ABCs for QRS, X, Y & Z

[Pye]

I'll take Dan Rowden's suggestion and do these questions over here, David.

I'm not sure what you are asking. What do you mean by "way of the pure determinist thinker"?

Basic determinist thinking states the view that all things in the universe are governed by causal law ("determined by"). By definition, this includes human beings and by that same definition excludes the possibility of any of human act of willing, free from these causal laws.

There's a weird spin to it in Leibniz and Laplace I am not that familiar with -- the positivist spin (you know - some "good" and practical results from this condition are possible). This spin seems to say if we pay enough attention to X causing Y (and the whole subsequent convergence of causes before and after), we might be able to "know" the future of the universe (or ourselves?). As weird as this sounds in the ethical sphere, it is obviously how cosmological physics still works, science in general.

My "problem" with this spin is the infinity of variables at work, and that this infinity itself suggests the impossibility of mechanistic prediction. I have no problem accepting the deterministic view (or, your "ultimate" truth of causality). Most of the complaints about it, of course, revolve around the moral and ethical responsibility we will expect each other to pay for - "responsibility" we don't really possess. Thing is, so too is the impetus to expect responsibility, to punish, to exact justice. We're going to keep doing both things anyway. (Until we are no longer caused to!)

I'm sure you realize that longetivity and notoriety aren't reliable measures of the quality of a person's thought. Look at Mohammed, for example. He was a thinker of very low quality and yet here we are 1300 years later and millions of people still take him seriously. At the same time, thinkers of infinitely greater quality, such as Diogenes, Huang Po, and Weininger, are all but ignored.

Yes, I worked this backwards, too, that there are forgotten thinkers and thinkers still traveling around with us stuck to the bottom of our shoes.

I see. You're trying to inject a little philosophical appreciation into the minds of busy people who aren't really interested. What do you do when you come across someone who has serious interest and talent? Do you try to dissuade them from embarking on an academic career?

Yep. Especially if it is serious interest and talent.

If it is aptitude alone, I tell them what academic philosophy looks like; the kinds of things they will have to do; and I pose immediately whether their impetus is to teach, to write academically, or to "simply" love and value philosophy on their own. And I tell them how strong that love and value will have to be to survive in this setting (that wants to dry them up into crisp elitism).

If they're just all excited about philosophy in general because they like me, liked the "weird" class and were made thoughtful about things they didn't know they were still allowed to thing about, I tell them to go test their excitement with another philosophy teacher, another class -- to try slogging their asses through Hegel or something to test the nature of that excitement.

To the ones who are dazed, desirous, and don't think their parents will let them switch to so "impractical" a major, I tell them they can have philosophy now and for the rest of their lives without formal study.

You know what most philosophy majors do with their degrees, yes? They either go into law school or take on professional ethics work, writing mission statements and the like for corporations. They get jobs as the ethical "face" of a company or organization and learn to spin. I think a few philosophy majors simply become stand-up comics ;) The rest inhabit the philosophy departments of the world and dry out right in front of each other.

To me, what matters is how much wisdom one's thoughts and actions express, how much they reflect the Truth, and how skillful they are in enlightening other people's minds. Everything else is meaningless.

Very high and uncompromising standards. I imagine you do not have the same suit-and-tie issue with dressed-up wisdom, and that you too can recognize it in all its configurations (including when it is in a suit and tie; possibly even a dress.)

Well, Socrates, rather than Plato. In my view, the rot had already set in with Plato!

Yes, I know this feeling and I am not sure why I hold a similar view. I have this bad habit of attributing everything teacherly and thoughtful to Socrates, and all the little "systems" to come from these teachings to Plato. I have no real support for this view. I fancied that after teaching a few dialogues for so long that I could "tell" when Plato's voice was overriding the Socratic ideas behind them, but now I just accept that there is a certain quality about Socrates that I admire and so everything admirable goes to him. There's some skewed rationale for you!

Rationality only begins to go astray when people have attachments to protect

Does Truth also qualify here as an attachment? - qualify also as something to protect? just asking.

I like Dostoevsky's work, but I've never considered him to be much of a philosopher. You seem to be refering more to exposing the "human condition" here, rather than awakening people's minds to the nature of Ultimate Reality. Is that right?

Right, well I decided some time back that it hasn't really been "wisdom" that I have loved all along because it never arrives to me without people (including myself, my own thinking). Part of this is an attentive fear of unconsciously creating a metaphysical entity out of a thinking mode. It is very weird, David, this change in my thinking to literature. I used to poo-poo it as inferior form all the time (enjoy, but poo-poo). It did not engage my brain the way of philosophy and hence was not as valuable. I think differently now. That's all I can say. A whole notebook file of philosophic observations is being transformed into people to live them.  

Jamesh writes:

I took for granted, due to the candidness and openness of your words, that you were a male. One just doesn’t expect to see the lack of traditionally valued emotions in women visitors to this forum

Well good then, we can just stay focused upon these qualities we both admire and not worry so much about the shape of the container that carries them.

[N0X23]

Basic determinist thinking states the view that all things in the universe are governed by causal law ("determined by"). By definition, this includes human beings and by that same definition excludes the possibility of any of human act of willing, free from these causal laws.

There's a weird spin to it in Leibniz and Laplace I am not that familiar with -- the positivist spin (you know - some "good" and practical results from this condition are possible). This spin seems to say if we pay enough attention to X causing Y (and the whole subsequent convergence of causes before and after), we might be able to "know" the future of the universe (or ourselves?). As weird as this sounds in the ethical sphere, it is obviously how cosmological physics still works, science in general.

My "problem" with this spin is the infinity of variables at work, and that this infinity itself suggests the impossibility of mechanistic prediction. I have no problem accepting the deterministic view (or, your "ultimate" truth of causality). Most of the complaints about it, of course, revolve around the moral and ethical responsibility we will expect each other to pay for - "responsibility" we don't really possess. Thing is, so too is the impetus to expect responsibility, to punish, to exact justice. We're going to keep doing both things anyway. (Until we are no longer caused to!)

If it’s not your fault, who do we blame? God? The Devil?


Morals are transient boundaries set by the ruling class to further their agenda, behavior modification mandated by the minority to govern the majority. There was a reason that this type of thinking was exiled to the realms of the esoteric. If it were demonstrated that free will is an erroneous dogma, then the entire legal system would be rendered irrelevant and the control and hierarchy that is supported by it’s framework would collapse.

Society isn’t interested in truth, it’s only directive is it’s own advancement.

Thou shall not kill...Unless it’s sanctioned by the State.
Thou shall not steal... Unless it best serves the nationalistic interest.

[Pye]

Society isn’t interested in truth, it’s only directive is it’s own advancement.

That would be the causal truth of society then, yes?

Thou shall not kill...Unless it’s sanctioned by the State.
Thou shall not steal... Unless it best serves the nationalistic interest.

And this too exists by the same necessity.

NOX, it's not good of me to address the "board" at large anymore as a collective entity, so as an individual amongst this, can I assume your comments are also directed in support of this overarching and definitive causality?

[DHodges]

If it were demonstrated that free will is an erroneous dogma, then the entire legal system would be rendered irrelevant and the control and hierarchy that is supported by it’s framework would collapse.

Nox, you sound like you've been reading Foucault.

Anyway, let's assume for the sake of argument that free will is an illusion (which I think it is anyway). Can't it still make sense to hold people accountable for their actions?

Recognising that what people do is a product of the society in which they are raised (among other factors), doesn't the existence of punishment, the existence of a legal system, modify their behaviors in ways that are desirable? Doesn't the existence of police, courts, etc., reduce the incidence of murder, rape, robbery, etc.?

The fact that people are held accountable for their actions can itself change their actions. It's one of the causal influences that goes into making people who they are.

The notion of free will may be taken for granted, but I don't think it's a necessary notion for the legal system to function. The notion of legal liability is enough.

[Diebert van Rhijn]

Hello Pye,

Basic determinist thinking states the view that all things in the universe are governed by causal law ("determined by"). By definition, this includes human beings and by that same definition excludes the possibility of any of human act of willing, free from these causal laws.

In most discussions about this it seems to boil down to what one defines as 'the one that wills'. Can there be a willing, free or not, without first determining who or what is supposed to be in control? Where are its boundaries?

My "problem" with this spin is the infinity of variables at work, and that this infinity itself suggests the impossibility of mechanistic prediction.

There are lots of examples of phenomenons which while having an infinite amount of variables at work can be predicted for practical purposes but only not with 100% certainty, for example the weather forecast for coming day. So it's not about being impossible but it's about the margin of error that varies depending on the type of phenomenon or the limits of data processing possible in that case.

Thing is, so too is the impetus to expect responsibility, to punish, to exact justice. We're going to keep doing both things anyway. (Until we are no longer caused to!)

This is an interesting topic and the reason why I follow the works of some neuroscientists and people like Daniel C. Dennett. A book I've read from him 'Freedom evolves' contains a lot about the topic of determinism from a certain scientific perspective which I found helpful in formulating the questions.

The point he often makes, and I agree with, is that a phenomenon can just as easily be determined to be changeable, chaotic or unpredictable. Philosophers often overlook this obvious fact. At one level processes can behave totally deterministic and predictable in their occurrences but in more complex groupings developments are possible that while being still deterministic at the core can hardly be called predictable or fixed.

In other words perhaps: from the perspective of an unchanging timeless god a deterministic universe takes away all notions of responsibility or the will to change and act. From the perspective of an actor, being part of a process in time with limited knowledge about details of future and past, ones actions do have consequences and one can progress closer to an ideal or err further away from it. So determinism as a result of causality, a timeless truth, won't change the uncertain results of actions seen from a human perspective. This means to him choices will still have to be made on best effort basis.

[Pye]

In most discussions about this it seems to boil down to what one defines as 'the one that wills'. Can there be a willing, free or not, without first determining who or what is supposed to be in control? Where are its boundaries?

In a wide-seeing scheme that takes into account all cause-and-effect, how can anything be said to have boundaries at all, strictly speaking? Great "incestuous," if you will, relationships exist between all cause and effect. It's a great question, Diebert, and I know it shall lead us to (or away from) the self. Yet, how can a thing with no real boundaries sense itself as definitive? And yet again, how can the experience of these bundled causes-and-effects not strike us as, well, a bundle, a real collection point, and furthermore, one that is aware of all this?

There are lots of examples of phenomenons which while having an infinite amount of variables at work can be predicted for practical purposes but only not with 100% certainty, for example the weather forecast for coming day. So it's not about being impossible but it's about the margin of error that varies depending on the type of phenomenon or the limits of data processing possible in that case.

Right, the weather. And sure, maybe it is not 100% I have in mind. Indeed it was human beings I was having the greatest trouble imagining an accurate use for cause/effect predictability, and yet we do it all the time, in medicine, psychology, sales, science, etc. No, I think for a minute there, I was just dumbfounded at the possibility of gathering it all up, all of cause and effect, to state even if for one single moment all effects that shall fall forth from these causes. It was just an infinity moment, I think. :)

The point he [Dennett] often makes, and I agree with, is that a phenomenon can just as easily be determined to be changeable, chaotic or unpredictable.

I just want to make sure I understand you: that one of the effects of causes is also chaos. That the appearance of this effect (chaos) is itself still bound to cause-effect law. And then I go on to extrapolate from there that chaos itself is a. still abiding within itself in a cause-and-effect fashion (?) and that, b. it simply looks like chaos or unpredictability to us because of its complexity (?)

Thoughtful things, Diebert; thanks.

[David Quinn]

I agree with Diebert in this. A lot of people make the mistake of equating determinism with predictibility. They are two seperate issues, although related on some levels.

Everything in the future is unpredictable to some extent, even though it is true that everything is a product of causes. Just the simple act of rolling a dice is unpredictable. Even though every aspect of the throwing of the dice is fully determined by causes - e.g. how the dice was sitting in the hand, how hard one decides to throw it, the hardness of the table, the amount of friction between dice and table, etc - we still have no idea what number will show up. We can't even predict that it will indeed thow up a number. It might well roll right off the table and land askew in thick carpet. Who knows?

It is interesting to examine the various logical permutations between determinism and predictability:

If all things are caused, then most things are predictable to some extent.

If all things are uncaused, then there can no predictability at all, anywhere. Everything would be entirely unpredictable.

If a thing is predictable, then it definitely means that it is determined by causes.

If a thing is unpredictable, then it may be either caused or uncaused.

-

[Kevin Solway]

"Free will" doesn't exist, but we can still use the term to describe our experience of not knowing what we are going to be doing next.

To me, it feels like surfing on huge wave, but not knowing where you are surfing to - and it doesn't matter since you can't do anything about it anyway. Sure you make choices, but it is the wave that pushes you into those choices, and determines their outcome.

Putting your faith in that wave is what "Faith in God" is meant to mean, in my view.

[David Quinn]

Pye wrote:

I have no problem accepting the deterministic view (or, your "ultimate" truth of causality). Most of the complaints about it, of course, revolve around the moral and ethical responsibility we will expect each other to pay for - "responsibility" we don't really possess. Thing is, so too is the impetus to expect responsibility, to punish, to exact justice.

As Dave Hodges says, society adheres to principles of justice and punishes criminals primarily for the sake of controlling future human behaviour. Given this, it doesn't really matter if one accepts the truth of causality or not. We all have a vested interest in modifying the destructive, anti-social elements of society.

Of course, the determinist wouldn't dream of "blaming" the criminal for his behaviour in an ethical sense, but nonetheless he can still agree to punishing him for the sake of society's future.

In any case, it has been my experience that the more deeply one understands causality, and the more one discerns its workings in society and in the Universe at large, the more responsible one becomes in an ethical sense. This is because one sees ever more clearly just how much our present actions can affect the future, and one thus realizes just how significant each action is.

So although it might sound counter-intuitive on the surface, the determinist actually affirms greater responsibility for the individual, rather than less.

We're going to keep doing both things anyway. (Until we are no longer caused to!)

Indeed! I like this little quip from Diogenes:

"It's my fate to steal," pleaded the man who had been caught red-handed by Diogenes.

"Then it is also your fate to be beaten," said Diogenes, hitting him across the head with his staff.

You know what most philosophy majors do with their degrees, yes? They either go into law school or take on professional ethics work, writing mission statements and the like for corporations. They get jobs as the ethical "face" of a company or organization and learn to spin. I think a few philosophy majors simply become stand-up comics ;) The rest inhabit the philosophy departments of the world and dry out right in front of each other.

Yes, I just can't relate to that at all. Somewhere along the line they must have lost that original spark which inspired them to become interested in philosophy in the first place.

That's what I really detest about academic philosophy, and why I will alway speak strongly against it. It constantly undermines the passion of young people for genuine philosophy and effectively destroys their souls.

DQ: To me, what matters is how much wisdom one's thoughts and actions express, how much they reflect the Truth, and how skillful they are in enlightening other people's minds. Everything else is meaningless.

P: Very high and uncompromising standards. I imagine you do not have the same suit-and-tie issue with dressed-up wisdom, and that you too can recognize it in all its configurations (including when it is in a suit and tie; possibly even a dress.)

What is "dressed-up" wisdom?

DQ: Well, Socrates, rather than Plato. In my view, the rot had already set in with Plato!

P: Yes, I know this feeling and I am not sure why I hold a similar view. I have this bad habit of attributing everything teacherly and thoughtful to Socrates, and all the little "systems" to come from these teachings to Plato. I have no real support for this view. I fancied that after teaching a few dialogues for so long that I could "tell" when Plato's voice was overriding the Socratic ideas behind them, but now I just accept that there is a certain quality about Socrates that I admire and so everything admirable goes to him. There's some skewed rationale for you!

It sounds perfectly logical to me. :)

I see Plato as someone who was deeply inspired by Socrates, but lacked the wisdom and skill to properly understand him. He was essentially a hagiographer with a worldly mentality and an academic desire to systemize. He didn't really understand Socrates' sense of irony, his Zennishness, his philosophic humour, his infinite consciousness. He sensed something powerful, of course, but he had no idea what.

And that is why we see his rather lame attempts to systemize Socrates' wisdom into a form that would be acceptable to the world. I'm sure that a lot of the arguments he attributes to Socrates in the various dialogues are really Platos' own views in disguise, originally derived from his own misunderstanding of Socretes. So to me, the dialogues are only powerful because the spirit of Socrates permeates through them, not because of the actual arguments that are there.

DQ: Rationality only begins to go astray when people have attachments to protect

N: Does Truth also qualify here as an attachment? - qualify also as something to protect? just asking.

It's definitely an attachment, particularly for people who are just starting out on the philosophic path. But it is the one attachment which can lead to the complete unleashing of reason. So it's a good attachment to have.

It is only towards the end, when one is nearing Buddhahood, that even the attachment to truth needs to be relinquished - it being the last attachment to go.

DQ: I like Dostoevsky's work, but I've never considered him to be much of a philosopher. You seem to be refering more to exposing the "human condition" here, rather than awakening people's minds to the nature of Ultimate Reality. Is that right?

P: Right, well I decided some time back that it hasn't really been "wisdom" that I have loved all along because it never arrives to me without people (including myself, my own thinking). Part of this is an attentive fear of unconsciously creating a metaphysical entity out of a thinking mode. It is very weird, David, this change in my thinking to literature. I used to poo-poo it as inferior form all the time (enjoy, but poo-poo). It did not engage my brain the way of philosophy and hence was not as valuable. I think differently now. That's all I can say. A whole notebook file of philosophic observations is being transformed into people to live them.

What's an example? Can you point to a specific example in, say, Dosteovsky's work?


-

[Kevin Solway]

P: Very high and uncompromising standards. I imagine you do not have the same suit-and-tie issue with dressed-up wisdom, and that you too can recognize it in all its configurations (including when it is in a suit and tie; possibly even a dress.)

What is "dressed-up" wisdom?

I think she means wisdom under the guise of various forms of expression or language. "Formal attire" like the Buddhist sutras, or "casual" like the Zen Masters.

You obviously haven't been reading enough poetry.

[David Quinn]

That's good. I was trying to imagine Socrates in a suit!

-

[Pye]

I think she means wisdom under the guise of various forms of expression or language. "Formal attire" like the Buddhist sutras, or "casual" like the Zen Masters.

That works, thanks Kevin.

This idea has been making me think of a young student I had some years ago, who never spoke in class, did not appear to know anyone in it, but he never missed and when he was there, I always felt a very dense attentiveness in the room from his general direction. I was curious for the first essay test he wrote to see what was going on with him, and when I got it, I was completely floored by the dyslexic morass of misspelling and twisted sentences. It was a dyslexic morass of misspelling and twisted sentences, but he was completely in possession of not only the questions I'd asked, but presented some really sharp reasoning on the (optional) opinion questions. I know how nervous he was to get it back; I know he knew how bad his writing was. I wrote at the bottom of his test that if he would just keep up this sharp thinking, he should rest assured that I would just keep finding it. He did, keep it up - never speaking, never missing class, and never failing to amaze me with that weird intuition that came through his "errors."

Putting your faith in that wave is what "Faith in God" is meant to mean, in my view.

What would you call the putting of one's wonderment into that wave?

David writes:

In any case, it has been my experience that the more deeply one understands causality, and the more one discerns its workings in society and in the Universe at large, the more responsible one becomes in an ethical sense. This is because one sees ever more clearly just how much our present actions can affect the future, and one thus realizes just how significant each action is.

In becoming aware of this significance, one has a new "cause" affecting their actions, yes?

So although it might sound counter-intuitive on the surface, the determinist actually affirms greater responsibility for the individual, rather than less.

It does sound counter-intuitive, but no moreso than the parameters necessary for 'freedom.'

That's what I really detest about academic philosophy, and why I will alway speak strongly against it. It constantly undermines the passion of young people for genuine philosophy and effectively destroys their souls.

I don't believe I can follow you all the way to the soul-destroying scenario at university -- I tend to see any 'destruction' taking place as the ancillary pressure young people are under to define themselves and set sail into the stifling values of society. To be fair, David -- at least in the hands of some of us -- that passion is lit in those good classes; not crushed by it. Just to be fair to some of us who carry that passion in with us every time.

It is only towards the end, when one is nearing Buddhahood, that even the attachment to truth needs to be relinquished - it being the last attachment to go.

Have you reached the end, David?

What's an example? Can you point to a specific example in, say, Dosteovsky's work?

Let me think about this a bit. It's like trying to pick out a single cause in the whole of causality :)

[Kevin Solway]

Putting your faith in that wave is what "Faith in God" is meant to mean, in my view.

What would you call the putting of one's wonderment into that wave?

If you are enjoying surfing the wave then your wonderment will be in the wave, and you will remain a surfer pushed along by the wave. But as your wisdom increases the more you will identify with the wave, which is your larger self. In reality there is no surfer. The wonderment vanishes once you realize it is yourself.

[Kevin Solway]

. . . possibly even a dress.)

Perhaps "wisdom in a dress" would be Taoism, since it concentrates more on the passive aspect of truthfulness.

[Jason]

. . . possibly even a dress.)

Perhaps "wisdom in a dress" would be Taoism, since it concentrates more on the passive aspect of truthfulness.

Socrates wore a dress. Of sorts. At least in the depictions of him that I have seen.

[Jason]

I agree with Diebert in this. A lot of people make the mistake of equating determinism with predictibility. They are two seperate issues, although related on some levels.

Everything in the future is unpredictable to some extent, even though it is true that everything is a product of causes.

To say that the future is unpredictable to some extent, is incorrect. All things are appearance. Appearance is absolutely certain and known in it's entirety. "Future" is an appearance and thus known in it's entirety with no uncertainty, and thus not subject to unpredictability.

Just the simple act of rolling a dice is unpredictable. Even though every aspect of the throwing of the dice is fully determined by causes - e.g. how the dice was sitting in the hand, how hard one decides to throw it, the hardness of the table, the amount of friction between dice and table, etc - we still have no idea what number will show up. We can't even predict that it will indeed thow up a number. It might well roll right off the table and land askew in thick carpet. Who knows?"

Or throwing the dice at a certain speed, along with the specific amount of friction of the dice with the table may have been some of the causes which led to the next event being: floating in space conversing with a group of purple seals.

A thing "A" is caused to exist by everything else in existence, other than itself. That is, A is caused to exist by non-A. There is no inherent reason to give more recognition to a cause which is only a subset of non-A, such as "friction between dice and table" in the example given.

It is interesting to examine the various logical permutations between determinism and predictability:

If all things are caused, then most things are predictable to some extent.

If all things are uncaused, then there can no predictability at all, anywhere. Everything would be entirely unpredictable.

If a thing is predictable, then it definitely means that it is determined by causes.

If a thing is unpredictable, then it may be either caused or uncaused. -

I don't think this makes any sense. Say we have "A" which represents "dice". Obviously, non-A will always be the ultimate cause of A. That is a certainty. "Dice" will always be caused by "non-dice."

But what appearance will non-dice actually have, and will this appearance always be the same? Let's pretend that I am only capable of perceiving two appearances/things simultaneously. Let's call them A and non-A.

Here is a hypothetical record of my perception of reality whilst playing a board game:
9:00AM: A="dice" , non-A="card"
9:15AM: A="dice" , non-A="table"
9:30AM: A="dice" , non-A="chair"

The above sequence could continue indefinitely with A always being "dice" but the content of non-A never being the same thing twice. In this way you can see that the specific content of A, does not rely on any specific content in non-A, and vice-versa(so long as the content does not contradict the law of identity). Therefore I question your first "logical permutation." How can you make predictions when the appearances which constitute A and non-A, do not necessarily follow repeating patterns?

*(In my examples I was using "dice" to describe a single object, sometimes called "die" instead.)

[Jason]

"Free will" doesn't exist, but we can still use the term to describe our experience of not knowing what we are going to be doing next.

To me, it feels like surfing on huge wave, but not knowing where you are surfing to - and it doesn't matter since you can't do anything about it anyway. Sure you make choices, but it is the wave that pushes you into those choices, and determines their outcome.

"A" doesn't cause "non-A" any more than "non-A" causes A. They are co-dependent and simultaneously arising. This means that I cause the rest of the universe as much as the rest of the universe causes me. It also means that I cause the past as much as the past causes me. It doesn't make any sense to take sides with the wave over the surfer.

Putting your faith in that wave is what "Faith in God" is meant to mean, in my view.

From the description above it sounds more like putting faith in a limited part of reality, instead of faith in the Whole.

[Kevin Solway]

From the description above it sounds more like putting faith in a limited part of reality, instead of faith in the Whole.

Yes, I went on to say that ultimately the surfer identifies with the wave. At this stage having faith in God means having faith in yourself, which is the whole.

[David Quinn]

Jason wrote:

DQ: Everything in the future is unpredictable to some extent, even though it is true that everything is a product of causes.

J: To say that the future is unpredictable to some extent, is incorrect. All things are appearance. Appearance is absolutely certain and known in it's entirety. "Future" is an appearance and thus known in it's entirety with no uncertainty, and thus not subject to unpredictability.

I didn't say that the future is unpredictable, but rather that everything in the future is unpredictable. For example, this Saturday night's lotto numbers are unpredictable.

DQ: Just the simple act of rolling a dice is unpredictable. Even though every aspect of the throwing of the dice is fully determined by causes - e.g. how the dice was sitting in the hand, how hard one decides to throw it, the hardness of the table, the amount of friction between dice and table, etc - we still have no idea what number will show up. We can't even predict that it will indeed thow up a number. It might well roll right off the table and land askew in thick carpet. Who knows?"

J: Or throwing the dice at a certain speed, along with the specific amount of friction of the dice with the table may have been some of the causes which led to the next event being: floating in space conversing with a group of purple seals.

Maybe.

A thing "A" is caused to exist by everything else in existence, other than itself. That is, A is caused to exist by non-A. There is no inherent reason to give more recognition to a cause which is only a subset of non-A, such as "friction between dice and table" in the example given.

Our past empirical experience of the world gives us reason to place more value on certain specific causes. For example, if I know that a dice is weighted in such a way that it is heavily geared towards showing a 6, then I can predict with a high degree of certainty that the next roll will indeed show a 6.

By contrast, if I have a normal dice and I come across the knowledge that the tree outside my window is beginning to flower, this is unlikely to help me predict what the dice will reveal in the next throw. Some causal factors carry far more weight than others when it comes to making specific empirical predictions.

DQ: It is interesting to examine the various logical permutations between determinism and predictability:

If all things are caused, then most things are predictable to some extent.

If all things are uncaused, then there can no predictability at all, anywhere. Everything would be entirely unpredictable.

If a thing is predictable, then it definitely means that it is determined by causes.

If a thing is unpredictable, then it may be either caused or uncaused.

J: I don't think this makes any sense. Say we have "A" which represents "dice". Obviously, non-A will always be the ultimate cause of A. That is a certainty. "Dice" will always be caused by "non-dice."

But what appearance will non-dice actually have, and will this appearance always be the same? Let's pretend that I am only capable of perceiving two appearances/things simultaneously. Let's call them A and non-A.

Here is a hypothetical record of my perception of reality whilst playing a board game:
9:00AM: A="dice" , non-A="card"
9:15AM: A="dice" , non-A="table"
9:30AM: A="dice" , non-A="chair"

The above sequence could continue indefinitely with A always being "dice" but the content of non-A never being the same thing twice. In this way you can see that the specific content of A, does not rely on any specific content in non-A, and vice-versa(so long as the content does not contradict the law of identity). Therefore I question your first "logical permutation." How can you make predictions when the appearances which constitute A and non-A, do not necessarily follow repeating patterns?

You're misapplying an abstract conception of causation at its broadest level to specific empirical issues.

If I go to the races and I know that seven out of the eight horses have been doped and the remaing horse is fast and fighting fit, then it won't matter a hill of beans what else I happen to be perceiving when I watch the race. For I already know, by examining the specific empirical causes in this instance, which horse is likely to win. The content of not-A, as a simultaneous perception to the horse (A) when I am viewing the race, is irrelevent - at least in the normal course of events.

-

[David Quinn]

Pye,

DQ: What is "dressed-up" wisdom?

Kevin: I think she means wisdom under the guise of various forms of expression or language. "Formal attire" like the Buddhist sutras, or "casual" like the Zen Masters.

P: That works, thanks Kevin.

In that case, all wisdom is "dressed-up", as it is always expressed in a form of language or action.

This idea has been making me think of a young student I had some years ago, who never spoke in class, did not appear to know anyone in it, but he never missed and when he was there, I always felt a very dense attentiveness in the room from his general direction. I was curious for the first essay test he wrote to see what was going on with him, and when I got it, I was completely floored by the dyslexic morass of misspelling and twisted sentences. It was a dyslexic morass of misspelling and twisted sentences, but he was completely in possession of not only the questions I'd asked, but presented some really sharp reasoning on the (optional) opinion questions. I know how nervous he was to get it back; I know he knew how bad his writing was. I wrote at the bottom of his test that if he would just keep up this sharp thinking, he should rest assured that I would just keep finding it. He did, keep it up - never speaking, never missing class, and never failing to amaze me with that weird intuition that came through his "errors."

Hui Neng, a 7th century Ch'an Master, was said to be illiterate, while Nietzcshe and Kierkegaard were both well-educated and highly read. Yet all three expressed comparable levels of wisdom in their own way. So yes, things like one's level of education and the ability to spell correctly are relatively unimportant in the context of wisdom. Absolutely vital is the ability to understand Reality with one's own mind and to dive into enlightenment.

DQ: In any case, it has been my experience that the more deeply one understands causality, and the more one discerns its workings in society and in the Universe at large, the more responsible one becomes in an ethical sense. This is because one sees ever more clearly just how much our present actions can affect the future, and one thus realizes just how significant each action is.

P: In becoming aware of this significance, one has a new "cause" affecting their actions, yes?

One is in a better position to shape the future more skillfully. One is conscious of millions of more causal chains in the world, usually involving the deeper realms of human psychology.

DQ: It is only towards the end, when one is nearing Buddhahood, that even the attachment to truth needs to be relinquished - it being the last attachment to go.

P: Have you reached the end, David?

No, far from it. But I have gained insight into it.

DQ: What's an example? Can you point to a specific example in, say, Dosteovsky's work?

P: Let me think about this a bit. It's like trying to pick out a single cause in the whole of causality :)

He certainly wrote some very large books! One of my favourites was a shorter work - Notes from the Underground.

-

[Jason]

J: To say that the future is unpredictable to some extent, is incorrect. All things are appearance. Appearance is absolutely certain and known in it's entirety. "Future" is an appearance and thus known in it's entirety with no uncertainty, and thus not subject to unpredictability.

DQ:I didn't say that the future is unpredictable, but rather that everything in the future is unpredictable. For example, this Saturday night's lotto numbers are unpredictable.

My point stands. "This Saturday night's lotto numbers are unpredictable." is also an appearance. Therefore it is totally certain and not subject to unpredictability.

J: A thing "A" is caused to exist by everything else in existence, other than itself. That is, A is caused to exist by non-A. There is no inherent reason to give more recognition to a cause which is only a subset of non-A, such as "friction between dice and table" in the example given.

DQ: Our past empirical experience of the world gives us reason to place more value on certain specific causes.

That's irrelevant, I didn't say anything about "empirical experience", and I was not speaking from within an empirical experience perspective.

J:The above sequence could continue indefinitely with A always being "dice" but the content of non-A never being the same thing twice. In this way you can see that the specific content of A, does not rely on any specific content in non-A, and vice-versa(so long as the content does not contradict the law of identity). Therefore I question your first "logical permutation." How can you make predictions when the appearances which constitute A and non-A, do not necessarily follow repeating patterns?

DQ:You're misapplying an abstract conception of causation at its broadest level to specific empirical issues.

Incorrect. It is you who is misapplying "empirical issues". I never said I was talking about empirical issues.

[Pye]

If you are enjoying surfing the wave then your wonderment will be in the wave, and you will remain a surfer pushed along by the wave. But as your wisdom increases the more you will identify with the wave, which is your larger self. In reality there is no surfer. The wonderment vanishes once you realize it is yourself. [emphasis mine]

I should have used a less emotionally interpretive word than "wonderment" so you might not assume it is this "yee-ha!" variety of streaming sensations. I meant it as the wondering after the what-is-it of the wave, and in clearing that up, I assume your analogy still stands: I am the thing that moves me.

Perhaps "wisdom in a dress" would be Taoism, since it concentrates more on the passive aspect of truthfulness.

This might save me a question regarding any Buddhist meditation practices of persons on the board. Here are my assumptions; correct them at will: that meditation is a "passive" form of training the mind on truth, and that the preferred method here is a more "aggressive" or 'active' form of contemplation.

On the one hand, such an active or aggressive pursuit of truth runs the danger of entangling one up in conceptual trickery (perhaps becoming 'addicted' to it, too). On the other hand, active working to contemplate these things would function in the manner of the koan -- that after exhaustive pitching and pitching against the light bulb, you finally fry out, right onto, right into, the light.

P: Have you reached the end, David?
DQ: No, far from it. But I have gained insight into it.

I'm glad you heard this not as a wry question or a pugnacious one, but as a real one, in turn giving a 'real' answer.

He certainly wrote some very large books! One of my favourites was a shorter work - Notes from the Underground.

Notes from Underground is one of the 40 or so books I have deep familiarity with from placing it [repeatedly] in the curriculum whenever I can. I also re-read them each time I teach them. Bland facts like this will surely indicate to you how much I agree with you on this score.

I am thinking first of the character of Kirilov and everything that concerns him in the lesser-mentioned of Dostoevsky's novels The Devils. I have also see the title translated as The Possessed. I tried to find some sections of the book to string together this character and his situation (yes, Dostoevsky writes "big" books :), but I found it will be impossible to pull him out of context this way.

The book is a little clumsier than his usual, a little weirder, a little more off the nihilistic charts for his usual nihilistic characters. There is just something about it that floors me (allow this more descriptiveness and less emotional ulteriority, please ;). There's always the [in]famous dialogue of The Grand Inquisitor - subset of The Brothers Karamazov, but that one has been done to death for philosophic note (along with Notes from Underground).

The paradoxical I am sensing here is that even if I am able to point at the Dostoevsky specifically, I won't be able to "tell" you what it is saying. This is my point about the "showing" of something without need for this. It might even become a bloody disgusting thing to chat it up, like locating "themes" in high school English classes.

Maybe next time I open my mouth on this, I'll have something written myself instead. To show. It's all right here; everything is all right here in appearance. So I should like to make some astonishingly recognizable things appear (without the need to annotate them :).

So, next question: Can someone here build a bridge for me between the law of causality and A=A? I see these two fundamentals showing repeatedly, but I find one of them redundant. The law of causality calls into question the thing-hood of any given piece of existence and pulls out from under it any inherency. If this is the case, is not A=A necessarily and always referring to the whole of existence? What purpose does it have in isolating separate things?

P.S. David, I have a little think-errand for you, too. Please to tell me after consideration in which of Plato's dialogues do you find the Socrates you know and admire the best? My own off-the-top answer to this is The Apology. I feel as though it is "safe" to assume some veracity to Plato's remembrance (and attendance to the trial). And too, it is chock full of that rapier sharp reason, wit, and cheerful uncompromising bliss of his. I also like the Euthyphro for less enhanced reasons. While you're at it, maybe tell me where you see this "Zennishness" to Socrates, too.

[David Quinn]

J: Incorrect. It is you who is misapplying "empirical issues". I never said I was talking about empirical issues.

Yes, but I was. And because I began writing about prediction on this thread before you did, I bags it!

You're going to get a lot of scratching of heads if you say to people that the future is entirely predictable because it is an appearance. It is a very obscure point, to say the least.

One has to connect with people where they are, mentally speaking, and nearly everyone is fully immersed in the conventional empirical mindset. That it is why is better to normally talk about "prediction" and "cause" in an empirical sense. One can always switch gears from that basis, if needs be, when encountering people who are a bit more philosophically-developed..

-

[David Quinn]

Pye,

DQ: He certainly wrote some very large books! One of my favourites was a shorter work - Notes from the Underground.

P: Notes from Underground is one of the 40 or so books I have deep familiarity with from placing it [repeatedly] in the curriculum whenever I can. I also re-read them each time I teach them. Bland facts like this will surely indicate to you how much I agree with you on this score.

I am thinking first of the character of Kirilov and everything that concerns him in the lesser-mentioned of Dostoevsky's novels The Devils. I have also see the title translated as The Possessed. I tried to find some sections of the book to string together this character and his situation (yes, Dostoevsky writes "big" books :), but I found it will be impossible to pull him out of context this way.

The book is a little clumsier than his usual, a little weirder, a little more off the nihilistic charts for his usual nihilistic characters. There is just something about it that floors me (allow this more descriptiveness and less emotional ulteriority, please ;). There's always the [in]famous dialogue of The Grand Inquisitor - subset of The Brothers Karamazov, but that one has been done to death for philosophic note (along with Notes from Underground).

The paradoxical I am sensing here is that even if I am able to point at the Dostoevsky specifically, I won't be able to "tell" you what it is saying. This is my point about the "showing" of something without need for this. It might even become a bloody disgusting thing to chat it up, like locating "themes" in high school English classes.

Understood. Can I ask, then, what is it that attracts you to his work in the first place? Is it because he tends to write about desperate characters who live on the fringe of society? Is it his sparkling writing style? His weird psychological explorations? That's more or less why I like him.

I confess that it has been some years since I've read his work, so I can't be sure that I would still think of him in this way. I would have to read him again. What is a lesser-known work of his that you would recommend?

So, next question: Can someone here build a bridge for me between the law of causality and A=A? I see these two fundamentals showing repeatedly, but I find one of them redundant. The law of causality calls into question the thing-hood of any given piece of existence and pulls out from under it any inherency. If this is the case, is not A=A necessarily and always referring to the whole of existence? What purpose does it have in isolating separate things?

Even though causality pulls everything part, appearances still continue to arise for us, the observers. A=A essentially applies to any kind of appearance - e.g. physical objects perceived through the senses, emotions, mystical experiences, abstract logical reasonings, etc. It basically states that any phenomena which appears to exist is recognizable and has its own identity. For example, what appears as a cloud in the sky is indeed the appearance of a cloud in the sky. It isn't, say, the appearance of a tree. It is what it is.

So to sum up, A=A applies to anything which appears to exist, while the law of causality helps point the mind to the truth that none of these appearance is inherently real.

In the practice of logic, the ability to stay perfectly aligned with A=A is critically important. Mistakes are made in the practice of logic when people start confusing the identity of what they are reasoning about. Their confused reasoning ends up being of the form, 2+2=5.

P.S. David, I have a little think-errand for you, too. Please to tell me after consideration in which of Plato's dialogues do you find the Socrates you know and admire the best? My own off-the-top answer to this is The Apology. I feel as though it is "safe" to assume some veracity to Plato's remembrance (and attendance to the trial). And too, it is chock full of that rapier sharp reason, wit, and cheerful uncompromising bliss of his. I also like the Euthyphro for less enhanced reasons. While you're at it, maybe tell me where you see this "Zennishness" to Socrates, too.

Yes, the Apology is probably my favourite as it seems to have been more faithful in its recording of Socrates's words. His spirit shines more brightly out of this one.

As for his "Zennishness", that is everywhere. For example, the way he kept claiming that philosophy is the noblest and greatest of all pursuits, and yet there he was, the philosopher and the family he neglected living in the most abject poverty. Another example is his famous quip that he understood nothing at all. That is very Zennish, comparable to the Buddha's assertion that he had attained nothing when he became enlightened.

-

[Jason]

Yes, but I was. And because I began writing about prediction on this thread before you did, I bags it!

Haha you smartass. I thought you might say that. Checkmate for you again hey. Or as Zap Brannigan from Futurama might say "If we can hit that bull's-eye, the rest of the dominoes will fall like a house of cards. Checkmate!"

You're going to get a lot of scratching of heads if you say to people that the future is entirely predictable because it is an appearance. It is a very obscure point, to say the least.

It's not obscure to me, it's very clear. It's clear to you too, correct? I was addressing it to you...

One has to connect with people where they are, mentally speaking, and nearly everyone is fully immersed in the conventional empirical mindset. That it is why is better to normally talk about "prediction" and "cause" in an empirical sense.

That's what I assumed you were doing: lowering your philosohical perspective to a more conventional one so that Pye etc could more easily make sense of what you were saying.

This is something I was talking about in that other thread(where I suggested that from a conventional perspective I had never needed courage to pursue a philosophical life). It seems to me like you think it's fine for you to speak from a more conventional perspective, but when I previously spoke from a more conventional perspective you jumped all of it, and told me I was wrong. Then when I took a higher perspective in this thread, again you tell me I am wrong. It's like I can't win. It's like you always want the chosen perspective to be completely on your terms, and when I choose a different perspective: what I say is automatically wrong. That's what I meant when I said you were too inflexible in that other thread.

Hopefully these instances were just misunderstandings, and you weren't motivated to argue against me simply for the sake of winning or beating me. I hope we can communicate more effectively in the future.

One can always switch gears from that basis, if needs be, when encountering people who are a bit more philosophically-developed.. -

Here I am. Switch gears.