Dependent Origination

[Beingof1]

Jupiviv:

Jup: By "arbitrarily" I didn't mean out of thin air or independently. I meant that there is no special, fixed cause of the process of distinction-making .



B1; Then it follows that they are arbitrary!

No matter how you slice it, as in the knife example, all distinctions are a choice. Is a knife sharp or dull? How long does a knife need to be before it is a knife? How sharp does it need to be to be defined as a butter knife or a hunting knife? At what point does a sharpened rock become a knife?



Jup; I specifically mentioned that by "arbitrary" I meant having no special fixed cause.

And I will repeat, then it follows that all distinctions are arbitrary.

If any thing has no special fixed cause, it then is distinct by and through arbitrary choice.

You said:

By "arbitrarily" I didn't mean out of thin air or independently.

Of course the distinctions depend on the perceptual, that is not the point. You are saying distinctions are perceived because something is there - I get it you see. That does not mean the distinctions are not applied by you.

If one man is color blind is his distinction of an objective reality correct or is yours?

Consciousness is not a special cause of any distinction. If it were then distinction-making would be the exact opposite of arbitrary, i.e, there would be a specific, inherent nature of every distinction(including consciousness).

If all distinctions are perceived, it follows that all distinctions are applied by and through consciousness.

You may not like it but that is irreducible logic.

Answer this question; when sharpening a rock, at what point is it no longer a rock and becomes a knife? By the way, it is both a rock and a knife in the exact same place at the exact same time.

My consciousness is one of the causes of the distinctions(things) I am aware of.

How does consciousness cause distinctions?

B1: This is the first time you used the word "exact."


Jup; Actually I used it before, but I used it then because apparently you think it's alright to mix scientific terms with philosophical ones.

You are right you did use it before. My apologies.You used it once before and only once for location and this has been part of the communication breakdown.

I thought you meant things could not overlap.

As far as mixing words, yes, since it is after all arbitrary. If you understand what I say the method does not matter.

B1: If you throw two rocks in a pond, they form two waves. Can these two waves exist in the same exact location at the same time?

Why yes, they can. They may appear to be one wave but who says so? If one wave becomes indistinguishable from the other, you can say there is only one wave and this would be correct. You would also be correct in saying there are two waves existing in the same "exact" location.

Jup; If only one wave appears then there is only one wave. You can't go beyond the appearance and know whether the one wave is really two waves or vice versa.

I think I understand what you are saying now - I wish you had used the word "exact" in your initial premise. You left it open ended by using the word "place' without a qualifier. Many of my examples were demonstrating two things overlapping and you said nothing, why? to create intentional confusion? Clouding and confusing the issue, this is wisdom?

Regardless, to the example.

1) Are you saying the only way to determine how many waves resulted in two rocks being thrown into a pond is good eyes or appearances?
2) If you knew there were two rocks thrown in the water, you would know conceptually there were two waves, would you not?

There is more to perception than the five sense.
You would know, by and through logic, there are two waves existing in the "exact" same location.

A=A in all cases, including conceptually. Anything can only be itself in all possible worlds. That is not the same at all as a thing can be in only one place or it cannot exist as another thing. A=A means a thing must be itself as defined. It has nothing to do with being in only one place. Being in one place is merely one distinction or property of many that we use to define a thing.

Water can be alluded to as a gas, solid or liquid - its still water.A=A means a clear definition conceptually - not empirically.

The very fact that you observe something means you alter its location anyway.

b1: You are claiming the body and mind cannot be separated and all at the same time they are. If two things cannot be in the same place at the same time, how then does the mind and body exist in the same place at the same time as you said earlier in this thread?


Jup; You're projecting your meaning onto what I'm saying.

You cannot assume others can fill in all the blanks for you.

This is what you said:

The body and mind are as inseparable as the ocean's surface and the waves upon it, like all things.

You put the body and mind together and wonder why I would assume you meant what you yourself wrote? If it is not what you meant then be more precise.

If I wrote" as inseparable as the ocean's surface and the waves upon it", would you be projecting by thinking I meant the waves and ocean were inseparable?

Either you are playing hop scotch with your positions or you are not being clear at all.

You seem to be OK with English so I can only assume this to be the case.

The body and the mind are inseparable in the context of the All, not of a third finite entity. The All cannot be a location or space in the same sense as a finite thing, even a very big finite thing like the observable cosmos.

So the body and mind are inseparable. You write it again and wonder why I assume you meant what you wrote.


You say they are separate but not really, maybe sometimes in the context of the all but we know that is not true because things are infinite when they are not in one place, sometimes things are infinite, but not really, they can be in only one place, things that is, except when the context of the all is brought up, then they are one, most times but not always.


Hope I cogitated what you meant there.




Leyla:

B1: First must be dispelled the myth that the infinite is finite because it can be conceptualized.



Leyla: I think you've been talking to yourself all this time, B1. Like, who said/argued that??

You did for one.

Once one surrenders to the inconceivable, it opens a very bright door. Immense light that reveals "everything."


Lol

I get that a lot. Usually from people who have a problem that is hard to pronounce.

PS: You know what a B1 is in Oz, right?

I called your boyfriend gay - he hit me with his purse.

:)

[Beingof1]

Diebert, Leyla or Jupiviv,

Anyone ready - "the infinite is just to vast to conceptualize."

Or are you going to keep on saying " I can fit the entire universe between my ears"?

[Diebert van Rhijn]

Anyone ready - "the infinite is just to vast to conceptualize."

But we can agree it's not too vast to say at least that about it with some intention for dealing truth?

Nature is utterly simple and complex, bound and boundless, unmeasurable brief as well seemingly for ever. Yet still all wisdom, all knowledge tries to say something about it.

Can we move on now?

[Diebert van Rhijn]

Of course I'm also saying the mind is not a thing or an organ.

If the definition of a thing is anything with boundaries, then the mind is a thing.

As I already said, the mind is evaluated by its content. The content does not have clear boundaries and as such I cannot see it as a locatable "thing". We can assert a boundary like "brain" and then it's a thing. But then we're talking about brains and not about minds.

The way I'd describe it would be a complex and compound, purely function driven phenomenon that arises from an immense web of interactions.

This can be said of all things, and yet things other than the mind, like rocks, do have locations.

And other things do not, like the Northern winds, climate change or salt water. Or the Internet even when it might be showing right now on your rectangle screen.

[Diebert van Rhijn]

I wouldn't call it self-centered to discern that this phenomena of the seemingly non-locatable mind happens to seemingly arise from the neural processes of the brain. Jup gave examples of evidence that backs this observance. Logical deduction plays an important role here. I think the key is to make sure we don't treat the mind or the brain as anything special or different in the grand scheme of causation.

But it might be tempting to put each and every concept and process as located inside our brain. That doesn't mean for example that the world actually is inside the brain, only the representations and our awareness of it. But again, it doesn't solve the problem because what we see as our brain remains a representation as well. In that sense our mind, awareness and conceptualizing are special cases (or variations on one special case, that of consciousness). Or at least it has some special property which only sentient beings seem to possess. In the larger scheme likely not that special but special enough to make note of and struggle with the philosophical aspects.

My reasoning centers around the content of our mind, our thinking and since that's mostly formed by representations of things which have their origins outside the body, like the "world", it's justified seeing the mind as a whole, as a collection, in a direct manner originating outside the body in ever-changing ways.

Now the interconnectivity of things would suggest we can claim this for every object but obviously we need to locate it in the way it makes most sense, where it's most practical or scientific to place it in our spacial awareness. For the mind, my point is that the most sensible, practical and over time perhaps even most scientific view would be to locate the mind not inside the body but inside all defining interactions which do not have a fixed location. In my estimation that would work best and will help any coherent study of the mind tremendously.

[Leyla Shen]

You're proposing the M-theory of all the disciplines of science.

[jupiviv]

If any thing has no special fixed cause, it then is distinct by and through arbitrary choice.

You are positing the "arbitrary choice" as the special cause here, so you are contradicting yourself.

Of course the distinctions depend on the perceptual, that is not the point. You are saying distinctions are perceived because something is there - I get it you see. That does not mean the distinctions are not applied by you.

You can't apply a distinction to itself. Any thing, including consciousness, is a distinction.

If one man is color blind is his distinction of an objective reality correct or is yours?

We're not talking about mere empirical reality here.

Answer this question; when sharpening a rock, at what point is it no longer a rock and becomes a knife?

At whatever point it appears to be a knife. This in turn depends on our definition of a knife, which in turn may depend on what we want to use it for and so on.

By the way, it is both a rock and a knife in the exact same place at the exact same time.

Just because things can possess different properties doesn't mean that two things can exist at the same time. The properties are subsumed under the larger thing, but even the properties themselves don't co-exist with each other at the exact same position.

I thought you meant things could not overlap.

Different things can't overlap *completely*, or else they wouldn't be different.

1) Are you saying the only way to determine how many waves resulted in two rocks being thrown into a pond is good eyes or appearances?

It's illogical to say that a thing is different to what it appears(empirically or otherwise).

2) If you knew there were two rocks thrown in the water, you would know conceptually there were two waves, would you not?

There is no absolute connection between throwing rocks in water and waves therein, so no.

You put the body and mind together and wonder why I would assume you meant what you yourself wrote? If it is not what you meant then be more precise.

It's not my problem if you interpret what I say only to suit your position. Things are *inherently* neither separate, nor united, nor both, nor neither, nor any quality that can be attributed to finite things. You were making the point that the mind is permanent and is the sole cause of distinctions, which would be inherent existence. Things are "inherently" the same only in relation to the infinite, in that they are necessarily equal parts of it. But this is not similarity in finite terms. This similarity lies both in their finite similarities and their finite differences.

[jupiviv]

Of course I'm also saying the mind is not a thing or an organ.

If the definition of a thing is anything with boundaries, then the mind is a thing.

As I already said, the mind is evaluated by its content. The content does not have clear boundaries and as such I cannot see it as a locatable "thing". We can assert a boundary like "brain" and then it's a thing. But then we're talking about brains and not about minds.

Nothing, not even a block of wood, ultimately has any inherent boundaries, but neither does it ultimately lack them. The conscious mind can be reduced to certain sections of the brain. Science hasn't yet come up with clearly defined boundaries of the mind within the brain, but it could in the future.

The way I'd describe it would be a complex and compound, purely function driven phenomenon that arises from an immense web of interactions.

This can be said of all things, and yet things other than the mind, like rocks, do have locations.

And other things do not, like the Northern winds, climate change or salt water. Or the Internet even when it might be showing right now on your rectangle screen.

The 4 things you mentioned are all located on earth. It's possible to be even more specific than that, e.g, climate change in the Urals, or the salt water of the Indian Ocean, or the BSNL servers, etc.

[Russell Parr]

Now the interconnectivity of things would suggest we can claim this for every object but obviously we need to locate it in the way it makes most sense, where it's most practical or scientific to place it in our spacial awareness. For the mind, my point is that the most sensible, practical and over time perhaps even most scientific view would be to locate the mind not inside the body but inside all defining interactions which do not have a fixed location. In my estimation that would work best and will help any coherent study of the mind tremendously.

I can certainly appreciate this viewpoint from a philosophical perspective, but to me it doesn't suit the purposes of science very well. In the observable causal chain of events, the evidence says that the mind is a phenomena that arises from the human brain, and its interactions with its environment.

Philosophy and science are two different ways of explaining reality, and work on different levels. While I would say that the philosophical perspective is more important, as it is deeper and more fundamental, it doesn't suit the purposes that science is designated for.

[Diebert van Rhijn]

The conscious mind can be reduced to certain sections of the brain. Science hasn't yet come up with clearly defined boundaries of the mind within the brain, but it could in the future.

If we take for example "thought" or "thinking" as one way to talk about the mind, then these cannot be reduced, to my knowing at least, to "certain brain sections". Anyway, you do admit science has not clearly defined the boundaries so you cannot really say if it really can be reduced to certain brain sections. Those statements conflict.

The 4 things you mentioned are all located on earth. It's possible to be even more specific than that, e.g, climate change in the Urals, or the salt water of the Indian Ocean, or the BSNL servers, etc.

Well I could say instead of "mind" for example: the smell of roses. I'm sure there's a brain section that could be found to have the activity corresponding to that sensation. But this is already reducing the term "mind" to something else.

[Diebert van Rhijn]

In the observable causal chain of events, the evidence says that the mind is a phenomena that arises from the human brain, and its interactions with its environment.

All phenomena appear to arise from the human brain and its interactions with its environment. From the observable causal chain of events one could make the argument the mind (as thing, as coherent complex of processing) and therefore perhaps any advanced notion of self arises mostly from interactions like communicative and social processes. Of course as particular thoughts and sensations go one could indeed detect brain patterns. But I'm talking about mind, the coherent superset, the "collective conscious and unconscious processes" and "spirit of consciousness".

Of course this all points to the need to define "mind" more precisely. After some browsing I noticed one from Dan Siegel: "A core aspect of the mind can be defined as an embodied and relational process that regulates the flow of energy and information". Perhaps with this we could argue that there are several minds in our body (like the "heart brain") and outside it, like any web of information and energy we are functioning inside of.

[jupiviv]

If we take for example "thought" or "thinking" as one way to talk about the mind, then these cannot be reduced, to my knowing at least, to "certain brain sections".

From what we do know about the brain, they probably work in a similar manner to the software on a computer.

All phenomena appear to arise from the human brain and its interactions with its environment.

"All phenomena" except the human brain and its environment...? This idea that the mind somehow literally manufactures the things it experiences basically boils down to solipsism, which is a kind of nihilism. You shouldn't get ensnared in it or else you may end up like Dennis! :)

But I'm talking about mind, the coherent superset, the "collective conscious and unconscious processes" and "spirit of consciousness".

Well any thing is necessarily a collective of its constituent things(parts). Why should the mind-collective be special?

"A core aspect of the mind can be defined as an embodied and relational process that regulates the flow of energy and information".

That's a fairly accurate description, except perhaps the "energy" part.

[Diebert van Rhijn]

From what we do know about the brain, they probably work in a similar manner to the software on a computer.

A better way of seeing this: we just have build machines based on some piss poor idea of how our reasoning works. But a computer has no mind in any sense of the word as far as I know.

"All phenomena" except the human brain and its environment...? This idea that the mind somehow literally manufactures the things it experiences basically boils down to solipsism, which is a kind of nihilism. You shouldn't get ensnared in it or else you may end up like Dennis! :)

Fair enough. But you'd agree that our brain seems responsible for generating our experiences. That is not solipsism, it's literary what you have been telling me. It becomes solipsism if I start doubting the existence of anything but the reality of my own mind. What I have been positioning is basically the uncertainty of the nature or at least location of "one's own mind" (a bit like the quantum wavefunctions that way). Almost the reverse of metaphysical solipsism! Keep paying attention, please.

But I'm talking about mind, the coherent superset, the "collective conscious and unconscious processes" and "spirit of consciousness".

Well any thing is necessarily a collective of its constituent things(parts). Why should the mind-collective be special?

It's not that special, just not as body-centric like a collection of brain functions in terms of location-ability.

[jupiviv]

A better way of seeing this: we just have build machines based on some piss poor idea of how our reasoning works. But a computer has no mind in any sense of the word as far as I know.

I'm not necessarily saying that conscious reasoning is exactly the same or even analogous to data processing in a computer, just that their mechanics seem to be similar. Both the software on computers and the thoughts in the brain seem to be electricity. The difference between them as far as we currently know is that the former acts upon metal and the latter upon a gelatinous blob.

Fair enough. But you'd agree that our brain seems responsible for generating our experiences. That is not solipsism, it's literary what you have been telling me.

I'm sorry, I thought you were implying that the brain and its environment aren't phenomena.

Well any thing is necessarily a collective of its constituent things(parts). Why should the mind-collective be special?

It's not that special, just not as body-centric like a collection of brain functions in terms of location-ability.

You will have to back up this statement with some evidence that the core functions of the mind occur outside the body.

[Beingof1]

Jupiviv:

B1:If any thing has no special fixed cause, it then is distinct by and through arbitrary choice.


Jup: You are positing the "arbitrary choice" as the special cause here, so you are contradicting yourself.

An explanation is not a contradiction if it answers the question.

If you say there are no special causes that are discernible to make up a thing, it is then a distinct thing by what?

B1: Of course the distinctions depend on the perceptual, that is not the point. You are saying distinctions are perceived because something is there - I get it you see. That does not mean the distinctions are not applied by you.


Jup: You can't apply a distinction to itself. Any thing, including consciousness, is a distinction.

You just did in the above sentence. You said "Any thing, including consciousness, is a distinction."

How do you know that?

B1:If one man is color blind is his distinction of an objective reality correct or is yours?


Jup:We're not talking about mere empirical reality here.

Now I am sure - you do not have a position.

I was trying to understand your position only to find out you don`t have one.

This is your position:
1) Things are distinct by no special causes.
2) We cannot discern causes of distinction.
3) We cannot apply distinctions to things.

Conclusion - things do not have distinctions and are themselves indistinct.

You just collapsed the universe as we know it and it has no things that appear, ever.

B1: Answer this question; when sharpening a rock, at what point is it no longer a rock and becomes a knife? By the way, it is both a rock and a knife in the exact same place at the exact same time.


Jup: At whatever point it appears to be a knife. This in turn depends on our definition of a knife, which in turn may depend on what we want to use it for and so on.

But its not arbitrary?

And two things, such as a rock and a knife, do not exist in the same place at the same time because???

I get it, only you get to draw distinctions and nobody else.

Im am skipping the rest of your post except your last statement.

It's not my problem if you interpret what I say only to suit your position.

You do not have a position. Can anyone make heads or tails out of what you are saying?

This is how you summed the subject up:

Things are *inherently* neither separate, nor united, nor both, nor neither, nor any quality that can be attributed to finite things. You were making the point that the mind is permanent and is the sole cause of distinctions, which would be inherent existence. Things are "inherently" the same only in relation to the infinite, in that they are necessarily equal parts of it. But this is not similarity in finite terms. This similarity lies both in their finite similarities and their finite differences.

This is the result of believing you can conceptualize the infinite. If Anyone can translate this, I would be happy to continue.



I am done debating you dude until you have a clear position. You are not making any sense at all and have no position. You, at this point, need to ask questions because you have no idea when you are contradicting yourself and are still not being honest by snipping my posts.

I appreciate you being on the path to truth but you have just got started. I do not mean to humiliate you but you need to know where you are at.








Diebert:

B1: Anyone ready - "the infinite is just to vast to conceptualize."


Diebert: But we can agree it's not too vast to say at least that about it with some intention for dealing truth?

Yes, we can say that it requires the infinite to make up who I am.

Nature is utterly simple and complex, bound and boundless, unmeasurable brief as well seemingly for ever. Yet still all wisdom, all knowledge tries to say something about it.

Yes brother D-man.

Can we move on now?

In order to allow our mind and state of being to be in sync, the first realization is that nothing exists but perceptual observations.

Things do not have complete, absolute and independent reality in themselves.

The universe and the mind are one and the same.

Any objections?

[Diebert van Rhijn]

In order to allow our mind and state of being to be in sync, the first realization is that nothing exists but perceptual observations. Things do not have complete, absolute and independent reality in themselves. The universe and the mind are one and the same. Any objections?

Should it even be questioned at this stage? What made you think that these fundamentals would be disagreed upon? Sometimes I think you bring disagreement where there's none.

But I do want to add that your "perceptual observation" turns out to be conceptual in nature. Perhaps in "henid" form at times like half finished thoughts and impressions but underneath them one can discover a lot of half-baked meaning and association. Observations are never "pure", they are relative and person-bound in how they work out in the way we respond to those observations. It's still unclear to me why you don't want to call such observation another form of conceptualization. They go hand in hand: assigning meaning and r̶e̶a̶l̶i̶t̶y̶ existence.

[Leyla Shen]

B1: First must be dispelled the myth that the infinite is finite because it can be conceptualized.

Leyla: I think you've been talking to yourself all this time, B1. Like, who said/argued that??

B1: You did for one.

I did not, and I insist that you either retract or prove this statement.

Once one surrenders to the inconceivable, it opens a very bright door. Immense light that reveals "everything."

L: Lol

B1: I get that a lot. Usually from people who have a problem that is hard to pronounce.

Namely?

I called your boyfriend gay - he hit me with his purse.

:)

And after I so vehemently objected, suggesting he use my bag for better impact; it has the kitchen sink in it.

At least then you'd be seeing stars rather than blinding, bright lights.

(:

[Leyla Shen]

Should it even be questioned at this stage? What made you think that these fundamentals would be disagreed upon? Sometimes I think you bring disagreement where there's none.

For the record, I disagree.

A perceptual observation cannot exist without something to be perceptually observed; so, it's incorrect and/or inaccurate (who knows which applies to you two at this stage!) to say that "nothing but perceptual observation exists" since there are at least two things that exist—the observer and the observed.

[Diebert van Rhijn]

A perceptual observation cannot exist without something to be perceptually observed

How so? The content of my dreams does clearly not exist beyond my dream, being just a process of perception. Same with hallucinations and honest mistakes.

That said, for me the word "existing" does not mean that something is happening somewhere in a material reality which is then neutrally, passively witnessed. "Hey, there goes existence!". Something defined comes into existence with the process of observation, through subjectivity and ultimately because of causality. To differentiate between truth and false, real and unreal, between dreaming and waking is a whole different process, not just a matter of perception or even a simple matter of something "being" there or not.

[jupiviv]

Jupiviv:

B1:If any thing has no special fixed cause, it then is distinct by and through arbitrary choice.


Jup: You are positing the "arbitrary choice" as the special cause here, so you are contradicting yourself.

An explanation is not a contradiction if it answers the question.

If you say there are no special causes that are discernible to make up a thing, it is then a distinct thing by what?

A "special" cause in this case is one that is said to be the only cause of a thing in spite of there being other causes. For example, saying that any thing is caused only by the mind, or saying that wood is caused only by oxygen.

B1: Of course the distinctions depend on the perceptual, that is not the point. You are saying distinctions are perceived because something is there - I get it you see. That does not mean the distinctions are not applied by you.


Jup: You can't apply a distinction to itself. Any thing, including consciousness, is a distinction.

You just did in the above sentence. You said "Any thing, including consciousness, is a distinction."

Identification is not application in the literal sense. You're saying that the quality that distinguishes one thing from another is created by the mind and then "applied" on them from without, which is clearly not true.

This is your position:
1) Things are distinct by no special causes.
2) We cannot discern causes of distinction.
3) We cannot apply distinctions to things.

Conclusion - things do not have distinctions and are themselves indistinct.

You just collapsed the universe as we know it and it has no things that appear, ever.

Why do you insist on putting words in my mouth?

B1: Answer this question; when sharpening a rock, at what point is it no longer a rock and becomes a knife? By the way, it is both a rock and a knife in the exact same place at the exact same time.


Jup: At whatever point it appears to be a knife. This in turn depends on our definition of a knife, which in turn may depend on what we want to use it for and so on.

But its not arbitrary?

Not if "arbitrary" means caused wholly by a conscious mind.

And two things, such as a rock and a knife, do not exist in the same place at the same time because???

They may exist in the same approximate location, but that's not the same as existing in an *identical* location. Both London and Amsterdam exist in Europe, or the Solar System, but they still don't exist in an identical location. If you have a rock that looks like a knife because it is edged, then the quality of being a rock in itself doesn't make it a knife. It is the edge in this case that qualifies it as a knife. But the edge of the rock is not equally distributed throughout the rock, so its position is not identical with that of the rock.

I am done debating you dude until you have a clear position. You are not making any sense at all and have no position. You, at this point, need to ask questions because you have no idea when you are contradicting yourself and are still not being honest by snipping my posts.

I appreciate you being on the path to truth but you have just got started. I do not mean to humiliate you but you need to know where you are at.

You see, this is what I don't understand about you people. You speak about the infinite like great sages as long as you don't receive any serious criticism, but you turn into prima donnas the instant anyone starts pointing out where you're wrong.

[jupiviv]

A perceptual observation cannot exist without something to be perceptually observed

How so? The content of my dreams does clearly not exist beyond my dream, being just a process of perception. Same with hallucinations and honest mistakes.

That's not actually true. Dreams seem to draw heavily from memories, which are not by themselves part of the dreams.

[Diebert van Rhijn]

A perceptual observation cannot exist without something to be perceptually observed

How so? The content of my dreams does clearly not exist beyond my dream, being just a process of perception. Same with hallucinations and honest mistakes.

That's not actually true. Dreams seem to draw heavily from memories, which are not by themselves part of the dreams.

Then in that case some supposed collection of "memories" are the existent something to be "perceptually observed"? And nothing exists but true and false, exact and random memories "without having complete, absolute, independent reality in themselves" (Beingof1). What difference would that make? There's a signal and interpretation, object and subject but neither one on itself contains "existence" somewhere hidden in its back pocket. Some things are determined to exist and others not but these concepts remain mutable although not subject to free will.

[Leyla Shen]

[drum roll] ... and I argue that the difference between the notion a) “nothing exists but perceptual observations” and, b) “perceptual observation cannot exist without something to be perceptually observed” is:

What can be further assumed from (a) but not from (b) is a world strictly caused by perceptual observation—i.e., perceptual observation as causality*, rather than perceptual observation as a manifestation of causality, which is why you have to qualify the assertion with this:

There's a signal and interpretation, object and subject but neither one on itself contains "existence" somewhere hidden in its back pocket. Some things are determined to exist and others not but these concepts remain mutable although not subject to free will.

*This aspect of sentient existence, however, accounts for the fact that every observation is, at the same time as being an effect, also a cause; both a passive component of existence and an affective, active one. The person who hallucinates, for instance, at the time of experiencing that hallucination is both an effect and a cause of and on his environment.

[Diebert van Rhijn]

[drum roll] ... and I argue that the difference between the notion a) “nothing exists but perceptual observations” and, b) “perceptual observation cannot exist without something to be perceptually observed” is ... a world strictly caused by perceptual observation—i.e., perceptual observation as causality*, rather than perceptual observation as a manifestation of causality

Causality dictates that even "perceptual observations" would not be without causes. Here you sneak in the expression "strictly caused by" which you then challenge. Hmmm. When does something exists, where does this existence happen, where are the boundaries to that process? Existence: a presence, an entity, something arising ("existere"), something standing out (outstanding! excellent). Or any ontological flavor one desires to present. And yes, it is very much as well a problem of language, simply because its conceptualization is related to all perceptual observation.

[Cahoot]

If what you see is sane, are you sane?
If what you see is crazy, are you crazy?
If what you see is God …

There are archetypal shapesin the reflections.