Yes,I think you are right about this.Trevor Salyzyn wrote:As I read it, 17 focuses on the relationships among language, logic (necessity in particular), and reality. This all ties back to the focus of his enterprise: to create a philological view of ethics. A linguistic accident, here agency, is assumed by logicians (like Descartes) to also point to a necessary truth about reality.
He says as much in the previous stanza:
16. There are still harmless self-observers who believe that there are "immediate certainties"; for instance, "I think," or as the superstition of Schopenhauer puts it, "I will"; as though cognition here got hold of its object purely and simply as "the thing in itself," without any falsification taking place either on the part of the subject or the object. I would repeat it, however, a hundred times, that "immediate certainty," as well as "absolute knowledge" and the "thing in itself," involve a CONTRADICTIO IN ADJECTO; we really ought to free ourselves from the misleading significance of words!
And also John Locke and David Hume's conception of identity, I suggestTS: Agency was at the heart of most theories of responsibility: if we live in a deterministic world, and did not have free will, many thought that there would be no grounds for ethics (responsibility and punishment). By suggesting that free will is created by an accident of grammar, Nietzsche is not only being the devilish linguist, but he is creating a serious challenge for those who tie ethics to metaphysics.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Personal_i ... hilosophy)