posteriori knowledge.

Observation cannot seek justification for any kind of knowledge or reasoning. A posteriori reasoning cannot justify or discredit a priori reasoning, and vice versa. They're both different kinds of reasoning used for different purposes.

If I derive (reason about) the formula for 1 amp = 1 coulomb/sec, and find a subsequent observation disparate with it, I have neither justified nor contradicted that reasoning, but merely demonstrated it to be inapplicable to said observation.
In other words, the relevance of a capacity to observe to the purpose of observation is to determine the empirical value of reasoning.
The empirical value of reasoning would itself be determined by reasoning without the aid of any empirical observation. The fact of an observation by itself contains no information about the value of its contents, unless that value be considered inherently existent. This cannot be done through empirical observation or any form of reasoning. So your refuted argument, which you slightly redraft with each new post, is refuted.
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Re: Email to Sam Harris:

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I thought I'd write a bit more about your argument, to lessen the chance of being ambushed by another redraft of it. And I'm bored.

Your essential argument is this: since reasoning about empirical things requires empirical observation, it must follow that the former is based upon the latter.

The first thing to clarify is what "based upon" means in this context.

When a piece of reasoning is said to be "based upon" something, that "something" generally refers to an axiom or a premise which is assumed to be true.

In the context of your argument, this logical axiom can be either of two things - the thing that is observed, or the act of observation.

If the observed thing itself is the axiom which the reasoning about it is based on, then it follows that the observed thing must be assumed to have a specific nature before we can even start reasoning about it. And that specific nature must be assumed to be immutable at least for the time it takes to reason about it, since any change would discredit any reasoning based on it. In short, we have to assume that whatever we observe is inherently existent.

If the act of observation, i.e, the process of perceiving/measuring something, is the axiom, then any perception/measurement must be assumed to be absolutely correct by default. If we perceive a snake, then a snake absolutely exists, and cannot be anything other than a snake. In short, here too we have to assume inherent existence.

Thus, both of these possible ideas are false, because both of them require use to believe in inherent existence, i.e, uncaused, absolute and permanent existence.

On the other hand, if by reasoning being "based upon" empirical observation you simply mean that the *object* of reasoning about empirical things is to cognise them, then I have nothing to say except that this is irrelevant to our discussion.
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Re: Email to Sam Harris:

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And I'm bored.
Really? I don't suffer from boredom. Perhaps it's because, unlike you, I am not omniscient, eh?

Or maybe you should get out a bit more. The amount of people prepared to to pull one over you is enough to save any good, reasoning mind from the malaise of such luxurious motivations.
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Re: Email to Sam Harris:

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Out's in and in's out.
Love's all we got before the man gets it too.
Emptiness imputed but not "present" outside your bubble.
Jealousy. Rage. Burma.
Ya dig?
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