Fujaro wrote:Not accepting the logical A=A statement amounts to not accepting formal logic itself for it is (with the tenets of the Law of Contradiction and the Law of the Excluded Middle) about the basic tenets of logic itself. It is unclear how to define a logic without LOI. This would surmount to illogic. So as a logical propositional statement it cannot be denied without denying the value of logic itself. I don't deny it and so far, I expect no disagreement with the stances of David and Kevin.
At least Kevin seems to make an additional metaphysical claim when Kevin denies the division between reality and one's own consciousness. But as I identified that stance as a form of solipsism David rejected it decisively. Solipsism is a special form of a metaphysical claim, that of idealism, the idea that there is only one sort of substance: thought. It might be that David and Kevin adhere to other forms of Idealism instead of solipsism (please do elaborate on this).
Kevin and I agree that consciousness is a necessary condition for existence. This is because an existing thing can only exist by virtue of having a form of some kind and, in turn, a form can only exist by virtue of presenting an appearance to an observer.
In other words, without the perspective generated by an observer, there can be no basis for a form to come into existence.
Consciousness isn't the sole creator of existence (i.e. solipsism is untrue), but it is a necessary condition of existence - just as a mirror is a necessary condition for the reflections occurring in its reflecting glass, but not the sole cause of them. However, unlike the mirror where the reflections are caused, in part, by objects external to the mirror, there are no objects or forms external to consciousness.
This is not to say there is nothing beyond consciousness, as nothingness too is a form. In the end, it is impossible for us to describe what is there in any definite sense. All we can say is that what exists beyond consciousness is reality in its unformed and unknowable state, while what we experience within our consciousness is reality manifested as forms. (Keeping in mind that "reality in its unformed and unknowable state" is still just another form and therefore a part of consciousness - but we don't want to get ahead of ouselves).
These conclusions are logically derived from the truth that a form cannot exist without the perspective generated by an observer.
Idealism as a metaphysical stance is contrasted by objectivism which holds that consciousness is not possible without the prior existence of something, external to consciousness, for consciousness to be conscious of: "To be aware is to be aware of something.". This also is a metaphysical claim. It is a stance I as a naturalist adhere to. IMO there is no deductive logic that conclusively can dissolve between some Idealist views and the Objectivist view, but there are phenomena that objectivism can explain but that idealism can not explain.
I can't really describe my stance as either idealistic or objectivist. Although I recognize that consciousness and forms necessarily arise together, that there can't be the one without the other, it doesn't stop from me also recognizing the utility of the standard objectivist view when it comes to practical matters.
For example, if I decide to walk out the door, I fully expect the next room to be waiting there for me, even though I am not directly aware of it at the moment. At the same time, I realize that the room cannot exist in any shape or form without an observer giving it form.
It is a bit like what happens in a dream. I can dream that I decide to walk out a door in the expectation that the next room will be waiting when I get there, even though the waiting room only appears the moment I observe it.
In objectivism there is a different interpretation of LOI than in idealism, for in objectivism thought can be about someting other than thought itself. Ataraxia is right that the definition of reality therefore is relevant for this discussion. I suspect that Kevin and David define reality as all consciousness perceived, but I'd like to have their affirmation or rejection of that.
Reality is utterly everything - which includes all the forms that are perceived in consciousness, as well as the unformed aspect of Reality "beyond" consciousness.
Ataraxia is wrong in linking the truth of A=A to a particular metaphysical stance, whatever it might be. A=A is always true, regardless of what metaphysical views a person might have, or what the metaphysical truth might be.
For example, an objectivist who believes that forms can exist beyond consciousness is, in the very act of positing this belief, affirming that these forms beyond consciousness are indeed what they are and not what they are not.
In other words, the truth of A=A is belief-neutral.
The objectivst worldview supposes that some thought, most conclusively thought that seems to stem from our senses, has its origin in a reality that is not entirely conscious thought. This is a very common view indeed and many philosophers have been proponents of it.
You're right, it is a standard view and, as I mentioned above, a perfectly valid one as far as practical matters are concerned. But it does break down under analysis. It has no ultimate basis.
Fujaro wrote:In this worldview there is a dichotomy between logical validation of LOI and the validation in that part of reality that is not thought. Here a mapping from the physical thing to the logical is needed to interpret LOI in the physical world. Something like this:
(A) <the real object> <--(pointer 1)--- logical subject A is logical predicate A --(pointer 2)--> <the real object>
While in the idealist view and in the realm of objectivism that concerns thought itself it would be:
(B) <thought of A> <--(pointer 1)--- Logical subject A is logical predicate A --(pointer 2)--> <thought of A>
In (B) the tought of A is not discernible from what is labeled with a logical A and therefore LOI always is complete. There are no hidden properties of A. In (A) the problem of non-conclusive indiscernability arises. This is because identity in the physical realm becomes independent from identity in the realm of thought. To make a complete mapping for the real object all properties of A have to be known with infinite precision.
You're confusing the issue of what is
there in Nature with our ability or inability to map it.
It doesn't matter whether we can map a thing completely or not. The fact still remains the thing in question is what it is and not something else. Even if it turns out that we can't map a thing completely (and of course, we can never completely map an object with simplified models), the thing still remains exactly what it is - namely, an object that can't be mapped completely with finite models.
A contradiction I perceive in the statements from Kevin and David but cannot resolve is that is claimed by them that LOI holds in all possible worlds. I would counter that by suggesting that the objectivist view imo constitutes a possible world in which the mapping from logical to the physical becomes relevant. So LOI in a logical sense is true in this world but does not hold conclusively for real objects because a fundamental indiscernability is present. In this way LOI can be denied in the possible world of objectivist reality.
Again, you are falsely linking the validity of A=A to our ability or inability to discern objects. They are two separate issues.
So it seems that underlying all the fuzz is the difference in the metaphysical viewpoints adhered to by the debaters. These differences in stances are best shown I think in the flatlander example David gave. For me as a naturalist the 3-D pyramid passing through the flatlanders plane comes closest to what I would call the truth about reality, while David is forced to a dichotomy between flatland and 3-D.
It would only be a dichotomy if I insisted that the object was really a square, or really a pyramid, or really both at once, or whatever. That is, if I insisted that the object has a true, objective, unsullied form underneath the appearances.
Instead, I recognize that no such "objective" form is possible. Things only gain their form in relation to an observer's perspective - in this case, a square from a flatlander's perspective and a pyramid from a 3Der's perspective. And who knows, it might have an entirely different form from a 4Der's perspective.
The disconnection between the flatlanders view and the 3-D view I assess as a great shortcoming in the idealist view.
That might be the case for an idealist, but I am not an idealist. Because of this, I do not perceive any disconnect between the flatlander's view and the 3Der's view.
-