sense, senseless, and nonsense (understanding Wittgenstein)

[ExpectantlyIronic]

A summary of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus:

A tautological proposition can be defined as the opposite of a contradictory proposition. Whereas there is no sense in which a contradiction is the case, there is also no sense in which a tautology isn't. Thus, we will call such propositions senseless. It would seem that what we can speak of with sense lies within these two extreme boundaries. A proposition like "that cat is grey" reports a state of affairs. A state of affairs can be the case or not be the case, and thus falls within the realm of sense, and thus can be spoken of. If a state of affairs is the case, then we should say that it is a fact. A true proposition reports a state of affairs that is the case: a fact.

There is no means by which to say that a tautology is true, as it cannot report a state of affairs. It is the case independent of states of affairs. A tautology defines the inner boundary of that which we can speak of. A contradiction also cannot report a state of affairs. It is not the case independent of states of affairs. A contradiction defines the outer boundary of that which we can speak of. Given that the propositions of logic are tautologies, and tautologies do not report a state of affairs, the propositions of logic say nothing.

Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must pass over in silence.


My views:

It would seem at first glance the Wittgenstein advocates for a rather radical form of empiricism. In fact, the Vienna Circle interpreted his work to mean that one could only logically verify empirical propositions. This is reported to have enraged Wittgenstein (not a terribly difficult thing to do, as ol' Ludwig was something of a jerk), who pointed to the problem of induction in response. To Wittgenstein we could talk of empirical matters, but had no way to confirm them beyond simply looking. Furthermore, he felt that the most important things of all were those that we could not speak of: what he seemed to have ironically termed "nonsense", given that such matters were neither matters of sense or simply senseless. One can easily interpret Wittgenstein as wanting to provide solid and convincing grounds for why philosophers could not speak sensibly about that which he valued most. At that I think he succeeded. Where I think he failed was in his comprehension of what would come to be spoken of with sense. He didn't kill philosophy as he had intended, but rather provided a solid grounds on which it would progress forward. He himself was unable to stop doing philosophy during his lifetime, and wrote volumes upon volumes of notes that have since been published posthumously.

[David Quinn]

Wittgenstein: A tautological proposition can be defined as the opposite of a contradictory proposition. Whereas there is no sense in which a contradiction is the case, there is also no sense in which a tautology isn't. Thus, we will call such propositions senseless.

In other words:

"There is no sense in a tautology, therefore a tautology is senseless."

By his own reckoning, this is senseless.

A proposition like "all cats are grey" reports a state of affairs. A state of affairs can be the case or not be the case, and thus falls within the realm of sense, and thus can be spoken of. If a state of affairs is the case, then we should say that it is a fact. A true proposition reports a state of affairs that is the case: a fact.

In other words:

"A state of affairs is a fact. Thus, if a proposition reports a state of affairs, it is stating a fact."

According to Wittgenstein, this also is senseless.

There is no means by which to say that a tautology is true, as it cannot report a state of affairs. It is the case independent of states of affairs.

In other words:

"A tautology cannot report a state of affairs, therefore a tautology cannot state a fact".

According to Wittgenstein, this also is senseless.

Given that the propositions of logic are tautologies, and tautologies do not report a state of affairs, the propositions of logic say nothing.

Needless to say, this is senseless as well ....

And people actually take this guy seriously? It's got to be a joke, surely.

I think what he really means is, "All tautologies are senseless, except the ones I happen to use."

-

[ExpectantlyIronic]

David,

"There is no sense in a tautology, therefore a tautology is senseless."

By his own reckoning, this is senseless.

No. A tautology is senseless in that there is no sense in which it is not the case. That which is senseless is not limited to that which is always the case, as contradictions are also senseless.

"A state of affairs is a fact. Thus, if a proposition reports a state of affairs, it is stating a fact."

According to Wittgenstein, this also is senseless.

No. A state of affairs isn't a fact. A state of affairs that is the case is a fact. A state of affairs can be the case or not be the case.

"A tautology cannot report a state of affairs, therefore a tautology cannot state a fact".

According to Wittgenstein, this also is senseless.

No. A state of affairs is different from a fact. A tautology cannot report a fact, not strictly because a tautology isn't a fact, but because a tautology cannot report a state of affairs (as states of affairs can be the case or not be the case, whereas a tautology is always the case).

I think what he really means is, "All tautologies are senseless, except the ones I happen to use."

We could perhaps say that the Tractatus stands outside of the realm of that which we can speak of, but that isn't because it is tautological and thus senseless. Rather, I think he would have admitted that it was what he called "nonsense" and intended to point to something that one needs to have already seen in order to understand. He explains this in his introduction to the work. It was intended, by admission of his own introduction, only to provide entertainment for those who had already seen that which he pointed to, and he realized that the work itself was capable of doing nothing beyond this pointing. It fell beyond the outer boundary of that which we can say.

It's got to be a joke, surely.

Ludwig was reported to have said that a serious and good work of philosophy could be written that was composed entirely of jokes. So if you find humor in what he said, perhaps he managed to do just that. Quite a feat for something written in the trenches of WWI, don't you think?

[ExpectantlyIronic]

David,

I'd also like to point out that Wittgenstein wasn't a pragmatist, and wasn't suggesting that tautologies are useless and thus invalid. Rather he was suggesting that they are incapable of reporting on that which isn't strictly definitional. They cannot speak of that which is in the world. They do not speak of the sensible. When they are used properly, they are used to do something (establish the meaning of a term for instance), rather then to report something. He goes into this in his Philosophical Investigations in which he describes those functional aspects of language which were not covered by the Tractatus.

[David Quinn]

Expectantly Ironic,

DQ: "A state of affairs is a fact. Thus, if a proposition reports a state of affairs, it is stating a fact."

According to Wittgenstein, this also is senseless.

EI: No. A state of affairs isn't a fact. A state of affairs that is the case is a fact. A state of affairs can be the case or not be the case.

Okay, I'll reword it then:

"A state of affairs that is the case is a fact. Thus, if a proposition reports a state of affairs to be the case, it is stating a fact."

It is still a tautology, and therefore still "senseless".

In any case, facts can be logical in nature, just as much as they can be empirical. Since tautologies can happily deal with logical facts, the conclusions Wittgenstein reached about tautologies are untrue.

A tautology is senseless in that there is no sense in which it is not the case.

That would make it full of sense, wouldn't it? Or sense-full.

Again, we're back at the form vs content debate we had a couple of weeks ago. If we focus purely on the form of a tautology and ignore the content, then yes, it could be viewed as "senseless". But that is only because we had already stripped the tautology of all sense by removing the content. It's a pre-ordained conclusion reached by biased reasoning.

The content is the all-important key which distinguishes a meaningful tautology from a meaningless one. It doesn't matter that the form of a tautology can never be wrong.

I'd also like to point out that Wittgenstein wasn't a pragmatist, and wasn't suggesting that tautologies are useless and thus invalid. Rather he was suggesting that they are incapable of reporting on that which isn't strictly definitional. They cannot speak of that which is in the world. They do not speak of the sensible.

If the content (i.e. the component definitions) of a tautology refers to the sensible world out of logical necessity, then the tautology will indeed be speaking of the sensible.

For example, the "Totality" refers to the sensible world out of logical necessity, and thus any tautological reasoning which branches out of this definition will necessarily remain applicable to the sensible world.

-

[Leyla Shen]

A tautological proposition can be defined as the opposite of a contradictory proposition:

1. There is no sense in which a contradiction is the case. (A=B is always false)
2. There is also no sense in which a tautology isn't. (A=A is always true)
3. Thus, we will call such propositions senseless. (Something which is always false is senseless because there is no state of affairs in which it is true and something which is always true is senseless because there is no state of affairs in which it is not true.)
4. If a state of affairs is the case, it is a fact. (Thus, a state of affairs is neither true nor false but is always sensible only by virtue of its somehow being the case.)

Oh, brother!

Talk about murdering truth. Scariest thing is that what you have above only makes it look like you’ve killed bullshit along with it.

[Edit to add post title.]

[ExpectantlyIronic]

David,

"A state of affairs that is the case is a fact. Thus, if a proposition reports a state of affairs to be the case, it is stating a fact."

That's still not quite right. You're getting close though. Using the terminology of Wittgenstein, not all propositions are true or false. A proposition isn't true when it reports a state of affairs to be the case, but rather when it reports a state of affairs that is the case. Reality is composed of states of affairs, and the world is those states of affairs which are the case. So whether or not a state of affairs is the case is dependent upon the world. A state of affairs can be the case or not be the case while everything else remains the same.

It is still a tautology, and therefore still "senseless".

The Tractatus itself is not deductive, and doesn't pretend at being as much. Where there are tautologies within it, they serve the functional role of defining terms. What Wittgenstein points to with the Tractatus could very well not be the case.

In any case, facts can be logical in nature, just as much as they can be empirical. Since tautologies can happily deal with logical facts, the conclusions Wittgenstein reached about tautologies are untrue.

Your confusing matters here by introducing different definitions to the discussion. Facts, to Wittgenstein, are not determined by that which is the case. They are only those states of affairs which are the case. States of affairs always include objects (those things that we can picture in our heads). Whereas the existence of tautological propositions is a fact, tautologies themselves are not facts, and do not report facts insofar as they are to remain tautologies. This is because states of affairs are defined as being able to be the case or not be the case. By your own admission, tautologies are certain, and thus there is no way for them to not be the case.

That would make it full of sense, wouldn't it? Or sense-full.

You can call it what you like. It is what it is, and one can only understand what Wittgenstein means by "tautology" by understanding it in context.

The content is the all-important key which distinguishes a meaningful tautology from a meaningless one. It doesn't matter that the form of a tautology can never be wrong.

Something is not a tautology if it reports content that one can imagine not being the case. A tautology is only always the case by virtue of being empty of such content. You don't get to have your cake and eat it too.

For example, the "Totality" refers to the sensible world out of logical necessity, and thus any tautological reasoning which branches out of this definition will necessarily remain applicable to the sensible world.

The "Totality" isn't even a proposition. Furthermore, you can't derive one tautology from another. By your own admission all tautologies are reducible to "A=A". They essentially all say the same thing--"I am the case"--insofar as they remain tautologies.

[ExpectantlyIronic]

Leyla,

You've misunderstood. You had pretty much right until...

(Thus, a state of affairs is neither true nor false but is always sensible only by virtue of its somehow being the case.)

A state of affairs isn't sensible because it is the case. Rather, we know that a state of affairs is the case when we observe it to be as much. Facts--states of affairs that are the case--are those things that we observe. It is a fact that there is a computer monitor in front of me as I write this. Thus, at the moment of me typing this the proposition "there is a computer monitor in front of me as I write this" is true.

[ExpectantlyIronic]

I'd like to add here that Wittgenstein saw the terms "true" or "false" as only applying to sentences or statements. States of affairs cannot be true or false as they are what is in reality, and facts cannot be true or false as they are what is in the world. They are what simply is, and if we view them as something that can be true or false, we are not thinking about states of affairs or facts, but rather the propositions used to refer to such. If I see a butterfly--a thing--I do not say that it is true. I only call true or false something said about the butterfly (which would refer to a state of affairs involving the butterfly).

[DHodges]

That's still not quite right. You're getting close though. Using the terminology of Wittgenstein, not all propositions are true or false. A proposition isn't true when it reports a state of affairs to be the case, but rather when it reports a state of affairs that is the case. Reality is composed of states of affairs, and the world is those states of affairs which are the case. So whether or not a state of affairs is the case is dependent upon the world. A state of affairs can be the case or not be the case while everything else remains the same.

Ignoring tautologies for the moment, this seems to be a correspondence theory of truth. That is, there are statements, and objective facts, and the truth of a statement is measured by how well it corresponds to those facts.

Facts are generally about things - physical objects presumed to have some objective existence - or the relationships between things.

Isn't there intrinsically a problem with defining exactly what it means for a statement to correspond with some fact, the statement being in language and the fact (presumably) not? Don't many - perhaps most - statements about some state of affairs have a degree of ambiguity to them, and depend on context for meaning and degree of truth?

[ExpectantlyIronic]

DHodges,

Ignoring tautologies for the moment, this seems to be a correspondence theory of truth. That is, there are statements, and objective facts, and the truth of a statement is measured by how well it corresponds to those facts.

Edit: deleted original text

I had originally posted that Wittgenstein didn't ascribe to correspondence theory, but upon thinking about, I'm pretty sure that he did. It's possible that he didn't mean "proposition" in the modern technical sense of the term, and thus didn't mean to rob meaning of its place in the bridge between true sentences and fact; but it is impossible to tell for sure. So I think it's safe to say that you've found either a glaring flaw or a simple oversight in his philosophy. Although I don't think such a matter cripples the main point he was trying to make.

Isn't there intrinsically a problem with defining exactly what it means for a statement to correspond with some fact, the statement being in language and the fact (presumably) not? Don't many - perhaps most - statements about some state of affairs have a degree of ambiguity to them, and depend on context for meaning and degree of truth?

Yep. Correspondence theory fails insofar as it entails propositions being direct and consistent representations of fact. To hold that propositions remain consistently true or false dependent on only facts is absurd (as W. V. Quine pointed out). The way I see it, the statement "the snow is white" is only true insofar as it means that the snow is white, and it is actually the case that the snow is white. It is the meaning of a sentence, rather then the sentence itself, that is true; and meaning can only be derived from context.

[David Quinn]

Expectantly Ironic,

DQ: In any case, facts can be logical in nature, just as much as they can be empirical. Since tautologies can happily deal with logical facts, the conclusions Wittgenstein reached about tautologies are untrue.

EI: Your confusing matters here by introducing different definitions to the discussion. Facts, to Wittgenstein, are not determined by that which is the case. They are only those states of affairs which are the case. States of affairs always include objects (those things that we can picture in our heads). Whereas the existence of tautological propositions is a fact, tautologies themselves are not facts, and do not report facts insofar as they are to remain tautologies. This is because states of affairs are defined as being able to be the case or not be the case. By your own admission, tautologies are certain, and thus there is no way for them to not be the case.

No one has said that tautologies are facts. The issue was whether tautologies can report what is there in the world. Since tautologies can deal with logical facts, they can indeed point the mind to what is there in the world.

For example, tautological reasoning can report that there is no single object out there in the world which can constitute the Totality of all there is.

DQ: The content is the all-important key which distinguishes a meaningful tautology from a meaningless one. It doesn't matter that the form of a tautology can never be wrong.

EI: Something is not a tautology if it reports content that one can imagine not being the case. A tautology is only always the case by virtue of being empty of such content. You don't get to have your cake and eat it too.

I can imagine the Totality to be a little tree on a hill, while tautological reasoning can report this isn't the case.

DQ: For example, the "Totality" refers to the sensible world out of logical necessity, and thus any tautological reasoning which branches out of this definition will necessarily remain applicable to the sensible world.

EI: The "Totality" isn't even a proposition. Furthermore, you can't derive one tautology from another. By your own admission all tautologies are reducible to "A=A". They essentially all say the same thing--"I am the case"--insofar as they remain tautologies.

This is like saying that since the scientific method is essentially the same in all scientific research, all scientific theories are essentially saying the same thing - which is absurd.

To repeat: While a tautology always has the form of A=A, it is the content which distinguishes one tautology from another.

For example, if I define the Totality to be utterly everything (which necessarily includes the sensible world), then tautological reasoning can report that the Totality isn't confined to being one particular thing in the sensible world. So here is a case in which a tautology has reported a fact in the sensible world, even though it maintains the form of A=A.

-

To Dave Hodges, you wrote:

To hold that propositions remain consistently true or false dependent on only facts is absurd (as W. V. Quine pointed out).

This is to ignore both mathematical and philosophic logic. Quine was a rabid empiricist and could only perceive the world through empirical filters.

The proposition 2+2=4 is consistently true dependent only on the facts of mathematical axioms and its own constituent definitions. Likewise, the proposition that the Totality isn't a single thing within the sensible world is consistently true dependent only on facts.

The way I see it, the statement "the snow is white" is only true insofar as it means that the snow is white, and it is actually the case that the snow is white. It is the meaning of a sentence, rather then the sentence itself, that is true; and meaning can only be derived from context.

What you're essentially doing, in order to make your argument, is arbitrarily selecting empirical objects, such as "snow", and then concluding from their example that tautological reasoning cannot report any empirical facts about them - which is perfectly correct in the case of snow. But where you make your mistake is in the next step - namely, when you extend this conclusion to cover all tautological reasonings without giving any further regard to the content.

-

[Leyla Shen]

ExI:

If I see a butterfly--a thing--I do not say that it is true. I only call true or false something said about the butterfly (which would refer to a state of affairs involving the butterfly).

But the fact and truth of the matter is that not only do you have to identify (A=A) the butterfly in order to say anything about it, but you have to identify any thing that you want to say about it. Also, for any object (such as butterfly) to be that object, it necessarily must be that object and not some other object (A=A).

To write tautologies off in philosophy as senseless is like, in life, cutting your own throat because you don’t have to make your body breathe by external means.

[ExpectantlyIronic]

David,

I'm about to backtrack a bit. I was mixing up some of my own views with those of Wittgenstein, and realized that I've made a couple of important mistakes in my explanation of it. First off, it would appear that you were right in suggesting that the Tractatus was senseless:

"6.54 My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)

He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly." -Wittgenstein

No one has said that tautologies are facts. The issue was whether tautologies can report what is there in the world. Since tautologies can deal with logical facts, they can indeed point the mind to what is there in the world.

I think Wittgenstein would have said that such propositions could point to the "scaffolding" of the world, but that such scaffolding only marked the limits of what can be spoken of. For instance, I imagine that he would have suggested that your suggestion that a single thing could not be the whole of reality was a indeed a logical fact, but it could nevertheless only be used to convey the notion that we cannot imagine a single thing being the whole of reality. Such a thing does not say something about the world, but rather marks the limits of that which we are capable of thinking, imagining, or saying. If things were actually otherwise, I do believe he would have suggested it to be a "fortunate accident", as he seemed to like the notion of things transcendent of what we could imagine.

For example, tautological reasoning can report that there is no single object out there in the world which can constitute the Totality of all there is.

Or, as Wittgenstein put it...

"2.0121 It would seem to be a sort of accident, if it turned out that a situation would fit a thing that could already exist entirely on its own. If things can occur in states of affairs, this possibility must be in them from the beginning. (Nothing in the province of logic can be merely possible. Logic deals with every possibility and all possibilities are its facts.) Just as we are quite unable to imagine spatial objects outside space or temporal objects outside time, so too there is no object that we can imagine excluded from the possibility of combining with others. If I can imagine objects combined in states of affairs, I cannot imagine them excluded from the possibility of such combinations." -Wittgenstein

For example, if I define the Totality to be utterly everything (which necessarily includes the sensible world), then tautological reasoning can report that the Totality isn't confined to being one particular thing in the sensible world. So here is a case in which a tautology has reported a fact in the sensible world, even though it maintains the form of A=A.

Again--to convey the words of Wittgenstein rather then my own opinion on this matter--you have not reported a fact in the sensible world, but rather a limitation in either our imagination or capacity to express ourselves. What you express is not an immanent truth, but rather one of those queer statements that provides a borderline for the transcendent. If we cannot imagine how something could not be the case, then how should we determine that it is? Whereas you'd suggest that if we cannot imagine how something could not be true, then it must be true; Wittgenstein probably would have said that it's much more clear that if we cannot imagine how something could not be true, then we cannot imagine how something could not be true.

This is to ignore both mathematical and philosophic logic. Quine was a rabid empiricist and could only perceive the world through empirical filters.

Are we talking about the same Quine? The Quine I know was a rabid defender of the fact that logical truths aren't made true by grammar alone. The guy wrote Two Dogmas of Empiricism for the love all things secular. One normally doesn't suggest that a viewpoint they hold is dependent upon dogmas. I've always gotten the impression that he was a transcendental realist (Platonist) towards matters of logic and mathematics.

What you're essentially doing, in order to make your argument, is arbitrarily selecting empirical objects, such as "snow", and then concluding from their example that tautological reasoning cannot report any empirical facts about them - which is perfectly correct in the case of snow.

What I was doing was explaining my favored theory of truth, without even mentioning tautologies. Although, I will say that I grant tautologies their own special sort of truth (logical truth), which is quite independent from plain ol' truth. I happen to think that when tautologies say something about the world it is quite accidental and contrived. One can make up a several hundred tautologies that report a bunch of nonsense, for every one that reports something empirically verifiable. You might tautologically philosophize about what you call the "Totality" and by some trick of chance you come up with things that can be seen in the world, but you could just have easily of philosophized about "Unicorns" and despite the "p=p"ness of it all it wouldn't have much to do with the world at all.

[ExpectantlyIronic]

Leyla,

But the fact and truth of the matter is that not only do you have to identify (A=A) the butterfly in order to say anything about it, but you have to identify any thing that you want to say about it. Also, for any object (such as butterfly) to be that object, it necessarily must be that object and not some other object (A=A).

If you're trying to say that anything can be restated into a tautology, then (then=then) I'd (I'd=I'd) have (have=have) to (to=to) agree (agree=agree) with (with=with) you (you=you). Now if you're saying that I need to recognize that the fluttery thing I see is indeed a butterfly in order to say something about it, I'd totally disagree. If I was looking at a picture of a butterfly, and thought it was an actual butterfly, I could still say "there is an actual butterfly really flying there, and it certainly isn't a picture of a butterfly". I'd then be reporting a state of affairs that wasn't the case, and thus my proposition would be false. It seems that you're either stating the obvious and inconsequential, the obviously false and inconsequential, or you're not recognizing that tautologies are always propositions. Tautologies aren't, by definition, states of affairs. It is a state of affairs when someone recognizes something to be what it is. Even if they were to suggest that "the butterfly I'm looking at is a butterfly" we should not say that they are saying a tautology for it is imaginable that what they say is not the case. Only if they say "a butterfly is a butterfly" or some such are they stating a tautological proposition.

To write tautologies off in philosophy as senseless is like, in life, cutting your own throat because you don’t have to make your body breathe by external means.

To suggest that tautologies are senseless (the way Wittgenstein did it) is much more akin to saying A=A.

[Leyla Shen]

L: But the fact and truth of the matter is that not only do you have to identify (A=A) the butterfly in order to say anything about it, but you have to identify any thing that you want to say about it. Also, for any object (such as butterfly) to be that object, it necessarily must be that object and not some other object (A=A).

ExI: If you're trying to say that anything can be restated into a tautology, then (then=then) I'd (I'd=I'd) have (have=have) to (to=to) agree (agree=agree) with (with=with) you (you=you). Now if you're saying that I need to recognize that the fluttery thing I see is indeed a butterfly in order to say something about it, I'd totally disagree. If I was looking at a picture of a butterfly, and thought it was an actual butterfly, I could still say "there is an actual butterfly really flying there, and it certainly isn't a picture of a butterfly". I'd then be reporting a state of affairs that wasn't the case, and thus my proposition would be false.

I just have one question about this: why do you think you would report certainly seeing an actual (no less) butterfly when what you’re actually looking at is a picture of a butterfly? Bad education resulting in erroneous propositions?

It seems that you're either stating the obvious and inconsequential, the obviously false and inconsequential, or you're not recognizing that tautologies are always propositions.

Let’s explore the third option: “tautologies are always propositions” and, thus, there is no sense in which a tautology isn’t the case. In the above situation, guy says to you “there’s a butterfly!” As a tautological proposition, this is in no sense not the case. Now, I’m standing there with this guy and he’s pointing his finger, see? I look at where his finger is pointing and I say, “Um, no. It’s only a picture of a butterfly.” Now, we have two tautological propositions, which in no sense are not the case. Right? Right. But he starts jumping up and down and says, “Look! Look! It’s a BUTTERFLY!” I call over three other people, who also tell him that it is, in fact, a picture of a butterfly and not a butterfly at all. We take him up to the painting and make him touch it. He suddenly says, perplexed, “Hey! Where it flew away!” And we say something really intelligent like, “No, son. It was just a cross-wiring in your axon bundles.” The only sense in which he was reporting a state of affairs that wasn‘t the case was one proved by (crude, in this example) empirical testing. So then we test the guy--prod and probe so we can make him see things just the way we see them--surgery, medication…whatever the scientific order of the day; and then we say, “There you go, now you can be one of us--truth!”

You were right about one thing. I am concerned with something much greater than pragmatism, whilst you are equating truth with it.

[Sapius]

EI,

Now if you're saying that I need to recognize that the fluttery thing I see is indeed a butterfly in order to say something about it, I'd totally disagree.

Why? Is it because the definition ‘butterfly’ as opposed to that which it could be other than what you define it to be, could possibly be different? Then absolutely everything that you define as defined, could possibly be different than what you define it to be, so logical reasoning that depends on definitions as defined, could possibly not be logical reasoning after all.

So why should I take anything seriously if according to that, reasoning could possibly be not what I define it to be, and may well be an illogical exercise than a logical one.

I cannot argue in an academic language, which seems quite complicated to me, but I would like to know in a plain and simple manner, how logical or illogical a reasoning is that?

If I was looking at a picture of a butterfly, and thought it was an actual butterfly, I could still say "there is an actual butterfly really flying there, and it certainly isn't a picture of a butterfly". I'd then be reporting a state of affairs that wasn't the case, and thus my proposition would be false.

I don’t know about the “ false proposition”, but your definition of ‘picture’ would be false to begin with, so I wouldn’t even begin to entertain what you propose.

AND, if your proposition is false, then what does that say about an “actual butterfly” that you mention? What do you mean by ‘actual butterfly really flying’? What that whole logical statement points to, or proposes, IS A=A, in its definition and its proposition. If it falters at any point, it does not totally conform to A=A.

Hence the possibility of false REASONING, but not LOGIC per say, which depends on how one recognizes a thing through his own reasoning, although created in and of A=A, which is consciousness itself, and is a logical thing, but not necessarily a logically reasoning thing, when it comes down to individual THINGS.

Which also points to individual choice as reasoned by an individual; not that he hangs high and dry, detached from All that there is, though.

------

Edit: I was typing while you posted, Leyla, but this...

I just have one question about this: why do you think you would report certainly seeing an actual (no less) butterfly when what you’re actually looking at is a picture of a butterfly? Bad education resulting in erroneous propositions?

...is exactly the point to begin with.

[bert]

I am enjoying this discussion - a delectation of ego's grandeur.
contrary towards it ,cripple reasoning and logic.

focus on a pure manner of relating,insight is by symbols.

[DHodges]

The proposition 2+2=4 is consistently true dependent only on the facts of mathematical axioms and its own constituent definitions. Likewise, the proposition that the Totality isn't a single thing within the sensible world is consistently true dependent only on facts.

To be really pedantically strict about it, "2" is a property of a set (*), "+" is an operation, and "4" is the result when performing that operation of two sets with the property "2"; the result is a set with the property "4".

There is no doubt that 2+2=4 is mathematically true; but how true it is when applied to actual objects depends on how well those objects conform to the mathematical notions of "set" and "element", and how well what we are doing corresponds to the abstract operation "+" (bringing all the elements of two sets together to form a single set).

Fortunately, mathematical definitions are chosen to reflect empirical observations of how things work; if I have two sheep, I can think of that as a set with two objects, and if I obtain an additional pair of sheep, the set of "my sheep" behaves much like the mathematical abstraction of a set when I add additional elements. And this is because this is exactly how the mathematical abstractions arose in the first place. "I have two sheep" is the sort of proposition that is can be treated very well with conventional logic; it will usually be either completely true or completely false that I have exactly two sheep.


(*) Pedantic set-theory definition of "2": If a set A has distinct elements a and b such that, for any element of A, either that element is a, or that element is b, and a is not equal to b, then the set A is said to have "2" elements.

Similarly, a set B with members a, b, c and d such that any element of B is either a, b, c or d, where a,b,c and d are distinct elements (and a<>b, b<>c, c<>d, d<>a, etc.) would be said to have "4" elements.

Implicit in these definitions is the idea that you can examine each element of the set and determine unambiguously if that element is equal to "a"; each element is either "a" or is "not a" (there are no elements that are "a-ish"). Those assumptions may fail in various extensions of set theory (e.g., when considering sets with an infinite number elements or "fuzzy" sets).

[DHodges]

Now, I’m standing there with this guy and he’s pointing his finger, see? I look at where his finger is pointing and I say, “Um, no. It’s only a picture of a butterfly.”

If you show most people a picture of a butterfly and ask them what it is, they will say "It's a butterfly," even though it is obviously a picture, not a butterfly. Natural language is often ambiguous.

[ExpectantlyIronic]

Leyla,

I just have one question about this: why do you think you would report certainly seeing an actual (no less) butterfly when what you’re actually looking at is a picture of a butterfly? Bad education resulting in erroneous propositions?

I intentionally chose a rather absurd example to illustrate my point, given that I found it amusing. Are you actually trying to suggest here that someone can never mistake something for what it isn't?

In the above situation, guy says to you “there’s a butterfly!” As a tautological proposition, this is in no sense not the case.

"There's a butterfly!" is not a tautology. It reports a state of affairs that can be the case or not be the case.

You were right about one thing. I am concerned with something much greater than pragmatism, whilst you are equating truth with it.

A pragmatic theory of truth considers that which is useful (usually for predicting future events) to be true. What I've been making a case for in this thread is not pragmatism.


Sapius,

Why? Is it because the definition ‘butterfly’ as opposed to that which it could be other than what you define it to be, could possibly be different?

What I'm saying is that folks can see something, and mistake it for what it isn't. It's an obvious and trivial point really. This has nothing to do with definitions.

What that whole logical statement points to, or proposes, IS A=A, in its definition and its proposition.

No. What the proposition proposes is that the fella who is saying it is looking at a butterfly. Thus, it is false if he isn't looking at a butterfly. It isn't a tautological statement.

[Leyla Shen]

ExI: I intentionally chose a rather absurd example to illustrate my point, given that I found it amusing. Are you actually trying to suggest here that someone can never mistake something for what it isn't?

Not at all. I intentionally gave you an absurd question to further illustrate the absurdity of your point. You should have been even more amused! I mean, what do you want for nothing? Do you really think anyone thinks someone can never mistake something for what it isn't?

Perhaps you should try a less absurd example. Or, are you actually trying to suggest that someone can never see things that others don't?

"There's a butterfly!" is not a tautology. It reports a state of affairs that can be the case or not be the case.

I did progress the incident a little further to illustrate my point, if you care to pay attention. Of course, it’s your prerogative if you choose not to.

A pragmatic theory of truth considers that which is useful (usually for predicting future events) to be true. What I've been making a case for in this thread is not pragmatism.

I don’t see it that way. So, which one of us is lying?

[Sapius]

EI,

What I'm saying is that folks can see something, and mistake it for what it isn't. It's an obvious and trivial point really.

Sure they can, and a better example in such an instance would be a mirage. They could take a mirage for water if they haven’t experienced any better. It is water before one goes close enough to "SEE" that it is not, but since it did appear to be so earlier, I will call it mirage. I have seen that happen not only as in water, but light too, and as in a distorted image over hot tarmac, or the area just above and around the nozzle of a petrol dispenser.

This has nothing to do with definitions.

What do you mean? “Definitions” are no more than mere representation of sensually perceived things, and that too because of language, and they have to mean exactly what they mean if logical reasoning means any thing at all.

Taking the mirage example; imagine me in the year 30,000 BC. “Reasoning” has just been developed, because obviously it helps survive better, but no proper language as such since my “words” are no more than different vocal grunts. (It was this urge to express experiences in words that has actually developed the kind of vocal cords that we have today. Mental notions arrived far before we could “conceptualize” abstract concepts, and with that began a search for truth.)

Now, I already have a mental notion of what “water” is because I have been quenching my thirst with it. So, if I am able to represent my mental experience into words, I will call it water and see if another accepts it. If he has the same capabilities, he will accept it when I will point to it, and due to the fact that no other thing has been yet named as such, and the definition becomes fixed for it, say in “English”. Now I cannot point to a “mountain” and say ‘Look, water’.

So far so good; now one day I travel too far into a dessert with my friend and encounter water. We race towards it only to find that it really isn’t there. To cut the story short, we define it as a mirage. But just as the water could evaporate, a mirage also disappears under certain conditions. So we know exactly what they are until we experience otherwise. And due to our human capabilities, we are able to think and converse about water and mirages without them actually being present to see and point to any more. Which is now known as abstract conceptualization. But unless we don’t have a fixed and agreed definition, neither our communications will make any sense nor one’s thinking in ones own head.

So definitions are necessarily essential irrelevant of one making a mistake in identifying a thing, for it is not a mistake until and unless one experiences otherwise.

Could you tell me; if I am watching a movie and say, “a butterfly is flying”, what kind of a sentence would that be?
Am I taking about an "actual butterfly really flying”?

[ExpectantlyIronic]

Or, are you actually trying to suggest that someone can never see things that others don't?

No. I wasn't trying to suggest that. Folks with synesthesia, autism, perfect pitch, etc; obviously experience the world differently from other folks. So if someone had synesthesia and they were to say "the snow looks like buzzing", and the snow really did look like buzzing, then they would be speaking the truth.

I did progress the incident a little further to illustrate my point, if you care to pay attention. Of course, it’s your prerogative if you choose not to.

Alright, I'll give my take on the rest of your example then.

We take him up to the painting and make him touch it. He suddenly says, perplexed, “Hey! Where it flew away!” And we say something really intelligent like, “No, son. It was just a cross-wiring in your axon bundles.”

Alright.

The only sense in which he was reporting a state of affairs that wasn‘t the case was one proved by (crude, in this example) empirical testing.

Yep.

So then we test the guy--prod and probe so we can make him see things just the way we see them--surgery, medication…whatever the scientific order of the day; and then we say, “There you go, now you can be one of us--truth!”

At least the fella in question won't end up under a train because he mistook it for a butterfly. Truth!

I don’t see it that way.

Fair enough. How do you see it?

So, which one of us is lying?

Neither of us. We were talking about different things. (Or, perhaps, you were trying to make some sort of point. I'll give you the benefit of the doubt though.)

[Leyla Shen]

There used to be this guy who posted to this forum quite regularly (can‘t remember his moniker, now--I think it began with “W”). He would argue predicates and “the present king of France,” and for and with his p’s and q’s until he was z in the face. He brought the alphabet to me via this place in a way I had never seen before! Formal logic. But, I might as well have been attempting (and was, in fact) to study the equations of quantum mechanics with no more than a few internet articles and a year 10 level education in maths.

I thought he was great, even though half the time I had no idea what he was banging on about and, about a further quarter of the time, I disagreed. You see, the stuff he was pointing to was not the stuff of experience. It was the stuff of abstraction (mind) that, he alluded, when integrated into the world of empiricism (senses), had a certain pay-off.

If we define and, thus, conceive wisdom as the understanding of how (and therefore necessarily why) to apply knowledge, then we necessarily find it in the abstract and not the empirical. It is one thing to teach and quite another to be wise.

We might have stopped the guy from being run over by a train for thinking it a butterfly, but this is all we have done. Such a truth is indeed pragmatic in every way, and without such truths it is certain that I, myself, and many others would not be here today, but it is not at all near the loftiness of wisdom--which is to be found individually and only in the deep crevices of philosophical thought that science can only patch up in those who have been finally battered by centuries of thought falling helplessly into it.

That is the extent of my point. I leave any wisdom in it for you to ponder.

(If you look at my finger again, don’t be surprised when you get another poke in the eye.)