memories

[clyde]

If there is no (self-existent) self, then who has memories and what is the nature of memories? :)

Do no harm,
clyde

[clyde]

Some have asserted that memory is required for consciousness or for identity, but no one is willing to provide an answer to the nature of memory. Is the answer so obvious that no one thought it worth the effort to answer or so elusive that no one was brave enough to answer?

Do no harm,
clyde

[Diebert van Rhijn]

Answer A: too obvious.

As memories go: context is everything.

[Kevin Solway]

If there is no (self-existent) self, then who has memories

The same self who wrote that sentence.

and what is the nature of memories?

The dictionary definition will give you a start. Be more specific.

[clyde]

Kevin;

Thank you for your reply.

Regarding the self, I believe our views are similar enough not to be side-tracked, at least for now. I hope you agree.

And the dictionary will not provide the understanding I seek.

I have not devoted much time pondering the nature of memories, but it does seem elusive to me. Experientially it seems that we (or some part of us) automatically (without intention or volitional) ‘records’ in some fashion our experiences and we are able to ‘re-play’ in some fashion the ‘recording’ with varying degrees of fidelity. We are usually able to discern what is a real-time experience, including dreams, imaginings, and other “internal events”, from what is a ‘recorded’ (memory) experience. How do we do that? And what about so-called “false memories”? If “false memories” exist, can we discern a ‘recorded’ (memory) experience from a “false memory” and if so, how? And what about kinetic memory? And what is the difference between an emotion and the memory of the emotion? Etc?

It seems odd to me that there is so little interest in exploring the nature of memory as so much is based on memory. Our thoughts, speech, and action are based on memory. Our sense of time, continuity, and identity is based on memory. For example, without memory we would not know the principle of causality.

Again, I do appreciate your reply, but I’ll go and ponder. Remember me : )

Merry New Year!

Do no harm,
clyde

[Kelly Jones]

Clyde,

I'm not sure what you mean by "nature of memory".

I think memory originated for survival purposes. Basically "pain" or "not-pain". I reckon this is how logic was created.

The brain probably developed in the same way an ocean wave erodes a sea-cliff. Emphatic survival feelings carved out "room", and these formed the memory-path.

Entropy of this force means that, as the memory-path develops, it becomes less coarse, and more specific. Just like a delta turning into many rivers. Feelings (and therefore memory) become more refined and subtle.

We are usually able to discern what is a real-time experience, including dreams, imaginings, and other “internal events”, from what is a ‘recorded’ (memory) experience. How do we do that? And what about so-called “false memories”? If “false memories” exist, can we discern a ‘recorded’ (memory) experience from a “false memory” and if so, how?

By generalising experiences. We can't know for certain where to draw boundaries. We make neat categories based on what's likely to be truthful.

If a memory is "false", it won't fit neatly into the memory pathways (categories).

And what about kinetic memory?

Do you mean memory stored in muscles? Like what happens to a mammal when it's just been killed, and keeps twitching?

And what is the difference between an emotion and the memory of the emotion? Etc?

If something is distinctly known, then it is a memory. It's a memory of itself, being contrasted with a memory of something else. That's A=A.

[ExpectantlyIronic]

We could understand every experience to be a memory in one sense of the term (though to do as much violates my basic principle of salvaging original meaning :) ). This is due to the fact that our experience of the world is simply the processes undergone by our neocortex. Of course, we don't know the exact difference between the process that causes the experience of a memory and the one that causes the direct experience, but I'd imagine that it has everything to do with the number of neurons fired. Direct perception would (more-or-less) force connections to be made between neurons, whereas a memory would depend upon pre-existing synaptic connections between neurons.

[tharpa]

Clyde, I cannot answer the question tit for tat, but I found much of Kelly's emphasis on the notion of 'categorising' in line with what I was considering in response to the topic.

I was thinking of it more like this: before you have memory, you have concept, which is a function of being able to take in a scene/perception/experience and apply a label and again I agree with Kelly that the pleasure-pain axis is perhaps the main one.

I also think that such learning - for this is what it is essentially - happens in the 'body' as well as 'the mind'. Whether you separate these or not, even if they are the same, some types of mind are more rooted in the body-physical aspects and some more in the mind-faculty aspects, in things we like, dislike, fear, longing and so forth.

As to the question of self, perhaps we can say that is a marvellous contraption, something that weaves a seeming solidity out of what is actually in fact totally transparent, similar to how quantum physicists in analysing the material world have discovered that there is no underlying solidity on the particle level, only the perceptual. Part of the functions of such self are what we call memories, not to mention thoughts with which we identify.

But the main point of this particular response is to suggest that a prerequisite for memory is the ability to categorise at all, which also presupposes a point of view/reference, along with an agenda for such reference, i.e. survival, comfort, absence of pain, or even higher agendas such as learning, expression, wisdom etc.

One set of notions from the buddhist tradition dealing with this, part of what is called 'abhidharma', is the notion of the five skandhas, which are translated as 'heaps', 'bundles' or 'conglomerations' or 'aggregates'. Briefly, they go: form, feeling, perception, concept, consciousness. Form is basic being/shape/location/individual territory; feeling is pain, pleasure, neutral; perception is sense perceptions to further discriminate the former; concept is categorising experiences along the lines of the previous; consciousness is stringing together a story from the previous four. Something like that. Memory would be in the last one in this approach, dependent upon the previous four. But that is just one way of explaining it, and of course this was extremely condensed.

[clyde]

tharpa, et al;

I was thinking of it more like this: before you have memory, you have concept, which is a function of being able to take in a scene/perception/experience and apply a label and again I agree with Kelly that the pleasure-pain axis is perhaps the main one.

OK, so you have a concept (for example, causality), but once you’ve initially learned the concept, when you think of the concept, are you re-discovering the concept or remembering the concept?

I also think that such learning - for this is what it is essentially - happens in the 'body' as well as 'the mind'. Whether you separate these or not, even if they are the same, some types of mind are more rooted in the body-physical aspects and some more in the mind-faculty aspects, in things we like, dislike, fear, longing and so forth.

Yes, I agree. (Kelly, I previously wrote "kinetic memory", but meant kinesthetic memory, which includes one’s sense of position and muscle memory allowing one, for examples, to ride a bicycle and play catch.)

As to the question of self, perhaps we can say that is a marvellous contraption, something that weaves a seeming solidity out of what is actually in fact totally transparent, similar to how quantum physicists in analysing the material world have discovered that there is no underlying solidity on the particle level, only the perceptual. Part of the functions of such self are what we call memories, not to mention thoughts with which we identify.

Yes, I agree the self-entity is “totally transparent”. And it is impermanent. But when you write that memories are a “function of such self”, is that the case – or – is the idea of self a function of memory?

Do no harm,
clyde

p.s: ExpectantlyIronic, I appreciated your post and the suggestion that all experience is memory . . . is . . . a memory : )

[tharpa]

tharpa, et al;

I was thinking of it more like this: before you have memory, you have concept, which is a function of being able to take in a scene/perception/experience and apply a label and again I agree with Kelly that the pleasure-pain axis is perhaps the main one.

OK, so you have a concept (for example, causality), but once you’ve initially learned the concept, when you think of the concept, are you re-discovering the concept or remembering the concept?

Well, I think causality is a bad example of a concept in this context, because it is more like on the later consciousness level (using the 5 skandha progression paradigm), i.e. a meta-concept, or purely abstract/logical concept. The concept I am talking of is at a more basic level, i.e. 'friend', 'enemy', 'dangerous' etc., sort of like how young children learn not to touch a stove, and start with basic notions like 'hot', 'no', 'good' etc. So the building block of concept is founded on basic territorial issues which define good, bad, neutral and in so doing one develops a style of navigating through territory and from that style, which utilises instant concepts from previous experience, then we have memories, which are more sophisticated developments from that basic flash-card learning approach.

As to the question of self, perhaps we can say that is a marvellous contraption, something that weaves a seeming solidity out of what is actually in fact totally transparent, similar to how quantum physicists in analysing the material world have discovered that there is no underlying solidity on the particle level, only the perceptual. Part of the functions of such self are what we call memories, not to mention thoughts with which we identify.

Yes, I agree the self-entity is “totally transparent”. And it is impermanent. But when you write that memories are a “function of such self”, is that the case – or – is the idea of self a function of memory?

Well, I think the initial impetus of self is pre-conceptual, somewhat an impulse to maintain territory in a certain way (and that way is characterised in the emotive styles of the infamous realms weaving their way throughout the reincarnation thread). Some ways are more essentially aggressive (regarding other as threatening) some more passionate (regarding others as allies) and some more neutral (using other to maintain status quo); these are not precise definitions, rather a description of the three main ways of dealing with maintaining an individuated territory, which by definition basically involves a self-other dynamic.

Perhaps they are mutually co-dependent if one considers the following: having a self codependently creates other, so that other also defines self such that other is an echo of selfhood. Similarly, as soon as one has categories of friend enemy etc. one has created memory because such category is based upon recognising certain aspects of a situation and fitting them into a preconceived idea. So the same faculty that can edit a situation into conceptual shorthand is already a form of memory in the sense that the only reason such category exists (i.e. learning that the stove is too hot to touch) is to be able to recognise the 'stove' as such next time and not touch it. In this way memory is the echo of concept/category and both are aspects of the same underlying function which allows the individual self to navigate through territory.

Now as to more sophisticated concepts - like abstract ones, or mythical narratives, or planning a marital or military campaign, managing the annual cycles on a farm and so forth - these are also echoed in more sophisticated memories. Both depend upon the 5th skandha type activity in which a large vocabulary of concepts can be used to string together complex grammatical, syntactial stream of consciousness functions, which is also why the human realm is traditionally described as being the most discursive btw. Often this function is purely discursive, albeit entertaining and multi-faceted, and sitting through this habituated chatterbox mind - with which 'we' identify - is one of the early phases of meditation practice until at some point we realise it is just a function, similar to breathing or digesting, that consciousness just keeps chattering but that no matter what the content, we don't have to identify with it any more than we need to identify with our small intestine as it absorbs nutrients from the last meal.

So perhaps my answer to the above question is that self and memory are two aspects of the same underlying function/process but in this case I am using self as in 'sense of self' as it displays on the conceptual and discursive consciousness level rather than the underlying principle of individuated being, which happens under the radar of the ongoing 'I,I,me,me,mine' broadcast.

[Blair]

Too many words tharpa. You mistake verbosity for wisdom.

You have no wisdom. you lack the discipline to discern it.

[tharpa]

prince, you may well be right. But at least I am contributing something other than cat-fight type responses to others.

Do you have anything to contribute about the topic of your own? Speak for yourself.

[clyde]

tharpa;

Well, I think causality is a bad example of a concept in this context, because it is more like on the later consciousness level (using the 5 skandha progression paradigm), i.e. a meta-concept, or purely abstract/logical concept. The concept I am talking of is at a more basic level, i.e. 'friend', 'enemy', 'dangerous' etc., sort of like how young children learn not to touch a stove, and start with basic notions like 'hot', 'no', 'good' etc. So the building block of concept is founded on basic territorial issues which define good, bad, neutral and in so doing one develops a style of navigating through territory and from that style, which utilises instant concepts from previous experience, then we have memories, which are more sophisticated developments from that basic flash-card learning approach.

OK, let’s examine the concept of hot. After you’ve learned (or grok’d; see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grok ) hot, the concept exists for you. Now, when you use the concept hot, do you re-discover the concept as if new or do you rely on your memory of the concept hot? And if we rely on our memory for such concepts, then is our thinking an arranging of memories?

Do no harm,
clyde


p.s: You seem to focus on territory and “territorial issues”. Perhaps you should start a thread and present your thoughts on those concepts/issues.

[tharpa]

well, I am saying that each is somewhat 'the echo' of the other. The function of encapsulating the whole experience of touching a stove into 'hot' - which at this infant level in the example is a certain type of pain, not a scientific definition of temperature - requires a cognitive ability to summarise everything important into one simple label -'hot'. That cognitive ability is the same that operates with memory, in that when the conditions arise that are close enough to the ones that we first labelled as 'hot', then immediately we recognise the situation as a 'hot' one. So it is the ability to summarise/categorise that is behind the memory process just as it is in the initial labelling process.

You can see this in animals, as well, who (presumably) have far less developed stream of consciousness level cognitive functions (dogs dream, but do ants?) but nevertheless, from birth, definitely do learn. And learning is a function of grasping certain aspects of a situation (concept, emotion, smell etc.) so that next time that same type of thing arises, one is armed with previous experience/learning with which to confront it. And the drive behind this could be called 'survival', but in any case it involves how to best function in the territorial universe which an individualised being/consciousness necessitates by definition.

In any case, learning is a form of memory, obviously.

Another small point: memory is much more a process than a 'thing'. We often tend to think of 'memories' as being stored somehow in the brain as substantive 'thingies' that can be recalled on demand, like how a computer can read stored files. Might be fine as a simple analogy, but the memory is also summoned by various sensory and visceral conditions that recreate the previous situation(s), so a large part of memory is indeed kinaesthetic, i.e. based in the body, the feeling of a certain type of territory, like how one feels when entering a certain familiar room again after an absence, or entering a new situation similar to other ones. They are felt in the emotional matrix processed especially in the 'lower brain' as well as the upper, put it that way. But of course, there are many different types of memories.

[clyde]

tharpa;

Whatever the cognitive abilities required to form the concept ‘hot’, once that concept is formed, it is remembered. (Note: Memory occurs without our intention.) Now, “when the conditions arise that are close enough to the ones that we first labelled as 'hot', then immediately we recognise the situation as a 'hot' one”; i.e., we do not form the concept, rather we remember the concept ‘hot’. So, do you think that our thinking is an arranging of memories?

Do no harm,
clyde

p.s: Of course you will if your memories arrange themselves so that you think so; otherwise, you wont : )

[tharpa]

tharpa;

Whatever the cognitive abilities required to form the concept ‘hot’, once that concept is formed, it is remembered. (Note: Memory occurs without our intention.) Now, “when the conditions arise that are close enough to the ones that we first labelled as 'hot', then immediately we recognise the situation as a 'hot' one”; i.e., we do not form the concept, rather we remember the concept ‘hot’. So, do you think that our thinking is an arranging of memories?

Do no harm,
clyde

p.s: Of course you will if your memories arrange themselves so that you think so; otherwise, you wont : )

I don't understand the p.s.

I think that memories are one part of what is arranged. However, I am also suggesting that there are underlying processes which memories share with other cognitive functions, such as the ability to categorise/conceptualise. And this is evidenced even in the animal world where learning occurs even without verbal/linguistic forms of conceptualisation. So the label 'hot', for example, is a higher or more sophisticated aspect of the ability to remember things that even small animals evidence.

In their case, it is somewhat easier to see this as a process of 'learning' about their environment/territory. Such learning is 'stored', but not in the higher cognitive functions of linquistically constructed labels, rather as more visceral, or 'felt' 'memories'.

This is why I think - thanks to the contemplation on this your thread has provoked - that the buddhist 5 skandha system is pretty nifty, because it postulates that there is a sort of progression from initial/basic building blocks (aggregates/skandha mechanism) to the more sophisticated, the latter including the sort of stream of consciousness sense of 'I' that we humans experience.

But I don't think that the basics of memory involves only the later stages of such stream of consciousness, since even insects can 'learn'.

A sense of self involves continuously evaluating self in relation to other, and also self in relation to doing well or poorly, i.e. surviving or dying in more extreme terms. So the will to exist and navigate immediately demands some sort of memory principle, which is related to the continuity principle without which a sense of self could not be constructed and maintained at all.

I guess ultimately I am suggesting that the postulate that memory is a sine qua non of consciousness needs further examination into what are the constituents of memory in the first place and whether or not such constituents are really the sine qua non, not memory which is a later product.

So although it might be true to say that there can be no sense of self (or consciousness) without memory, this does not necessarily imply that memory is a causative factor in such consciousness, rather part of what arises in the overall matrix involved in individuated existence/being. In other words, just as with everything else, it is an interdependent process, not a thing per se. So 'memories' do not exist per se, even though we can experience them.

[clyde]

tharpa;

Please understand that I am not presenting some “system”, but am utilizing this thread as a focus of contemplation (as your are) to explore.

I think that memories are one part of what is arranged. However, I am also suggesting that there are underlying processes which memories share with other cognitive functions, such as the ability to categorise/conceptualise. And this is evidenced even in the animal world where learning occurs even without verbal/linguistic forms of conceptualisation. So the label 'hot', for example, is a higher or more sophisticated aspect of the ability to remember things that even small animals evidence.

In their case, it is somewhat easier to see this as a process of 'learning' about their environment/territory. Such learning is 'stored', but not in the higher cognitive functions of linquistically constructed labels, rather as more visceral, or 'felt' 'memories'.

You suggest that memory is one of many cognitive functions and you present “the ability to categorise/conceptualise” as an example. Oddly, I think one may view “the ability to categorise/conceptualise” as the ability to form memories.

Yes, I agree that there are forms of memory that do not involve “verbal/linguistic forms of conceptualisation”. We do that. We remember how to act; e.g. – we sit, stand, and walk, use an eating utensil, play catch, hold and use a pencil, ride a bicycle, etc.

This is why I think - thanks to the contemplation on this your thread has provoked - that the buddhist 5 skandha system is pretty nifty, because it postulates that there is a sort of progression from initial/basic building blocks (aggregates/skandha mechanism) to the more sophisticated, the latter including the sort of stream of consciousness sense of 'I' that we humans experience.

I am aware that Buddhism has a “psychological system”, but I have not studied it. (I am weary of systems. I believe systems, like the concepts with which they are constructed, do not inherently exist. So, I am not eager to learn another system, no matter how elegant. …) But I will. At least a bit.

I guess ultimately I am suggesting that the postulate that memory is a sine qua non of consciousness needs further examination into what are the constituents of memory in the first place and whether or not such constituents are really the sine qua non, not memory which is a later product.

Oh, I don’t think memory is the “sine qua non of consciousness”. But I do think one can view it that way.

So although it might be true to say that there can be no sense of self (or consciousness) without memory, this does not necessarily imply that memory is a causative factor in such consciousness, rather part of what arises in the overall matrix involved in individuated existence/being. In other words, just as with everything else, it is an interdependent process, not a thing per se. So 'memories' do not exist per se, even though we can experience them.

Yes, I rather agree.

Do no harm,
clyde

p.s: My previous p.s. was meant to be taken lightly and humorously (hence the smiley). My meaning was this: If (imagine) one views concepts as memories and thinking as arranging memories, then one would think that is one’s view if one’s memories arranged themselves (We don’t arrange our memories!) so that one would think that is one’s view; otherwise, the opposite is the case.

[tharpa]

I hear what you are saying about systems.

It's a push-me pull-you. Given that most of our world is indeed part of an interdependent complex (i.e. is not really all that simple), certain types of system theory mirror the underlying processes rather well. But when taken too literally - or dogmatically - they become barriers to direct contemplation and action.

And yet if we want to contemplate such matters and so forth, it is hard not to develop various systemic explanations etc. as part of the contemplation process.

What I like about both buddhist and daoist expositions is that they combine experiential contemplation with theory that is then tested in the laboratory of further praxis. Furthermore, mirroring experience/reality, they comprise multiple systems, some progressively linked (i.e. the next one emerges once the previous one is fully grocked) or simply different. Chinese medicine contains about twenty non-correlated systems, so when you diagnose using 3-5 as most practitioners do, and each of them starts to point in the same direction, albeit using different modes of analysis, you feel you are getting a good picture. At the same time, being able to 'think' using different systems at the same time ensures that you don't take any single one too literally. They are all living metaphors, really. Anyway.

I liked very much what you say on your website. Admirable.