Videocy/Literacy

[Pam Seeback]

Not to worry, a discussion of the infinite nature of form would birth the ultimate heated language of reasoning. There's no fire quite like the fire of ego 'vs.' spirit!

[Diebert van Rhijn]

The only one engaging in obscurantism, Diebert, is you, who wrote:

Well I was really just quoting Karl Popper on Marx. But he might be right! And you just love obscure, just admit it. :)

Hegel, being accused of the same (by Schopenhauer for example) replied pretty clever, perhaps too clever that it is "not the philosopher who thinks abstractly, but the layman, who uses concepts as givens that are immutable, without context. It is the philosopher who thinks concretely, because he transcends the limits of quotidian concepts, in order to understand their broader context. This makes philosophical thought and language appear obscure, esoteric, and mysterious to the layman" (source Wikipeda). And yet I do think Hegel ended up obscuring more than enlightening, not engaging in philosophy but more a speculative mode of thinking, materializing a religion-as-system, ideological at root with truth as "continuous world-historical process" instead of always an individual’s subjectivity, informing the social being w̶h̶e̶n̶ i̶t̶'̶s̶ ̶a̶l̶l̶o̶w̶e̶d̶ ̶ to move as "spirit" (see also the earlier Weininger discussion).

It's hard to understand what's your problem with my critique. Really, just that: "going in circles". Do we all have to guess what you mean? Read your mind? I guess we do.


[edit: added some obscurity to remove some]

[Pam Seeback]

Diebert: ...informing the social being when it's allowed to move as "spirit" (see also the earlier Weininger discussion).

This is the shadow of ego exposed. It was the Lord God himself that planted the tree of knowledge of good and evil in the garden of the mind, and then, being the ignorant spirit bully that he is, commands himself in the form of Adam and Eve not to eat of its fruits. But of course, not even God himself can stop his spirit from moving toward form that he himself causes to "rise from the hidden darkness of his void." The modern sound-byte wisdom of "its all good" comes to mind (even when it tastes not-good). The spirit of discovery of form (I taste like this!) cannot be stopped. As painful as the experience usually is, the finger in the dyke of fear eventually must be pulled out.

[Diebert van Rhijn]

You're going a bit wild with all the Gnostic imagery there, Pam :) But I guess we could say that there was no morality intended: the seventh day is still the seventh day. But you made me change the phrase as it could be read in too many ways.

[Bobo]

And, the comeback of the moralists.

• Exchange and Equity.—In an exchange, the only just and honest course would be for either party to demand only so much as he considers his commodity to be worth, allowance being made for trouble in acquisition, scarcity, time spent and so forth, besides the subjective value. As soon as you make your price bear a relation to the other's need, you become a refined sort of robber and extortioner.—If money is the sole medium of exchange, we must remember that a shilling is by no means the same thing in the hands of a rich heir, a farm labourer, a merchant, and a university student. It would be equitable for every one to receive much or little for his money, according as he has done much or little to earn it. In practice, as we all know, the reverse is the case. In the world of high finance the shilling of the idle rich man can buy more than that of the poor, industrious man.

• The Value of Labour.—If we try to determine the value of labour by the amount of time, industry, good or bad will, constraint, inventiveness or laziness, honesty or make-believe bestowed upon it, the valuation can never be a just one. For the whole personality would have to be thrown into the scale, and this is impossible. Here the motto is, “Judge not!” But after all the cry for justice is the cry we now hear from those who are dissatisfied with the present valuation of labour. If we reflect further we find every person non-responsible for his product, the labour; hence merit can never be derived therefrom, and every labour is as good or as bad as it must be through this or that necessary concatenation of forces and weaknesses, abilities and desires. The worker is not at liberty to say whether he shall work or not, or to decide how he shall work. Only the standpoints of usefulness, wider and narrower, have created the valuation of labour. What we at present call justice does very well in this sphere as a highly refined utility, which does not only consider the moment and exploit the immediate opportunity, but looks to the permanence of all conditions, and thus also keeps in view the well-being of the worker, his physical and spiritual contentment: in order that he and his posterity may work well for our posterity and become trustworthy for longer periods than the individual span of human life. The exploitation of the worker was, as we now understand, a piece of folly, a robbery at the expense of the future, a jeopardisation of society. We almost have the war now, and in any case the expense of maintaining peace, of concluding treaties and winning confidence, will henceforth be very great, because the folly of the exploiters was very great and long-lasting.

• How far Machinery Humiliates.—Machinery is impersonal; it robs the piece of work of its pride, of the individual merits and defects that cling to all work that is not machine-made—in other words, of its bit of humanity. Formerly, all buying from handicraftsmen meant a mark of distinction for their personalities, with whose productions people surrounded themselves. Furniture and dress accordingly became the symbols of mutual valuation and personal connection. Nowadays, on the other hand, we seem to live in the midst of anonymous and impersonal serfdom.—We must not buy the facilitation of labour too dear.

[Leyla Shen]

And you just love obscure, just admit it. :)

Correction! And so as to keep it in the realm of the language you understand: Only a certain kind of obscurantism.

The type that challenges the folly of the ultimate obscurantism; the obscurantism of ego-proper, of "gen(i)us" of species, of self-utility par excellence!

(I do wish to, and will, take up your hidden obscurity of self as Popper at the earliest opportunity.)

[Leyla Shen]

Hegel, being accused of the same (by Schopenhauer for example) replied pretty clever, perhaps too clever that it is "not the philosopher who thinks abstractly, but the layman, who uses concepts as givens that are immutable, without context. It is the philosopher who thinks concretely, because he transcends the limits of quotidian concepts, in order to understand their broader context. This makes philosophical thought and language appear obscure, esoteric, and mysterious to the layman" (source Wikipeda). And yet I do think Hegel ended up obscuring more than enlightening, not engaging in philosophy but more a speculative mode of thinking, materializing a religion-as-system, ideological at root with truth as "continuous world-historical process" instead of always an individual’s subjectivity, informing the social being w̶h̶e̶n̶ i̶t̶'̶s̶ ̶a̶l̶l̶o̶w̶e̶d̶ ̶ to move as "spirit" (see also the earlier Weininger discussion).

There is no distinction here between concepts that form the "layman's immutable givens without context" and the context within which his philosopher's concepts supposedly transcend such everyday thinking: symbolic language, formalised and systematised, i.e., the literal domain of self/other consciousness. This has nothing to do with one's subjectivity (or "truth"), subjectivity being, as it is, truly individual (Nietzsche). The real distinction here is between practical existence and philosophy as concepts taking pure concepts as the concrete (objects). In my view, it doesn't touch any informative explication between abstract and concrete, but conflates them, as if no practical reality within which the individual (subject) appears is even possible.

[Diebert van Rhijn]

There is no distinction here between concepts that form the "layman's immutable givens without context" and the context within which his philosopher's concepts supposedly transcend such everyday thinking: symbolic language, formalised and systematised, i.e., the literal domain of self/other consciousness.

The distinction I see is one of context. Alienation of any concept happens because it does not stand any longer in any dialectical relation to the larger context it functions in. This is why a philosopher tends to think in larger contexts, the largest available like the universe, possible universes and the mind. One could also limit the context to a certain age, experience, place or morality but one ends up with at best some practice, at worst: ideology or religion. In those latter systems the context inhabits the system and when reading it or having it explained one has to first accept that embedded context as the real, as if it's telling first what it is you're looking at and how you should look. A blueprint is hammered onto the real and over time, give it one or two centuries, the disconnect becomes unbearable. To survive it has to be reformed at the fundamental level with as result that not any of such systems remain a singular object to analyze historically. Their meaning has been shifted perhaps already more than one time over a given period. In my view this already happened with Marxist thought but certainly has happened with something like Christianity.

[Leyla Shen]

Diebert wrote:

The distinction I see is one of context. Alienation of any concept happens because it does not stand any longer in any dialectical relation to the larger context it functions in. This is why a philosopher tends to think in larger contexts, the largest available like the universe, possible universes and the mind.

I don’t understand.

And the concept “dialectical relation to the ‘larger’ context it functions in” is not alienated from reality, i.e., does not lose its usefulness? Somehow, its “universality” (?) escapes being a blueprint hammered on to reality?

Nietzsche:

This is the proper phenomenalism and perspectivism as I understand it: the nature of animal consciousness involves the notion that the world of which we can become conscious is only a superficial and symbolic world, a generalised and vulgarised world; - that everything which becomes conscious becomes just thereby shallow, meagre, relatively stupid, - a generalisation, a symbol, a characteristic of the herd; that with the evolving of consciousness [Ed. through the conceptualisation of mind/mental states] there is always combined a great, radical perversion, falsification, superficialisation, and generalisation*. Finally, the growing consciousness is a danger, and whoever lives among the most conscious Europeans knows even that it is a disease. As may be conjectured, it is not the antithesis of subject and object with which I am here concerned: I leave that distinction to the epistemologists who have remained entangled in the toils of grammar (popular metaphysics). It is still less the antithesis of "thing in itself" and phenomenon, for we do not "know" enough to be entitled even to make such a distinction. Indeed, we have not any organ at all for knowing, or for "truth": we "know" (or believe, or fancy) just as much as may be of use in the interest of the human herd, the species; and even what is here called "usefulness" is ultimately only a belief, a fancy, and perhaps precisely the most fatal stupidity by which we shall one day be ruined.

*Emphasis mine.

[Diebert van Rhijn]

And the concept “dialectical relation to the ‘larger’ context it functions in” is not alienated from reality, i.e., does not lose its usefulness? Somehow, its “universality” (?) escapes being a blueprint hammered on to reality?

No escape but it's just such a great blueprint since it's almost transparent, like a "proper phenomenalism and perspectivism" as understood by someone! Really comes down more like a tuning wrench and not a sledge hammer. The idea of usefulness as your Nietzsche quote indicates appears to be ultimately fanciful. It's a great quote altogether from the Gay Science. The preceding part of The "Genius of the Species" is also insightful. Here's another part which also relates to the We Are Not Always Thinking topic elsewhere.

The thinking which is becoming conscious of itself is only the smallest part thereof, we may say, the most superficial part, the worst part: - for this conscious thinking alone is done in words, that is to say, in the symbols for communication, by means of which the origin of consciousness is revealed. In short, the development of speech and the development of consciousness (not of reason, but of reason becoming self-conscious) go hand in hand.

Thinking about thinking is generally the worst quality of thought since it's done in words.

As is obvious, my idea is that consciousness does not properly belong to the individual existence of man, but rather to the social and gregarious nature in him

Linguistic thought which is shaped and formed by social forces, culture and such. Which gives the following result:

- that our thought itself is continuously as it were outvoted by the character of consciousness - by the imperious "genius of the species" therein - and is translated back into the perspective of the herd.

Consciousness defined as social consciousness and word language is socially engineered and will always gravitate to the irrationalities and plain practicalities of the herd. But

Fundamentally our actions are in an incomparable manner altogether personal, unique and absolutely individual there is no doubt about it; - but as soon as we translate them into consciousness, they do not appear so any longer....

Did he just describe concepts like those of Marx as pure linguistic phenomenons? I think he just did. Nietzsche advocates deeper intuitive timeless awareness as leading. That's the context.

[Bobo]

Yes, the übermensch, the future of man, the link of man and . . . . . . . . . .

[Dennis Mahar]

Thinking about thinking/language breaks thru' it.
well, whaddya know,
Empty.
shock, horror.

looks like a ribbon of commentary.

message in a bottle.

[Pye]

Cahoot writes: Eschewing emotionalism and exaggeration, the good doctor de-conflates medical cost and medical care, and notes the role of personal responsibility in health and life.

The role of personal responsibility in health and life is not an ideology belonging to conservative capitalists alone, howevermuch they would like to think of their "opponents" (socialists) as whiners in search of a nanny.

It's the right idea, though, and many many (at least) americans have been waking up and withdrawing from the market products that are making them sick - including medicine/pharmacology itself. But this is not being done with the help of the capitalist competition model; it's being done over, against, and in spite-of it.

[Bobo]

Or maybe it is the Leibnizian will to power.... (What Nietzsche advocates for.)

[Leyla Shen]

Did he just describe concepts like those of Marx as pure linguistic phenomenons? I think he just did. Nietzsche advocates deeper intuitive timeless awareness as leading.

No, this is a limitation imposed upon the word “Marx” by your reasoning about reasoning, but you’d have to reason beyond words to get it, I guess!

Nietzsche states reason itself is individual (or as you prefer to express it, “deeper intuitive timeless awareness”) and all linguistic expressions of reasoning are herdly; are social—that consciousness is a social phenomenon.

To prove your claim in relation to Marx, you would have to prove (and then, what would you be doing?) that there exists a linguistic/symbolic concept of reasoning which has no cause/effect relation to the herd/society, which would be rather interesting. What will you say? People do not exist, when we've already established existence of the intuitive individual?.

What reason does an individual, clearly quite capable of reasoning alone, have to express any “deeper intuitive timeless awareness” reasoning in words?

Nietzsche, again:

The sign-inventing man is at the same time the man who is always more acutely self-conscious; it is only as a social animal that man has learned to become conscious of himself, - he is doing so still, and doing so more and more. - As is obvious, my idea is that consciousness does not properly belong to the individual existence of man, but rather to the social and gregarious nature in him; that, as follows therefrom, it is only in relation to communal and gregarious utility that it is finely developed; and that consequently each of us, in spite of the best intention of understanding himself as individually as possible, and of "knowing himself," will always just call into consciousness the non-individual in him, namely, his "averageness"; - that our thought itself is continuously as it were outvoted by the character of consciousness - by the imperious "genius of the species" therein - and is translated back into the perspective of the herd. Fundamentally our actions are in an incomparable manner altogether personal, unique and absolutely individual there is no doubt about it; - but as soon as we translate them into consciousness, they do not appear so any longer.

And, said Marx:

The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. [...]

In studying such transformations it is always necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic – in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out.

Not yet the Ubermensch, baby. What will you do?

[Diebert van Rhijn]

To prove your claim in relation to Marx, you would have to prove (and then, what would you be doing?) that there exists a linguistic/symbolic concept of reasoning which has no cause/effect relation to the herd/society, which would be rather interesting. What will you say? People do not exist, when we've already established existence of the intuitive individual?.

My opinion here doesn't need to be proven. The topic, like any Marxist thought, has not entered the realm of science at all. It's true that deeper analysis will unavoidably adhere to social mores and linguistic self-serving constructs. One solution is to smash frameworks to pieces, throwing them into confusion, and putting it all back together in an ironic fashion, pairing the most alien things and separating the closest. Paraphrasing Nietzsche here but it's exactly what philosophers in the truest sense of the word always have been doing, if you read carefully.

What reason does an individual, clearly quite capable of reasoning alone, have to express any “deeper intuitive timeless awareness” reasoning in words?

More like afterthoughts really. Generally what you're reading is hardly representative of the full reason and deep intuition that is wisdom. And it couldn't be for reasons outlined already.

In studying such transformations it is always necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic – in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out.

But those material transformations can't be determined with the precision of natural science either. Thanks for reminding me of the basic error also in Marx's theorizing on economics.

[Leyla Shen]

My opinion here doesn't need to be proven.

Enough said, then.

But those material transformations can't be determined with the precision of natural science either.

Sure it can. That 's what natural science does, if it is natural science. Far more accurate than your opinion.

[Diebert van Rhijn]

But those material transformations can't be determined with the precision of natural science either.

Sure it can. That 's what natural science does, if it is natural science. Far more accurate than your opinion.

What "natural science" did indicate is that those material transformations of the economic conditions of production cannot be quantified outside some strict and severely limited box model. Marxism is left as social science and it's not all bad in that sense. But social sciences, at least in my view, are all about some social critique or interpretive method. They rarely escape the ruling social order in that "consciousness" present in its analyzing. This is why Marx is so interesting as it's easiest the biggest more recent example of this very issue.

[Leyla Shen]

What "natural science" did indicate is that those material transformations of the economic conditions of production cannot be quantified outside some strict and severely limited box model.

What are you talking about, Diebert. Capitalist economics as natural science? (!)

Are you seriously suggesting that the development of science leading to the material transformation of the economic conditions of production that is the industrial revolution cannot be quantified “outside some severely limited box model”?

[Diebert van Rhijn]

Are you seriously suggesting that the development of science leading to the material transformation of the economic conditions of production that is the industrial revolution cannot be quantified “outside some severely limited box model”?

This was about Marx saying that "the material transformation of the economic conditions of production" can be determined with the precision of natural science. It's not about the development of science itself. But even so, any history of science is still not part of the natural sciences and certainly doesn't contain any precision at all. Then what is left is the analysis of what was considered to be natural sciences in Marx's world view, where a positivist social science appeared still in reach. That differs from how the term is being used since the 20th century, where the development within science has created a more clear separation between purely theoretical and experimental disciplines. Now social sciences might still have some empiricism in terms of direct and indirect observations but analysis happens normally qualitative and interpretive. This is not how Marx tried to approach these matters.

As for capitalist economics, some or their models certainly involve natural sciences (in the way as Marx invoked Darwinism) but as a whole I'd place them in the social sciences as well. This is by the way exactly one of the reasons I started to critique Marx but I could just as well critique capitalist economics apart from them claiming less about the process of human history and nature. And I think that anyone studying the development of methodology in history as discipline over the last century would know that any concept like "science of history" or "scientific social theory" lies dead in the water, completely abandoned by now.

[Leyla Shen]

This was about Marx saying that "the material transformation of the economic conditions of production" can be determined with the precision of natural science. It's not about the development of science itself.

Indirectly, oh yes it is. Directly, it's about the science of man—viz; dialectics.

But even so, any history of science is still not part of the natural sciences and certainly doesn't contain any precision at all.

It does, thanks to its history.

And I think that anyone studying the development of methodology in history as discipline over the last century would know that any concept like "science of history" or "scientific social theory" lies dead in the water, completely abandoned by now.

Says the absolutist, living in his mind the age of pure enlightenment...

Marx was a dialectician. You'd understand him better if you'd stop projecting your own misunderstandings as his.

[Bobo]

Jesus H Christ.

"In studying such transformations it is always necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic – in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out."


Ahem, in studying transformations it is always necessary to distinguish between: the material, and the ideological. While the precision of the natural sciences apply to the material.

[Leyla Shen]

(:

Deja vu. Ready to the way of round the mulberry bush again?

He doesn't believe in the material world, or haven't you noticed between all his lines...

[Bobo]

Diebert does sound like a drunk that cannot even read. And he does have some third hand opnions on marxism. But wasn't Marx himself that - like 'Marx' - said that he never was a marxist? Maybe some cuba libres would do him some good. :)

He's all talk about causality but I think he is just afraid that from now on things are getting too close to Mr. N.

[Leyla Shen]

I think a general seething contempt is more accurate than afraid, Bobo.