Empiricism vs. Logic

[Trevor Salyzyn]

I was trying to help Faust sort through his beliefs in relation to truth. He feels that this problem has been insufficiently addressed by those most adamant about the value of truth (QRS). I don't think I did his problem justice, so (hoping that I'm not presenting a strawman), here is the problem as Faust conceives it:

Given that a) everything is perceived through our senses, hence everything (including, say, the principle of non-contradiction) is empirical, and b) all perception is flawed, how can fundamental truths be known?

He claims that QRS have created a dichotomy between empiricism and logic that sidesteps the issue, rather than directly answering it. Logic, being something that is perceived, is subject to all the flaws of all other experiences.

Rather than restate my response (which failed to convince Faust), does anyone here wish to give this a try?

[Kevin Solway]

Given that a) everything is perceived through our senses, hence everything (including, say, the principle of non-contradiction) is empirical

The appearances of things are generated by the mind. These appearances are non-empirical. Things such as the number 1, too, and all logic, including the principle of non-contradiction, is generated by the mind.

b) all perception is flawed, how can fundamental truths be known?

Logic is flawless. It is not a "perception" but a creation of the mind.

When logic fails, it means that a person holds a thing to be other than what it is, and therefore they are not really using logic.

Rather than restate my response (which failed to convince Faust), does anyone here wish to give this a try?

This has been explained to Faust before, but I think he has a mental block about it.

[PeterL]

a) everything is perceived through our senses, hence everything (including, say, the principle of non-contradiction) is empirical,

Everything? Thoughts aren't perceived through the senses.

b) all perception is flawed, how can fundamental truths be known?

Logic is used to understand perception. ATs are not perceived, but reached through a logical process. They are true whether or not there is someone to think about them. For example: 1+1=2, is true and it doesn't matter whether or not there's a mind that can conceive it, it will always be true.

Btw, I wouldn't say: "all perception is flawed". In fact, it's perfect.

[clyde]

Given that a) everything is perceived through our senses, hence everything (including, say, the principle of non-contradiction) is empirical

The appearances of things are generated by the mind. These appearances are non-empirical. Things such as the number 1, too, and all logic, including the principle of non-contradiction, is generated by the mind.

b) all perception is flawed, how can fundamental truths be known?

Logic is flawless. It is not a "perception" but a creation of the mind.

When logic fails, it means that a person holds a thing to be other than what it is, and therefore they are not really using logic.

Kevin;

HUH? You state that both appearances (when referring to perception) and logic are "generated by the mind". It seems to follow that appearances and logic have the same nature ("generated by the mind"); so why should one (logic) generated by the mind be flawless and another (appearances) which are also generated by the mind be flawed?

clyde

[Kevin Solway]

so why should one (logic) generated by the mind be flawless and another (appearances) which are also generated by the mind be flawed?

Both are flawless. Appearances are only appearances.

We make errors when we try to isolate what is behind the appearances.

[Dan Rowden]

The empirical and the abstract have the same existential character, therefore this issue is moot.

[Relo]

We could say QRS that is brought in & out with the mind can be exampled to the way we filter our sight, for example color. A certain color could most definately be different from another person's view, as in saying to the general population of liking the color blue can be seen through others who don't like blue as a different color, including the color blind and all the if, and, and buts included. The color blue exampled above can easily be defined to a popular religion which in a good majority believe in to be the truth, so per-say we can't really be fact with our definitions, but be related with one another in some sense.

[Sapius]

Kevin wrote;

The appearances of things are generated by the mind. These appearances are non-empirical. Things such as the number 1, too, and all logic, including the principle of non-contradiction, is generated by the mind.

But then so is that which we define as ‘empirical’, appearances of things generated by the “mind”, so what exactly is the difference between empirical and non-empirical? Is the ‘empirical’ in anyway independent of the ‘mind’?

[brokenhead]

so why should one (logic) generated by the mind be flawless and another (appearances) which are also generated by the mind be flawed?

Both are flawless. Appearances are only appearances.

We make errors when we try to isolate what is behind the appearances.

Nice back-tracking, Kevin.

You are trying to cast empiricism into doubt. This is your prejudice against physical sciences.

You seem to ignore what the scientific method tries to be. We perceive the appearances. We then try to understand why certain appearances fall into patterns (something released from a height almost always falls down. A bird or a helium balloon might not.) We use both deductive and inductive reasoning - logic - to form explanations. We then employ the purest systematic logic we have, mathematics, to provide an underpinning for our subsequent theories, in this case, of gravitation and air pressure and how they relate.

Sometimes the mathematical language already exists apart from practical applications. That the applications are discovered later should demonstrate the validity of pure math as a logical activity alone.

Sometimes the math is created out of necessity, such as when Newton created the calculus to analyze the motion of heavenly bodies. This branch of math has since been wildly successful in dealing with a virtually unlimited wealth of practical applications. This too should prove that pure logic and the empirical observations which it describes are not as separate as you are making them out to be when you say the one (logic) is created and is perfect; the other (empirical observations) are perfect but are only appearances and applying one to the other is somehow less than than either separately.

This is not logical and contradicts experience. If you were less of a philosopher and more of a scientist, it would contradict your experience as well, and I daresay you would be less ready to proclaim it as some kind of deep truth.

We do indeed make errors. The errors are appearances as well. Then we correct the errors when they become apparent by using the same method of employing our created system of logic.

It is an evolving process. What makes philosophy sterile is that it purports to be complete and not in need of evolving or perfecting. To the extent this is true, however, philosophy says nothing and is therefore useless and without merit, as I have noted before.

[Sapius]

BH;

It is an evolving process. What makes philosophy sterile is that it purports to be complete and not in need of evolving or perfecting. To the extent this is true, however, philosophy says nothing and is therefore useless and without merit, as I have noted before.

In my opinion it should read “philosophy on its own…” (or say "pure logic")

One cannot really discard any aspect of existence and cling on to one particular aspect, for existence (reality) compassionately encompasses them all… poetically speaking of course.

[brokenhead]

BH;

It is an evolving process. What makes philosophy sterile is that it purports to be complete and not in need of evolving or perfecting. To the extent this is true, however, philosophy says nothing and is therefore useless and without merit, as I have noted before.

In my opinion it should read “philosophy on its own…” (or say "pure logic")

One cannot really discard any aspect of existence and cling on to one particular aspect, for existence (reality) compassionately encompasses them all… poetically speaking of course.

Good point, Sapius. I'll stand corrected on that one.

[divine focus]

The empirical and the abstract have the same existential character, therefore this issue is moot.

This is true--not the mootness of the point, but the similar existential characters. All of experience is sensed, and the sensing of thought happens through vision. All sight and all envisioning stems from a deeper or more basic form of "thought" than the logical, linear thought we all know and love. The point Faust seems to be making is that we confuse our linear thoughts with the more basic "thought" or vision that informs it. We see our thoughts as independent of the rest of our experience and proceed to build constructs based on some absolute "logic" value that have very little to do with what is true. The logic value that is known is actually that of our deeper vision, which is always open to all of experience, but whose place becomes taken by the bewildered linear mind.

[Trevor Salyzyn]

Kevin, I just talked to Faust again, mostly about your post. I'll summarize his side of the conversation.

The appearances of things are generated by the mind. These appearances are non-empirical. Things such as the number 1, too, and all logic, including the principle of non-contradiction, is generated by the mind.

Faust arrived at the conclusion that all abstractions have an empirical source, and since they have an empirical source, they are themselves essentially empirical.

Logic is flawless. It is not a "perception" but a creation of the mind.

When logic fails, it means that a person holds a thing to be other than what it is, and therefore they are not really using logic.

Faust's conception of logic confused me. He insisted that there is nothing 'logical' about logic (in particular, self-identity). I asked him, "so, what is 'logical'?", and he said that nothing is so.

Rather, we've only got empirical facts and causality.

This has been explained to Faust before, but I think he has a mental block about it.

When he first brought the issue of truth to my attention, he called it "a crisis of faith", so there's certainly a lot of tension surrounding this issue.

[Kevin Solway]

Faust arrived at the conclusion that all abstractions have an empirical source

He's wrong about that.

Take the concept "false" for example. Or the concept of zero. These things do not have an empirical source.

"Empirical" means measurable, and preferably verifiable by others, but all the things that appear in our mind are not measurable in an empirical sense. What I means is, we might be able to measure chemical and electrical activity in my brain, but such measurements don't tell me whether I am experiencing the appearance of, say, a sunset, or exactly how it makes me feel.

we've only got empirical facts and causality.

There's no empirical evidence for this, but this idea is something created by the mind.

[divine focus]

"Empirical" means measurable, and preferably verifiable by others, but all the things that appear in our mind are not measurable in an empirical sense. What I means is, we might be able to measure chemical and electrical activity in my brain, but such measurements don't tell me whether I am experiencing the appearance of, say, a sunset, or exactly how it makes me feel.

"Empirical" means "seen," from the greek meaning "experienced." Others verifying anything is besides the point.

[clyde]

"Empirical" means measurable, and preferably verifiable by others, but all the things that appear in our mind are not measurable in an empirical sense. What I means is, we might be able to measure chemical and electrical activity in my brain, but such measurements don't tell me whether I am experiencing the appearance of, say, a sunset, or exactly how it makes me feel.

Kevin;

Why not? Why shouldn't we (at least theoretically) be able to measure chemical and electrical activity in the brain and from that tell whether one is experiencing the appearance of a sunset or how it feels? And vice versa; that is, why shouldn’t we be able to tell from the experience what the measurements of chemical and electrical activity in the brain are?

If it were true that one couldn't tell, it would follow that there two distinct worlds of causation; one in which there are measurable things and one in which there are not measurable things, and that these two worlds are independent.

I don’t believe that.

clyde

[Kevin Solway]

Why shouldn't we (at least theoretically) be able to measure chemical and electrical activity in the brain and from that tell whether one is experiencing the appearance of a sunset or how it feels?

Firstly, because all empirical measurements are approximations. Secondly, because what we are measuring may in fact have nothing to do with what we want to find out. That is the nature of science.

[clyde]

Kevin;

Your reply does not address my point: Do you believe there are two independent worlds of causation, one which includes expirical measurements and one which includes your experience? I don't.

clyde

[Kevin Solway]

Do you believe there are two independent worlds of causation, one which includes expirical measurements and one which includes your experience? I don't.

There is only one type of causation.

When we are speaking of particular empirical causes, we are only guessing about causes.

[clyde]

Kevin;

Given that we agree that there is but one world of causation and all things (measurable and immeasurable) exist within this one world of causation, how is it that you hold that brain (the measurable) and mind (the immeasurable) are not dependent on one another, so that one cannot tell (at least theoretically) from the state of one, the state of the other?

clyde

[Kevin Solway]

Given that we agree that there is but one world of causation and all things (measurable and immeasurable) exist within this one world of causation, how is it that you hold that brain (the measurable) and mind (the immeasurable) are not dependent on one another, so that one cannot tell (at least theoretically) from the state of one, the state of the other?

As I explained previously, it is impossible, even theoretically, to tell the state of the brain, and it is impossible to know that the state of the brain has anything to do with the state of the mind.

[clyde]

Kevin;

As I explained previously, it is impossible, even theoretically, to tell the state of the brain . . .

If by this you mean that we cannot tell completely and perfectly the state of the brain, I agree, but that is true for all things, including the mind.

. . . and it is impossible to know that the state of the brain has anything to do with the state of the mind.

And if by this you mean that the state of one thing does not reflect the state of another thing, I disagree, and for all things, including the mind.

clyde

[Kevin Solway]

As I explained previously, it is impossible, even theoretically, to tell the state of the brain . . .

If by this you mean that we cannot tell completely and perfectly the state of the brain, I agree, but that is true for all things, including the mind.

It is not true of one's own mind. Whatever one's own mind is - whatever one experiences - is exactly the state of one's own mind.

. . . and it is impossible to know that the state of the brain has anything to do with the state of the mind.

And if by this you mean that the state of one thing does not reflect the state of another thing, I disagree, and for all things, including the mind.

You are missing the point. There is no way to know that the state of the brain is closely linked to the state of the mind.

[clyde]

Whatever one's own mind is - whatever one experiences - is exactly the state of one's own mind.

Really? Does your definition of the mind include, for example, the unconscious?

You are missing the point. There is no way to know that the state of the brain is closely linked to the state of the mind.

Really? I thought we agree that there is one world of causation; so how do you posit that one thing does not effect another thing in the one world of causation?

clyde

[Kevin Solway]

Whatever one's own mind is - whatever one experiences - is exactly the state of one's own mind.

Really? Does your definition of the mind include, for example, the unconscious?

The unconscious mind is one of the causes of mind.

You are missing the point. There is no way to know that the state of the brain is closely linked to the state of the mind.

Really? I thought we agree that there is one world of causation; so how do you posit that one thing does not effect another thing in the one world of causation?

You must be having a conversation with someone else. I never said anywhere that one thing does not have an effect on any other thing.

The brain and the mind may be linked in the same way as the big toe of a goalkeeper playing in a football match in small town in Spain is connected to a speck of dirt on a small planet in another galaxy. That is, the link may be extremely remote.