Arbitrary absolutism: the values of the house philosophy

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Arbitrary absolutism: the values of the house philosophy

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This essay was inspired by a months old response by Nick to one of my posts. In it, he wrote, "Obviously we don't share the same values, so why does it matter if you think I can do better at something you value?" Here I explore the values of the house philosophy, their supposed basis, and how my own values differ. It's quite a long essay, and it's best read in sequence because later sections refer back to earlier sections, but for ease of reading I've added section headings.

A value system based on causal determinism

The value system of the house philosophy is significantly based on the purported truth of causal determinism. For several reasons, I find this causal determinism to be at the very least questionable, and I'll explain here one of the reasons why. In a thread from a few years back, Kevin referred (metaphorically) to the Totality as a "block" i.e. in that all of its dimensions, including temporal dimensions, and their properties and contents, are fixed; it being like a multidimensional brick: static and changeless from the absolute perspective. A related analogy that Kevin has agreed to in personal conversations is that the Totality is like a video playing in a VCR: all future scenes are predetermined at any given point in the video. According to the house logic, this "block" (or playing video) is uncaused, and to ask anything akin to "Why?" with respect to it as a whole is to ask a wrongly put question (because there can be no external cause).

Nevertheless, this "block" which is the Totality has definite properties: at the current moment, definite and particular perceptions are occurring to each and every one of us. In terms of the second analogy, there is a particular and specific video playing, and right now we are experiencing a particular and specific scene from that movie. The pertinent question then is, "Why is this particular and specific video playing, and not another one?" In more literal terms, that question is, "Why is the Totality as an entirety the way that it is, and not some other way?"

The house philosophy has no sound and consistent answer to this question, and here I'll explain why. It seems that there are at least four potential answers to this question: firstly, that it was caused to be that way; secondly, that it is the way that it is by pure chance; thirdly, that "it just is" with no need for, nor possibility of, explanation; and, fourthly, "I don't know". The house philosophy rejects the first answer due to the impossibility, by definition, of causes external to the Totality. This leaves three possible answers. The problem with the second answer is that it completely undermines the causal determinism that the house philosophy ascribes to the rest of the Totality: if the Totality itself has its properties through pure chance, then why not the parts of the Totality too? In other words, if we have a precedent for lack of causal determinism in favour of pure chance on the largest scale, then there is no longer any reason to assume causal determinism on smaller scales, and it is possible that "finite" phenomena arise through pure chance too[*].

The third answer ("it just is") is the answer that most accords with the house philosophy, but what's interesting is that it's not actually an answer as such, it's more strictly a refusal to answer, much like a parent, irritated by a child's constant "Why?", answers "Because it just is". This dynamic can be seen when laying out the question followed by its answer:

"Why is the Totality this way and not some other?"
"Because it just is".

We wouldn't accept an answer like this in any other case: why would we accept it on the largest scale? It's clear then that this non-answer abdicates from a valid answer, but let's ignore that and assume for argument's sake that it is a valid answer. Now, similarly as for the second answer, we can ask: if the Totality itself "just is", then why not its parts?[*] Why need we discover sufficient causes for the parts when there is a precedent on the largest scale for lack of sufficient cause? In other words, this answer also undermines the causal determinism purported by the house philosophers to be in effect for finite phenomena within the Totality.

[*] Note that the implications from the two alternative answers of "pure chance" and "it just is" don't necessarily include the assumption that no causal relationships whatsoever exist between parts of the Totality, because we do seem to observe such relationships: the implication is simply that it need not be the case that parts of the Totality are fully determined causally - in other words, the implication is that we can reasonably question the existence of a fully deterministic causal explanation for every finite phenomenon.

The fourth answer seems to me to be the most honest of all, and yet the house philosophers abjure it in favour of their non-answer. I wrote above that each of these only "seems" to be a potential answer because, unlike the house philosophers, I'm not at all certain that ultimate questions like this have simple, easy to understand answers, nor that we are necessarily capable of understanding the answers without a radical shift in the paradigm through which we view these issues. I often hear the suggestion that the only two possibilities to describe a finite phenomenon are in terms of (deterministic) causes or (indeterministic) randomness. This suggestion is often used to negate the possibility of libertarian free will, through the further suggestion that neither random will nor causally deterministic will (nor any combination of the two) can reasonably be described as "free will". How, though, can we be so confident in the inclusiveness of this primary dichotomy between the causal and the random? How can we be so confident that there are not yet other paradigms of which we are simply not cognisant, but which reasonably permit of the description, "free will"? I raise these questions to explain why, after having explained why I think the causal determinism of the house philosophers is not on such solid ground as they make it out to be, I do not dismiss the possibility of libertarian free will.

The valuing of emotionlessness

So there's my take on the house philosophy's causal determinism. I brought it up because, as I pointed out earlier, causal determinism is part of the basis on which the value system of the house philosophy is built: it seems to me that its value system can be summed up in a single phrase as, "truth, wisdom, and the transcendence of ego and emotion". According to the house philosophy, a deep understanding of causal determinism leads one to the realisation that the ego is "false" or "illusory" and even that it "does not exist" (in the inherent sense), and that any emotions that one feels predicated on the existence of a "separate" self are "delusional".

It takes a while for a newcomer to understand what the house philosophers are saying here, because it's often framed in rather extreme language, such as that "the self does not exist", whereas, when you probe deeper, you find that for example Kevin acknowledges that the self actually does exist - he describes it as existing in a similar (abstract) way to that in which the number "one" exists - and that what he really seems to mean by such extreme statements as those negating the existence of the self is that those parts of our self-conception that are based on or that feed off of a belief in a self-willing identity separate from the rest of the universe, and that those parts of our self that experience feelings based on the relation of that self-willing separate self to the rest of the universe ("I am thrilled that I won that game!"; "I am angered by that insult directed at me"), are based on delusional thinking, and constitute a "false self" that naturally dissipates in the face of truth-realisation. Similarly, Dan put it this way a couple of years ago, in a post to which I will continue to refer in the rest of this essay: "A self exists. You can't doubt this because if something appears, it exists. But the trick is to know in what way the self exists, and that entails understanding the nature of existence, per se."

The reasoning for the supposedly delusional nature of emotions based on this "false self" seems to accrete in several related arguments: firstly, that given a deterministic universe, true self-willing is impossible, and so to impute credit or responsibility, and to feel emotions based upon that imputed credit or responsibility - or anything of that nature - to an individual agent is to err, because ultimately the responsibility lies with the causal web of the Totality as a whole, and not with the individual agent; secondly, that because no "finite" phenomenon is either objectively superior or objectively inferior to any other "finite" phenomena, then to feel an emotion based on the perceived superiority or inferiority of any state of affairs is to base one's feelings in delusion; thirdly, that because there are no true boundaries in nature, the self does not exist "inherently", and so to feel emotions based on threats or rewards to the ("inherently existing") self is to base one's feelings in delusion.

That is not necessarily an exhaustive outline of the arguments made by the house philosophers in support of the delusional nature of emotions based on the "false self" - it is just my summary of some of the arguments that I've seen them make. The phrase that the house philosophers seem to prefer to describe "the false self" is "the ego": this is a distinct usage from that of the psychoanalytic traditions, which again can be confusing for newcomers.

The first argument against emotions: determinism invalidating personal responsibility

Given what I've written above about the unsoundness of claiming with certainty that reality is wholly deterministic, I don't accept that the first argument (determinism invalidating the imputation of personal responsibility) is definitively sound. Even assuming a deterministic universe, though, this argument only goes so far: it only deals with emotions that are based upon the false imputation of responsibility - a prime example being pride. It doesn't deal with one of the emotions that gets criticised a lot (most?) by the house philosophers: happiness. It is not necessarily the case that happiness is based upon any imputation of personal responsibility at all - happiness can arise simply from the appreciation of pleasant surroundings or a pleasing thought.

I want to make one other point prior to moving on to the other arguments (and in fact this point applies to the other arguments too), and that point is one based on the relationship between emotion and truth, and the implications of that relationship. To start with, note that emotions belong to a category that permits of no assignment of truth value - they make no statement about reality that can be tested for truth or falsity: they are instead subjective states of consciousness which, whilst those states might be based on beliefs that can have a truth value assigned to them, are not belief-carrying in themselves. Thus, the claim that any particular emotion is a delusion is definitively false, given that delusions are states of false belief, which I have just established do not apply to emotions per se.

Assuming then for the sake of argument the hard determinism of the house philosophers, it would be fair to claim that emotions arise in and of a mental context which includes beliefs, which might or might not be delusional, even if, as the previous paragraph argued, it's not fair to claim that emotions themselves can be delusional. The house philosophy can then at best claim that the triggers for emotions are delusions or delusional, even though to characterise the emotions themselves as delusions or delusional is to commit a category error. It is a category error, however, that the house philosophers do commit, as seen in this exchange in Dan's post:

brokenhead: Dan, are you saying that every emotion is a delusion?

Dan: Yes, that's what I'm saying.

Dan later in that post clarifies his definition of delusion, a definition which, given what I've just argued, I clearly take issue with (I agree with brokenhead's initial definition):

brokenhead: A delusion is simply a mistaken belief.

Dan: And/Or that which arises from mistaken beliefs.

So what is my point? It is simply that emotions have no inherent value or lack of value in the primary paradigm of the house philosophy: truth. Rather, the value of an emotion is, like that of an act, in its effects. Here, then, a functional argument can be raised for emotions: the effects of some emotions can be valuable. Taking the above example of pride: whilst it's undeniable that an excess can lead to foolhardiness and vainglory, it's also the case that in moderation, pride can motivate a person to perform well. Assuming hard determinism, is the imputed responsibility upon which pride arises "false"? Perhaps so, but even this is arguable: in everyday terms, it is often unavoidable that we assign personal responsibility for practical purposes - that responsibility being based on various practical considerations such as causal proximity to the event. It might be argued that under hard determinism, such assignment of responsibility is ultimately, like free will, an illusion, and yet it serves a practical purpose: one upon which emotions such as pride can be based, again for practical purposes. Pride is, amongst other things, a natural human reaction to personal accomplishment, and any individual can wisely use that natural reaction in moderation to maintain or improve their level of achievement, rather than to avoid that reaction due to its supposedly false basis.

Dan writes something that could be interpreted as an argument against such a functionalist position in his post: "What I would concede is that an absence of emotion would render a person dysfunctional if not accompanied (and indeed caused by) by a heightening of consciousness and reason. For an absence of emotions to occur it really necessitates either that very heightening of consciousness or some form of mental disease and dysfunction. [...] Rational engagement and information are vastly superior functions to "fear of the unknown" type responses. The development of consciousness has given us a superior model by which to function. We don't need to fear something when we can rationally conclude that we must have information to know how best to engage it."

This position seems at first to be reasonable, and perhaps it is: I'm just not sure that the ultimate goal of 100% functional consciousness and 0% (functional and/or dysfunctional) emotion is actually achievable, at least for human beings, and I'll explain why here. Yes, it seems at least on the surface that the functionality of emotion can be replaced by heightened consciousness, particularly when it comes to emotions as aids to discerning truth; perhaps less so in the realm of emotions as motivators, but, even there, it does seem possible. I don't think that we should automatically assume the validity of this possibility without examining it though. Often emotions indicate to us certain truths: for example, we might pick up on subtle cues and start feeling angry and irritable towards an associate, without initially realising why consciously: when, however, we examine the source of those feelings, we might discover that there is good evidence that our associate is cheating us in some way. There is thus a combination of emotion and consciousness involved in this process of arriving at truth: the question then becomes whether it's possible to replace the emotional aspect of this process such that consciousness alone picks up on the cues and abstracts from them the truth. Likewise for motivation the question arises whether an "unemotional" consciousness can, based on values and goals alone, function effectively. I'd say that this is an open question, but not one that I'd definitively close the door on against the house philosophers.

Let's assume, though, that it is possible for functional consciousness to entirely replace functional emotions: why would one choose to jettison emotions in favour of pure consciousness? It seems that ultimately this question comes down to personal preference. Now is a good time to introduce an aesthetic argument for emotions: in the same way that we enjoy the taste of certain foods, we can appreciate the sensation of certain emotions. This has nothing to do with truth, and everything to do with experience. The house philosophy provides no good reason for a wise individual to refrain from the experience of, say, happiness, if that individual can access it without creating additional harm to anyone, including him/herself.

Does the experience of emotions for functional or aesthetic purposes contradict another important value of the house philosophers: non-attachment? No. One need not be attached to emotions any more than one need be attached to reasoning: one can simply experience them and then let them pass away, without clinging to them. Of course this is far easier said than done, but it is far more realistic and sensible than aiming for the complete cessation of all emotion.

Similarly, an holistic argument can be raised for emotions: in the same way that our thoughts reflect who we "really" are, so do our emotions. They can be seen as a core aspect of our being. To be humanly conscious is to be in some state of subjective feeling, or, in other words, to be in some mood. Now, we might debate as to how intense and "emotional" those moods need be, but there can be no doubt that there is a feeling associated with every state of human consciousness, even if that feeling is "numbness". This argument then relates to the aesthetic argument in that, just like it is a matter of personal taste which emotions one prefers over the others, similarly it is a matter of personal identity which emotions one tends to experience over the others.

The second argument against emotions: lack of objective differentiation

This (personal taste) brings me to the second argument which I noted above is used by the house philosophers against emotions: that because no "finite" phenomenon is either objectively superior or objectively inferior to any other "finite" phenomena, then to feel an emotion based on the perceived superiority or inferiority of any state of affairs is to base one's feelings in delusion. This argument is almost trivial to respond to, because, as I will shortly argue with respect to non-inherency, the introduction of an objectivity is a red herring. The brute fact is that given the ability of consciousness to perceive both pleasure and pain, and given the goals and values of a conscious self, there are superior and inferior states of affairs from the perspective of that consciousness, which can be "objectified" to some extent based on an overall "maximise pleasure; minimise pain" principle, and which naturally tend to evoke emotional responses from that conscious self's perspective.

The third argument against emotions: existence as non-inherent

Finally I'll turn to the third argument against emotions, which seems to be the primary one, in which all emotions are "based on delusion". In his post, Dan presented that third argument in metaphorical form something like this: if a man had the (false) belief that his wife was cheating with the milkman, then he might feel emotions of anger, resentment and envy; when, however, he discovers that his belief is false because the milkman is gay, then those emotions evaporate: so it is when a man discovers that he has no inherent self-existence - all of his emotions evaporate.

A response to this argument requires a definition of the word "inherent" in this context, and that definition might run something like this: "entirely causally separate from the rest of reality". As has been pointed out on this forum in the past, it's highly unlikely that many if any people truly do suffer from this very bizarre delusion - who in their right mind, even subconsciously, would consider themselves to have no causal relationship whatsoever with the rest of the world? - so here is not only solid evidence for the exaggeratedness of the house philosophy, but also proof against the argument itself: emotions are very obviously possible in the absence of this delusion. Even the three moderators of this forum, at least two of whom consider themselves to be enlightened and therefore not subject to this delusion, nevertheless exhibit emotions from time to time.

Why might this be so? Well, it seems to me that whether the self's existence is inherent or non-inherent is completely irrelevant: what is relevant is simply its existence per se. Given subjective consciousness, and the individual's susceptibility to those external causes which lead to either pleasure or pain (speaking roughly), a natural response of the human being is emotional. Dan's metaphor fails to explain what it is about the supposed "realisation" of the non-inherent existence of the self that blocks the usual effects (emotions) of those external causes. Certainly it's easy to see how a realisation that a belief that one's wife is cheating with the milkman is false would extinguish the correlated emotions, but how is this relevant to the non-inherency of the self's existence? The husband inherently existing or not, a cheating wife is an external phenomenon that has effects, particularly for and on that husband, and the sanity of the recognition that one actually is subject to external causes is no foil against them.

In his post, Dan writes, "I'm saying that the ego essentially is the belief that your wife is screwing the milkman". He later elaborates: "What we experience as a self, as an apparent seat of consciousness and experience is just like all other things - an appearance whipped by causality (Nature) that lacks inherency. Now, this self is perfectly real, as real as anything else; it's just not an appearance that can generate the sort of psychological output we see in/as emotion. There's isn't the false dualism of self/other and the attachments that accrue as a consequence. There's nothing that loses and gains; nothing that needs security and validation and therefore experiences "rejection"; nothing that desires things be other than how they are or that can be attached to outcomes".

Given that Dan acknowledges that the self does exist, it follows that in terms of the metaphor the wife actually is screwing the milkman, inherency notwithstanding. A non-inherent cuckolding is a cuckolding nonetheless, and understanding that one's self is - at some level, anyway - a composite, in and of itself provides one with no subsequent means of quieting the emotions that naturally arise. Dan asserts that the "appearance" of the self is not one "that can generate the sort of psychological output we see in/as emotion", and yet this remains an essentially unsupported assertion. His attempts to support it are very weak. He asserts the "false dualism of self/other", and yet this dualism is the basis of conscious existence: we do not have direct access to the consciousness of others and in this sense others are separate from us, even if, as the house philosophers like to argue through their platform of hard determinism, ultimately we are all causally linked in a unity. He asserts that there is "nothing that loses and gains" and yet he fails to justify this in the light of his acknowledgement that the self "is perfectly real": it is this "perfectly real" self which, inherently or not, can lose and gain (for example, enlightenment is a gain to this self, and any subsequent delusion is a loss). A self that realises itself as existing non-inherently, Dan asserts, does not "desire things be other than how they are": but why would this be so? Realisations of the nature of self-existence do not change the fact that conscious life can be pleasurable or painful, and that, failing some other higher goals, it is natural and reasonable to desire the former over the latter.

Inherency is, in other words, as I am arguing here, a red herring. Existence is what's essential: the purported lack of inherency of that existence does not and cannot in and of itself have the effects that the house philosophers ascribe to it. This seems to me to be a simple enough point, and yet the house philosophers continue through the years to cling determinedly to their anti-emotion platform, which leads me to wonder... why? There's a clue in something that David wrote in this thread: 'In this light [consciousness of Truth], I define "emotion" to be any feeling that overwhelms the mind, captures it, and enslaves it within a net of selfish, narcissistic thinking'. David seems to be concerned that emotions blind the mind to truth, and that they result in narcissism. As someone pointed out to me, it would be easy for David to use this as a self-serving definition: he could simply claim that any feeling that does not have this effect is not an emotion, but I'll give him the benefit of the doubt and assume that he intends it to apply to all of what we would typically regard as emotions.

What is striking about this definition is the highly negative value it connotes to emotions: they "capture" and "enslave"; they result in "selfish" and "narcissistic" thinking. As I've tried to explain in this post, I personally don't believe that emotions and truth are incompatible: I believe that emotions can point us in the direction of truth. This is not a given, and is more like an holistic ideal, yet it seems to me to me to be a more reasonable ideal than the ideal of total lack of emotion. It seems likely to me then that the basis on which the house philosophers devalue emotions is largely an aesthetic one, given that their other arguments - at least as I've presented and refuted them in this post - seem to me to fail. I raised holistic and aesthetic arguments for emotions, and presumably the house philosophers find that the premises of those arguments don't apply to them: their aesthetic sense is that feelings are for women, and that reason is for men. David has also in this thread referred to being "imprisoned" by emotions, which is quite interesting: why, given hard determinism, in which we are all in some sense "imprisoned" by the causes that make us up, would "imprisonment" matter except for how it makes you feel? The irony is only escaped if the feeling of being imprisoned is not classified as "emotional", which is quite a stretch given how David has categorised the joy at the appreciation of other life forms as emotionally narcissistic, and given that imprisonment is even more personal.

To bring this all back to the origins of this post - namely Nick's assertion that he and I share different values: I would say that my aesthetic and holistic values are indeed different to those of the house philosophers in this respect. To me, the ideal is an emotional life integrated with values and reason, and not the dissolution of all emotion, which, depending on the exact definition of emotion, I don't believe is possible anyway. That said, do I agree with the house philosophy to the extent that I believe that emotions can be disconnected from reality and based on delusions, and to the extent that I seek to avoid such emotions as will falsely impute importance to myself or cause harm to others.

Ego transcendence

Speaking of false self-importance, this seems to be another part of the house philosophy's value paradigm with which I might align or misalign: ego transcendence. The house philosophy teaches of ridding oneself of the false self - the belief in inherent self-existence - and that in the face of this truth-realisation, the process culminates in ego transcendence. It's quite difficult to understand, though, what this ego transcendence entails exactly. Certainly not humility, being as the house philosophers are not at all shy to self-proclaim their own enlightenment and wisdom. It seems practically to reduce to the issue of emotions which I've just finished discussing: it seems to be about valuing truth over one's emotions; and not just this, but also an eschewing of "conventional" modes of transacting with others (in the terms of the house philosophy, "conventional" is a pejorative term).

The principle seems to be that the ego-transcended individual seeks neither to receive nor to provide emotional comfort, including conventional friendship, to others. I don't recall having ever seen the explicit reasoning behind this attitude outlined, but I suspect that the position arises from the perceived fundamental dichotomy between emotion and truth to which David referred earlier in this thread, as I quoted him so doing a little earlier in this post. If this is the case, then, as I argued for the house philosophy's position on emotions in general, I consider this to be a mistaken perception: emotional comfort need not stem from falsehood. It is possible to comfort with the truth, and, outside of the realm of truth/falsity, with hope, affirmation, optimism, advice, suggestion, humour, wit, play, fun and solidarity. The house philosophers, however, prefer not the way of heart, but the poisoning of that heart.

The reasoning for this approach seems to have something to do with cultivating strength and individuality. It seems that in the house philosopher's eyes, to participate in conventional friendship with another is to weaken both parties. Again, I argue that this weakening need not be the case: good friendships can strengthen both parties as they learn and grow together. I also argue that friendships can enrich our lives if only because we are social creatures who - conventionally and not so conventionally - value relating to one another.

The propagation of wisdom and moral nihilism

Presumably, the house philosophers would argue that there is a point beyond which one can no longer learn from another; a point at which one needs to "immerse oneself in The Infinite". At this point, one supposedly realises the formlessness of reality; the lack of inherent purpose of life; and ... dedicates oneself to ... the propagation of wisdom...?...

I question this dedication to wisdom not because it is unworthy in and of itself, but because it does not at all follow from the platform of the house philosophy. Indeed, I'm not even sure how the house philosophy is saved from nihilism (particularly moral and existential nihilism), although I am sure that the house philosophers deny that they are nihilists. The house philosophy has no specific moral code, and no specific moral imperative to treat other people in any particular way, and, indeed, such an imperative seems not to even be derivable from what it does hold to be true: it would seem that the logical consequence of its doctrines, particularly those of formlessness and lack of ultimate meaning, is that "anything goes", and yet instead of this it proffers the overriding value of the propagation of wisdom. Why? Because - at least according to David - on the path to enlightenment, this is the primary value that pushes the seeker onward, and when enlightenment is attained, this momentum (of the valuing of wisdom) continues unopposed.

This seems to me to be a pretty ad hoc and arbitrary reason. In terms of the house philosophy, the enlightened being, fully aware of formlessness, has more or less unlimited choice in his or her values. Nothing is off limits - after all, one makes one's own meaning, and one is fully conscious. Why choose the propagation of this so-called "wisdom"? Is there a better reason than "because of my pre-enlightenment momentum"? Given that the house philosophers believe that their "wisdom" is the ultimate attainment, and, given that, as far as I know, they believe that it is the most effective relief of suffering, it would make moral sense to choose this as a goal if one's morality included compassion, which most moralities seem to do - in fact I'd go so far as to suggest that compassion of one form or another is one of the bases of morality - and yet the house philosophers seem to deny their moral agency, or at least Dan does, for example in this post: 'I don't think or function in moral terms - I think and function in "outcome" terms. That necessitates making practical judgements about people and states of affairs - and categorising them appropriately, according to my desired outcomes.' How this differs from a variant of utilitarian morality I'm not sure, but the real question is what those desired outcomes are and how they are arrived at.

Lack of a moral code notwithstanding, I acknowledge that the house philosophers have a moral compass: they seem to generally have decent moral sense as human beings, although it's unclear to me whether this moral sense can be attributed to, or whether it exists in spite of, their purported enlightenment. I am interested in morality, though, and performing a cursory search of the archives, I found this quote by David from Weininger's notebook: "Morality expresses itself thus: Act in full consciousness, that is, act so that in every moment you are whole, your entire individuality is there.". Is this the extent of the morality of the house philosophers? What if your "entire individuality" is sadistic - is torture acceptable behaviour for an enlightened being? If not, why not? - there is no ultimate meaning, after all, and there's already a precedent for torture-like behaviour in the "poisoning of hearts". The house philosophers seem, though, to preference compassionate acts over sadistic ones: if this preference does not have a moral basis, then what is its basis?

All-around arbitrariness

Summarising all that I've written of the house philosophy in this post so far, one factor is striking: its incredible arbitrariness. The arbitrariness begins in the house philosophy's cosmological model, in which the Totality as a whole is utterly arbitrary: there is no reason why as a whole it is the way it is, with, according to the house philosophers, not even the possibility of a reason why. It extends into the house philosophy's devaluation of emotions, which seems largely to boil down to a matter of arbitrary aesthetic judgements, with dubious arguments asserted in what perhaps amounts to a post hoc rationalisation of those aesthetic judgements. It extends further into the primary goal of the purportedly enlightened house philosophers: the propagation of wisdom, which again is utterly arbitrary - why just "go with the flow" and accept one's current momentum rather than, in the height of one's conscious glory, forge a new goal based on one's new-found understanding? And of course I haven't even mentioned in this post the house philosophy's definitions of masculinity and femininity, in which all that is noble is arbitrarily assigned to masculinity and all that is ignoble, equally as arbitrarily, to femininity. Arbitrariness all around. That doesn't seem like any way for Ultimate Truth to work.

How my values differ

Having critiqued the house philosophy's value system, and given that this post was inspired by Nick's comment that he and I do not share a value system, it seems only fair to outline how my own values differ. The starting point is morality. Whilst I wouldn't claim to have a comprehensive moral code, what I do have is based on valuing the autonomy and well-being of all consciousness beings. There is, as others before me have realised, a conflict between these two values, in that autonomy includes the possibility of threatening another's well-being, so a balance between these two values is necessary. This, and not what I described as part of the house philosophy's primary values - "wisdom, and the transcendence of ego and emotion" - is the basis of my philosophical position. Where wisdom and ego transcendence lead to overall enhanced autonomy and well-being, then I encourage them, but to me they are secondary.

Even after what I wrote above about the dubiousness of the house philosophy's platform of causal determinism, it might be unclear what my own position is, so I'll clear that up here. I believe that not only is the house philosophy's causal determinism on shaky ground, but so is the essentially pure-materialist[*] paradigm that it proffers, in which all of the complexity and wonder of life... "just is". I find it incredible that anyone can actually subscribe to that position, and I sometimes wonder whether this forum and others like it where such pure-materialist paradigms are championed is not some elaborate hoax. In another thread (Evolution/creation: the underlying dilemma; explaining order), I outlined what I see as the dilemma of origins. Given various experiences in my life, which I don't intend to explore publicly, I tend towards a theistic understanding of origins, but I don't claim to have "the answer". It seems plain to me, though, and to others who have not closed their eyes to it, that there is an essentially divine magic to life, which - at least for those who have experienced it - cannot be simplistically explained away as the reductionist pure-materialist types on this forum tend to do very dismissively. My other main value, then, although one that I battle putting into practice, stems from the relationship that I believe it is possible to have with divinity, and not divinity in a pantheist sense, but in a magical, conscious sense.

[*] What I mean by "pure-materialism" is the view that everything in the universe either is, or is derived from, physical matter and energy, with no contrasting "supernatural"/"spiritual" aspects to reality.

Concluding with magic

Magical: another pejorative term on this forum. It is, to their detriment, a characteristic of the house philosophers that they believe that everything ultimate not only can be understood in their terms, but has been understood by them in those terms, leaving nothing remaining unexplained. The irony is that at the heart of their own philosophy lies Magic with a capital M: the Magic of why it is that the Totality is as it is and not some other way. And thus we come full circle...
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Blair
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Re: Arbitrary absolutism: the values of the house philosophy

Post by Blair »

guest_of_logic wrote:. The irony is that at the heart of their own philosophy lies Magic with a capital M: the Magic of why it is that the Totality is as it is and not some other way. ..
A=A
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Dan Rowden
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Re: Arbitrary absolutism: the values of the house philosophy

Post by Dan Rowden »

It's unfortunate that he included that piece of abject stupidity, but I'm going to respond and try to overlook it.
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Re: Arbitrary absolutism: the values of the house philosophy

Post by Robert »

guest_of_logic wrote:... beliefs, which might or might not be delusional
So near, and yet so far. All beliefs are delusions. Fancy a dance?
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Re: Arbitrary absolutism: the values of the house philosophy

Post by guest_of_logic »

guest_of_logic: The irony is that at the heart of their own philosophy lies Magic with a capital M: the Magic of why it is that the Totality is as it is and not some other way. ..

prince: A=A
That a thing has an identity doesn't explain why it has that particular identity.
Robert wrote:All beliefs are delusions.
Including a belief that "A is A"?
Robert wrote:Fancy a dance?
I thought you'd never ask. Nice song. I'm listening to it a third time.
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Re: Arbitrary absolutism: the values of the house philosophy

Post by Robert »

guest_of_logic wrote:Including a belief that "A is A"?
Um, belief or non belief is irrelevant to a truth.
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Re: Arbitrary absolutism: the values of the house philosophy

Post by guest_of_logic »

Robert wrote:Um, belief or non belief is irrelevant to a truth.
Beliefs can be false or true, hence delusional or non-delusional, contrary to your assertion.
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Re: Arbitrary absolutism: the values of the house philosophy

Post by Diebert van Rhijn »

Laird, you still don't get causality and identity at all. But you think you do and all kinds of questions keep forming, while you're driven to write a lot of cleverness but it's the fundamentals which just don't register. If it did register, you'd realise that things are as they are in each and every other way they might appear as. It's a logical necessity and challenging it is only possible by challenging ones own question, being and logic at the same time. In other words questioning only defeats the questioner.
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Re: Arbitrary absolutism: the values of the house philosophy

Post by Robert »

guest_of_logic wrote:
Robert wrote:Um, belief or non belief is irrelevant to a truth.
Beliefs can be false or true, hence delusional or non-delusional, contrary to your assertion.
If something is true, why the need for belief? Identifying a truth renders belief unnecessary, superfluous.

Think of it this way. All beliefs are conscious states within duality, and yet duality is ultimately a delusion.
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Re: Arbitrary absolutism: the values of the house philosophy

Post by Cory Duchesne »

Let's define what we mean by belief, shall we. To me, belief means the conviction that something is true when rigorous proof is lacking. E.g., a wife may believe her husband is faithful, a patriot believes in the superiority of his nation, a new age person believes in the law of attraction, Jupiviv belives he's wise, etc.

When rigorous proof is present, belief would seem superfluous, since, by definition, belief requires a lack of proof.

Laird, how are you defining belief?

The irony is that at the heart of their own philosophy lies Magic with a capital M: the Magic of why it is that the Totality is as it is and not some other way. ..
Why it is that the totality is as it is? The totality is eternal, it always is. No beginning, no end. "Why" is an attempt to apply causation to it, but causation cannot apply to it. It is not caused, and cannot be caused.
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Re: Arbitrary absolutism: the values of the house philosophy

Post by skipair »

Causal determinism isn't the explanation of all the wonder in the world, it is a tool to question the validity of any beliefs we might have about it. This is important if you want your beliefs to be fact-based and not just made up. We examine the causes of the beliefs because the causes are what we believe in.

It's strange that in the end the only thing fact-based is our direct experience in the moment. Everything else is an accumulation of scientific models. It could be that there actually is intelligent design and that a God is just making us think this way. But show me the evidence first, and I'll use that as a model until the next new piece of evidence comes around.
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Re: Arbitrary absolutism: the values of the house philosophy

Post by Dan Rowden »

guest_of_logic wrote:
Robert wrote:All beliefs are delusions.
Including a belief that "A is A"?
If you believe A=A, you don't understand it at all.
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Re: Arbitrary absolutism: the values of the house philosophy

Post by guest_of_logic »

Cory Duchesne wrote:Let's define what we mean by belief, shall we. To me, belief means the conviction that something is true when rigorous proof is lacking. E.g., a wife may believe her husband is faithful, a patriot believes in the superiority of his nation, a new age person believes in the law of attraction, Jupiviv belives he's wise, etc.

When rigorous proof is present, belief would seem superfluous, since, by definition, belief requires a lack of proof.

Laird, how are you defining belief?
I'm sure any dictionary definition would do, but, in short, pretty similarly to you. To me it's a mental position that some particular thing is true, one step below "knowledge", but where there is a continuum between the two (belief and knowledge, that is). For example, I've never been to the North Pole and verified it for myself, but I've seen footage on TV that indicates that polar bears live there; Wikipedia also describes one habitat of the polar bear as the Arctic Circle. So, without having been to the Pole myself, do I merely believe that there are polar bears at the North Pole, or with the documentary and Wikipedia evidence, do I know it? It's debatable, depending on how rigorous you require your proof to be - like I said, there's a continuum from weak belief to strong belief to weak knowledge to strong knowledge - but if I were to choose a term in this instance, I'd probably choose "know". How about when I walk across a pedestrian crossing when a car is approaching? Do I merely believe that the car is going to slow down and stop, or do I know it? I would say that this qualifies as mere belief, but a strong belief.

To respond more emphatically to Robert, then, using my last example: my belief that the car is going to stop could be true or false, and given that it could be (and probably is) true, then it's not necessarily, as you claimed it to be, a delusion.
Laird: The irony is that at the heart of their own philosophy lies Magic with a capital M: the Magic of why it is that the Totality is as it is and not some other way. ..

Corey: Why it is that the totality is as it is? The totality is eternal, it always is. No beginning, no end. "Why" is an attempt to apply causation to it, but causation cannot apply to it. It is not caused, and cannot be caused.
From my perspective, that doesn't answer the question. Perhaps we could try coming at it from this angle: hypothetically speaking, could the Totality as an entirety be other than it is right now, such that, for example, rather than reading my post at this instant of time, you are instead making a cup of tea, or, even more drastically, you never even existed?
Dan Rowden wrote:If you believe A=A, you don't understand it at all.
Bad example for you, then - try one of the ones I gave above.
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Re: Arbitrary absolutism: the values of the house philosophy

Post by Dan Rowden »

guest_of_logic wrote:Perhaps we could try coming at it from this angle: hypothetically speaking, could the Totality as an entirety be other than it is right now, such that, for example, rather than reading my post at this instant of time, you are instead making a cup of tea, or, even more drastically, you never even existed?
You don't even understand your own questions, methinks - firstly, you're confusing (falsely conflating) the Totality and a finite entity within it. To ask why the Totality can't be other than what it is - is to 100% misunderstand the Totality. It's a meaningless and incoherent question. Isn't the reason blindingly obvious?: the Totality is already everything - it cannot be "other" because "other" already is (as part of the Totality).

The cup of tea example also demonstrates a lack of understanding of A=A. I'm not even going to explain why it's so obvious.

It's back to basics (again) for you, bucko.
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Re: Arbitrary absolutism: the values of the house philosophy

Post by guest_of_logic »

Diebert van Rhijn wrote:If [causality and identity] did register, you'd realise that things are as they are in each and every other way they might appear as. It's a logical necessity and challenging it is only possible by challenging ones own question, being and logic at the same time.
So far as I understand you, I'm not challenging that, but the first sentence is confusingly worded, so perhaps I don't understand you after all.
Dan Rowden wrote:
guest_of_logic wrote:Perhaps we could try coming at it from this angle: hypothetically speaking, could the Totality as an entirety be other than it is right now, such that, for example, rather than reading my post at this instant of time, you are instead making a cup of tea, or, even more drastically, you never even existed?
You don't even understand your own questions, methinks - firstly, you're confusing (falsely conflating) the Totality and a finite entity within it.
I'm describing how a part of the Totality could be different to indicate that the whole could be different. Assuming infinity, it's impossible for me to describe all of the changes to the whole.
Dan Rowden wrote:To ask why the Totality can't be other than what it is - is to 100% misunderstand the Totality. It's a meaningless and incoherent question. Isn't the reason blindingly obvious?: the Totality is already everything - it cannot be "other" because "other" already is (as part of the Totality).
You don't seem to understand me. Yes, the Totality is already everything, but that everything has specific features across its entirety, and those features could, in principle, be different.
Dan Rowden wrote:The cup of tea example also demonstrates a lack of understanding of A=A. I'm not even going to explain why it's so obvious.
The cup of tea example simply presumes some similarities between the-Totality-as-it-is and the hypothetical Totality-as-it-could-be, which perhaps is what is confusing you.
Dan Rowden wrote:It's back to basics (again) for you, bucko.
Damn, and I was getting really comfortable in my nikes. Oh, wait... basics.
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Re: Arbitrary absolutism: the values of the house philosophy

Post by Cory Duchesne »

guest_of_logic wrote:
Cory Duchesne wrote:Let's define what we mean by belief, shall we. To me, belief means the conviction that something is true when rigorous proof is lacking. E.g., a wife may believe her husband is faithful, a patriot believes in the superiority of his nation, a new age person believes in the law of attraction, Jupiviv belives he's wise, etc.

When rigorous proof is present, belief would seem superfluous, since, by definition, belief requires a lack of proof.

Laird, how are you defining belief?
I'm sure any dictionary definition would do, but, in short, pretty similarly to you. To me it's a mental position that some particular thing is true, one step below "knowledge", but where there is a continuum between the two (belief and knowledge, that is). For example, I've never been to the North Pole and verified it for myself, but I've seen footage on TV that indicates that polar bears live there; Wikipedia also describes one habitat of the polar bear as the Arctic Circle. So, without having been to the Pole myself, do I merely believe that there are polar bears at the North Pole, or with the documentary and Wikipedia evidence, do I know it?
You know that you've experienced evidence (TV doc, wiki) of polar bears in the north pole. That's it, that's all you know. In other words, you know the appearances of your own mind, insofar as you recognize an appearance is as it appears. Now, you can go on and believe in polar bears in the North Pole, but that's not necessary, and it's definitely not the truth. In fact, there is no truth in modeling (science) at all, facts about the world are useful constructs, or, just as often, masturbation.
It's debatable, depending on how rigorous you require your proof to be
Deductive logic is the only real proof. If you can deduce it logically, then you have absolute proof, no need for belief.
like I said, there's a continuum from weak belief to strong belief to weak knowledge to strong knowledge - but if I were to choose a term in this instance, I'd probably choose "know". How about when I walk across a pedestrian crossing when a car is approaching?
You know only the appearances, and hence, really you know nothing at all. It's all guess work in the realm of the empirical.
Do I merely believe that the car is going to slow down and stop, or do I know it?
If you're wise, you'll wait and see.
Laird: The irony is that at the heart of their own philosophy lies Magic with a capital M: the Magic of why it is that the Totality is as it is and not some other way. ..

Corey: Why it is that the totality is as it is? The totality is eternal, it always is. No beginning, no end. "Why" is an attempt to apply causation to it, but causation cannot apply to it. It is not caused, and cannot be caused.
From my perspective, that doesn't answer the question. Perhaps we could try coming at it from this angle: hypothetically speaking, could the Totality as an entirety be other than it is right now, such that, for example, rather than reading my post at this instant of time, you are instead making a cup of tea, or, even more drastically, you never even existed?
You can't divide the totality up in parts like that and make contrasts without destroying it's totalness. You are comparing the finite with the finite.
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Re: Arbitrary absolutism: the values of the house philosophy

Post by skipair »

It's possible that we hallucinate everything, and that what we experience as A is actually B. But I think that line of thinking would get old very fast. Life is ultimately subjective because the only thing we have to go on is what we ourselves experience. IMO the only things that matter are whether you understand them philosophically and how you can incorporate them to get what you want.

Objectivity is not getting beyond or outside your own mind to see what's REALLY going on. Real objectivity is honestly looking inward to examine your deepest beliefs and see if you actually know what you're talking about. Whether other people seem to have experiences similar to our own has no bearing on our own level of honesty and insight.
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Re: Arbitrary absolutism: the values of the house philosophy

Post by Dan Rowden »

skipair wrote:It's possible that we hallucinate everything, and that what we experience as A is actually B.
Um, no, that's not possible. You seem to be having a similar issue with A=A that Laird has always had. That things are hallucinations is actually totally irrelevant.
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Re: Arbitrary absolutism: the values of the house philosophy

Post by jupiviv »

@Dan Rowden, why do you think that A=A is not a belief? What proof can you give for the truth of A=A?
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Re: Arbitrary absolutism: the values of the house philosophy

Post by guest_of_logic »

Cory Duchesne wrote:You know that you've experienced evidence (TV doc, wiki) of polar bears in the north pole.
OK, well, if you want to be all extreme about things, which it seems you do, then let's take it to the most extreme: do I really know that I've experienced evidence? What if I'm under mind control and have had false memories inserted?
Cory Duchesne wrote:Now, you can go on and believe in polar bears in the North Pole, but that's not necessary, and it's definitely not the truth. In fact, there is no truth in modeling (science) at all, facts about the world are useful constructs, or, just as often, masturbation.
Woah there Nellie! "Definitely not the truth"? How in the world do you justify that? If there are indeed polar bears at the North Pole, then any belief to that effect is true. If the scientific models reflect reality perfectly accurately, then they are true.
Deductive logic is the only real proof. If you can deduce it logically, then you have absolute proof, no need for belief. [...] You know only the appearances, and hence, really you know nothing at all. It's all guess work in the realm of the empirical.
Your use of "real" and "really" presumably connotes that only knowledge gained through pure deduction (particularly, abstract mathematical knowledge) or pure experience ("I know that I am experiencing a monitor screen in front of me right now") is valid. I would concur that it's the knowledge in which we can be most certain, but empirical knowledge is possible too; if we deny the possibility of empirical knowledge then we lose a great deal of meaning for the word "know". Knowing entails that what is known is true, and empirical facts can be true, and can be known.
Laird: Do I merely believe that the car is going to slow down and stop, or do I know it?

Cory: If you're wise, you'll wait and see.
Very clever, but if you're trying to imply that beliefs are unnecessary in the world, then I disagree - at least if one wants to be active in the world: then, at the very least, implicit beliefs are inescapable. For example, to take a walk on solid ground is to implicitly believe that that ground will remain solid - if on the other hand one believed that it were readily subject to spontaneous liquification, then one would not take the risk of walking on it, would one?
Laird: Perhaps we could try coming at it from this angle: hypothetically speaking, could the Totality as an entirety be other than it is right now, such that, for example, rather than reading my post at this instant of time, you are instead making a cup of tea, or, even more drastically, you never even existed?

Cory: You can't divide the totality up in parts like that and make contrasts without destroying it's totalness. You are comparing the finite with the finite.
You don't seem to have understood what I wrote. I wrote "as an entirety". That's the key phrase. I'm not destroying its totalness because any local changes would be reflected throughout the rest of the Totality, so that its causal integrity (which is what I think you mean by "totalness") was maintained. I only compared finite with finite as representatives of the respective (different) infinites to which they belong.
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Re: Arbitrary absolutism: the values of the house philosophy

Post by Blair »

jupiviv wrote:What proof can you give for the truth of A=A?
(laughing out loud) I nominate this ^ douche as deluded ignoramus of the century, thus far.
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Re: Arbitrary absolutism: the values of the house philosophy

Post by David Quinn »

guest_of_logic wrote:It takes a while for a newcomer to understand what the house philosophers are saying here, because it's often framed in rather extreme language, such as that "the self does not exist", whereas, when you probe deeper, you find that for example Kevin acknowledges that the self actually does exist - he describes it as existing in a similar (abstract) way to that in which the number "one" exists -
More accurately, it is equivalent to the conception of 1+1=3. The "self" is a logically incoherent conception, after all.

Just think, the whole of your life rests precariously on a piece of insanity ....

Even better, the entire history of the human race can be summed up as the blind, endless struggle to promote and protect the concept of 1+1=3, even to the point of fighting each other over whose conception is better.

And whenever an individual dares to point out the madness of all this, his usual reward is to be mocked, derided, persecuted, marginalized, executed, etc.

What a world we live in.

guest_of_logic wrote:Given what I've written above about the unsoundness of claiming with certainty that reality is wholly deterministic, I don't accept that the first argument (determinism invalidating the imputation of personal responsibility) is definitively sound. Even assuming a deterministic universe, though, this argument only goes so far: it only deals with emotions that are based upon the false imputation of responsibility - a prime example being pride. It doesn't deal with one of the emotions that gets criticised a lot (most?) by the house philosophers: happiness. It is not necessarily the case that happiness is based upon any imputation of personal responsibility at all - happiness can arise simply from the appreciation of pleasant surroundings or a pleasing thought.
Nothing ever "arises simply", particularly within the human mind. How easily you reveal yourself, Laird.

Here is a perfect example of what is wrong with your entire thesis at the start of this thread, and your approach to wisdom in general. There is a strong boundary in your mind beyond which you are determined to never cross. It is a boundary which surrounds the soap-opera which comprises your life (which you love so much) and shuts out the machinary of the egotism which powers it. To cross this boundary is expressly forbidden in your mind, for it would mean bringing your entire soap-opera world tumbling down.

I'm reminded of a quote from Kierkegaard: "In his majesty God sets the pitch so high that if a person is unwilling to let go of his finite common sense, will not abandon flat, self-indulgent mediocrity - then what God calls help, salvation, grace etc, is the most biting irony."

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Re: Arbitrary absolutism: the values of the house philosophy

Post by RobertGreenSky »

'... if you're trying to imply that beliefs are unnecessary in the world, then I disagree - at least if one wants to be active in the world: then, at the very least, implicit beliefs are inescapable. For example, to take a walk on solid ground is to implicitly believe that that ground will remain solid ...'

- Laird

That is simply not true. Horses can proceed without erecting beliefs about the safety of their journeys or thinking about them at all and which is a very good thing for horses since they don't have the time for beliefs. Men need only walk on without worrying for the ground being liquid, or gaseous, or molten, or frozen, or being mined or otherwise boobytrapped, or the journey being an unending one - in short, we need not worry about any of the damned near limitless perturbations we can invent instead of simply walking and without even thinking about it.


If beliefs are necessary to be active in the world then how do animals which we suppose do not engage in linear thinking even function? What is the human genetic necessity of belief? Which particular beliefs are genetically necessary to life, and where might you find them functioning in the brain? Have scientists located them? Are scientists even looking for them? Why you could take that up and get yourself one of them there Noble Prizes. Laird, how could a baby learn to walk when it couldn't form a belief about its walking?


But do have fun with the 'house philosophy'. Zhuangzi wrote, Chapter Two, 'Who knows an unspoken discrimination, an untold Way? It is this, if any is able to know it, which is called the Treasury of Heaven.'
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Re: Arbitrary absolutism: the values of the house philosophy

Post by David Quinn »

Laird is talking here about provisional assumptions, not beliefs. At least that is how a more conscious person operates - taking nothing for granted, thinking of the future in terms of proposals and tentative assumptions.

Belief represents the end of consciousness. A person with a belief is saying to the world that further than this he will not go.

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Re: Arbitrary absolutism: the values of the house philosophy

Post by Dan Rowden »

jupiviv wrote:@Dan Rowden, why do you think that A=A is not a belief? What proof can you give for the truth of A=A?
It's impossible to coherently imagine A=A to be untrue, therefore it cannot be "believed". It is either understood - or not; that's all.
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